JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - The Insurance Company has filed this appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award of the' Claims Tribunal awarding a sum of Rs. 2.80,000/-as compensation with interest at the rate of twelve per cent from the date of the claim application. It was directed that the amount should be paid by the Insurance Company. 2. The accident occurred on 7-8-1994. Claim application has been filed by the widowed mother of the deceased, his dependent brother and unmarried sister. At the time of death, the deceased was a Central Government employee drawing a salary of about Rs.. 1,900/-. It is alleged that while the deceased was going on bi-cycle, the bus bearing registration number OR-04-9545 came from opposite direction in a high speed and suddenly swerved hitting the deceased who fell down and ran over the deceased. The deceased expired while being taken to the hospita1. 3. The owner of the vehicle did not contest in spite of notice and was set ex parte. The Insurance Company which had been impleaded as an opposite party in the claim application from the inception appeared and filed written statement denying the allegations made in the claim case. 4. The Claims Tribunal found that the accident took place on account of the negligent driving of the driver of the bus. It further found that the brother and sister who had filed the claim application along with the widowed mother of the deceased were dependents. Keeping in view the future prospects of the deceased, the Tribunal assessed Rs. 2.400/- to be the monthly income of the deceased and deducting one-third for his own expenses, and applying the multiplier of 13, came to the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 2.49,600/- was payable on that score.Adding Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 15,000/towards loss of consortium, the Tribunal rounded the compensation to a sum of Rs. 2,80,000/- and directed that the said amount should be paid by the Insurance Compay as the vehicle had been validly insured. 5. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that since death was of the son, the question of payment of Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of consortium does not arise and the Tribunal has awarded the said amount mechanically without application of mind. 5. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that since death was of the son, the question of payment of Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of consortium does not arise and the Tribunal has awarded the said amount mechanically without application of mind. Similarly, it has been contended that at the time of death, the income of the deceased was about Rs. 1,900/- and the Tribunal could not have assessed the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 2.400/- by considering the future prospects. It is further submitted that since the widowed mother of the deceased (one of the claimants) was about 47 years old. the multiplier of 13 appears to be on higher side. 6. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant-respondents submitted that the appeal at the instance of the Insurance Company challenging the quantum of compensation is not maintainable. He has furtper submitted that future prospects in life can be taken into account while considering the average contribution and the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not excessively high. 7. Prima facie, it appears that there was some amount of non-application of mind on the part of the Tribunal, inasmuch as the question of paying any amount towards loss of consortium could not have arisen in the claim application in the case of death of a son, However, though no amount was payable, it appears that the Tribunal has not given any sum towards funeral expenses. The question as to whether the award is otherwise excessively high or not could have been considered but for the question of maintainability of the appeal itself. 8. In course of hearing, the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents had placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1997 (2) T.A. C. 1 (S.C.) (Narendra Kumar and Anr. v. Yarenissa and Ors. where after noticing the relevant provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Supreme Court observed as follows: 5. It is a different matter that claimants normally make the Insurance Company a party to the-claim application. That by itself cannot confer a right of appeal on the insurer. The grounds on which the insurer can deferred the action commenced against the tort-feasers are limited and unless one or more of those grounds is/are available the Insurance Company is not and cannot be treated as a party to the proce'edings. That by itself cannot confer a right of appeal on the insurer. The grounds on which the insurer can deferred the action commenced against the tort-feasers are limited and unless one or more of those grounds is/are available the Insurance Company is not and cannot be treated as a party to the proce'edings. That is the reason why the Courts have consistently taken the view that the Insurance Company has no right to prefer an appeal u/s llO-D of the Act unless it has been impleaded and allowed to defend on one or more of the around set out in Sub-section (2) of Section 96 or in the situation envisaged by Sub-section (2-A) of section llO-C of the Act. 1f then the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle file a joint appeal and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the insurer had no right to prefer an appeal u/s 110-D of the Act because none of the defences mentioned in sub.section (2) of Section 96 were available to him nor had a situation of the type envisaged by Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110. C arisen, it cannot be permitted to file an appeal whether on its own or in association with one or more of the tort-feasers against whom the award is made which the insurer is liable to answer as if a judgment-debtor. 9. The learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, submitted that in the aforesaid case of the Supreme Court, the owner had also contested the claim application and was in fact, one of the co-appellants in the appeal before the High Court. It was, therefore, submitted that the principle laid down in paragraph-5 of the aforesaid decision, which has been quoted. is not applicable to a case where the owner remains ex parte. In support of such contention, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court reported in 73 (1992) C.L. T. 815 (The New India Assuraace Company Lid. v. Sri Braja Kishore Sutar and Anr.). It is also submitted that similar view has been expressed in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 42 (1976) C.L. T, 648 (F.B.) (National Insurance Company v. Magikhaia Das (after him) Mst. Laxmi Dibya and Ors.}. 10. v. Sri Braja Kishore Sutar and Anr.). It is also submitted that similar view has been expressed in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 42 (1976) C.L. T, 648 (F.B.) (National Insurance Company v. Magikhaia Das (after him) Mst. Laxmi Dibya and Ors.}. 10. At the time of conclusion of hearing, I was of the tentative view that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1997(2) T.A.C. l(S.C.) may not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the present case the owner had remained ex parte and I was inclined to hold, following the Full Bench decision (42 (1976) C.L. T. 648 (F.B.)) as well as the decision reported in 73(1992) C.L.T.815 (supra), that the appeal may be maintainable. However, it transpires from the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, that even where the owner was ex parte unless specific order is passed in terms of Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company does not have the right to contest on merit and consequently, no right to file appeal challenging the award on merit. After noticing the relevant provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Supreme Court observed in the said decision as follows: 4. It clearly shows that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the section -are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed. the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence,on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defence. It is true that the claimants themselves had joined Respondent No. I. Insurance Company in the claim petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability on the Insurance Company on account of the contract of the insurance. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions mentioned in Section 170. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions mentioned in Section 170. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts of the preaent case, Respondent-I. Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal. 11. In fact, the said decision has been followed by me in several other decisions including one reported in 86 (1998) C.L.T. 429 (Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Bainsidhar Mallick and Anr.. In view of the clear decision of the Supreme Court, there is no alternative but to hold that an appeal at the instance of the Insurance Company challenging on merits of a case is not maintainable unless the, Insurance Company has been permitted to, contest the case on merits by a specific reasoned order, as envisaged in Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another it is not necessary to refer to other decisions of the various High Courts upon which reliance has been. placed by the counsel for c1aimant- respond en ts, 10. F or the aforesaid reasons, I find that there is no merit in this appeal, which is liable to be dismissed. 12. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed Final Result : Dismissed