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1998 DIGILAW 384 (MP)

JAGDAMBA PRASAD v. UMASHANKAR RAJABHAU

1998-04-30

S.P.SRIVASTAVA

body1998
S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) -FEELING aggrieved by an order dated 14. 2. 1997 passed by the trial Court allowing an application filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 5 under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code for their impleadment in the suit as defendants, the plaintiff-applicant has now approached this court seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impunged order. ( 2 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-applicant as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondents and have also carefully perused the record. ( 3 ) THE facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this revision lie in a narrow compass. The plain tiff-applicant had filed a suit against Umashankar Pandey, the respondent No. 1, praying for a decree specific performance of an agreement of sale relating to the house in dispute and for the recovery of possession thereof. The plaintifff had based his claim on an agreement of sale executed by the defendant on 2. 7. 1967 in favour of the plaintiff through the mother, the natural guardian of the said defendant, who was minor at that time. The plaintiff had asserted that the house in dispute exclusively belonged to and had continued to be in possession of the defendant and it was recorded as such in the record maintained by the Nagar palika, Bhander. The plaintiff further asserted that the defendant had attained majority and the plaintiff was entitled for the specific performance of the agreement after payment of the balance consideration of Rs. 37,000/ -. It was claimed that the plaintiff had always been willing and ready to perform his part of the contract and the defendant inspite of notice had not executed the sale-deed for the property in dispute, hence the suit. ( 4 ) THE defendant contested the plaintiff's claim by filing a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. In his written statement the defendant Umashankar Pandey asserted that he had neither any right, title or interest in the property in dispute nor had ever been in possession thereof. It was claimed that the house in dispute belonged to Govind das Pandey who was the exclusive owner in possession thereof and had purchased the same through a registered sale-deed dated 14. 2. 1946 from Mahila Rani alias Munmun widow of Jankiprasad Tiwari. It was claimed that the house in dispute belonged to Govind das Pandey who was the exclusive owner in possession thereof and had purchased the same through a registered sale-deed dated 14. 2. 1946 from Mahila Rani alias Munmun widow of Jankiprasad Tiwari. After the death of Govind Das Pandey his right, title and interest had been inherited by his sons, Badri prasad, Ramswaroop, Harimohan and predeceased son Kishorisharan and at present the ownership of the said house stood in the name of Badriprasad, Ramswaroop and harimohan and pre-deceased son Kishorisharan and at present the ownership of the said house stood in the name of Badriprasad, ramswaroop and Harimohan sons of Govind das Pandey and his grand-son Shyamsharan pandey who is the son of Kishorisharan Pandey, the deceased son of Govind Das Pandey. In paragraph 11 of the written statement the defendant Umashankar Pandey had asserted, that since after the death of Govind Das pandey the right, title and interest of Govind das Pandey had developed on his sons and shyamsharan, the grand-son they all were necessary parties in the suit. But, since the plaintiff had not impleaded the aforesaid Badri prasad, Ramswaroop, Harimohan and shyamasharan as defendants in the suit it was liable to be dimissed outright on account of non-joinder of necessary parties. ( 5 ) ON 8. 1. 1997 Badriprasad, Ramswaroop Harimohan and Shyamasharan moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC seeking their impleadment as defendants in the suit claiming that they were not only proper but necessary parties but had not been impleaded in the suit. In their aforesaid application these persons asserted themselves to be the owners in possesion of the house in dispute and alleged that the agreement of sale relied upon by the plaintiff was a fictitious document and the house in dispute was in the ownership and possession of the defendants which fact was known to the plaintiff and it was necessary that they be impleaded as defendeants and they be permitted to file a written statement. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff contested the aforesaid application on various grounds denying the claim of the proposed respondent Nos. 2 to 5. ( 7 ) THE trial Court being of the view that respondent Nos. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff contested the aforesaid application on various grounds denying the claim of the proposed respondent Nos. 2 to 5. ( 7 ) THE trial Court being of the view that respondent Nos. 2 to 5 appeared to have an interest in the property in dispute and in the circumstances it was necessary to hear them, and held that it would be in the interest of justice to allow the application for impleadment as sounght for. Accordingly, the plaintiff was directed to implead the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 as defendants in the suit and supply them a copy of the plaint. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiff applicant has strenuously urged that considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, especially the nature of the suit and the basis of the claim of the plaintiff, as set out therein, the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 could not be deemed to be either proper or necessary parties in the suit and the application filed by them seeking their impleadment as defendants was liable to be rejected. It is further contended that the plaintiff being the dominus litis he could not be forced to implead the aforesaid persons and in case the Court came to the conclusion that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties it could be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, however have urged that the presence of the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 in the suit was necessary in order to secure a complete adjudication of the controversy and to pass an effective order. The contention is that a person could be added as a defendant even in a case where his presence is necessary to enable the Court to decide the matter effectively. It may be noticed, at this stage, that hon'able the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors. , while interpreting the implications arising under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC had clarified that the Court is empowered to join person whose presence is ncessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. , while interpreting the implications arising under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC had clarified that the Court is empowered to join person whose presence is ncessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. It was further observed that if the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of the existiing action, the court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplycity of actions. ( 10 ) THE question which arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the presence of the respondents could not be considered as necessary for the purpose of enabling the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. ( 11 ) THE Court in its decision in the case of Smt. Geeta Sharma v. State of M. P. , had observed:"the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, sub-rule (2), CPC are very clear, which cast a duty on the Court to ascertain as to who is the necessary or proper party to be impleaded in the suit for complete adjudication of the matter between the parties. If the Court finds that impleadment of a particular person was proper for ascertaining the claim put by the plaintiff, to adjudicate the matter finally it is the duty of the Court to implead such a person in such a suit, It is not material that what relief has been sought and against which person. No doubt, the plaintiff has a right to implead person she chooses against whom relief is claimed, but when the Court finds that by granting such relief interest of third person may by adversely affected, the Court may call upon such a person to be impleaded in the suit, so that at the time of granting relief to the plaintiff, interest of third person be also protected. In such a situation, provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, Sub-rule (2), cpc are to be invoked, which is the duty of the Court itself. The right conferred on the plaintiff under Order 1, rule 10, Sub-rule (2) CPC is subject to the discretion of the Court exercised in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1, cpc. In such a situation, provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, Sub-rule (2), cpc are to be invoked, which is the duty of the Court itself. The right conferred on the plaintiff under Order 1, rule 10, Sub-rule (2) CPC is subject to the discretion of the Court exercised in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1, cpc. Therefore, ultimately it is the duty of the Court, which is paramount, to ascertain, as to whether the person was a proper party for complete and effective adjudication of the suit. " ( 12 ) THIS Court had in another decision in the case of Kanchhedilal v. State o/m. P. , had clarified that if a third party claims to have interest in the litigation and his right might be adversely affected over a particular property, he is deemed to be a proper party in such a litigation and once the trial Court allowed to implead him as defendant the same could not be questioned, in view of the fact that it is for the trial Court to control the proceedings and to pass an effective and executable decree. ( 13 ) IN the presentcase what I find is that in his suit the plaintiff has founded his claim for a decree of specific performance on an agreement of sale which is said to have been executed by the defendant, Umashankar. The plaintiff has come up with a clear and categorical case that it was Umashankar Pandey, who was the exclusive owner in possession of the property in dispute and it is in this view of the matter that the relief claimed in the suit is directed against the said defendant only. In his defence the aforesaid Umashankar Pandey while denying the allegations of the plaintiff had clearly set up a plea of "jus tertii" in defence. He had set up the title in a third person. Such a plea in the facts and circumstances of the case, was available to the defendant. In case, he succeeded in establishing this plea it could result in the dismissal of the suit as no decree as claimed by the plaintiff seeking transfer of the proprietory interest in the property in suit could be passed in his favour as the defendant Umashankar could not be held entitled to transfer an interest in the property which he never had. ( 14 ) THIS Court in its decision in the case of Panna and Anr. v. Jeewanlal and Anr. , rendered by a Full Bench, and while affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Gananandrao v. Babulal and Ors. 5, had held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale in respect of a property against the defendant, some person who applies for being impleaded as a party to the suit on the ground that he had an interest in the property cannot be joined as a party under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC because if such a person was allowed to intervene in the suit as a party, the nature of the suit will change from a suit for specific performance of a contract to that of a suit for title. The Full bench clearly approved the view that the proper course in such circumstances is to institute another suitfor title, impleading parties to the suit in which the interveners had prayed for being joined as a party. ( 15 ) THE answer given by the Full Bench to the question referred to it was that the strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant (vendor)contending that they are the co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper party and are therefore not entitled to be joined as parties to the suit. ( 16 ) I am of the considered opinion that the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench of this court referred to hereinabove is squarely attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the trial Court has manifestly erred in allowing the application of the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 with a direction to the plaintiff to implead them as defendants in the suit merely on the ground they apperared to have some interest in the property in the suit and it was necessary to hear them. ( 17 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances as brought on record and my conclusion indicated hereinabove sufficient ground has been made out for interference. ( 18 ) IN the result, this revision succeeds. The impunged order passed by the trial court, so far as it relates to impleadment of respondent nos. ( 17 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances as brought on record and my conclusion indicated hereinabove sufficient ground has been made out for interference. ( 18 ) IN the result, this revision succeeds. The impunged order passed by the trial court, so far as it relates to impleadment of respondent nos. 2 to 5 as defendants in the suit is set aside. ( 19 ) THERE shall, however, be no order as to costs. Revision Petition allowed. .