D. N. Chowdhury, J. — This is an appeal under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Original Contempt Application No.60 of 1997 (1998 (2) GLJ 244). 2. In Civil Rule No.2577 of 1995, the High Court by an order dated 23.8.96, passed the following order: “The learned Govt Advocate points out that the petitioner was serving as contingent employee. Be that as it may, whatever nomenclature be given to the appointment, it does not behave the State Govt to withhold or delay payment of wages of its employee for the period his service has been taken by it. The respondents are directed to see that the petitioner is paid his salaries along with the current salary upto date by 30.9.96, failing which they shall be exposing themselves to Contempt proceedings. The petition stands finally disposed. I make no order as to cost.” Thereafter a contempt petition was presented before the High Court for alleged violation of the above order. A contempt proceeding was initiated and the present appellant as respondent No.l appeared and submitted his reply to the show cause notice. This Court on considering the facts and circumstances, made the following observation: “A perusal of the aforementioned order makes it abundantly clear that the payment of the entire amount claimed by the petitioner along with current salary up to 30th of September, 1996 was to be made before 30th of September, 1996. The payment having not been made, the petitioner was left with no other alternative but to approach this Court in contempt proceeding. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed stating therein that there was no deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent in not making the payment and that no funds were available at his disposal. It has further been stated in the affidavit that he has issued necessary instructions to another officer. This Court while disposing of the civil rule observed in so many words that the respondents would expose themselves to proceedings for contempt if the payment is not made by 30th September, 1996. In view of the wording of the order, the minimum which this Court expects, if no funds were available, the respondent No. 1 could have filed an application before this Court for extension of time. In view of the wording of the order, the minimum which this Court expects, if no funds were available, the respondent No. 1 could have filed an application before this Court for extension of time. It was orally explained before me during the course of arguments that payment has now been made on 27th of May, 1998 and that no funds were available earlier. No affidavit has been filed today which could throw light as to when funds were made available to respondent No.l for making payment to the petitioner. The present is one of the rare cases in which violation of the order of this Court is apparent on the face of it. However, since the payment has been made, this Court does not propose to award any punishment under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. However, the petitioner has suffered harassment at the hands of respondent and has incurred expenditure in approaching this Court. Above all his payment of such a huge amount of Rs. 63,000 has been withheld for one year and eight months. Simple interest on the amount withheld @ 12% per annum would come to more than Rs. 12,000 and, therefore, in my considered view, the petitioner is entitled another sum of Rs. 15,000 by way of interest and cost of the proceeding. The aforementioned amount be paid by respondents within a period of 15 days by way of a Bank draft in the name of the petitioner to be drawn at State Bank of India, Nalbari. The draft be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due. Copy of this order be given to the counsel for the parties forthwith on payment of copying charges. With the aforementioned observation and direction the contempt petition is disposed of.” In view of the fact the payment was already made the Court refused to award any punishment under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, at the same time to compensate the petitioner/opposite party for the harassment, the learned Single Judge awarded simple interest on the amount withheld at the rate of 12% per annum and accordingly awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000 by way of interest and directed the respondent/appellant to pay the said sum within fifteen days by way of a Bank Draft in the name of the petitioners/opposite party. 15,000 by way of interest and directed the respondent/appellant to pay the said sum within fifteen days by way of a Bank Draft in the name of the petitioners/opposite party. The appellant thereafter moved this Court by way of this appeal questioning the legality of the aforesaid order dated 29.5.98 passed by the learned Single Judge in the contempt original petition. 3. Before entering into the merits of the case, we wanted to examine the appeal under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and accordingly, was asked the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. BD Das, to address on that preliminary point. BD Das, the learned counsel for the appellant argued at length and in support of his contention submitted that section 19 of the Act, 1971 is to be given a wide interpretation and that an appeal is maintainable even against an order whereby no order for punishment is made. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant pointed to the following decisions of the Supreme Court (i) AIR 1978 SC1014, Purushotam Das Goel vs. Hon'ble Mr. Justice BS Dhillon. (ii) (1975) 3 SCC 535 , Barada Kanta Mishra vs. CJ Orissa; (iii) (1988) 3 SCC 26 , DN Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal. Apart from the above, the learned counsel for the appellant also referred to page 322 of the AIR Manual, 5th Volume, and to a treatise by Samaraditya Pal on the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and more particularly to page 246 of the treatise dealing with maintainability of appeal under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge awarding a sum of Rs. 15,0007- was wholly without jurisdiction and therefore, the counsel further submitted, the matter requires to be 8 examined by this Court. Thereafter Mr. Das submitted that the above order was passed without completion of service on other respondents though the appellant did not dispute that notice was served on him and he appeared before the Court and also submitted his explanation. 4. Appeal is a creature of statute and we are to proceed with the matter in that light taking into consideration the provisions of the statute. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for punishment for contempt of Courts which reads as follows: “12. 4. Appeal is a creature of statute and we are to proceed with the matter in that light taking into consideration the provisions of the statute. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for punishment for contempt of Courts which reads as follows: “12. Punishment for contempt of Court- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both : Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Explanation - An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that & sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. (4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any undertaking given to a Court, is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of each person : Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment, if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercise all due diligence to prevent its commission. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4) where the contempt of Court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer. Explanation - For the purpose of sub-section (4) and (5) — (a) 'Company' means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) 'Director' in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” Section 19 of the Act, 1971 provides for appeal which reads as follows : “19. Appeals - (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court: (b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that — (a) The execution of the punishment, or order appealed against be suspended; (b) It the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail, and (c) The appeal be heard notwithstanding that be appellant has not purged his contempt. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that — (a) The execution of the punishment, or order appealed against be suspended; (b) It the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail, and (c) The appeal be heard notwithstanding that be appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed, satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) In the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days (b) In the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of the order appeal against.” From the above provisions, it thus transpires that an appeal can be preferred as of right by a person who is punished for contempt of any order or decision of the High Court; and where such order or; decision is of a Single Judge, then the appeal shall be preferred before a Bench comprising of not less than two Judges and where the order or decision is that of a Division Bench, the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The power of contempt is exercised by the High Court by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India which states that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of a Court of record including the power to punish for contempt of the Court. From a plain reading or section 19 of the Act, 1971 indicates that appeal shall lie as of right from any order of decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. An appeal will thus lie against an order of punishment awarded in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 5. Mr. BD Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to the observation of the learned author, of the treatise on the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Mr. Samaraditya Pal, which also indicated two decisions of the Calcutta High Court - 85 CWN 1003, Ranjit Chatterjee vs. Ram Bandan Choubey, and 96 CWN 278, Ashoke Rai vs. Ashoke Arora. 5. Mr. BD Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to the observation of the learned author, of the treatise on the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Mr. Samaraditya Pal, which also indicated two decisions of the Calcutta High Court - 85 CWN 1003, Ranjit Chatterjee vs. Ram Bandan Choubey, and 96 CWN 278, Ashoke Rai vs. Ashoke Arora. We have gone through those passages referred by Shri BD Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, from the treatise of Mr. Samaraditya Pal, on the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which also referred to the aforesaid two decisions of the Calcutta High Court as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court in DN Taneja (supra)'s case. The author Mr. Samaraditya Pal, has referred to the decision in Ashoke Rai vs. Ashoke Arora & another, reported in 96 CWN 281. In the above noted case (Ashoke Rai's) the Calcutta High Court preferred the decision of the Supreme Court in Barada Kanta Mishra vs. Justice GK Mishra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1206 , to that in DN Taneja (supra) in entertaining the appeal of Ashoke Rai on the facts situation. In our considered opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in Barada Kanta (supra) cannot be read as a decision laying down the principle for entertaining an appeal in a case where the learned Single Judge refused to punish for contempt. Judgments are to be read in the light of the facts of the case. In this context, we may profitably rehearse the following of Lord Halsbury at the beginning of his famous speech in his judgment in Quinn vs. Leathemn, (1901) AC 495 at page 506. “Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The concrete decision is binding between the parties, it is only the abstract ratio decidendi, found on consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision has the binding force. It is the pronouncement of reason or principle upon which the Court decided a question which will be binding. The concrete decision is binding between the parties, it is only the abstract ratio decidendi, found on consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision has the binding force. It is the pronouncement of reason or principle upon which the Court decided a question which will be binding. A precedent is only an authority for what if actually decides and not what logically follows from it.” (Quinn vs. Leathemn (supra). A judgment is not to be acted upon as a precedent in support of a proposition of law that it did not decided. In Barada Kanta Mishra (supra), the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide the issue as to the maintainability of an appeal on a subject where the High Court did not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt, which portends from the following passage of the Supreme Court in Barada Kanta (supra): “We may point out that in the present case it is unnecessary to consider whether an appeal under section 19, sub-section (1) is confined only to a case whether the High Court after initiating a proceeding for contempt finds the alleged contemner guilty for contempt as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General or it extends also to a case where after initiating a proceeding for contempt the High Court finds that the alleged contemner is not guilty of contempt and exonerates him, or even if he is found guilty of contempt, declines to punish him. A question may well arise whether in a latter case the Advocate General or any other person who has, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, moved the High Court can appeal as of right against the order or decision of the High Court. That question does not arise in the present case and we need not, therefore, express any opinion upon it...” In DN Taneja (supra), the Supreme Court was seized with the issue that we are now confronted. The application of DN Taneja for contempt before the Punjab & Haryana High Court against the respondent was admitted and Rule nisi was issued. The respondent appeared in the case and opposed the same by filing an affidavit. The application of DN Taneja for contempt before the Punjab & Haryana High Court against the respondent was admitted and Rule nisi was issued. The respondent appeared in the case and opposed the same by filing an affidavit. The High Court after considering the application and affidavits and submissions made on behalf of the parties, took the view that there were circumstances to indicate that it was not a fit case in which the Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the Act. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application and discharged the Rule nisi. The Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal under section 19 (1) of the Act, 1971 as not maintainable and incompetent The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are cited below: “The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution which provides that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution . The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution . There can be no doubt that whenever a Court, Tribunal or authority is vested with a jurisdiction or decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in deciding the matter in favour or against a person. For example, a civil Court is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide a suit; the civil Court will have undoubtedly the jurisdiction to decree the suit or dismiss the same. But when a Court is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will involve the acting in that particular manner and in no other. Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt or not, the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the contemner, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied). 6. On our reading of the statute, more particularly section 19 of the Act, 1971 and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that an appeal shall lie against an order of the learned Single Judge in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction when it exercise the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it cannot be said that the High Court exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. That is also the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Mr. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it cannot be said that the High Court exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. That is also the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on the face of it, the learned Single Judge could not have awarded interest on the fact situation and, therefore, contended the learned counsel, the above order was wholly without jurisdiction. Mr. Das, the learned counsel, pointed out that the said order imposing interest, on the face of it, was an error apparent on the face of the record. But presently, we are only concerned about the maintainability of the appeal under the statute. In our opinion under the statute, no appeal lies in this situation. It is not that the appellant is without any remedy. He may either move before the learned Single Judge, if he is so advised by way of review petition, or otherwise, he may move the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India; but it is not for this Court to give him the remedy sought for in the absence of any provision under the statute. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal on the preliminary ground of maintainability.