D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is landlords revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the bombay Rent Act, 1947. ( 2 ) THE brief facts are that the landlord-revisionist filed a suit against the tenantrespondent for eviction on several grounds, viz. , the tenant being in arrears of rent for more than six months and had failed to pay the same after service of notice of demand and that the tenant created nuisance in the suit premises. Another ground for eviction was that the landlord bona fide required accommodation in suit for his residence because he has been asked by notice from the Municipal Board that he has to demolish first and second floors in his occupation which has become dilapidated and are dangerous to the life of the inmates of the house and also the neighbours. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted on variety of grounds upon which number of issues were framed by the trial Court. ( 4 ) FIRST plea of tenant being in arrears of rent was more than six months was not pressed by the revisionist - landlord in the trial Court. Hence no decree for eviction could be passed on this ground. Plea of nuisance could not be established by the landlord. However, according to the trial Court the landlord established that the disputed tenanted accommodation was bona fide required by the landlord for his residence to accommodate himself and his family members. Comparative hardship was also considered by the trial Court which came to the conclusion that in case decree for eviction is refused the landlord will suffer hardship and the tenant has failed to adduce any evidence of hardship what to speak of greater hardship in case decree of eviction is passed against him. ( 5 ) THE matter was taken in appeal. The Appellate Court agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the disputed accommodation was bona fide required by the landlord for his personal use and occupation. Still the Appellate Court disagreed with the reasonings and findings recorded by the trial Court that the landlord will suffer greater hardship in case decree for eviction is refused. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed by the Appellate Court. Hence this revision. ( 6 ) I have heard Mr. Still the Appellate Court disagreed with the reasonings and findings recorded by the trial Court that the landlord will suffer greater hardship in case decree for eviction is refused. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed by the Appellate Court. Hence this revision. ( 6 ) I have heard Mr. P. B. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the revisionist and have considered the two judgments on record and also provisions of Sec. 13 (g) of the Bombay Rent Act and also sub-sec. (2) thereof. ( 7 ) SECTION 13 (1) (g) provides that the decree for eviction against tenant can be passed if the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. ( 8 ) SUB-SEC. (2) of Sec. 13 provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. It further provides that where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. ( 9 ) THUS, from the above provision the scheme of the statute is manifest. Initially, it is for the landlord to establish that he requires the premises let out to the tenant for his bona fide use. Word bona fide means not mala fide. It is for the landlord to establish that he requires premises reasonably for his bona fide use or for bona fide use of the members of his family. If bona fide requirement of the landlord is established then the Court has to compare relative hardship to the tenant and landlord and as contemplated in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act. While comparing such hardship the Court has to consider entire evidence adduced by the landlord and tenant and then it should form opinion as to who will suffer greater hardship in case decree for eviction is passed or is refused. (2) of Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act. While comparing such hardship the Court has to consider entire evidence adduced by the landlord and tenant and then it should form opinion as to who will suffer greater hardship in case decree for eviction is passed or is refused. Likewise, if the Court feels and is satisfied that no hardship will be caused either to the landlord or to the tenant by passing the decree for eviction in respect of a portion of the accommodation, decree for eviction shall be passed by the Court in respect of such portion of the tenanted accommodation. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, in the instant case before me, second alternative is not available because the landlord has not sought eviction from portion of the tenanted accommodation but he had sought eviction of the tenant from the entire accommodation. ( 11 ) NOW coming to the judgments of the two Courts below both the Courts have recorded findings from the evidence on record including notice issued by municipal Corporation for demolishing the first and second floor portion in occupation of the landlord. The report prepared by the Commissioner was also taken into consideration. The Appellate Court did not consider it proper to give preference to the report of the Commissioner over the opinion expressed by technical hand who issued notice, Exh. 46 from the Municipal Board. It also considered the admission of the defendant and also oral evidence adduced by the landlord. There is abundant evidence to show that the first floor and the second are in dilapidated condition and portion thereof fell down. According to the landlord his financial condition is not sound that it could be repaired. Leaving aside the financial condition of the landlord, when notice Exh. 46 was issued by the Municipal Board that the first and second floor have become dangerous for human life and are required to be pulled down, it seems obvious that these two portions are not repairable. Thus, if these portions are not repairable due to their dilapidated nature unsound financial condition of the landlord becomes totally irrelevant consideration. If he is required by the Municipal Board to demolish these portions he has to shift himself and his family members consisting of his two major sons and wife etc. , to some shelter. Thus, if these portions are not repairable due to their dilapidated nature unsound financial condition of the landlord becomes totally irrelevant consideration. If he is required by the Municipal Board to demolish these portions he has to shift himself and his family members consisting of his two major sons and wife etc. , to some shelter. In this view of the matter, the two courts below have rightly recorded findings that the disputed accommodation is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his personal use and for the use of his family members. This finding is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record hence it cannot be disturbed in this revision. ( 12 ) NOW comes the next stage, namely, comparison of hardship of landlord and tenant in case decree for eviction is passed or refused. For comparing the hardship of the tenant certain judgments have been cited by the lower Appellate Court in its judgment but I feel that the law laid down in those cases was not properly appreciated by the lower Appellate Court. ( 13 ) IT is true that it is the duty of the landlord to establish that in case decree for eviction is refused he will suffer greater hardship. Likewise it is for the tenant to establish that in case the decree for eviction is passed against him he will suffer greater hardship. The lower Appellate Court has observed that there is no reliable evidence on this aspect from the two sides. However, whatever evidence was on record it should have been considered by the lower Appellate Court but unfortunately it was not considered on proper lines. ( 14 ) THE observation of the lower Appellate Court that the tenant has no other alternative accommodation is not proper criteria for comparison of hardship of tenant. If a landlord owns a house and resides on first and second floor which have become dilapidated and he is required to carry out immediate demolition, he has to shift somewhere. It is in evidence from the landlord-revisionist that he has no other alternative accommodation either in his ownership or in his tenancy or in his occupation in any capacity. If a landlord owns a house and resides on first and second floor which have become dilapidated and he is required to carry out immediate demolition, he has to shift somewhere. It is in evidence from the landlord-revisionist that he has no other alternative accommodation either in his ownership or in his tenancy or in his occupation in any capacity. Thus, there is evidence of the landlord that if he has to demolish first and second floor necessarily he has to shift to the ground floor which consists of two rooms in the tenancy of the respondent. The landlord cannot be forced to go out in the market and search rented house for himself especially when he owns a house. He had let it out for meeting his financial stress or strains or for any other consideration but the situation at present is that he has to demolish the portion in his occupation and has to shift to the ground floor portion. ( 15 ) I am unable to appreciate the approach of the Appellate Court that it was for the landord to show and establish that the tenant has an alternative accommodation. On the other hand the correct approach is that it is for the tenant to convince the Court that he made efforts to search out alternative accommodation but he has failed to acquire so on lease, licence or otherwise. The suit was filed in the year 1985 and during these 13 years no attempt has been made by the tenant to search out alternative accommodation for himself. Even after passing of the decree by the trial Court the respondent did not make any efforts to find out suitable accommodation for himself. The observation of the Appellate Court that the landlord has failed to establish that the tenant can obtain an alternative accommodation at reasonable rate is also uncalled for. The Appellate Court was conscious of the fact that the rent rates have gone high during these years but this alone could be no consideration nor the landlord can be compelled to go on searching for an identical accommodation for the tenant on the same rent at which it was initially let out. Financial status of the tenant-respondent is sound. He was in a position to advance rs. 5,000/- as loan to the plaintiff-revisionist several years back. Financial status of the tenant-respondent is sound. He was in a position to advance rs. 5,000/- as loan to the plaintiff-revisionist several years back. A person having sound financial condition can easily find out suitable accommodation at reasonable rent for himself and in this process the help of the landlord is hardly required. Neither any statute nor any judgment of any Court imposes such obligation upon the landlord. ( 16 ) IT is in evidence that the family of the landlord consists of himself, his wife and two sons. It is also in evidence that one son of the landlord is not having sound health and is a patient of Tuberculosis. It is also in evidence that other son of the landlord is carrying out business in vegetable earning between Rs. 30. 00 to Rs. 40/ - per day. As such the landlord cannot be expected to remain aloof from his sons nor he can be expected to throw out his dependent and ailing son. If the landlord in these circumstances consisting four family members required two rooms for occupation which are in the tenancy of the respondent it can hardly be said that the requirement of the landlord is fanciful or unreasonable. In case these two rooms are not given to the landlord obviously he will suffer greater hardship and not the tenant. ( 17 ) THUS, within the ambit of Sec. 13 (2) the lower Appellate Court committed manifest error in not considering the evidence and circumstances of the case to conclude that no other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord and that with little efforts the tenant could have obtained reasonable accommodation for himself. Thus, the reversal of the decree of the trial Court by the Appellate Court seems to be wholly erroneous and unjustified. Revision in these circumstances succeeds. ( 18 ) REVISION is accordingly allowed. Judgment and decree of the lower Appellate court are set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The respondent is permitted to vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31-12-1998 subject to his filing usual undertaking in this Court within two weeks from today and further on his paying regularly every month on the third day of each English calendar month the mesne profits awarded by the trial Court. Costs of the revision shall be easy. .