Judgment 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 24-9-87 passed in Revision Case No. 2258/84 with 3413/86 by Joint Director of Consolidation, Patna under Sec. 35 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby and whereunder the appellate order and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer were set aside. 2. In this case, the dispute relates to right and title in respect of land measuring 15.41 acres appertaining to khata No. 159 situated in village Banahi, P. S. Shahpur Anchal Bihiyan in the district of Bhojpur. 3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the land originally belonged to Maharaja Radhika Raman Pd. Singh of Surajpura which was settled with the family of petitioner by unregistered patta in the year 1940. It was so executed in the name of deceased respondent No. 4 (now substituted by heirs), he being karta of the family and full brother of the petitioner. After revisional survey, the joint family lands, including the disputed land, were jointly recorded in the name of petitioner and the deceased respondent No. 4. No objection was preferred by any person including deceased respondent No. 4 under Sec. 103A of the B. T. Act. However, with respect to one R. S. plot No. 1631, which was also acquired by same patta, it was wrongly recorded in the name of State of Bihar in the R. S. Khatian for which the petitioner and deceased respondent No. 4 jointly filed a suit under Sec. 106 of the B. T. Act, which was registered as Case No. 357/70. After initiation of consolidation proceeding in the area, no objection under Sec. 10(2) of the Act was preferred by any person including the deceased respondent No. 4. Even when publication under Sec. 12(1) of the Act was made, the deceased respondent No. 4 did not choose to prefer any objection under Sec. 12(2) of the Act with respect to land in question. After much delay, a petition was preferred by deceased respondent No. 4 under Sec. 10 (sub-section not known), much beyond the period of limitation. It was rejected by Consolidation Officer, Bihiyan on 21-3-84 being time barred. The deceased respondent No. 4 thereafter preferred an appeal under Sec. 10(6) of the Act, which was registered as Appeal No. 62/84-85. After much delay, a petition was preferred by deceased respondent No. 4 under Sec. 10 (sub-section not known), much beyond the period of limitation. It was rejected by Consolidation Officer, Bihiyan on 21-3-84 being time barred. The deceased respondent No. 4 thereafter preferred an appeal under Sec. 10(6) of the Act, which was registered as Appeal No. 62/84-85. The appeal was also dismissed on the same ground on 6-6-84. Thereafter a Revision Case No. 2258/84 was filed by the deceased respondent No. 4 under Sec. 35 of the Act, wherein he claimed the land to be his exclusive property, acquired by him by patta dated 20-4-40, after partition between the petitioner and deceased respondent No. 4. Prayer was made to expunge the name of petitioner showing the land in dispute as his exclusive property.Another application was preferred by deceased respondent No. 4 relating to correction of chak entry with respect to one R. S. Plot No. 1631, which was recorded in the name of State of Bihar. Said application was rejected being time barred against which an Appeal No. 58/83-84 was preferred. The appellate authority vide its order dated 31-1-86 allowed the appeal and ordered to record the name of petitioner and the deceased respondent No. 4. Against the said order, the deceased respondent No. 4 preferred a Misc. Case No. 16/85-86 for recording his name exclusively, which was allowed in his favour on 2-4-86. The petitioner had no knowledge with respect to the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 16/85-86, which was not maintainable, and so the petitioner preferred a separate Revision Case No. 3413/86 against the said order.Both the aforesaid Revision Case Nos. 2258/84 and 3413/86 were heard together and allowed in favour of the deceased respondent No. 4 by common impugned order dated 24-9-87. 4. According to the petitioner, the family was joint, there being no partition till 1978. The names of petitioner and deceased respondent No. 4 were rightly shown in the revisional survey khatian. The revisional authority erred in law in giving finding in favour of deceased respondent No. 4 that it was his self-acquired property, which is based on no evidence and is error of record. The names of petitioner and deceased respondent No. 4 were rightly shown in the revisional survey khatian. The revisional authority erred in law in giving finding in favour of deceased respondent No. 4 that it was his self-acquired property, which is based on no evidence and is error of record. The deceased respondent No. 4 being the karta of the family, lands in dispute were purchased in his name which is also evident from the fact that the petitioner mortgaged an area of 2.52 acres of land of Khata No. 159, which is also under dispute. 5. The counsel for the petitioner raised question relating to maintainability of petition under Sec. 10 of the Act, as well as, the power of revisional authority under Sec. 35 of the Act. According to him, the initial petition preferred by deceased respondent No. 4, was stated to be filed under Sub-sec. A (sic) of Sec. 10(A) of the Act, which merely imposes bar of filing such petition after certain stage. Further, according to him, even objection under Sec. 10(2) of the Act beyond the period of limitation was not maintainable. In the aforesaid circumstances, the revisional authority had no jurisdiction to decide the question of right and interest for the first time in a petition under Sec. 35 of the Act, without looking into the legality and propriety of the orders passed by subordinate authorities. 6. The counsel appearing on behalf of heirs of deceased respondent No. 4 relied on counter-affidavit to substantiate the claim over the disputed property. He tried to impress the Court that the disputed lands were self-acquired property of deceased respondent No. 4. Further, according to him, the bar under Sec. 10A of the Act being not applicable for decision in a petition under Sec. 35 of the Act, the revisional authority at any time and stage has power to decide a case on merit.According to the respondents, the separation between the petitioner and deceased respondent No. 4 took place much prior to 1940. Each party, thereafter, were carrying their separate business. The petitioner also acquired certain other lands separately out of his own income in his name in the year 1943. Each party, thereafter, were carrying their separate business. The petitioner also acquired certain other lands separately out of his own income in his name in the year 1943. Even in Land Encroachment Proceeding No. 38/78-79 and 16/81-82, the deceased respondent No. 4 was shown as the landholder and a report was submitted by Circle Inspector and Halka Karamchari giving finding in favour of deceased respondent No. 4 vide report dated 25-1-79 and 29-1-79. 7. In the present case, the questions to be determined are :(a) Whether the revisional authority has wide power to determine the right and interest at any time and at any stage?(b) Whether even in absence of any irregularity in a proceeding or illegal/impropriety in any order passed by subordinate authority, the revisional authority can entertain and decide a case on merit under Sec. 35 of the Act? 8. Sec. 35 of the Act fell for consideration from time to time before this Court. Learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Sheo Kumar Thakur V/s. The State of Bihar, 1985 Pat LJR 986, held that the revisional authority has jurisdiction to pass appropriate order in a case or proceeding as he thinks fit, even at his own motion or on application of any party or on reference made by subordinate authority. The bar as stipulated under Sec. 10(A) of the Act is not applicable in such a case. This Court held as follows :"If, therefore, the Director of Consolidation found that there was any irregularity in the proceeding or for that matter any injustice was being done, it was open to him to pass an appropriate order to further the case of socio economic justice."Sec. 35 of the Act also fell for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Narain Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1997 (1) Pat LR 302 : (1997 AIHC 3340). In the said case taking into consideration the decision in the case of Sheo Kumar Thakur (supra), this Court held as follows (at page 3346 of AIHC) :- "It is difficult to construe that the provision of Sec. 35 vest wide power in the Director of Consolidation to exercise the powers of various authorities. In the said case taking into consideration the decision in the case of Sheo Kumar Thakur (supra), this Court held as follows (at page 3346 of AIHC) :- "It is difficult to construe that the provision of Sec. 35 vest wide power in the Director of Consolidation to exercise the powers of various authorities. If the power of the Director under Sec. 35 of the Act is construed to be so wide as is contended by the learned counsel for the reinforcement it would amount to giving him sanction to usurp the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself all the fact de novo, even though is completely barred by Sec. 10A of the Act. In fact, Sec. 35 of the Act does not contain any non obstante clause like the one contained in Sec. 10D, nor does it deal with any changed circumstances, as contemplated under Secs. 10B, 10C, 10D and 12B of the Act. There being no non obstante clause in Sec. 35, it is difficult to infer that the legislature purported to give such a wide power in the Director of Consolidation to ignore any bar of limitation provided for filing objection, appeal etc. at different stages and to give it an overriding effect even on S. 10A providing bar from raising any objection at any subsequent stage of proceeding, if not raised within the stipulated time. Any other interpretation would, in my opinion, lead to absurdity, inasmuch as under such circumstances, the consolidation scheme shall never come to an end and even after long lapse of finality of a consolidation proceeding an objection can be raised directly before the Director in revision, which can be entertained by the Director in the garb of revisional power. This, in my opinion, cannot be the intention of the legislature. This, in my opinion, cannot be the intention of the legislature. In my opinion, the object of S. 35 of the Act is to empower the Director of Consolidation to see that the subordinate Courts are not acting arbitrarily and illegally in exercise of their jurisdiction but not to assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself all the facts de novo, as has been held by the Apex Court in the aforementioned case of Ramdular (supra) whereafter the aforementioned Division Bench judgment of this Court are per incuriam."Sec. 35 of the Act power has been delegated on the Director of Consolidation in respect to revision and reference. However, such power has been delegated to pass appropriate order in certain circumstances as will be evident from the said provision (S. 35) as set out hereunder : "35. Revision and Reference - The Director of Consolidation may of his own motion or on the application of any party or on reference being made by any subordinate authority, call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by such authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, and may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit." 9. From the aforesaid provision of law, while the stage at which the Director of Consolidation can look into the matter has been prescribed, therein the circumstances in which he can exercise the power has also been prescribed by the legislatures. The following stages have been prescribed under S. 35 of the Act, namely, (a) in a case, the Director on his own motion decides to look into the matter or (b) on the application of any party or (c) on reference being made by any subordinate authority.The circumstances in which the Director can interfere and the matter and can look into, are as follows : "(a) Any case decided; or(b) Proceeding taken by any authority. However, the aforesaid power is vested only to satisfy himself.(i) As to the regularity of the proceeding; or(ii) As to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by any authority in the case or proceeding." Thereby, it will be evident that the Director of Consolidation is first required to satisfy himself only with respect to the regularity of the proceeding; or the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by any authority. The power to make such order as Director may thinks fit, as prescribed under S. 35 of the Act only arises, if the Director is not satisfied with the regularity of the proceeding or doughts the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by any authority. In a case, where there is no irregularity in the proceeding or order passed by any subordinate authority is correct, legal and proper, no power is vested with the Director of Consolidation to re-determine the issue already decided by subordinate authorities, of his own, appraising evidence on record, de novo. 10 The learned single Judge of this Court in another case of Jagu Mollah V/s. The State of Bihar 1996 (2) PLJR 924 held that the revisional authority has no power under S. 35 to set aside the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority after considering the entire materials on record and substitute his own finding de novo assessing the evidences on record. 11. From the aforesaid discussion, decisions of this Court as referred above and provision of S. 35 of the Act, it is clear that the Director of Consolidation can only interfere in the matter under S. 35 of the Act, if, (i) there is irregularity in a proceeding or (ii) the order passed by subordinate authority is incorrect, illegal or improper. In absence of such irregularity in the proceeding or illegality or impropriety of any order, the Director cannot exercise his power under S. 35 to pass an order as he thinks fit and proper; the Director has no power under S. 35 of the Act to set aside the findings of fact recorded by appellate authority/subordinate authority after considering the entire materials on record and substitute his own finding de novo, assessing the evidences on record and the Director cannot ignore any bar or limitation provided for filing objection, appeal etc. 12. 12. In the present case, the respondents are not in a position to show any irregularity in the proceeding. It is not the case of the respondents that the procedure which was required to be followed in a proceeding at different stages was not followed. The petition under S. 10 of the Act filed by deceased respondent No. 4 was time barred and thereby it was not maintainable before the consolidation officer. The Consolidation Officer rightly rejected such application. The appellate authority having affirmed such illegal order of the consolidation officer, it cannot be stated to be illegal. Thereby, I hold that the Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to decide the claim on merit on appreciation of evidence in a petition under S. 35 of the Act which was preferred by deceased respondent No. 4. Further, there being limitation prescribed to prefer objection, appeal etc., the same having not taken into consideration by the revisional authority while passing the impugned order, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 13. For the reasons stated above, I set aside the impugned order dated 24-9-87 and allow the writ petition.However, on the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.Petition allowed.