Honble GODARA, J.–This Criminal Misc. Petition has been filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 24.10.97 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Barmer in Criminal Revision Petition No. 23/97 whereby, while dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner, the impugned order dated 15.10.97 thereby cognizance of offences under Sections 307, 302, 323, 325, 147, 148 read with Section 148, I.P.C. was taken against the accused-petitioners who were ordered to be added as co-accused persons along with five accused-persons challaned for aforesaid offences by the police of Barmer. (2). Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Kistura Ram, the first informant lodged a written report at the Police Station, Sadar, Barmer on 15.7.97 at 2.40 A.M. against Thakra Ram, Uma Ram, Meha Ram, Kana Ram, Amra Ram, Girdhari Ram, Padma Ram and Punama Ram, including the present petitioners, alleging that on 14.7.97 he along with Lumba Ram, Lala Ram and Jai Ram had gone to his field situated bordering the village Banthiya for `Nirai of the crop. At about 8 P.M. while they were returning to their house, on reaching near the field of Kachhab Singh, all the accused-persons so named in the report, being armed with axes and lathis conjointly started beating and assaulting Kistura Ram, Lumba Ram and, after they were subjected to serious and grievous injuries, the assailant took to their heels and escaped from there. Both Kistura Ram as well as Lumba Ram were taken to the hospital in a serious condition whereat Lumba Ram succumbed to the injuries. Kistura Ram being seriously hurt received simple as well as grievous injuries with blunt weapons. Resultantly, F.I.R. No. 152/97 was registered and investigation was taken up by the Officer-in- charge of the Police Station. He inspected the site of occurrence and prepared site memo along with its memoran- dum, inquest report of the dead body of Lumba Ram and the post-mortem report and the injury report of Kistura Ram were also obtained. The statements of eye-witnesses Lala Ram, Rukhmana Ram, Kumari Maloo, Kistura Ram, Jai Ram and Purkha Ram were recorded on 15.7.97 itself who named as many as 8 accused-persons including the present petitioners who were injured in the incident resulting in death of Lumba Ram besides injuries to Kistura Ram. The statements of eye-witnesses Lala Ram, Rukhmana Ram, Kumari Maloo, Kistura Ram, Jai Ram and Purkha Ram were recorded on 15.7.97 itself who named as many as 8 accused-persons including the present petitioners who were injured in the incident resulting in death of Lumba Ram besides injuries to Kistura Ram. Consequently, all the accused-per- sons were arrested and produced before the learned Magistrate on 17.7.97 in police custody when they were required to be remanded to judicial custody and, accordingly, an order was passed. The petitioners Thakara Ram, Padama Ram and Meha Ram were all named by the aforesaid witnesses as co-accused-persons of the rest of the five accused-persons who have been, resultant upon investigation, challaned before the trial Court but, any how, the names of the present petitioners being so mentioned in the statements of the witnesses on 15.7.97 besides the F.I.R. itself, the same having resulted in arrest of the accused-petitioners as well, subsequently, any how, from the side of complainant, an application having been presented before the Circle Officer (Dy.S.P.), Barmer, he proceeded to record supplementary statements of the witnesses of the occurrence on 25.9.97. Consequently, he examined Kum. Maloo, Jai Rama, Smt. Puro, Vishana Ram, Gamana Ram and Purkha Ram etc. and, on the basis of supplementary statements of these witnesses, a report under Section 169/172, Cr.P.C. was filed simultaneously with the charge-sheet for alleged commission of the aforesaid offences against the rest of the five accused- persons named as co-accused of the present petitioners in the F.I.R. lodged on 15.7.97 itself and it was requested that the accused-petitioner be released since there was no material to proceed against the accused- petitioners. However, being aggrieved, Kitura Ram, filed a protest petition before the lower court alleging that there were good grounds existing to believe involvement of the accused- petition- ers as well in commission of the aforesaid offence along with other co-accused persons against whom a charge-sheet was filed and hence cognizance of the alleged offences be also taken against the accused-petitioners and they be also proceeded against according to law. However, this protest petition filed by the complainant was seriously opposed to by the accused-persons and, after giving an opportunity to be heard to both the sides, the learned Magistrate, vide his order dated 15.10.97, holding that there were no grounds to discard earlier statements of the witnesses examined by the officer-in-charge of the Police Station who also investigated this case as early as on 15.7.97 and, resultantly, since all these accused-persons were also named as assailants and being involved in commission of the aforesaid offences, resulting in death of Lumba Ram and multiple injuries to Kistura Ram and hence there being no valid justification for the Circle Officer of the Police, Barmer to have re-examined all these witnesses previously examined and, at the time of filing of police report under Section 169/172, Cr.P.C. to have overlooked the statements of witnesses recorded on 15.7.97 besides the F.I.R. and its author Kistura Ram, who himself is an injured person and, consequently, while relying on the F.I.R., statements of Kistura Ram as well as other witnesses so examined on 15.7.97, the learned Magistrate held that there were good grounds to hold that the accused-petitioners were also involved in commission of aforesaid offences resulting in impugned order taking cognizance of the aforesaid offences against the accused- petitioners and the order dated 15.10.97 so having been confirmed resulting in dismissal of criminal revision petition by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Barmer, has given rise to the present petition, as above. (3). I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor and have also perused and considered the legality, propriety as well as regularity of the impugned order and considered the same carefully. (4). To dispose of the controversies as raised above, it is to be determined: (i) whether the court of Addl. Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Barmer was not empowered to have taken cognizance of offences u/Ss. 302, 307, 323, 325, r.w. Sec. 149, I.P.C. against the accused-petitioner left out by the police from the array of accused-persons in the charge-sheet, to be added as accused-persons in the charge-sheet to be added as accused-persons in exercise of power u/S. 190(1)(b), Cr.P.C., before commitment; and (ii) whether there were no grounds for taking cognizance of the said offences against the accused petitioners and hence the impugned orders of the lower courts are liable to be set aside. These points are taken to be disposed of ad seriatim. Re.:1 (5). Though the accused-petitioners were also named in the F.I.R. lodged by Kistura Ram as the assailants of the deceased as well as his own and the witnesses also, in the first instance, when examined by the investigating officer, named the three petitioners as well as assailants but, relying on their subsequent statements recorded by the Dy.S.P., in which they allegedly omitted the names of the petition- ers, on the protest of the first informant Kistura Ram, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the said offences against the petitioners as well as the revisional court also did not find any illegality or impropriety in the same, dismissing the revision petition as well. (6). Section 190(1)(b), Cr.P.C. provides that the Magistrate subject to the pro- visions of this Chapter (XIV), may take cognizance of any offence upon a police report of such facts. The Code has prescribed the modes of taking cognizance by the courts competent to try the same. Taking of cognizance of offence necessary requirement before initiation of further proceedings can be commenced. The Court taking cognizance of any offence is required to apply its mind to the facts of the case placed before it either upon a police report, as is the instant case, or upon a complaint, or in some other manner the court comes to know about it and in the case of Court of Sessions upon commitment of the case u/S. 209, Cr.P.C. to overcome the embargo of Sec. 193, Cr.P.C., unless there is contrary legal provision giving go by to the necessity of commitment. (7). (7). So, as and when a police report under Section 170/173, Cr.P.C. is filed in the court against certain persons, alleging commission of certain offences which are either triable by the Magistrate, in whose court the same in filed, or the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate being competent to take cognizance of such offences under Section 190(1), Cr.P.C., in case the offences are exclusively triable by a court of Sessions, before proceeding to commit the case to the Court of Sessions, has to take cognizance of the case disclosing commission of alleged offences and, as a part of the same process of taking cognizance of the case and the offences, he has to simultaneously ponder over the question as to who are the offenders who appear to have committed those offences as disclosed from the charge-sheet and the con- nected material and documents filed by the police in support of the allegations of the charge-sheet. (8). As is the instant case, when the charge-sheet is against some persons accused of committing those offences but some persons similarly accused have been left out from the array of the accused-persons and, either on the protest of the prosecution or the complainant or suo motu, the court applies its mind to the aforesaid material and documents filed in support of the police report and comes to the conclusion that some persons left out of charge-sheet also appear or are found to be prima facie liable to be proceeded against and added as accused-persons along with those charge-sheeted by the police, it becomes the judicial duty of the Magistrate to proceed against all such persons and consequently, the Magistrate has to take cognizance of the offences disclosed in the case and simultaneously to find out the accused-persons produced or appearing before the court in the case and those excluded or left out in the police report/chargesheet by the police. In case there are grounds to believe that there are certain persons who have been left out by the police not filing charge-sheet/police report against them, before committing the case to the court of Sessions u/S. 209, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is to ponder over and find out as to who the real offenders in the case to be forwarded to the court of Session while committing the case to the Sessions Court to be tried. In case some accused are neither produced before him nor are they appearing before him, the Magistrate can summon such persons by taking cognizance of such offences against them on the basis of the material and documents filed along with the police report/charge-sheet so as to be sent to the court of Session so as to stand trial for commission of those offences. (9). In the instant case too, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offences against the accused-persons. (10). The learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in: Raj Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (1), which has been followed in S.B. decision in Rajendra Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (2). to derive support to his contention that since no Magistrate is empowered to add any new person as an accused along with those challaned by the police under the garb of provisions of Sec. 190(1)(b), Cr.P.C. since the Magistrate, on filing of a police report/charge-sheet immediately takes cognizance of the offence and, in case the same is exclusively triable by a court of Session, the Magistrate is called upon and required to see that the copies of the documents are mentioned in clause (i) to (v) of Section 207, Cr.P.C., have been supplied to the accused persons only who were found to be appearing to have been found to have committed offences as is mentioned in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Sec. 173, Cr.P.C. only and no inquiry is envisaged to be embarked upon as to whether the persons alleged, either by the prosecution or the complainant or even found suo motu by the court also appearing to be the offenders to be added as accused person in addition to those who have already been arrayed as accused-persons in the police report/charge-sheet since the same falls out of the scope of Section 209, Cr.P.C. as under clause (a) of this Section, since the Magistrate is to see as to whether provisions of Sec.207, Cr.P.C. have been complied with and the case is exclusively triable by a court of Session, under clause (a), he shall commit the case to the Court of Session and, subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody ensuring compliance of clauses (b) to (d) as well and nothing more. (11). (11). It may be noted that in the case of Raj Kishore Prasad (supra), the nature, object and scope of provisions of Sections 207, 208, 209 and 319, Cr. P.C. only were under consideration and neither it fell under adjudication nor did the Honble Supreme Court consider the nature and scope of provisions of Section 190(1), Cr.P.C. and the nature and scope of Section 319, Cr.P.C. was directly under consid- eration. The Honble Supreme Court held that, at the committal stage, in stricto-sensu, Sec. 319, Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked in a case where no evidence has been led at a trial, wherefrom, it can be said that the accused, other than the one facing trial appears to have been involved in the commission of the offence and para 13 of the judgment is as follows: ``13. Thus we come to hold that the power u/s 209, Cr.P.C to summon a new offender was not vested with a Magistrate on the plain reading of its text as well as proceedings before him not being an ``inquiry and material before him not be `evidence. When such powers was not so vested, his refusal to exercise it cannot be corrected by a Court of Revision, which may be the Court of Session itself awaiting the case on commitment, merely on the specious ground that the Court of Session can, in any even, summon the accused to stand trial, alongwith the accused meant to be committed for trial before it. Presently it is plain that the stage for employment of Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. has not arrived. The Order of the Court of Session requiring the Magistrate to arrest and logically commit the appellant alongwith the accused proposed to be committed to stand trial before it, it patently illegal and beyond jurisdiction. Since the Magistrate has no such power to add a person as accused u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. when handling a matter u/s. 209 Cr.P.C., the Court of Session, in purported exercise of revisional powers cannot obligate it to do so. (12). Since the Magistrate has no such power to add a person as accused u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. when handling a matter u/s. 209 Cr.P.C., the Court of Session, in purported exercise of revisional powers cannot obligate it to do so. (12). Therefore, when the decision of the Honble Supreme Court was based upon the nature of scope of aforesaid provisions of Sections 207, 208 and 209 r.w. Sec. 2(g) and 319, Cr.P.C. only and the nature and scope of provisions of Sec. 190, Cr.P.C. which empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence, be it triable by a Magistrate or a Court of Session, on any one or more conditions as are described in clause (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 190, Cr.P.C. which did not come to be considered nor the Honble Court was addressed on this point and there is no check against the same except that the Magistrate taking cognizance should be one who is empowered to take cognizance under sub-sec. (1) or (2) of the same. Apparently, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence against those who have not been arrested by the police nor arrayed as accused-persons in the police report provided it so appears from the evidence collected by the police by that time that they are also prima facie guilty of commission of offences alleged to have been committed. (13). The nature and scope of Sec. 190. Cr.P.C. has been adjudicated upon by the Honble Apex Court on more than one occasions. (14). In Hare Ram Satpathy vs. Tika Ram Agarwala(3), following the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in: Raghubans Dubey vs. The State of Bihar (4) etc., the Honble Supreme Court, on the basis of long catena of decisions referred to, held that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the police report or complaint or evidence led in support of the same to be prima facie satisfied about the commission of an offence and consequently a cognizance of an offence is taken to find as to who are the offenders who appear to have committed the offence(s) and once he comes to a conclusion that apart from the persons set up by the police some other persons are also involved, it is his legally mandated duty to proceed against those persons. There is nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the scope and nature of Sec. 190 to restrain the Magistrate from doing so in the committal case and hence the provisions of Sec. 319, Cr.P.C. cannot have any over- riding effect on the scope, nature and power of the Magistrate u/s 190, Cr.P.C. to add new accused persons who appear to be offenders from the material and documents accompanying the police report before the case is committed to the Court of Session. The Magistrate cannot embark upon any committal inquiry u/s 209, Cr.P.C. and, instead, he shall have to peruse and consider the evidence collected during the course of investigation and find out as to what offences appear to have been committed and who are the offenders as it appears from such evidence. There is no warrant for limiting this power of the Magistrate to those offenders only who have been arrested and produ- ced before him or those appearing subject to provisions of bail but even those who have been left out by the police from the array of offenders in the police report. (15). It is worthwhile to quote paras 7 and 8 of the judgment in Hare Ram Satpathys case (supra) as follows: ``7. From the foregoing it is crystal clear that under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence made out in the police report or in the complaint and there is nothing like taking cognizance of the offenders at that stage. As to who actually the offenders involved in the case might have been has to be decided by the Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence. 8. In the instant case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance of the offence of the police report, and after taking cognizance of the offence and perusal of the record he appears to have satisfied himself that there were prima facie grounds for issuing process against the respondents. In so doing the Magistrate did not in our judgment exceed the power vested in him under law. (16). Similarly, while interpreting the nature and scope of Sections 190, 193, 204 and 209, Cr.P.C. as well as Section 319, Cr.P.C., the Honble Supreme Court in Kishun Singh & ors. vs. The State of Bihar (5), in para 13 of the decision observed: ``13. (16). Similarly, while interpreting the nature and scope of Sections 190, 193, 204 and 209, Cr.P.C. as well as Section 319, Cr.P.C., the Honble Supreme Court in Kishun Singh & ors. vs. The State of Bihar (5), in para 13 of the decision observed: ``13. The question then is whether de hors Section 319 of the Code, can similar power to be traced to any other provision in the Code or can such power be implied from the scheme of the Code? We have already pointed out earlier the two alternative modes in which the Criminal Law can be set in motion; by the filing of information with the police under Section 154 of the Code or upon receipt of a complaint or information by a Magistrate. The former would lead to investigation by the police and may culminate in a police report under Section 173 of the Code on the basis whereof cognizance may be taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1) (b) of the Code. In the latter case, the Magistrate may either order investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code or himself hold an inquiry under Section 202 before taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1) (a) or (c), as the case may be, read with Section 204 of the Code. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence he may proceed to try the offender (except where the case is transferred under Section 191 or commit him for trial under Section 209 of the Code if the offence is triable exclusively by a Court of Session. As pointed out earlier cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. This Court in Raghubans Dubey vs. State of Bihar (1967(2) SCR 423). stated that once cognizance of an offence is taken it becomes the Courts duty `to find out who the offenders really are and if the Courts finds `that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is its duty to proceed against those persons by summoning them because The summon- ing of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by its taking cognizance of an offence. `Even after the present Code came into force, the legal position has not undergone a change; on the contrary the ratio of Dubey case (supra) was affirmed in Hareram Satpathy vs. Tikaram Agarwal ( 1978(4) SCC 58 ). Thus far there is no difficulty. (17). It was further observed by the Honble Apex Court that after application of mind for the purpose of taking cognizance of any offence for the limited purpose, in case the Court finds that besides the accused arraigned before him the complicity or involvement of others in the commission of the crime prima facie surfaces from the material placed before him, what course of action should he adopt and, consequently, it was further held that, as already indicated earlier from the ratio of the Apex Courts decisions in the cases of Raghubans Dubey and Hareram Satpathy (supra) that once the court takes cognizance of the offence (not offender) it becomes the Courts duty to find out the real offenders and if it comes to the conclu- sion that besides the persons put up for trial by the police some others are also involved in the commission of the crime, it is the courts duty to summon them to stand trial along with those already named, since summoning them would only be a part of the process of taking cognizance. (18). On the basis of aforesaid decisions on the nature and scope of Sections 190, 193, 204, 209 and 319, Cr.P.C., in the instant case, in absence of question being directly under adjudication in the case of the Raj Kishore Prasad(supra) before the Honble Apex Court, the decisions rendered in Raghubans Dubey vs. State of Bihar (6), since there is no change in legal position as regards the empowerment of the Magistrate u/s 190 (1)(b), Cr.P.C. which is followed by two Judge Bench of the Honble Apex Court in the decision of Hare Ram Satpathys (supra) holding that the Magistrate taking cognizance of offence on the police report and thereafter satisfying himself that there were prima facie grounds for issuing process against the respondents, did not exceed the powers vested in him under law. (19). (19). In : Kishun Singhs case (supra), relying on the decisions of Raghubans Dubey and Hareram (supra), the Honble Apex Court while upholding the power of Sessions Judge, after commitment, delving upon provisions of Sections 193, 209 and 319, Cr.P.C., to take cognizance of offence has held that on commitment the Sessions Court takes cognizance of offence and hence is empowered and has got jurisdiction to summon such offenders whose complicity in the crime comes to light from the material available on record and who have been left out by the police in the police report filed u/Sec. 173, Cr.P.C., without further recording evidence, which is permissible only during the inquiry or trial u/Sec. 319, Cr.P.C., and add them in the array of those who have been challaned and forwarded to the Sessions Court with the commitment of the case to face the trial even at the pre-charge and post-cognizance stage. (20). Accordingly, the same ratio of this decision applies with equal force to the pre-commitment stage and hence the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence(s) on the basis of a police report, u/s 190(1)(b), Cr.P.C. is equally empow- ered and has jurisdiction to find out as to who are the real offenders whose complicity is found from the material on record in addition to those who have been arraigned as offenders in the report and to summon even those who have been left out against the existence of grounds of belief of their complicity as well as offenders to face trial. (21). On the face of this settled legal position, in my humble view the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Raj Kishore Prasads case (supra), as is the case in hand, the Magistrate empowered u/s 190, Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of a case, is not barred from proceeding against and summoning the additional offenders/accused whose complicity is prima facie apparent from the material and documents filed in support of the allegations of the charge-sheet/police report filed u/s 173, Cr.P.C. but they have been left out from the array of the accused-persons sought to be proceeded against and so also the decision of the Honble Mr. V.S. Kokje J., in Rajendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), in which reliance has been placed on the decision in Raj Kishore Prasads case (supra) with due respect does not dis- suade me from arriving at the conclusion that the learned Magistrate did not act beyond his jurisdiction vesting u/S. 190(1)(b) in summoning the accused-petitioners as he is empowered to do so until the case was committed to the court of Session for trial. (22). Resultant answer to this question is that the Magistrate is empowered to and has jurisdiction to summon additional accused persons whose complicity in the crime is prima facie, found out from the material on record and have been left out by the police in the police report filed u/s 173,Cr.P.C. In a committal case, it is permissible before commitment u/s 209, Cr.P.C. and not thereafter. Re.2 (23). Now, reverting to the merits of the case, admittedly, all the three petitioners were also named in the F.I.R. lodged by Kistura-injured who was accompanying the deceased Loomba Ram at the time of incident. The officer-in-charge of the Police Station, Sadar, Barmer who, in the first instance, investigated the case, after preparation of inquest report and site inspection, examined Kistura, Lala Ram, Rukhman Ram, Km.Maloo who is daughter of the deceased and was also in the company of her father when the alleged incident took place, Jairama Ram, Udai Ram, Purkha Ram and, subsequently, on the basis of the complaint Chimana Ram that the Investigating Officer was not investigating the case impartially and innocent persons were also being falsely implicated, the (police) Circle Officer, Barmer, took up the investigation himself and started investigation and he, barring Kistura Ram himself, re-examined all the aforesaid witnesses in addition to Jawahara Ram Shambhoo Singh, Kheta Ram, Panney Singh, Durg Singh, Nakhat Singh, Jeewan Singh, Smt. Pura, Kishana Ram, Laga Ram, Rama Ram, Sona Ram, Dhanna Ram, Beerma Ram, Gunesh Ram, Dhanna Ram s/o Taja Ram, Kistura Ram s/o Lala Ram, Gamana Ram, Leela Ram, Tulchha Ram, Padam Singh, Madan Lal, Bakhtawar Singh, Hindu Singh, Gama Ram u/s 161, Cr.P.C. and hence the officer-in-charge of the Police Station Sadar filed charge-sheet u/s 173, Cr.P.C. against Poonama Ram, Amara Ram, Uma Ram, Girdhari Ram and Mana Ram while leaving out the three accused- persons, on the basis of investigation done by the Circle Officer. (24). (24). The learned Magistrate and the learned Judge of the revisional court, have discarded the supplementary statements of the aforesaid witnesses resulting from their re-examinations specially when Kistura was not re-examined nor there was any need to do so and hence the statements of the witnesses examined by the officer-in-charge in the first instance could not be overlooked for the purpose of exclusion of the petitioners from the array of accused-persons whose complicity was also found to be prima facie established from the material on record and hence the impugned order of the magisterial court and consequential revisional order affirming the same. (25). The learned counsel for the petitioners while taking through the statements of witnesses specially those who were re- examined by the Circle Officer and also those who were additionally examined, submitted that except the injured Kistura who the first informant himself, there is not a single witness to corroborate his version of the F.I.R. as well as one given in his examination u/s 161, Cr.P.C., and the alleged eye-witnesses Km. Maloo, who is daughter of the accused Loomba Ram as well as Lala Ram, Jairama Ram and Rukhmana Ram, in their statements recorded on 15.7.97 and 22.7.97 by Bhawani Singh, S.H.O. stated that the petitioners were also among the assailants of Loomba Ram (deceased) and Kistura injured and that the petitioner Thakara Ram was armed with an axe while others were ar- med with lathis and they conjointly assaulted them resulting in fatal and grievous injuries to both the deceased and so also Kistura Ram. Post-mortem examination of the dead body of Loomba Ram and the medical examination of Kistura testify to this fact. So, presently, it is prima facie found that Loomba Ram met with a homicidal death and Kistura Ram received grievous and simple injuries resulting in his becoming unconscious. Besides, as regards the five accused- persons, ultimately, challaned for commission of offences u/ss 302, 307, 325, 323 r.w. Sec. 149, 147 and 148, I.P.C. has been filed against them. (26). So, presently, it is prima facie found that Loomba Ram met with a homicidal death and Kistura Ram received grievous and simple injuries resulting in his becoming unconscious. Besides, as regards the five accused- persons, ultimately, challaned for commission of offences u/ss 302, 307, 325, 323 r.w. Sec. 149, 147 and 148, I.P.C. has been filed against them. (26). The petitioners stand excluded from the array of the accused who were, in the first instance, on the basis of statements of the witnesses examined on 15.7.97 and 22.7.97 by Bhawani Singh, S.H.O., arrested and, consequent upon their re- examination, excluding only Kistura Ram who does not appear to have been re-examined or, at any rate, he does not appear to have resiled from or reconciled to the resultant result of investigation that the petitioners were not among those who committed the aforesaid offences, being not present at the site, and also, after examination of rest of the witnesses named hereinbefore on 25.9.97 by the Circle Officers, numbering 25, filed a negative report u/s 169, Cr.P.C. with the prayer that the petitioners having been falsely alleged and named as accused in the F.I.R. and also in the statement of Kistura were neither among the assailants nor present at the scene of the occurrence and their involvement was false and so they should be released from the custody. (27). Admittedly, as also borne out of Post Mortem Report, the accused Loomba Ram received as many as 11 injuries and none of those is opined by the Medical Board to have been caused by a sharp/cutting weapon to show that Thakara Ram allegedly being and with an axe also participated in the assault. In addition too, though Bhawani Singh did examine besides Kistura himself, Km. Maloo, Jairama Ram, Rukhmana Ram, Lala Ram, Purkha Ram and Uda Ram, they did support Kisturas first version of F.I.R. but, on grievance agitated by the accused-side that the investigation was not fair and impartial, the supervising and superin- tending Circle Officer, being superior and controlling officer of Bhawani Singh, re-examined all these witnesses, except Kistura himself, and admitted that the names of the three accused-persons, presently, petitioners, were falsely included in their earlier statements and they were neither present at the place of the occurrence nor did they participate in the same. Km. Km. Maloo, being daughter of the accused, would ordinarily be the last person to exclude the accused-persons in case they were also the assailants of her father. (28). Besides, as 25 persons so examined by the Police Circle Officer lend circumstantial corroboration to the statements of all those witnesses who initially, admittedly, falsely named the accused-petitioners, in an exercise of over implica- tion as is not unusual in such cases, excluding the possibility of involvement or complicity of the petitioners in the incident. Absence of any injury with a sharp/cutting weapon, resulting from an axe alleged to have been used by Thakara Ram who is attributed pivotal role in the First Information Report, further excludes his participation and consequential presence at the site. This also probabilises the ab- sence and non-inclusion of petitioners Meha Ram and Padma Ram in the incident. There does not appear any ulterior motive on the part of the Circle Officer to have recorded statements of the witnesses, excluding Kistura, those previously examined by the S.H.O. Bhawani Singh, again in which they did not stick to or stand by their earlier version and, besides, the Circle Officer proceeded to examine 25 more independent witnesses who have also ruled out the possibility of involvement of the petitioners in the incident. None of these witnesses, except Kisturas protest against exclusion of the petitioners, alleged that the Circle Officer had not recorded their statements correctly. (29). Resultantly, on the face of medical, circumstantial and direct evidence referred to hereinbefore, there is solitary version, as given in the F.I.R. and in the statement u/s 161, Cr.P.C. by Kistura injured. None of these witnesses, except Kisturas protest against exclusion of the petitioners, alleged that the Circle Officer had not recorded their statements correctly. (29). Resultantly, on the face of medical, circumstantial and direct evidence referred to hereinbefore, there is solitary version, as given in the F.I.R. and in the statement u/s 161, Cr.P.C. by Kistura injured. The parties being relations were litigating about land and hence the conclusion so arrived at by the police was non-involvement of the petitioners and hence, on the protest from Kistura first informant, the learned Judicial Magistrate, while discarding the statements recor- ded by the Circle Officer, on the direction of S.P., Barmer on the complaint of Chimana Ram, held that there was no justification for change of investigation officer and so there was no justification for re-examination of all the eye-witnesses who were already examined on 15.7.97 by Bhawani Singh and since, as per their statements recorded on 15.7.97, all the three petitioners equally appear to be invol- ved in commission of aforesaid offences and hence there is enough material to proceed against the petitioners as well and hence cognizance of the same was was taken and they were ordered to be summoned as above. (30). Therefore, there is difference of approach on the part of police as well as the Magistrate as the Magistrate relied on the statements which were recorded on 15.7.97/22.7.97 discarding those recorded on their re-examination on 25.9.97 by the Circle Officer. Rest of the 25 witnesses additionally examined too stood ignored. The reasons assigned therefor are hardly appealing. When Chimana Ram complained to the S.P., who directed the Circle Officer to accordingly investigate into the allegations of the F.I.R. and hence the Circle Officer, not of his own volition, took up and completed the investigation and the witnesses who were re-examined, stated that they had implicated the petitioners falsely at the behest and on promoting by Purkha Ram. There is no complaint against either the S.P. nor the Circle Officer, Barmer that they had sided with or favoured the accused-petitioners. Therefore, when it was at the instance and on the order of the S.P. that the Circle Officer re-examined the so called eye-witnesses including Km. There is no complaint against either the S.P. nor the Circle Officer, Barmer that they had sided with or favoured the accused-petitioners. Therefore, when it was at the instance and on the order of the S.P. that the Circle Officer re-examined the so called eye-witnesses including Km. Maloo who did not implicate the petitioners and admitted their false involvement and as many as 25 witnesses were examined bringing out the circumstances supporting their statements regarding non-inclusion of the petitioners in the array of assailants of Loom- ba Ram deceased and Kistura Ram injured. The medical evidence too excluded the possibility of involvement of Thakara Ram allegedly being armed with an axe. Therefore, there is solitary statement of Kistura Ram as also given in the F.I.R. while all the alleged eye- witnesses including Km. Maloo have contradicted his version that the petitioners too were involved in the commission of the offences. (31). Therefore, the police did not commit any mistake while recommending closure of case against the petitioner by discharging them while proceeding against other five accused- persons. No fault can be found with investigation of the Dy.S.P. who is a supervising senior officer nor there was any oblique motive for the Circle Officer, Barmer to falsely exclude the petitioners. (32). Therefore, when the statements of all the witnesses and so also the F.I.R., medical evidence, motive for the crime, and statements of the witnesses is collectively taken into consideration, there was no good ground for the Magistrate to have overlooked and discarded the material collected by the Circle Officer consequent upon re-investigation made so exhaustively to find out the truth resulting in exclu- sion of the petitioners and hence, at present, there is solitary version of Kistura injured himself and nothing more and all the alleged eye- witnesses and those lending circumstantial corroboration do not appear to be partisan or favouring the petitioners. Therefore, on the basis of available material and the documents including the statements of the witnesses excluding only that of Kistura himself, overwh- elmingly excludes the possibility of involvement of the petitioners and hence an application of mind as to whether there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused-petitioners, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered all these circumstances to find out a prima facie case of involvement and complicity of the accused-petitioners in the case excluding the possibility that they were also involved in the crime and hence, on the face of overwhelming evidence discussed hereinbefore, the learned Magistrate could not be held justified to have proceeded against the accused-petitioners solely on the basis of Kistura injured who and the deceased had estranged relationship with the accused-persons which resulted in long-pending litigation. (33). Therefore, when all the facts and circumstances are considered together, there is no enough material on record of the case to hold that the petitioners were involved in commission of the alleged offences and hence they are also liable to be proceeded against justifying the impugned order. Otherwise, on its face value, the overwhelming evidence in support of the result of the investigation cannot be made subservient to the solitary version of Kistura alone specially against the medical evidence. (34). Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid discussion, the learned Magistrate fell into serious error to have passed the impugned order contrary to overwhelming material excluding possibility of exclusion of petitioners in commission of the alle- ged offences and hence the same cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed and set aside so also the order of the revisional court affirming the same. This question is answered accordingly, in absence of material enough to proceed against the petitioners as well. In the result, in case the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would result in manifest injustice to the petitioners occasioning a failure of justice. (35). This question is answered accordingly, in absence of material enough to proceed against the petitioners as well. In the result, in case the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would result in manifest injustice to the petitioners occasioning a failure of justice. (35). However, before parting with it, it may also be observed that since, in absence of cross-examination of the witnesses excluding only Kistura, it cannot be held pre-maturely that the statements on which the prosecution, at present, relies for prosecution of the 5 accused named in the police report/charge- sheet and non-prosecution of the petitioners are not the correct statements and hence the trial court shall be obliged and under legal duty to examine all those witnesses who were examined by Bhawani Singh, S.H.O., in the first instance, and then again by the Police Circle Officer, during the trial, to be in a better position to appreciate and, in case any need therefor be, to proceed in exercise of power vesting u/s 319, Cr.P.C. by summoning all or any of the petitioners also to be arraigned as accused-persons. For the present, no such exercise appears possible. (36). Lastly, though not with equal vehemence, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No.2, on the basis of sub-section (3) of Section 397 and sub-section (3) of Section 399, Cr.P.C., submitted that since the petitioners being aggrieved by the impugned order of cognizance preferred criminal revision before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge which was dismissed and, almost on similar grounds the present petition purporting to have been filed in exercise of right vesting under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been preferred but, since the lower courts have unanimou- sly upheld the protest raised by Kistura complainant that the accused-petitioners being also involved in commission of the alleged offences along with other accused-persons who have not been challaned by the police, after completion of investigation, thereby forcing the learned Magistrate to take cognizance against the present petitioners as well and hence, in the aforesaid circumstances, this petition is not maintainable. However, it cannot be denied that availing of remedy of revision to the Sessions Judge under Section 399 does not bar a person from invoking powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and, at the same time, it is equally true that the High Court ought not to act as Second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter. The High Court would only interfere where it is satisfied that if the impugned order is allowed to stand and the accused-petitioners are proceeded against, it would amount to abuse of process of court or that the interests of justice otherwise call for quashing of the impugned order. (Ganesh Narayan Hegde vs. S. Bangarappa (7). The Honble Supreme Court quoted the following paras 3 and 4 of the decision in Dhanalakshmi vs. R. Prasanna Kumar (8), which is reproduced hereinbelow: ``Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magi- strate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complainant has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that even there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. The High Court without proper application of the principles that have been laid down by this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha vs. State of Bihar (1977(1) SCC 503), S. Trilok Singh vs. Satya Deo Tripathi ( 1979(4) SCC 396 ) and Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala ( 1983(1) SCC 9 ). The High Court without proper application of the principles that have been laid down by this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha vs. State of Bihar (1977(1) SCC 503), S. Trilok Singh vs. Satya Deo Tripathi ( 1979(4) SCC 396 ) and Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala ( 1983(1) SCC 9 ). proceeded to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed against all the respondents. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the ma- terial before it and concluding that the complainant cannot be proceeded with. We find that there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognizance of. It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere. (37). In the instant case, on analysis of the prosecution case made hereinbefore, in the light of material and documents relied upon by the complainant in su- pport of his allegations against the accused-petitioners that they were also involved in commission of the alleged offences along with those against whom a charge- sheet has already been filed, in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether conviction would be sustainable on such premises arives at a conclusion that even if all the circumstances and evidence so collected during the course of investigation is accepted on its face value, no conviction appears to be sustainable and, consequently, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in absence of which it is bound to occasion a failure of justice warranting its being quashed. Therefore, keeping in view the ratio of Ganesh Narayan Hegdes case (supra), merely because a revision preferred by the accused- petitioners has been dismissed by the Sessions Judge, that does not bar the High Court from exercising its inherent powers though the High Court should not act as a Second Revisional Court but it can interfere to prevent abuse of process of court otherwise to secure ends of justice and, in the instant case as well, on the face of aforesaid conclusion so arrived at not sustaining the impugned order, any preliminary objection against maintenance of the present petition is without any force and is hereby dismissed. (38). On the basis of aforesaid discussion, this petition is well merited and deserves to be accepted. (39). Accordingly, this petition is accepted and the impugned orders dated 15.10.97 and 24.10.97 passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance as well as the re- visional court are hereby quashed and set aside and the proceedings if any, taken pursuant to the same against the present petitioners are also quashed. (40). However, the observations made during the course of this Order, shall not prejudice the order and judgment to follow in this case and so also any proceedings under Section 319, Cr.P.C., in case there is any warrant therefor, during the pendency of the trial. (41). This petition along with its connected stay petition stands disposed of accordingly.