JUDGMENT - Deshmukh D.K., J.:---This Civil Revision Application has been filed challenging the order dated 29th March, 1997 passed by the 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur in M.J.C. No. 47/1993. It appears that there were some disputes among the members of the family who are joined as party in this application either as petitioner or as respondents. The parties arrived at an agreement to refer their disputes to an Arbitrator, who was a sole arbitrator. The sole arbitrator made an Award dated 28th August, 1992 and filed it in Court which was registered as S.C.S. No. 998/92. It further appears that in S.C.S. No. 998/92, all the parties, who were parties to the arbitration agreement, filed consent terms and on the basis of those consent terms, the award was made Rule of the Court by order dated 28th December, 1992. An application was filed by applicants Nos. 1 to 5 before the Civil Judge, S.D., Nagpur, which was registered as M.J.C. No. 47 of 1993. This application was filed under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside of award followed by decree. It further appears that out of the five applicants, who filed the application on 8th March, 1993 viz., present non-applicants Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were transposed as non-applicants subsequently in M.J.C. No. 47 of 1993. 2. It further appears that in M.J.C. No. 47/1993, on 18-12-1996, the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application for setting aside the decree on the ground that the decree is nullity. This application is marked at Ex. 188 on the record of the trial. It was prayed by that application that the Court should set aside the impugned decree passed pursuant to the order dated 18-12-1996 Court as null and void, illegal and invalid. This application at Ex. 188 was decided by the 4th Jt. C.J., S.D. Nagpur by order dated 29th March, 1997. The learned trial Court allowed the application at Ex. 188, set aside the decree and the entire proceedings in M.J.C. No. 47 of 1993 were disposed of. It is this order dated 29-3-1997 which is impugned in this C.R.A. 3. This application at Ex. 188 was decided by the 4th Jt. C.J., S.D. Nagpur by order dated 29th March, 1997. The learned trial Court allowed the application at Ex. 188, set aside the decree and the entire proceedings in M.J.C. No. 47 of 1993 were disposed of. It is this order dated 29-3-1997 which is impugned in this C.R.A. 3. Shri Bhangade, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant urged that the Court has observed that the order setting aside the decree has been passed by the Court on an application filed under sections 30 and 31 of the Arbitration Act. In the submission of Shri Bhangade, however, in proceedings initiated under sections 30 and 31 of the Arbitration Act, a decree passed by the Court cannot be set aside. He further submitted that the Court has set aside the decree by holding that the filing of the Award was not proper and that the Court did not give notice to the parties before passing decree. In the submission of Shri Bhangade, however, the Arbitrator is competent to file an Award in the Court on his own motion. He further submitted that it was not necessary for the Court to issue any notice to the parties because the parties on their own appeared before the Court and filed the consent terms. Shri Bhangde, for the proposition that an Award can be filed by the arbitrator himself suo motu, relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of M.P. v. Saith and Skeleton Pvt. Ltd.,)1, 1972(1) S.C.C. 702 . Shri. Bhangade also relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat)2, reported in 1969(2) S.C.R. 432, in support of this submission that as the parties on their own have appeared before the Court and filed consent terms the decree does not become invalid because the Court has not issued notice to the parties. 4. Shri. Aney, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner urged before me that it is clear from the provisions of section 14 of the Arbitration Act that a Court gets jurisdiction to pass a decree on an award only after issuance of notice to the parties. He submitted that a party may appear in the Court and waive the service of notice. However, the Court has to issue a notice to the parties. He submitted that a party may appear in the Court and waive the service of notice. However, the Court has to issue a notice to the parties. By appearance of the parties, what is dispensed with is service of the notice on the parties. Shri Aney submitted that in order to get the jurisdiction to make the award, the Court has to issue a notice and without issuance of notice, the Court does not get the jurisdiction to make the Award. In support of this proposition, he relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Nilkanth v. Kashinath)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 666. He also relied on certain other judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court holding that a decree cannot be passed by the Court without issuing notice to the parties. 5. Shri Sen, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 6 to 8, relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Patel Motibhai Naranbhaiv. D.M. Patel)4, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 997 submitted that an Arbitrator cannot file an Award on hiw own unless he is called upon to do so by parties to the Arbitration Agreement. He further stated relying on the same judgment that an Arbitration cannot file an application for passing a decree in terms of the arbitration award and as in the present case as said application has been filed by the arbitrator, decree passed pursuant to the application is void. 6. Now taking up the submission of Shri Bhangde that it was not necessary for the Court to give any notice to the parties to the agreement before passing the decree, it is clear from the perusal of the provisions of section 14 of the Act that after an Award is filed before the Court, the Court is to give notice to the parties of the filing of the Award. It is to be emphasised here that notice that is to be given by the Court to the parties is that the award has been filed in the Court. It is clear that the purpose behind issuing this notice is to inform the persons, parties to the arbitration agreement that the Award has been filed in the Court and that the Court may pass a decree pursuant to that Award. It is clear that the purpose behind issuing this notice is to inform the persons, parties to the arbitration agreement that the Award has been filed in the Court and that the Court may pass a decree pursuant to that Award. Thus, the notice issued by the Court also entitled the parties to the Arbitration agreement to lodge their objections to the Award. The objections to the Award can be lodged by the parties because under section 15 of the Arbitration Act, the Court has power to modify the Award. Under section 16 of the Act, the Court can also remand the award back to the Arbitrator. It is thus clear that the notice that is required by the Court to be issued under section 14 of the Act is a notice to be issued by the Court to give an opportunity to the parties to the arbitration agreement to raise their objection if they want to do so. If that be the purpose for which the notice is required to be issued, then in case the parties to arbitration agreement of their own volition appear before the Court then the necessity of issuance of notice to the parties to the award must be held to have been dispensed with. The decree passed by the Court without issuing a notice as contemplated by section 14 of the Act may be rendered illegal and a nullity only in case a decree is passed pursuant to the award without issuing notice to any of the parties to the arbitration agreement who have not appeared before the Court and have not filed their consent before the Court for passing a decree pursuant to the Award. It is to be seen that if the purpose of giving notice is to grant an opportunity to the persons who are parties to the arbitration agreement to raise objection then notice stands dispensed with in case all parties to the agreement appear before the Court and request the Court for passing a decree or lodge objections to the Award. In my opinion, persons who have appeared before the Court, voluntarily without the Court issuing notice filed an application before the Court for passing a decree in terms of the award, cannot turn around and challenge the decree on the ground that the decree has been passed without issuing notice to the parties. In my opinion, persons who have appeared before the Court, voluntarily without the Court issuing notice filed an application before the Court for passing a decree in terms of the award, cannot turn around and challenge the decree on the ground that the decree has been passed without issuing notice to the parties. In case the persons who are entitled to the notice from the Court are already before the Court, I fail to see why the Court should issued notice to the same persons. The objections raised to the decree on this ground, in my opinion, has no substance. 7. Now taking up the next ground, according to Shri Bhangde, an application was filed under section 30 of the Act. According to Shri Bhangde, under section 30, an application can be filed raising objection to an Award and not to a decree. A perusal of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bahadur Singh's case shows that the Supreme Court has also held, "After a decree is passed on the Award, it is not open to the parties to the reference to raise any objection as to the validity of the award. As between them the decree conclusively determines that an Award is valid, nor the decree be pronounced as nullity on the ground that Award was invalid." From these observations, it is clear that an application under section 30 of the Act is not tenable for setting aside the decree passed pursuant to the Award. By making an application under section 30, a decree which is passed pursuant to an award cannot be challenged. 8. In so far as the submission of Shri Sen that because the Award has been filed and an application for Award has also been made by the Arbitrator in this case, and therefore, the decree passed pursuant to such an application is a nullity is concerned, it is true that the Supreme Court by its Judgment in Patel Motibhai Naranbhai's case, referred to above, holds so. However, as has been rightly pointed out by Shri Bhangde, the Supreme Court by its judgment in the case of State of M.P. v. Saith and Skeleton Pvt. Ltd. referred to above, has taken a contrary view and the Supreme Court has observed that "The High Court held that there is nothing in section 14(2) of the Act, which precludes the arbitrator from filing the Award suo motu and it is not correct to say that the Award should be filed only if the parties make a request to the arbitrator to file the Award or make an application to the Court for that purpose. We are in agreement with this view of the law, especially when there is no prohibition in the Act, particularly in section 14(2) against the arbitrator filing suo motu his Award in Court." 9. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. M/s. Saith and Skeleton Pvt. Ltd. is delivered by a Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court whereas the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Motibhai Naranbhai, is delivered by the Division of two judges of the Supreme Court. It is pertinent to note here that while delivering the Judgment in Patel Motibhai Naranbhai's case, the Supreme Court has not considered the Judgment of the larger Bench in the case of State of M.P. 10. In this view of the matter, therefore, the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. would be a binding precedent and, therefore, it is that judgment which has to be followed. In the face of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P., the submissions of Shri Sen has no substance. 11. In so far as the other aspects of the matter are concerned, though in the judgment of Patel Motibhai Naranbhai's case, the Supreme Court has referred to the fact that the arbitrator has made an application to the Court for a decree, perusal of the provisions of Arbitration Act shows that the Arbitration Act nowhere contemplates an application being made either by the Arbitrator or by a party to the Court for making an Award. All that is required to be done is an award is to be filed in the Court and then the Court issues notice to the parties, thus the process for making a decree pursuant to the award is set in motion by an Arbitrator filing the Award and no application is required to be filed. Therefore, whether an application for decree has been filed or not is of no consequence and, therefore, merely because the arbitrator had made an application Will, in my opinion, will not affect the validity of the decree. 11-A. Shri Dubey, the learned Counsel appearing for the non-applicants Nos. 3 to 5 submitted that their signatures were obtained on no objection by misrepresentation. It is pertinent to note here that the issue whether the signatures of the persons who have signed the no objection dated 18th December, 1992 were obtained by a fraud or misrepresentation by one of the parties to the agreement has not been raised by non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2 before the trial Court by their application and, therefore, the Court had not dealt with that aspect of the matter by its order. I have also been told that a civil suit has been filed challenging the decree on that ground which is pending before the Competent Court. Therefore, in my opinion it is not possible to go into that question in this proceeding. I, thus, conclude that the trial Court was not justified in setting aside the decree on an application filed under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act as has been done in the present case. 12. In the result, therefore, this revision application succeeds and is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of the prayer Clause (3). Insofar as the aspect of costs is concerned, the application was moved before the trial Court by non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2, therefore, the costs of this application shall be borne by the non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2. Certified copy expedited. 13. At this stage, the learned Counsel appearing for the non-applicants Nos. 3 to 5 request for staying of the Judgment delivered by this Court for a period of six weeks as he wants to challenge this judgment in the Apex Court. The request is opposed by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicants. However, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, non-applicants Nos. 3 to 5 request for staying of the Judgment delivered by this Court for a period of six weeks as he wants to challenge this judgment in the Apex Court. The request is opposed by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicants. However, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, non-applicants Nos. 3 to 5 would be entitled to the stay of the order that they are seeking. It is, therefore, directed that the Judgment delivered by this Court shall remain stayed for a period of six weeks from today. Revision application allowed. -----