H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code arises from the order dated 16-4-1994 delivered in Ex. Case No. 2 of 1991 by the Munsiff and J. M. F. C. , Navalgund. The operative portion of the order reads as under. "case advanced on board. G. L. M. ADV. filed application under order 21, Rule 38, Section 51, Civil Procedure Code with P/f praying for issue of arrest warrant to judgment-debtor with police aid. Heard and same is allowed. Issue arrest warrant to judgment-debtor with police aid, returnable by 22-4-1994. Sd/-16-4-1994 munsiff, Navalgund". Feeling aggrieved from this order, the judgment-debtor has filed this present revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. ( 2 ) I have heard Sri S. A. Kalagi, learned Counsel for the revisionist-petitioner and Sri Umesh R. Malimath, learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 3 ) IT has been contended by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor, revisionist-petitioner that the Court below has acted illegally in passing the impugned order and in issuing directly the warrant of arrest without giving any opportunity or without giving any show-cause to the judgment-debtor. Learned Counsel contended that the order impugned has been passed in violation of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 37 and as such, it is without jurisdiction or at least it has been passed illegally in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court. Learned Counsel further contended that it is one of the well settled principles of law under the constitution as per Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with law. Learned counsel contended that here the order passed results in depriving the applicant of his fundamental right of liberty which cannot be deprived except in accordance with the provisions of rule. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent contended that as the decree was not being satisfied and the judgment-debtor has not complied with decree sought execution decree and there was an apprehension that he may run away, hence arrest warrant has been issued. Learned Counsel contended that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest. Learned Counsel further contended that no equity is in his favour as the judgment-debtor has not complied with the decree by paying the decretal amount. Learned Counsel contended that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest. Learned Counsel further contended that no equity is in his favour as the judgment-debtor has not complied with the decree by paying the decretal amount. He further contended subsequently the judgment-debtor-revisionist appeared before the Court and promised to deposit but he did not deposit, inspite of this Court's issuing an interim order for deposit of decretal amount, the judgment-debtor has not complied with the interim order of this Court. So revision petition may be dismissed. ( 5 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Right of life and liberty is a very important fundamental right conferred under Article 21 of the Constitution which clearly provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with law. Constitution mandates that rule of law is to prevail and a person can be deprived of his liberty only in accordance with the provisions of law and not otherwise. Further Order 21, Rule 37 and Rule 38 are material to be taken into consideration. It will be appropriate to quote in extenso Rules 37 and 38 of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code. "37. Discretionary power to permit judgment-debtor to show-cause against detention in prison. (1) Notwithstanding anything in these rules, where an application is for the execution of a decree for the payment of money by the arrest and detention in the civil prison of a judgment-debtor who is liable to be arrested in pursuance of the application, the Court shall, instead of issuing a warrant for his arrest, issue a notice calling upon him to appear before the Court on a day to be specified in the notice and show-cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison: provided that such notice shall not be necessary if the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that with the object or effect of delaying the execution of the decree, the judgment-debtor is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Where appearance is not made in obedience to the notice, the court shall, if the decree-holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. 38. Warrant for arrest to direct judgment-debtor to be brought up. (2) Where appearance is not made in obedience to the notice, the court shall, if the decree-holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. 38. Warrant for arrest to direct judgment-debtor to be brought up. Every warrant for the arrest of a judgment-debtor shall direct the officer entrusted with its execution to bring him before the Court with all convenient speed, unless the amount which he has been ordered to pay, together with the interest thereon and the cost (if any) to which he is liable, be sooner paid, or unless satisfaction of the decree be endorsed by the decree-holder on the warrant in the manner provided in sub-rule (3) of Rule 25 of this order". A reading of the Rule 37 and its proviso and Rule 38 reveals that, subject to what conditions the power to issue warrant of arrest has been provided under Rule 37. The exception created by the proviso to Rule 37 cannot be read as a general rule. It can be read as an exception to what is contained in the main clause. That for issuing directly the warrant without issuing the notice, the Court has first to satisfy, on the basis of an affidavit or other material which the decree-holder may produce to show, that the judgment-debtor on issuance of notice is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, then Court may issue the notice. This is a special condition. Issuance of show-cause notice and giving of opportunity to judgment-debtor as per Rule 37 (1) is a rule to be followed in the initial stage and not the issuance of warrant. The order impugned, as has been quoted by me, does not reveal at all that the Court below has satisfied itself about this preliminary conditions of issuance of warrant, that the judgment-debtor is likely to abscond or run away from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court itself. As no such thing appears from the order, the order cannot be said to have been issued in exercise of powers under the proviso or any exception nor stands covered by the proviso. Once this is not shown, general rule had to be followed. No such contention has been advanced by the decree-holder. As no such thing appears from the order, the order cannot be said to have been issued in exercise of powers under the proviso or any exception nor stands covered by the proviso. Once this is not shown, general rule had to be followed. No such contention has been advanced by the decree-holder. that the decree-holder had filed an application along with the affidavit alleging that there is likelihood of judgment- debtor running away from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court. When no such material is placed to the satisfaction of the Court, the duty of the execution Court as law ordains has been to issue a show-cause notice to the judgment-debtor to show-cause why in execution of decree he should not be arrested and put in civil prison. In this case, this mandatory provision of law has not been followed, really a good-bye has been given to it. It is tantamount to Court acting illegally as well as acting in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of warrant of arrest against the judgment-debtor. When the law provides certain power of jurisdiction and prescribes certain conditions, then authorities are not expected and it is not open to them to act in breach of those conditions. It means this warrant of arrest has been ordered to be issued not in accordance with law, but in breach of law. No authority is entitled to deprive a citizen his right of liberty except in accordance with the provisions of law. When I so observe, I find support for my view from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jolly George Varghese and Another v Bank of Cochin, and also from the decision of a Division bench of this Court in the case of K. Karunakar Shetty v Syndicate bank, Manipal. In paragraph 9 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of Jolly George Varghese, has been pleased to observe as under: "we concur with the Law Commission in its construction of Section 51, civil Procedure Code. It follows that quandum affluence and current indigence without intervening dishonesty or bad faith in liquidating his liability can be consistent with Article 11 of the covenant, because then no detention is permissible under Section 51, Civil Procedure Code". Justice Krishna Iyer further observes, "the simple default to discharge is not enough. It follows that quandum affluence and current indigence without intervening dishonesty or bad faith in liquidating his liability can be consistent with Article 11 of the covenant, because then no detention is permissible under Section 51, Civil Procedure Code". Justice Krishna Iyer further observes, "the simple default to discharge is not enough. There must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasises the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree". ( 6 ) IN such circumstances, it can well be held that as provided by Order 21, Rule 37, it was utmost necessary for the Court before issuing any warrant of arrest to have issued a show-cause notice to the judgment-debtor and judgment-debtor could have placed his position and reasons or defence and the Court could have examined whether really there was a dishonest intention on the part of the judgment-debtor to run away from discharge of his obligation or that he has the intention to discharge the obligation no doubt, but because of the vagaries of life and in case he has become penniless, whether he was to be ordered to be arrested keeping in view the human considerations. So not following of Rule 37 itself renders the order impugned to be illegal, null and void and without jurisdiction. The order of arrest being in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution as well can well be said to be without jurisdiction. The revision, as such, deserves to be allowed. The order dated 16-4-1994 is hereby set aside. It is kept open to the execution Court to follow the necessary provisions of law and issue fresh notice and decree-holder any other step as well but according to law. --- *** --- .