JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—The plaintiff-appellant has come up in second appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts below dismissing his suit. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is that of Shri Surjit Singh, District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul Spiti Districts Camp at Kullu dated 10.12.1990 and that of the trial Court is of Shri J.L. Gupta, Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Kullu dated 26.6.1987. 2. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration that he was owner in possession of 10 Bighas 7 Biswas of land bearing Khasra Nos. 1705/176 and 1706/176 situated in Phati Chipni, Kothi Town, Tehsil Banjar District Kullu and that the revenue entries in the revenue papers showing the defendants as owners and himself as mortgagee were wrong. By way of consequential relief, he sought for issuance of a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. 3. It was pleaded by him that one Budhu, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had mortgaged the suit property with him in the year 1948 vide deed dated 7.10.1948 and had put him in possession of the property in terms of the mortgage deed and ever since he had been in possession. He further alleged that the defendants or their said predecessors did not get the mortgage redeemed within the time prescribed under the law and thus he became the owner by foreclosure on the expiry of the said term. He further alleged that a few days prior to the institution of the suit, the defendants threatened to oust him from the suit land and as such he was left with no alternative but to file a suit; hence the suit. 4. In their written statement, the defendants admitted that their predecessor late Shri Budhu had created the mortgage in respect of the suit property but denied that the possession of the property had also been delivered to the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that they were marginal farmers within the meaning of Section 2(i)(k) of the Himachal Pradesh Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). On and with effect from the appointed day the mortgage debt stood discharged and the mortgage redeemed and the interest, if any, of the plaintiff stood extinguished. 5. After the replication had been filed, the trial Court framed the following issues : "1. On and with effect from the appointed day the mortgage debt stood discharged and the mortgage redeemed and the interest, if any, of the plaintiff stood extinguished. 5. After the replication had been filed, the trial Court framed the following issues : "1. Whether Shri Sadhu the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants mortgaged with possession the suit land with the plaintiff on 4.10.1987? OPP. 2. If Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the plaintiff has become the owner in possession of the suit land by lapse of time? 3. Whether the defendant Nos. 1, 3 to 7 and Ghumphlu are/were marginal farmers under the definition of Himachal Pradesh Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1976? OPD. 4. Whether the entries showing the defendants as owner in possession of the suit land are wrong? OPP. 5. Relief." 6. Under Issue Nos. 1 and 2, it was found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land, though there was a mortgage, as was the admitted case of the parties. It was found that the liability of the defendants to pay the mortgage money was a debt within the meaning of the Act, and as such, it stood discharged on the appointed day, i.e., 13.11.1995. Consequently, the interest of the plaintiff as mortgagee ceased to exist. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. 5. The appeal before the lower Appellate Court having met the same fate, has given rise to this second appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have examined the records. 7. The only point, which has been argued at this stage by Shri Praneet Gupta, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is that since it was the pleaded case of the defendants-respondents that they were marginal farmers as defined under the Act, and since they themselves had made an application after they had filed the written statement, for making a reference to the Tahsildar to determine whether they were marginal farmers on the appointed day or not, it was incumbent on the trial Court to make a reference as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the said Act. In support of his submission, he has cited Prem Dass v. Kallu, ILR 1981 (H.R Section) 161. In particular, he has referred to para 2 of the said report at page 164. 8. In support of his submission, he has cited Prem Dass v. Kallu, ILR 1981 (H.R Section) 161. In particular, he has referred to para 2 of the said report at page 164. 8. On the other hand, Shri K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the defendants-respondents has invited the attention of this Court to para 4 of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court wherein, it is mentioned that on the very day of filing the reply by the plaintiff-appellant to the application of the defendant-respondents for making the reference to the Tahsildar as aforementioned, he made a statement, on oath, stating therein that they were marginal farmers. 9. A perusal of the record of the trial Court shows that at page 113 thereof, there is an application by the defendant-respondents for making a reference to the Tahsildar, Banjar dated 12.6.1987. At page 117 thereof, there is a statement of the Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant dated 16.6.1987 in Hindi. This, when translated into English reads as follows: "Stated that the ownership of the land according to possession is of the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 7 and Bhumplu on the appointed date (the date given in the Himachal Pradesh Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1976), and it was less that 12-1/4 Bighas. At that time, they were marginal farmers. But in the present case, the suit land was under mortgage with possession. In these circumstances, the defendants and Bhumplu were not marginal farmers within the meaning of the Act." On the same date, the Presiding Officer of the trial Court passed an order, which runs as follows : "Reply filed. Arguments heard. I find that issue No. 3 has been framed to find out as to whether the defendants are marginal farmers. Hence, a reference be made to Tahsildar to report after hearing both the parties as to whether......At this stage, learned Counsel for the plaintiff made a statement that though Ghumphlu and defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 7 were marginal farmers on the appointed date, they are not entitled to any benefit of the provisions of this Act. Hence, there is no need for making any reference to the Tahsildar. To come up on 24.6.1987 for arguments." 10. At the outset, it must be stated that the learned Presiding Officer of the trial Court completely mis-read the statement of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, referred to above. Hence, there is no need for making any reference to the Tahsildar. To come up on 24.6.1987 for arguments." 10. At the outset, it must be stated that the learned Presiding Officer of the trial Court completely mis-read the statement of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, referred to above. It was to the effect that although on the appointed day, the defendants-respondents were marginal farmers, but since the suit land was not mortgaged with possession, they did not come within the meaning of the said expression under the Act. A perusal of the order dated 16.6.1987 indicates that the trial Court has given a garbled version of the said statement, for reasons best known to him. Similarly, the lower Appellate Court in para 4 of the impugned judgment has fallen into grave error by holding that the said statement of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff dated 16.6,1987 before the trial Court was a concession that they were marginal farmers. This approach of both the Courts below, to say the least, is unjudicious and calls for adverse comments. The result has been that substantial justice has not been done in the case inter-parties. 11. Apart from the above, the manner in which the Presiding Officer of the Trial Court proceeded to record his order dated 16.6.1987, was against all judicial norms. He left one portion of the order relating to the application-cum-reply to the same for referring the matter to the Tehsildar, and also issued a direction that reference be made to the Tehsildar and report after hearing both the parties as to whether in mid-stream. Thereafter, he left that part of the order, including the sentence incomplete and hanging in mid-air. Immediately, he proceeded to record the statement of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff which, as indicated above, has been wholly misread both by him as well as by the learned lower appellate Court. Rather than amounting to a concession in toto, the said statement was a conditional concession and it nowhere precluded the making of a reference to the Tehsildar as provided under Section 2(2) of the Act and as directed to be made by the trial Court in his order mentioned above, which however, he left in midstream. 12. Rather than amounting to a concession in toto, the said statement was a conditional concession and it nowhere precluded the making of a reference to the Tehsildar as provided under Section 2(2) of the Act and as directed to be made by the trial Court in his order mentioned above, which however, he left in midstream. 12. In view of the above discussion, there is no option but to remand the case to the trial Court to decide the suit of the plaintiff-appellant in the light of the above observations and in accordance with law. While doing so, the Presiding Officer of the trial Court will consider the application of the defendant-respondents for making a reference to the Tehsildar as prayed therein, the reply thereto, as also the statement of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff dated 16.6.1987 which should be construed in proper perspective as a whole. Thereafter, applying his mind to the matter in issue, he shall proceed to pass an order as to whether a reference under Section 2(2) of the Act is required or not. He shall do so after giving an opportunity to both the parties to be heard as regards the same. It is made clear that the trial Court shall proceed on the pleadings as well as the evidence on record. 13. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the light of the observations/directions contained hereinabove. The parties through their learned Counsel are directed to appear before the Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Kullu on 4.5.1998. The records of both the Courts below be transmitted to the trial Court forthwith. Since the matter is an old one, the learned trial Court shall proceed to decide the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of the first appearance of the parties before him. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.