J. R. VORA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel. This petition is filed by the petitioner stating that he is Sarpanch of Matar Gram Panchayat and he has received one notice from D. D. O. which is dated 24-3-1998 to the effect that the petitioner is prima facie involved in an offence of moral turpitude and that why the petitioner be not suspended. Against this notice, this petition is filed to quash and set aside the showcause notice. ( 2 ) MR. Barot, learned Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that F. I. R. , on the basis of which this notice is issued, does not disclose the name of the petitioner as an accused and that the F. I. R. does not disclose any offence of moral turpitude. It was urged that the petitioner is not at all involved in any criminal offence as alleged in the notice and, therefore, the notice was bad in law, violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner. On the other hand, Mr. Anant S. Dave urged that at this stage, the stage is interlocutory and it could not be said that any fundamental right of the petitioner is infringed so as to file this petition under art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) OBVIOUSLY and admittedly this petition is filed on a show-cause notice issued by the D. D. O. which is dated 24-3-1998. Notice states that the petitioner prima facie appears to have been involved in an offence of moral turpitude. The fact constituting the so-called offence is publishing a pamphlet which is also placed on record. It clearly appears that the stage is quite premature. The authority competent to take any action against the petitioner is still to take a decision whether the petitioner is involved in any criminal prosecution which can be labelled as an offence of moral turpitude. At this stage the D. D. O. has issued a show-cause notice giving an opportunity to the petitioner to explain certain circumstances. From this fact, it could not be said that the authority concerned has acted mala fide, because a final decision in the matter under Sec. 59 of the Panchayats Act is neither taken nor the action for suspension of the petitioner is guaranteed to be taken. From this fact, it could not be said that the authority concerned has acted mala fide, because a final decision in the matter under Sec. 59 of the Panchayats Act is neither taken nor the action for suspension of the petitioner is guaranteed to be taken. It may happen that on a representation of the petitioner, the show-cause notice may be filed by concerned authority. In this set of circumstances, there is no breach or violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner so as to entitle him to have the extraordinary remedy under art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied on a decision of this Court in the matter of Thakorbhai Bhagabhai v. D. D. O. , Surat , as reported in 1980 glr 966 wherein it has been held that in order to attract the provisions, the criminal proceedings involving moral turpitude must have been instituted against the officer of the Gram Panchayat. The other decision is in the matter of Narabhai Veljibhai chaudhary v. R. S. Vaghela , as reported in 1997 (1) GLR 599 wherein the court has observed that whether the act constitute an offence of moral turpitude there cannot be any straight-jacket formula. A Sarpanch cannot be suspended just on institution of criminal case and facts and circumstances had to be seen. In that case the suspension order was not justified. The third decision which was relied on behalf of the petitioner is in the matter of Ahmedabad Cotton Mfg. Co. LIMITED v. Union of india, as reported in 1977 GLR 714 , which is a decision of Full Bench wherein the objection raised that existing available remedy was not exhausted was negatived holding that the remedy provided was not efficacious and as, the action of insistence on complying with the Trade Notice is challenged is ex facie without jurisdiction and, therefore, the fetter created under Art. 226 (3) does not come into operation. ( 5 ) CONSIDERING the above mentioned three cases, it clearly appears that none of the cases helps the present petitioner. In two cases, i. e. , in the case of Narabhai v. Chaudhary (supra) and Thakorbhai Bhagabhai (supra) the Government had already passed the orders of suspension and in the third case, i. e. , in the Full Bench decision in the case of Ahmedabad Cotton Mfg. Co. In two cases, i. e. , in the case of Narabhai v. Chaudhary (supra) and Thakorbhai Bhagabhai (supra) the Government had already passed the orders of suspension and in the third case, i. e. , in the Full Bench decision in the case of Ahmedabad Cotton Mfg. Co. LIMITED (supra) it has been held that there was no alternative efficacious remedy. In the present case, only a showcause notice is issued. The authority competent to take action has yet to take any action. It is yet to be decided that a criminal proceeding against petitioner involving moral turpitude is instituted and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner under s. 59 (1) and (3) of the Panchayats Act, if such actions are taken against petitioner at all and therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere at this juncture under the extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Court is in complete agreement with the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 that the petition is premature. It cannot be said that merely because a show-cause notice is issued, any fundamental right is violated. Fundamental right is infringed when the competent authority takes action under the Panchayats Act and acts mala fide or allegedly acts against the statutory provisions. In this view of the matter, this petition stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. No order as to costs. ( 6 ) MR. Barot on behalf of the petitioner at this stage submits that this Court has granted ad interim relief in terms of para 7 (c) vide order dated 31-3-1998 and the same may be continued for some time. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this ad interim relief is extended till 10-7-1998. .