Judgment R.A.Sharma, J. 1. The appellants filed Title Suit No. 82/96 in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd., Ranchi, for declaration of their one half share in the undivided properties described in Schedules B and C of the plaint and also for declaration that the sale-deed dated 2-4-1996 executed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 in favour of defendant No. 4 has neither created any right, title and interest in favour of the respondent No. 4 in respect of holding No. 772, nor has it affected in any way the plaintiffs right title and interest in the said holding. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff filed an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for interim injunction. The trial Court, vide order dated 22-3-1997, granted interim injunction restraining the defendant Nos. 1 to 4, their agents, servants and employees from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession of the property in dispute. Against the said order, the defendant No. 4 filed Misc. Appeal No. 120/97R under Sec. 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) of the Code before this Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge, vide judgment dated 19th December, 1997. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the plaintiff has filed this appeal under Clause 10 of letters patent. 2. At the threshold, a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this appeal has been raised We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this appeal. 3. Against an order passed under Order XXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, an appeal lies under Sec. 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule l(r) of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 104 of the Code has barred any further appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge passed in an appeal filed under Section 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code. But, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that in spite of the prohibition contained in Sec. 104(2) of the Code against filing any further appeal from an appellate judgment passed by the Single Judge, the appeal will lie from such judgment under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent which governs and regulates the internal appeals within the High Court. In his support, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on Shah Babulal Khimji V/s. Jayaben D. Kania -- . 4. The question raised herein is not res integra. Such a question has already been decided by this Court as well as by the apex Court. A Full Bench of this Court in Bihar Caustic & Chemicals Ltd. V/s. Rameshwar Shukla and Anr. L.P.A. Nos. 111 & 112 of 1991 (R) decided on 1-5-1996 has, in this connection, laid down as under: In view of the above discussions, it is clear that unless a Statute itself bars a Second Appeal in the High Court or makes the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court find, a Letters Patent appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the Court. 5. Supreme Court in Resham Singh Pyara Singh V/s. Abdul Sattar -- has held that from a judgment of a Single Judge passed in appeal filed under Order XLIII, Rule 1 read with Sec. 104 of the Code, no further appeal shall lie in view of the prohibition contained in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 104. Shah Babulal Khimji V/s. Jayaben D. Kania -- (supra), which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants, was distinguished by the apex Court on the ground that the Single Judge in that case passed the order in the suit filed in the original side of the High Court against which an appeal does lie before the Division Bench under the Letters Patent. Paragraph 6 of the judgment of the Supreme Court being relevant is reproduced below: 6. It would, therefore, be clear that when an appeal was filed against the order of the City Civil Court, Bombay to the learned Single Judge under Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) as provided in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 104 by operation of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 104, no further appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section. In Khimji case the suit was filed on the original side of the High Court and the learned Single Judge on the original side passed an interlocutory order. Against the orders of the learned Single Judge, though it was an interlocutory under since the appeal would lie to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, this Court held that against the interlocutory orders passed by the Single Judge, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. Against the orders of the learned Single Judge, though it was an interlocutory under since the appeal would lie to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, this Court held that against the interlocutory orders passed by the Single Judge, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. That ratio, therefore, is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case. 6. A Division Bench of this Court in Chandrakant Jalan V/s. J.B. Investment (P) Ltd. and Ors. L.P.A. No. 392 of 1997 (R), following the decision of the apex Court in Resham Singh Pyara Singh V/s. Abdul Sattar -- (supra), has also declared that against the judgment of Single Judge given in an appeal preferred under Order XLIII, Rule 1 read with Sec. 104 of the Code, appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable. 7. The position is, thus, settled that in view of the prohibition contained in Sec. 104(2) of the Code, appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Single Judge given in an appeal filed under Sec. 104(1) read with Rule 1 of Order XLIII, of the Code is not maintainable. 8. Before closing this case, reference may be made to the decision in Vinitam H. Khanolkar V/s. Pragna M. Rai and Ors. -- , wherein the apex Court has made the following observations regarding maintainability of the appeal under Letters Patent applicable to the Bombay High Court: 3. Now, it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excluded appeals under letter patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act. It could not he seriously contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that if Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable. Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction of the Court. Only on that short ground, the appeal is required to be allowed. (Emphasis supplied). Only on that short ground, the appeal is required to be allowed. (Emphasis supplied). 9 By Clause 41, the Letters Patent applicable to Patna High Court have been made subject to legislative power of the State. Clause 41 of the Letters Patent, Patna, is reproduced below: 41. And, we do further ordain and declare that, all the provisions of these our Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council, and also of the Governor-General in Council under Sec. 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and also of the Government-General in cases of emergency under Sec. 72 of that Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby. 10. As Clause 41 has made the Letters Patent subject to the legislative power of the State, the Legislature, by legislative enactment, can curtail the appellate power conferred on this Court by the Letters Patent. In the instant case, the competent Legislature by enacting Sec. 104(2) has restricted/curtailed the appellate power granted to this Court by the Letters Patent. Hence, no further appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge passed in an appeal filed under Sec. 104(1) will lie. 11. In this connection, reference may be made to Union of India V/s. The Mohindra Supply Co. -- , wherein the Supreme Court has laid down that from a judgment of Single Judge passed in an appeal tiled under Sec. 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, appeal under Letters Patent of the Punjab High Court is not maintainable because of express prohibition contained in Sec. 39(2). The relevant extracts from the Supreme Court decision, in this regard, is reproduced below: 5. The problem to which attention must then be directed is whether the right to appeal under the Letters Patent is at all restricted by Sec. 39, Sub-sections (1) and (2). Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, insofar as it is material provides: And we do further ordain that an appeal, shall lie to the High Court... from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction...) of one Judge of the High Court.... from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction...) of one Judge of the High Court.... By this Clause, a right to appeal except in the cases specified from one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench is expressly granted. But the Letters Patent are declared by Clause 37 subject to the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council and also of the Governor-in-Council under the Government of India Act, 1915, and may, in all respects, be amended or altered in exercise of legislative authority. Under Sec. 39(1), an appeal lies from the orders specified in that Sub-sec. and from no others. The Legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. If by the express provision contained in Sec. 39(1) a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that Clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent. If for reasons aforementioned, the expression "second appeal" includes an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be impossible to hold that notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed in appeal under Sub-sec. (1) is competent. The Supreme Court, while holding as above, relied upon Clause 37 whereby the Letters Patent, Punjab, were made subject to the legislative power of the State. 12 In South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. V/s. S.B. Sarup Singh and Ors. -- , the same view was reiterated. In that case, the question involved was whether right of appeal conferred by Letters Patent, Lahore has been taken away by Sec. 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Sec. 39 of the said Delhi Act has provided for an appeal to High Court from an order made by the Tribunal. By Sec. 43, the order passed by a Single Judge in appeal under Sec. 39 was made final. Sec. 39 of the said Delhi Act has provided for an appeal to High Court from an order made by the Tribunal. By Sec. 43, the order passed by a Single Judge in appeal under Sec. 39 was made final. The apex Court held that as the judgment of the Single Judge has been made final, any further appeal therefrom stands excluded. It was accordingly held that appeal under Letters Patent from the judgment of the Single Judge is not maintainable. The relevant portions of the apex Court decision are reproduced below: (11) The following legal position emerges from the said discussion: A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a Tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Sec. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, an appeal under Sec. 39 of the Act will be heard by a Single Judge. Any judgment made by the Single Judge in the said appeal will, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court! If the order made by a Single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the Single Judge to the High Court. ***** (13) The next question is whether the right of appeal conferred by Clause 10 of the Letters patent, Lahore, has been taken away by a law made by the appropriate Legislature. It is conceded that the appropriate Legislature can take away the right, see Clause 37 of the Letters Patent, Lahore.... * * * * * (17) ... The Expression "final" in the first part of Sec. 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. * * * * * (17) ... The Expression "final" in the first part of Sec. 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. The Section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings.... In the above case also, the Supreme Court also relied upon Clause 37 of the Letters Patent, Lahore. Clause 41 of the Letters Patent applicable to this Court is in pan materiel with Clause 37 of the Letters Patent, Punjab/Lahore. 13 Letters Patent applicable to this Court having been made subject to the Legislative Power of the State cannot override express prohibition against the filing of further appeal contained in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 104 of the Code. So far as this State is concerned, in order to exclude Letters Patent appeal, it is not necessary that enactment concerned should expressly exclude such appeals. The appeal under Letters Patent applicable to this Court from judgment of the Single Judge will be barred if the Statute under which the Single Judge decided the matter has, expressly or by necessary implication, taken away the right of any further appeal from such decision/judgment. In Resham Singh Pyara Singh V/s. Abdul Sattar -- (supra), the appeal under Letters Patent was held as not maintainable because Sec. 104(2) of the Code has expressly barred any further appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge. The Letters Patent Appeal will be barred by necessary implication if the judgment of the Single Judge has been made final by the statutory enactment concerned or has been delivered under a Statute which is a self-contained Code. S.A. Industries (P) Ltd. V/s. Sarup Singh and Ors. -- (supra) is a case where the Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge was held barred because the concerned Statutory enactment has made the Single Judge judgment as final. Upadhyaya Hargouind Dushankar V/s. Dhirendrasinh Virbhadrasinhji Solanki and Ors. -- is an authority where the Letters Patent appeal from the order of a Single Judge passed under the Representation of Peoples Act was declared not maintainable because the said Act was held to be a self-contained Code. 14. Upadhyaya Hargouind Dushankar V/s. Dhirendrasinh Virbhadrasinhji Solanki and Ors. -- is an authority where the Letters Patent appeal from the order of a Single Judge passed under the Representation of Peoples Act was declared not maintainable because the said Act was held to be a self-contained Code. 14. For the reasons given above, this appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs. 15. A.K. Prasad, J. I agree.