Haasaria, J. — This matter has been placed before this Bench on a reference by a learned single Judge on the question as to when finding relating to a tenant being a defaulter or the premises being needed bona fide by a landlord (two pleas normally taken in eviction suits ) can be interfered by this Court in exercise of its power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This reference has been made keeping in view the decision of this Court in LPA 11/76 (Ramesh Chandra vs. Deo Narain, disposed of on 30.10.79 ) in which it was held that in a matter governed by the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, hereinafter the Act, the party aggrieved by the appellate decision cannot approach this Court in second appeal. The result of the decision has been that the aggrieved persons have been approaching this Court under section 115 of the Code. Finding that there are a large number of such cases in which a question very often arises whether the finding relating to the aforesaid aspects arrived at by the first appellate Court can be disturbed by this Court sitting in revision, the present reference has been made. 2. Section 115 of the Cede is in the following terms : "115. Revision - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except -where - (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the .party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Explanation - In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding." 3. We have heard lengthy arguments on the aforesaid question, large number of case laws have been placed before us. Before we advert to the decisions, we may point out that under the provisions of the Act a Court derives jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction on the ground, inter alia, that the tenant is a defaulter or the house is required bona fide by the landlord for his own occupation or for repair or rebuilding, etc. The findings are thus related to the jurisdiction of the Court in passing a decree for eviction. 4. With the aforesaid in our mind, we may examine the relevant case law.We may begin with the decision of the Privy Council in Joychand vs. Kamalaksha, AIR 1949 PC 239. In that case, some relief was sought under the provisions of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. That Act could have been invoked if a loan taken by the party was not a commercial loan. The trial Court took the view that the loan was a commercial loan and such a loan did not come within the purview of the Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The original order was passed by Subordinate Judge against whose order a revision was preferred before the High Court. The learned Judge hearing the case disagreed with the view taken by the trial Court and came to the conclusion that the loan was not a commercial loan. On such a view being taken, the order of the Subordinate Judge was set aside and the case was sent back to him to hear the parties on merits. Against the decision of the High Court, the matter was taken to the Privy Council and one of the points urged was that approach to the High Court being under section 115, it was not open to it to reverse the finding relating to the question whether the loan was a commercial or not. Against the decision of the High Court, the matter was taken to the Privy Council and one of the points urged was that approach to the High Court being under section 115, it was not open to it to reverse the finding relating to the question whether the loan was a commercial or not. In examining this question, it was observed by the Privy Council that a subordinate Court does not act illegally or with material irregularity because it decides a question wrongly - the matter being within its competence. It was pointed out that the Court has jurisdiction to decide a case wrongly or rightly. Being of this view, it was held that clause (c) of section 115 of the Code would not apply to such a case. It was, however, pointed out that the trial Court, after deciding the question that the loan was a commercial loan, refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law and it was open to the High Court to interfere in revision under sub-section (b) of section 115. In this connection, it was stated as below: "That although error in a decision of a subordinate court does not by itself involve that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revi­sion under sub-section (c), nevertheless if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate court's exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under sub-section (a) or sub-section (b), and sub-section, (c) can be ignored". 5. Reference of two Indian decisions was thereafter made and it was stated that one of the cases dealt with where a subordinate Court by its own erroneous decision (erroneous in view of the High Court) in the one case on a point of limitation and in the other on the question of res judicata vested itself with the jurisdiction which in law it did not possess, and the High Court had power in such cases, even while exercising revisional jurisdiction to prevent such a result. As to the case at hand, it was pointed out that the High Court upon the view which it took that the loan was not a commercial loan, had power to interfere in revision under sub-section (b) of section 115. 6. As to the case at hand, it was pointed out that the High Court upon the view which it took that the loan was not a commercial loan, had power to interfere in revision under sub-section (b) of section 115. 6. The aforesaid would show that even a finding of fact can be interfered by a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction if the finding is relatable to the question of exercise of jurisdiction not vested in it or failure to exercise jurisdiction so vested. 7. In Choube Jagadish Prasad vs Ganga Parsad, AIR 1959 SC 492 , the landlord first approached the House Allotment Officer for fixation of a "reasonable annual rent". Against the order of the House Allotment Officer a suit was filed before the Additional Civil Judge. The suit would have been maintainable had the premises been newly constructed. The Subordinate Court took the view that the suit was not barred and increased the rent from Rs. 40/- fixed by the House Allotment Officer to Rs. 55 8.0. Against this decree of the trial Court, the respondent preferred revision under section 115 of the Code. The High Court took the view that the accommoda­tion in the occupation of the tenant was not a part of the new construction and, therefore, no suit lay at the instance of the landlord to get the agreed rent enhanced. The revision was therefore allowed and the suit was dismissed. This order was assailed before the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed. In this connection, what pointed out in para 21 is relevant:- "The only question to be decided in the instant case is whether the High Court had correctly interfered under section 115 C.P.C. with the order of the Civil Judge. As we held above, at the instance of the landlord, a suit was only main­tainable if it was based on inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of construction of the accom­modation and if the Court only decided that fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in 76 Ind. Appl. 131 : (AIR J949 PC 239) (supra). Appl. 131 : (AIR J949 PC 239) (supra). The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946........." It shows that if exercise of jurisdiction depends on a question of fact and that fact is wrongly decided by a subordinate Court, it would be within the power of the High Court to re-examine the related question of fact which becomes the jurisdictional fact even in exercise of its power under section 115 of the Code. 8. We may now come to a Constitution Bencn decision in Roshan Lal vs. Iswardass, AIR 1962 SC 646 . This case dealt with the ques­tion of jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to take action under section 7A of the Delhi-Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. This depended on the question with the floor of the house in question was newly constructed or not. This is what the Apex Court stated in this regard in para 17 of the judgment. "It is clear from the orders of the Rent Controller and of the District Judge in appeal that the question whether the second floor was newly constructed or not was really a question of fact, though undoubtedly jurisdictional fact on which depended the power of the Rent Controller and or of the District Judge under S. 7A. If the Rent Controller had wrongly decided the fact and assumed jurisdiction where be had none, the matter would be open to reconsideration in revision". 9. Reference may now be made to Manindra Land Building Corporation vs. Bhutnath, AIR 1964 SC 1336 . The question there was whether the Hich Court could interfere under section 115 of the Code with the order of the subordinate Court allowing an application for setting aside abatement on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause to condone the delay. 9. Reference may now be made to Manindra Land Building Corporation vs. Bhutnath, AIR 1964 SC 1336 . The question there was whether the Hich Court could interfere under section 115 of the Code with the order of the subordinate Court allowing an application for setting aside abatement on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause to condone the delay. It was pointed out in para 8 that the proposition that an erroneous decision on a question of limitation involves the question of jurisdiction applies to cases in which the law definitely ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to try certain dispute between the parties and not to cases in which there is no such ouster of jurisdiction under the provisions of any law, but where it is left to the Court itself to determine certain matters as a result of which determination, the Court has to pass certain order and may, if necessary proceed to decide the dispute between the parties. The distinction between the two classes of cases was held to be that in one case the Court decides the question of law pertaining to jurisdiction whereas in the other case it decides a question within its jurisdiction. It was also pointed out that the question whether there was sufficient cause or was not exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court and it could decide it rightly or wrongly. 10. It would be useful to note the decision in Abbasbhai vs. Gulamnabi, AIR 1964 SC 1341 , whether the question was regarding the readiness of the tenant to pay standard rent. It was pointed out that as no question of jurisdiction arose in such a case, the High Court could not interfere in its revisional capacity with the finding arrived at by the subordinate Court. 11. We may now refer to another Constitution Bench decision in Pandorang vs. Maruti, AIR 1966 SC 153 . Therein the question related to construction of a decree. As to this, it was pointed out that it was difficult to see as to how the High Court was justified in reversing this finding under section 115 of the Code. 11. We may now refer to another Constitution Bench decision in Pandorang vs. Maruti, AIR 1966 SC 153 . Therein the question related to construction of a decree. As to this, it was pointed out that it was difficult to see as to how the High Court was justified in reversing this finding under section 115 of the Code. It was accepted that the construction of a decree like the construction of a document of title is no doubt a point of law, but then it was held that the High Court could not exercise its revisional power because the question decided by the subordinate Court had no relation with the jurisdiction of the Court. It was stated in Sher Singh vs. Joint Director of Consolidation, AIR 1978 SC 1341 , also that it is not open to the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under section 115, to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. 12. The decision in M. L. Sethi vs. R. P. Kapoor, AIR 1972 SC 2379 may now be noted. In this judgment, Mathew, J., after pointing out to the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Arisminic Ltd t. Foreign Compensation Commission, 1969 (2) AC 147, stated that the word "jurisdiction" is a verbal cast of many colours and then stated as below in para 11 : “The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords, in the above case would show the extent to which 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we moved away from the traditional concept of "juris­diction". The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction of the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal", "imposing an unwarranted condit­ion” "or addressing themselves to a wrong question". This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction of the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal", "imposing an unwarranted condit­ion” "or addressing themselves to a wrong question". The majority opinion in the case leaves a Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow. In the end it can only be a vague judgment (See W.W.R. Wade, "Constitutional and Admi­nistrative Aspects of the Anisminic case", Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 85, 1969 p. 198). Why it is that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision y It is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the Court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court." 13. In this connection, it may be of some interest to refer to the observations of Lord Denning in Pearlman vs. Governors of Harrow School, 1979 (1) All ER 365, wherein it was observed that if the High Court chooses to interfere, it can formulate its decision by saying "The Court below had no jurisdiction to decide the point wrongly as it did" and if it chooses not to interfere it could say "the Court had jurisdiction to decide wrongly as it did". Confronted with this situation, Lord Denning suggested that th« High Court should be given jurisdiction to control pro­ceedings of lower courts and tribunals when they go wrong in law. 14. Confronted with this situation, Lord Denning suggested that th« High Court should be given jurisdiction to control pro­ceedings of lower courts and tribunals when they go wrong in law. 14. The case of Raj Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy, AIR 1980 SC 1253, pointed out that "appeal" and "revision" are expre­ssions of common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction between "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction" is well-known though not well-defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Ordinarily again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometime be exercised without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping the tribu­nals subordinate to the revising tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well-defined principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to statute is always included in appellate jurisdiction, but not vice versa. It was, however, pointed out that the question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be determined in each case with reference to the language employed by the statute. 15. The statute which had come up for consideration in Ran­gaswamy (supra) was Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, section 25 of which provided that the High Court may on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority, call for and may examine the records of the appellate authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or reversed or remedied for reconsideration it may pass orders accordingly. It was recognised that this power was larger than the one conferred by section 115 ; even so, it was not so wide as to make the High Court "a second Court of first appeal". It was recognised that this power was larger than the one conferred by section 115 ; even so, it was not so wide as to make the High Court "a second Court of first appeal". In that case, the question posed before the High Court was whether the concurrent finding based on evidence that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation was one which could not be touched by the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under the Act in question. It was held that merely because a mixed question of law and fact arose, the same was not sufficient to warrant exercise of revisional power.. It must be shown before interference is made in such a case that there was a taint of unreasonableness resulting in miscarriage of justice. 16. The question examined in Manick Chandra vs. Debdas, AIR 1986 SC 446 , was whether a petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code was correctly disposed of by the subordinate Court. The defendants' case was that they had no knowledge of the decree prior to a certain date. The trial Court arrived at the finding on the evidence that the defendants were not served with suit summons and, therefore, an exparte decree was liable to be set aside. The High Court interfered with the order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It was pointed out that in doing so the High Court treated the application as if filed before it as first appeal and not an application invoking its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code. This was, however, done because the contention advanced was that the 'petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code was barred by limitation. It was pointed out that though the plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries a proceeding, for, finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In such a situation, the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law and fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. In such a situation, the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law and fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the subordinate Court had decided such a collateral question rightly, it was however pointed out that the High Court cannot function as a court of first appeal so far as assessment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own finding for those arrived at by the subordinate Court unless any such finding is not in any way borne out by the evidence on the record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand the same would result in grave injustice to a party. (See para 5). In this para, it was also observed that exercise of revisional power which is different in nature, quality and extent, from appellate jurisdiction is confined to question of jurisdiction' It was held that while in first appeal, the Court is free to decide all questions of law and fact which arises; in the case of exercise of revisional juries diction, the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re assess the evidence on record and substitute its own finding on fact for those of the subordinate Court. 17. Learned counsel of both the sides also referred in this context to Vinode Kumar vs. Surjit Katr, AIR 1987 SC 2179 . This case also dealt with the question whether the respondent bona fide required the premises for residential use. The case of the respondent was rejected by the authorities below. However, in revision, the High Court took a different view. The inference by the High Court was upheld because both the authorities below had based their findings on conjectures and surmises and secondly because they had lost sight of relevant pieces of evidence which had not been controverted. It was pointed out that for a finding to be binding on a High Court the same must be rendered with reference to facts and not on the basis of non-existent materials and baseless assumption. 18. It was pointed out that for a finding to be binding on a High Court the same must be rendered with reference to facts and not on the basis of non-existent materials and baseless assumption. 18. So far as the Apex Court is concerned, reference may lastly be made to Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chandra, 1988 (3) SCC 131 , in which the revisional power conferred on the High Court had allowed it to satisfy itself as to the "legality and propriety" of the order which was regarded as having given much wider power than section 115 of the Code. On the language of the revisional jurisdiction conferred, it was pointed out that in appropriate cases, the High Court could re-appraise the evidence when the findings of the appellate Court are found to be infirm in law. 19. Reference may now be made to some decisions of this Court. Shri Lahiri drew our attention to Pratima Prova vs. Arun Kumar, 1985(1) GLR (NOC) 1, wherein it was pointed out that where according to law a tenant is to be adjudged as a defaulter, but the Court below holds otherwise and declines to order eviction and thereby declines to exercise jurisdiction to evict the tenant, the question may be said to be connected with the jurisdiction. Such an erroneous decision may tantamount to non-exercise of jurisdiction permitting a High Court to interfere with the same in exercise of its power under section 115 of the Code. 20. In Manas Kamal vs. Satyendra Ch., 1982(1) GLR 653, it was pointed out that though the revisional power is limited and the High Court cannot interfere even if the Court below commits error of law or fact, the High Court can certainly lay its hand upon any decision if in reaching the same the subordinate Court commits a clear breach of provision of law or a procedural error. 21. Shri Das referred to Ambika Moral vs. Tamijul Hoque, 1983(2) GLR 189, in which it was pointed cut that the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can interfere where the impugned order is not "areal decision" but a "purported decision”, or if the findings are based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or the finding is patently wrong so much so that no person instructed in law could have reached the conclusion and in consequence thereof there has been a failure of justice. 22. The above bird's eye view of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court would show that interference in a case of the present nature is admissible where the finding relating to default by a tenant or the landlord needing the premises bona fide, or finding on any other plea available to a landlord under the Act, is palpably wrong being based on surmises and conjectures, or in disregard of relevant pieces of evidence which have not been controverted. This is so because any wrong decision in these matters would either result in failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law or in exercising a jurisdiction not vested by law. It may be stated that in such cases, the requirement of the proviso to section 115(1) of the Code would also be satisfied inasmuch as if the finding would have been in favour of the petitioner, the same would have finally disposed of the suit and also because any wrong finding in a case of the present nature would occasion failure of justice. 23. The question posed by the learned single Judge is answered accordingly. Sangma, J — I agree.