Judgment : This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned First Additional District Judge, Salem, in A.S.No.105 of 1983, dated 211. 1984. The defendant is the appellant in the above second appeal. 2. The plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery of Rs.25,000 with interest by way of special and general damages from the defendant and for directing the defendant to return the account books and M.L.4 licence. 3. The plaintiff contended that he was the proprietor of ‘Prakash Oil Mills’, Salem and the defendant was the Inspector of Ammapet Police Station during 1974, that the mill premises is within the jurisdiction of the said police station and after taking charge, the defendant was demanding illegal gratification from the plaintiff for which the plaintiff refused. The defendant had threatened the plaintiff and gave out that he would foist criminal cases against him. The plaintiff applied before the District Revenue Officer for renewal of licence and that the District Revenue Officer issued a show cause notice why licence should not be cancelled. It is further stated that the plaintiff replied to the said notice on 16. 1975 making allegations against the Ammapet Police Station. One of the allegations was that the report of the Ammapet Police Station was false and that on the basis of the report, the renewal was refused. The Superintendent of Police, did not make any enquiry. The defendant having scented the contents of the reply, entered into the mill premises of the plaintiff on 16. 1975 forcibly and unlawfully arrested the plaintiff and took him to the police station and he was threatened by demanding illegal gratification. The news of his arrest leaked out to the public and so the defendant foisted a case against the plaintiff under Sec.4(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act and that the arrest was done with malice and without any reasonable and probable cause. The plaintiff never attempted to sell khandasari waste to anybody, which do not require any licence and the defendant illegally seized the account books and licenses and illegally arrested and detained him in the police station. The plaintiff never attempted to sell khandasari waste to anybody, which do not require any licence and the defendant illegally seized the account books and licenses and illegally arrested and detained him in the police station. Not even the counsel for the plaintiff was allowed to meet him in the police station, next day he took him to the court by walk with a view to insult, defame and dishonour him in the eye of the public and caused publication in the journal ‘Malai Murasu’ on 16. 1975 and he was produced before the court. Subsequently, he was remanded and the bail application filed by the plaintiff was objected by the defendant and he was released on bail on 20.6.1975. The defendant had also illegally caused to be seized 21 barrels on 20.6.1975 and 26 barrels of khandasari on 26. 1975 and kept them in his custody. Even though the plaintiff applied for return of the property on 26. 1975 itself and in spite of the court having ordered direction of the production of the goods, the police did not produce. Therefore, the plaintiff was necessitated to file a criminal revision petition before the Sessions Court, which ordered the Magistrate to return the goods to the plaintiff. There was no further action and therefore the plaintiff approached the High Court by means of a Miscellaneous Petition to quash the F.I.R. and the High Court also quashed the F.I.R. on 19. 1976. It is further stated that the account books were not at all returned to the plaintiff and the A.C.T.O. also issued a show cause why the penalty of Rs.8,416 should not be imposed. The plaintiff suffered damages as listed in the plaint. 4. The defendant objected to the pleadings as stated in the plaint and he had contended inter alia that there was no malice or ill-will against the plaintiff, that there was reasonable and probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, that the defendant did so in his capacity as Inspector of Police and that the prosecution was never malicious. The defendant also submitted that in the absence of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit was barred by provisions of Sec.53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act and that the suit was also bad for want of issue of notice under Sec.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant also submitted that in the absence of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit was barred by provisions of Sec.53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act and that the suit was also bad for want of issue of notice under Sec.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Government also ought to have been implead as a party and the suit was also barred under Order 79 of the Police Standing Orders. The defendant also contended that he had arrested the plaintiff on information that he was about to sell molasses to one Mani and that therefore he seized the account books and took the custody of the goods and he registered a case in Crime No.1303 of 1975 and he produced the plaintiff before the court on 16. 1975, but as the Magistrate was not on duty, on 20.6.1975 he was released on bail and from 26. 1975 to 26. 1975 he was away from the station for security and on 7. 1975 he was transferred from Ammapet Police Station and took leave from 7. 1975 to 27. 1975 and that therefore he was not responsible for the failure of his successors to take any subsequent action. He handed over all the records and goods to his successors and he may not be blamed for the inaction of his successors. It is true that certain remarks were passed against him by the High Court in the petition of quash the F.I.R. but on his subsequent filing of a petition for expunging of remarks, the remarks made against him were expunged and that therefore he was not liable to pay any compensation. 5. The trial court after analysing of the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that there has been no basis on the claim made in the plaint and therefore the suit was dismissed. However, on appeal the learned appellate Judge held that the action of the defendant in having arrested the plaintiff/respondent herein was not justified and therefore the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff was decreed and the judgment of the trial court was reversed. As against the said judgment, the above second appeal has been filed. .6. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there are several defects in the findings given by the lower appellate court. As against the said judgment, the above second appeal has been filed. .6. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there are several defects in the findings given by the lower appellate court. He refers to the finding given by the lower appellate court to the effect that the finding of the High Court in Ex.A-8 to the effect to the case against the petitioner was not registered bona fide and that the registration of the case was with some alterior motive would still hold good. This finding was not justified in view of the subsequent clarification issued by the High Court exonerating the accused. The learned counsel for the appellant also refers to the fact that immediately after the incident, the appellant had been transferred to some other place and the he cannot be blamed for the failure to return the account books or the seized articles to the respondent. 7. It is true that the findings of the learned appellate Judge in the context of the finding given by this Court in the earlier proceedings cannot be sustained nor can the accused be responsible for the actions of successor-in-office. But at the same time, the issue which has to be considered is as to whether the conduct of the appellant to the extent of his acts was justified in the discharge of his duties in his official capacity as Inspector of Police. His very conduct as admitted in the evidence that he did not take any steps to ascertain as to whether the seized barrels contained Khandasari Molasses or not would disclose that he was not acting bona fide but was only interested in harassing the plaintiff. In fact he has also admitted in the evidence that no licence was necessary for khandasari molasses and that he did not take any steps to ascertain about the actual contents of barrels which was seized from the plaintiff. This circumstance alone is sufficient to hold that the appellant had behaved and acted in excess in his jurisdiction and not in the bona fide discharge of his duties. If he had any suspicion as regards the nature of the contents, he should have proceeded to arrest the plaintiff only after ascertaining that the plaintiff had committed any illegality. This circumstance alone is sufficient to hold that the appellant had behaved and acted in excess in his jurisdiction and not in the bona fide discharge of his duties. If he had any suspicion as regards the nature of the contents, he should have proceeded to arrest the plaintiff only after ascertaining that the plaintiff had committed any illegality. Even though the seizure may be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion or apprehension, the arrest of the accused without even ascertaining the nature of the contents of the barrels cannot be but motivated. No public official can be allowed to act so indiscreetly and seek protection under any immunity attached to a public office. .8. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to the judgment of this Court in K. Rajammal v. B. Thirugnanamurthy, (1995)1 L.W. 86 . In that case, the respondent has filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.5,000 with interest thereon for wrongful attachment. The court held that the plaintiff had not made out a case for damages and the trial court also held that the reputation and status of the plaintiff as alleged by him cannot be true, and that the appellant had acted bona fide and her intention was only to protect her right and to secure the amount due to her. Further the lower appellate court had reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the appellant has instituted the earlier proceeding without reasonable and probable cause and that she was reckless in not ascertaining the real facts before filing an application for attachment. The lower appellate court had further held that the plaintiff was liable to pay damages. S.S. Subramani, J. allowed the appeal after holding that in a case alleging the tort of malicious prosecution, malice must be shown as an additional requirement of proof. The term ‘malice’ in this form of action is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred but actuated by improper and indirect motives. The learned Judge proceeded further and held that the lower appellate court has erroneously held that the appellant had acted recklessly and initiated earlier proceedings without ascertaining the real facts. 9. The term ‘malice’ in this form of action is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred but actuated by improper and indirect motives. The learned Judge proceeded further and held that the lower appellate court has erroneously held that the appellant had acted recklessly and initiated earlier proceedings without ascertaining the real facts. 9. On the basis of the judgment, the learned counsel contends that in the present case there was no proof of any malice against the appellant except for stating that the appellant demanded bribe from the plaintiff. It is true that as the trial court had pointed out there is no documentary evidence to prove the fact of the defendant having claimed any bribe from the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also not sent any complaint to the higher authority alleging that the defendant was demanding any bribe from him. But the learned judge had taken into account the other circumstantial factors also to the effect that the action was preceded by the show cause notice from the Revenue Divisional Officer and that the impugned action by the appellant was immediately after the notice was received from the Revenue Divisional Officer. The very show cause notice was the result of a report against the petitioner from Ammapet Police Station. Therefore, it was obvious that the defendant was itching to take some kind of action against the plaintiff and he had seized the barrels as well as arrested the accused even without ascertaining the nature of contends of the barrels. The appellate court had therefore correctly held that the defendant had acted in a reckless manner and hence liable for making good the damages sustained by the plaintiff. Furthermore, in the case reported in K. Rajammal v. B.Thirugnana Murthy, (1995)1 L.W. 86 , the learned Judge was dealing with a case of malicious prosecution arising out of alleged “wrongful attachment”. The learned Judge himself had pointed out that strict proof of malice would be necessary because the damage was caused not by the conduct of the defendant but by an act of court. 10. I therefore do not find any reason to set aside the finding of the fact arrived at by the lower appellate court. 11. However, the learned counsel for the appellant also points out that the appellant having died, his legal representatives have now been brought on record. 10. I therefore do not find any reason to set aside the finding of the fact arrived at by the lower appellate court. 11. However, the learned counsel for the appellant also points out that the appellant having died, his legal representatives have now been brought on record. He relied on a passage from “The Law of Torts” of S. Ramaswami Iyer. In page 573 of the VI Edition of this book, it is stated as follows: “The Indian Succession Act enacts, that all cause of action in favour of or against a person survive, except, those for defomation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, and other personal injuries not causing the death of the party. The term ‘personal injury’ has been understood to mean not merely physical injury but also any injury other than one to the estate of the deceased person for instance, an action for libel or malicious prosecution would abate on the death of either party. Action for recovery of money, of property or for damages for conversation will therefore survive.” 12. On the basis of the above statement of law, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the legal representatives of the appellant cannot be held liable at least to the extent of the damages awarded towards malicious prosecution. 13. In the above suit, a total sum of Rs.25,000 has been claimed out of which Rs.3,250 was claimed towards the value of Molases and Rs.8,416 was claimed towards damages arising out of the non-return of the account books. The rest of the claim is towards malicious prosecution and defamation alleged to have been caused to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to receive a sum of Rs.11,666 being the total amount of the value of Molases and damages arising out of non-return of the account books. To the said extent, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed. 14. The second appeal is therefore dismissed subject to modifying the decree of the trial court to the extent of Rs.11,666 and the interest thereon as payable to the plaintiff. 15. Subject to the above modification, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently C.M.P.No.4148 of 1985 is also dismissed.