JUDGMENT MS. KAMLESH SHARMA, ACJ.—Admit. With the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, this petition is heard finally and disposed of in the following terms :— 2. Petitioner Vadia Banerjee is sister, whereas, respondent Sardar is widow of late Pyare Lai, who died on 27.3.1992. His ordinary residence at the time of his death was Ward No. 5, Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra. He had left behind a sum of Rs. 70,000/- invested in FDR No. AF/P/759209/ 524KY/90-91 of UCO Bank Branch Birta 1023, Tehsil and District Kangra and Rs. 3726.55 deposited in his Savings Bank Account No. 9148 of Punjab National Bank, Nagrota Bagwan, Tehsil and District Kangra. On the basis of a will dated 15.6.1991 executed by late Pyare Lal in her favour, Vadia Banerjee filed petition under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter called the Act) for granting her succession certificate of the amounts lying in the said FDR and Savings Bank Account. 3. Respondent Sardar objected to the petition on merits besides raising preliminary objections. According to her, her husband late Pyare Lai had not executed any legal and valid will in favour of his sister Vadia Banerjee and it is only she who has right to inherit his moveable and immoveable property. In rejoinder filed by Vadia Banerjee, she has reiterated her stand in the petition and further pleaded that respondent Sardar had never lived with her husband after marriage and the will executed in her favour by late Pyare Lai is valid and genuine document. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:— 1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to succeed to the estate of Shri Pyare La! on the basis of will, as alleged? OPR 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged? OPR 3. Whether the will dated 15.6.1991 is not valid and genuine will as alleged? OPR 4. Final order 5. Issue Nos. 1 and 3 were answered in favour of Vadia Banerjee, whereas, Issue No. 2 was decided against respondent Sardar. On the basis of evidence on record Sub-Judge 1st Class (2), Kangra in his order dated 4.4.1996 came to the conclusion that will Ex. PW-2/A is a valid and genuine will, on the basis of which Vadia Banerjee is entitled to succeed to the estate of late Pyare Lai. 6. On the basis of evidence on record Sub-Judge 1st Class (2), Kangra in his order dated 4.4.1996 came to the conclusion that will Ex. PW-2/A is a valid and genuine will, on the basis of which Vadia Banerjee is entitled to succeed to the estate of late Pyare Lai. 6. In the appeal filed by respondent Sardar, the order dated 4,4.1996 of the Sub-Judge 1st Class was set aside on the ground that the petition of Vadia Banerjee is barred under Section 213 of the Act, as she had not obtained the probate of the will in Question, it was also observed that the appeal against the order of the Sub-Judge 1st Class would lie to the High Court and not to the District Judge. Hence, the present petition. 7. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record, this Court finds that the District Judge is not right in holding that the petition for succession certificate filed by Vadia Banerjee is barred under Section 213 of the Act. It is clear that he has not referred to subsection (2) of Section 213 as well as Section 57 of the Act, the perusal of which will show that sub-section (1) of Section 213 does not apply to the will in question. Section 213 of the Act is :— "213. Right as executor or legatee when established.—(1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed. (2) This Section shall not apply in the case of wills made by Muhammadans, and shall only apply :— (i) in the case of wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jains where such wills are of classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57, and (ii) in the case of wills made by any Parsi dying, after the commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 1962, where such wills are made within the local limits of the ordinary (original) civil jurisdiction of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and where such wills are made outside those limits, insofar as they relate to immoveable property situate within those limits." Sub-section 2(i) of Section 213 is clear that in case of will made by any Hindu, as in the present case sub-section (1) will apply, which provides for the bar, only if the said will is of one of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57. Whether the will in question falls in one of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57, reference to Section 57 is necessary. Section 57 of the Act is:— "57. Whether the will in question falls in one of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57, reference to Section 57 is necessary. Section 57 of the Act is:— "57. Application of certain provisions of Part to a class of wills made by Hindus, etc.—The provisions of this Part which are set out in Schedule Hi shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply— (a) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina, on or after the first day of September, 1870, within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and (b) to all such wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immovable property situate within those territories or limits; and (c) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which those provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b): Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such will or codicil." Reading of clause (a) of Section 57 makes it clear that the will in question was not made within the territories mentioned therein and it was made outside those territories and having been related to moveable property only, it also falls outside the scope of clause (b) of Section 57. 8. In this view of the matter, the District Judge was not right in holding that Vadia Banerjee was not entitled to apply for succession certificate on the basis of the will without getting its probate, as provided under subsection (1) of Section 213 of the Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah (since deceased) and after her legal representative Mrs. Marlean Wilkinson v. Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Bose and others, AIR 1962 SC 1471, relied upon by the District Judge is not applicable to the present case, as the parties therein were Christians to whom Section 57 does not apply, hence their Lordships only considered the implications of sub-section (1) of Section 213 and not of sub-section (2) of that Section read with Section 57 clauses (a) and (b). This Court has also taken support from judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Behari Lal Ram Charan v. Karam Chand Sahni and others, AIR 1968 Punj 108, and that of Allahabad High Court in Bhaiya Ji v. Jageshwar Dayal Bajpai, AIR 1978 All, 268. 9. The District Judge is also not right in holding that appeal against the order granting succession certificate would lie to High Court and not to the District Judge, as the Sub-Judge 1st Class passing such an order is delegate of the District Judge. In this regard reference to Section 388 of the Act is relevant, sub-section (1) of which provides that the State Government by notifications in the official Gazette may invest any Court inferior in grade to a District Judge with power to exercise the functions of a District Judge under Part X of the Act, which contains Sections 370 to 390 pertaining to succession certificates. As per the report of the District and Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala called for by this Court, all the Subordinate Judges of 1st Class in the State have been vested with the powers to exercise the functions of the District Judge under Part X of the Act by issuing requisite notifications by the State Government. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the Subordinate Judge 1st Class had the jurisdiction to try the petition of Vadia Banerjee for grant of succession certificate. Sub-section (2) of Section 388 further provides that the inferior Court invested with the powers of District Judge will have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge within its local limits. Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 388 also provides that appeal against the order of inferior Court, as is mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 384, shall lie to the District Judge and not to the High Court, who may, if he thinks fit, by his order in the appeal, make such declaration and directions as the sub-section authorises the High Court to make by its order on an appeal from an order of District Judge. The order of District Judge on an appeal from an order of an inferior Court is subject to revision by the High Court and also to review under Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 388 of the Act. The order of District Judge on an appeal from an order of an inferior Court is subject to revision by the High Court and also to review under Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 388 of the Act. However, the District Judge has been given the powers to withdraw any proceedings from any inferior Court and either try it himself or transfer to another such Court established within the local limits of his jurisdiction and having authority to dispose of the proceedings, as stated in sub-section (4) of Section 388. Therefore, the appeal against the order of Sub-Judge 1st Class granting succession certificate to Vadia Banerjee is maintainable before the District Judge. 10. The result of above discussion is that there is merit in this revision petition and it is accepted, and the impugned judgment of the District Judge is set aside. It will be in the interest of justice and fair play to remand the case to the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala with directions to restore the appeal to its original number and decide it in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the records. Order accordingly. The parties will appear before the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala on 12.5.1998. No costs. Petition allowed. -