M. H. S. ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) PURSUANT to the directions of the Division Bench dated 3rd December, 1997 passed in M. A. T. No. 4082 of 1997, the above two writ petitions have been heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993:-the petitioner in the present writ petition is an advocate practising on the Criminal Side of the District Courts at Midnapore. He was appointed as Public Prosecutor for the District of Midnapore in 1984 vide a Government Order being No. 6094-A/gp-15/65 dated 26th July, 1984. He took charge of the said office of Public Prosecutor on 31st July, 1984. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner after elapse of seven years of assuming office of the Public Prosecutor, for the first time, he came to learn of the duration of the tenure of his office when he received two office orders being Memo Nos. 455-A/gp/-15/65 and 465-A/gp-15-65 both dated 16th January, 1992 issued by the Legal Remembrancer and Ex-Officio Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department, respondent No. 2 herein. By the said memos Ex-post-facto approval of the extension of the term of appointment of the petitioner as Public Prosecutor was granted for the period from 31st July, 1988 to 31st December, 1991 and by the Second Memo, the period was extended for one year from 1. 12. 92 to 31. 12. 92. Thereafter, in or about 3rd week of January, 1993, the petitioner received a memo being No. 238/1 (9)-A dated 12th January 1993 issued by the respondent No. 2 whereby it was communicated that the term of petitioner's office as Public Prosecutor was extended for a further period of 6 months with effect from 1st January, 1993. ( 3 ) THE petitioner came to know that the Legal Remembrancer, respondent No. 2 had issued a memo being No. 290-A dated 18th January, 1993 whereby the District Magistrate, Midnapore was requested to follow the provisions of Rule 96 of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual (hereinafter referred to as the said Manual) to prepare a panel of suitable and eligible candidates and send the same at an early date, so that a new incumbent may be selected and appointed as Public Prosecutor after the expiry of the petitioner's extended tenure. The petitioner thereupon filed the above writ application seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities to refrain from giving effect to the said memo bearing No. 290-A dated 18th January, 1993, being annexure 'a' and for certain interim relief. ( 4 ) BY an interim order dated 28. 6. 93 while giving directions for affidavits, it was directed that status quo as on that date will continue. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner continued until by an order dated 11. 3. 97, the writ application being C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 was dismissed for default and the interim order was vacated. However, by an order dated 11. 7. 97, the order dated 11. 3. 97 was recalled. ( 5 ) W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997: it appears that pursuant to the memo dated 18. 1. 93 issued by the Legal Remembrancer to the District Magistrate, Midnapore for preparation of a panel in accordance with the Rule 96 of the Manual, a panel appears to have been prepared and Shri Shyam Sundar Das, an advocate practising in the District Judges Court at Midnapore was appointed as Public Prosecutor of Midnapore District vide an order No. 5434-A dated 23. 6. 93 in the place of the respondent No. 6, who is none other than the petitioner in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993. According to Shri Shyam Sundar Das, he was appointed to the said post of Public Prosecutor on 23. 6. 93 prior to the order of status quo passed in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 and he was neither made a party respondent to the said writ petition being No. C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 nor the panel prepared or the appointment of Shri Shyam Sundar Das was challenged or questioned. However, the said Shyam Sundar Das, writ petitioner in W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997 was not allowed to function as Public Prosecutor in terms of his appointment order dated 23. 6. 93. It is stated that the first writ petition was dismissed by an order dated 11. 3. 97 and the interim order passed by His Lordship Justice Susanta Chatterjee dated 24. 6. 93 was thereby vacated. 6. 93. It is stated that the first writ petition was dismissed by an order dated 11. 3. 97 and the interim order passed by His Lordship Justice Susanta Chatterjee dated 24. 6. 93 was thereby vacated. It is the submission of the petitioner in the writ petition that after the said order, the respondent No. 6 did not inform the authority concerned of the dismissal of his writ petition until the petitioner, Shri Shyam Sundar Das informed the respondent No. 4 on 11. 4. 97 in writing, whereupon the District Judge was pleased to direct Mr. Shyam Sundar Das to start functioning from 15. 4. 97 but the respondent No. 6 did not deliver his charge and continued to work as Public Prosecutor. The grievance of the petitioner Shri Shyam Sundar Das is that the District Magistrate, Midnapore, respondent No. 5 without considering the effect of the order of High Court or the legal effect of the functioning of the respondent No. 6 as Public Prosecutor after dismissal of the writ application ordered that same arrangement will continue. In spite of several representations made by the petitioner for giving effect to his order of appointment and as no action was taken, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition being W. P. No,. 9584 (W) of 1997 seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to give effect to the order of appointment being letter No. 5434-A dated 23rd June, 1993, annexure 'a' and for certain consequential directions restraining the respondent No. 6 (petitioner in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993) to act as Public Prosecutor. By an interim order dated 26. 11. 97 passed by his Lordship Justice Altamas Kabir, the petitioner was directed to be allowed to function as Public Prosecutor in terms of the order of the District and Sessions Judge, Midnapore dated 10th April, 1997 for a period of 6 months or until further order whichever is earlier. Thereafter, the Division Bench by its order dated 3. 12. 97 passed in M. A. T. No. 4082 of 1997 directed that no interim order either in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 and W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997 be permitted to operate pending the final disposal of the aforementioned writ petitions and further directed that both the writ petitions be posted for final hearing. 12. 97 passed in M. A. T. No. 4082 of 1997 directed that no interim order either in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 and W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997 be permitted to operate pending the final disposal of the aforementioned writ petitions and further directed that both the writ petitions be posted for final hearing. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, the said two writ petitions were listed before this Court and were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 7 ) IT must be noted here that the W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997 was dismissed for default by an order dated 11th August, 1997 and an application filed for restoration of the same was also dismissed for default by an order dated 12th August, 97. However, later, upon mentioning, the order dated 12. 8. 97 was recalled. This aspect was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The reason for non-appearance of the counsel on 11. 8. 97 when the writ petition was called, it is stated in the recall application was neither wilful nor want on but for reasons beyond the control of the learned counsel for the petitioner who comes from Jhargram and could not appear on the nick time when the matter was called on account of late coming of the train. For the said reason, the writ petition deserves to be restored and is accordingly restored. ( 8 ) MR. Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 referred to the provisions of the Code and the relevant rules of the Legal Remembrancer Manual and in particular to Rule 96 which relates to the appointment of Public Prosecutor. For the sake of convenience Rule 96, to the extent relevant, is extracted hereunder:"96. Appointment of Public Prosecutor: (1)whenever the office of Public Prosecutor becomes permanently vacant, the District Magistrate, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, shall inform the legal Remembrancer whether suitable candidates are available locally or whether applications of candidates from outside the district should be called for. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) when the vacancy is advertised generally all the applications shall be submitted to the District Magistrate of the District in which the applicant usually practises, who shall forward them to the District Magistrate of the district where the vacancy occurs, with his recommendations after consultation with the Sessions Judge as to the fitness of the applicant for the post; (5)applications from candidates practising on the Original Side of the High Court shall be submitted to the Advocate General, West Bengal and those from candidates practising on the Appellate Side of the High Court, or the Small Cause Court or the Police Court, Calcutta, shall be submitted to the Deputy Legal Remembrancer the Chief Judge, Small Cause Court, and the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta respectively. All such applications shall be forwarded to the Magistrate of the District where the vacancy occurs with the recommendations of the respective officers. (6)all applications in respect of such advertisement shall be received by the District Magistrate, who shall forward them through the Commissioner to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the recommendations of himself and the Sessions Judge. All such applications shall be forwarded to the Magistrate of the District where the vacancy occurs with the recommendations of the respective officers. (6)all applications in respect of such advertisement shall be received by the District Magistrate, who shall forward them through the Commissioner to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the recommendations of himself and the Sessions Judge. (7)after the Legal Remembrancer has considered all the applications he shall submit the file with his recommendations as ex-officio Secretary to the Minister-in-charge of the Judicial Department for necessary orders regarding appointment of Public Prosecutor in the district. (8)all appointments shall be for a period of not exceeding three years, and may be renewed for further periods if the incumbents are found fit and efficient. (9)incumbents will receive their letters of appointment from the Legal Remembrancer and ex-officio Secretary to the Government of West Bengal in the Judicial Department. (10 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 9 ) NEXT, reference was also made to Rule 100 which relates to removal, suspension or other penalties and provides inter alia, that whenever the Collector shall see cause to recommend the removal or suspension or other punishment of a Government Pleader, he shall submit a report of the facts of the case to the Legal Remembrancer through the Commissioner and the Legal Remembrancer as (ex-officio) Secretary shall, if he thinks fit, submit his recommendation to the Minister-in-Charge of the Judicial Department for necessary orders. Then reference was made to Rule 101 which relates to retirement of Public Prosecutor. It says that a public Prosecutor shall ordinarily retire on completion of 60 years of age. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Then reference was made to Rule 101 which relates to retirement of Public Prosecutor. It says that a public Prosecutor shall ordinarily retire on completion of 60 years of age. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Banerjee, these provisions show that although the initial appointment of Public Prosecutor is for a period of three years, the same is renewable for further periods, in the event the appointee be found fit and efficient and that such renewals be given to the appointee periodically upto the age of 60 years which is the age of retirement of the Public Prosecutor. It is his further submission that since the petitioner has not been found or adjudged unfit and inefficient, he is entitled to renewal of his term of his office of Public Prosecutor for further periods and allowed to continue in office till he attains the age of 60 years. The respondent authority, it was contended, have acted illegally and arbitrarily for shortening the tenure of office of the petitioner as Public Prosecutor without forming any opinion that the petitioner is unfit and inefficient. Reliance was placed by Mr. Banerjee upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harpal Singh Chauhan v. State of U. P. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 552 . ( 11 ) THE Harpal Singh Chauhan's case (supra), the appellants therein had been appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal) in accordance with the section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code (therein and hereinafter referred to as "the Code") and before the expiry of the tenure, the District Judge recommended their names for extension of their terms and requested the District Magistrate, who sent his recommendation to the State Government for extension of the term. However, the District Magistrate did not recommend the names of appellants, for extension of their terms, saying that on the enquiry at his level "reputation, professional work, behaviour and conduct of the abovementioned Government Counsel was not found in accordance with the Public Interest. " The State Government extended the terms of appellants therein till further orders and ultimately without assigning any reason, the extension recommended by the District Judge was rejected by the State Government and which decision was the subject-matter of the controversy in the said appeals before the Supreme Court. " The State Government extended the terms of appellants therein till further orders and ultimately without assigning any reason, the extension recommended by the District Judge was rejected by the State Government and which decision was the subject-matter of the controversy in the said appeals before the Supreme Court. The matter was considered in the light of section 24 of the Code and the provisions of the U. P. Legal Remembrancer Manual, certain relevant portions of the said judgment, for the sake of convenience, are extracted hereunder:"11. The Code prescribes the procedure for appointment of Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor, for the High Court and the District Courts by the State Government. The framers of the Code, were conscious of the fact, that the Public Prosecutor and the Additional Public Prosecutor have an important role, while prosecuting, on behalf of the State, accused persons, who are alleged to have committed one or the other offence. Because of that, provisions have been made for their selection in the Code. It is for the Sessions Judge to assess the merit and professional conduct of the persons recommended for such appointments and the District Magistrate to express his opinion on the suitability of persons so recommend from the administrative point of view. Sub-section (5) of section 24 provides that no person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4 ). "the aforesaid section requires an effective and real consultation between the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate, about the merit and suitability of person to be appointed as Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor. That is why it requires, a panel of names of persons, to be prepared by the District Magistrate, in consultation with the Sessions Judge. The same is the position so far the Manual is concerned. It enumerates in detail, how for purpose of initial appointment, extension or renewal, the District Judge who is also the Sessions Judge, is to give his estimate of the quality of the work of the Counsel from the Judicial standpoint and the District Officer i. e. , the District Magistrate is to report about the suitability of such person from administrative point of view. " ( 12 ) THE mandate of sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Code was construed as under in paragraph 14 (S. C. C. ). "14. . . . . . the mandate of sub-section (4) of section 24 is that "the District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons". Sub-section (5) of section 24 prescribes statutory bar that no person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the District "unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4)". When sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 24 of the Code, speak about the preparation of a panel, out of which appointments against the posts of Prosecutor Additional Public Prosecutor have to be made, then the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate are required to consult and discuss the names of the persons fit to be included in the panel and to include such names in the panel. The expression "panel of names of persons", does not mean that some names are to be suggested by the Sessions Judge and some command, are to be made in respect of those names by the District Magistrate, without proper consultation and discussions over such names. The statutory mandate ought to have been complied with by the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge in its true spirit. In the facts of the present case, no such panel appears to have been prepared by the District Magistrate in terms of sub-section (4) of section 24. As section 24 of the Code does not speak about extension or renewal of the term of the person so appointed, the same procedure, as provided under sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Code, has to be followed. In the present case the District Magistrate, instead of having an effective and real consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, simply made some vague and general commands against the appellants, which cannot be held to be the compliance with the requirement of sub-section (4) of section 24. "and it was further observed in paragraph 16' (S. C. C.) as under:"16. As already mentioned above, section 24 of the Code does not speak about the extension or renewal of the term of the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor. "and it was further observed in paragraph 16' (S. C. C.) as under:"16. As already mentioned above, section 24 of the Code does not speak about the extension or renewal of the term of the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor. But after the expiry of the term of the appointment of persons concerned, it requires the same statutory exercise, in which either new persons are appointed or those who have been working as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, are again appointed by the State Government, for a fresh term. The procedure prescribed in the Manual-to the extent it is not in conflict with the provisions of section 24-shall be deemed to be supplementing the statutory provisions. But merely because there is a provision for extension or renewal of the term, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right. " ( 13 ) THE case of Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 was referred to and explained as under:"15. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi this court was not concerned with the question regarding the extension/renewal of the terms of the Government Counsel. The primary question which was examined by this court in that case, was as to whether it was open to the State Government by the impugned circular dated February 6,1990, to terminate appointments of all the Government Counsel in the different districts of the State, by an omnibus order, even though, those appointments were all individual. It was held that any such exercise of power by the State Government cannot satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, was unreasonable and arbitrary. In that connection reference was made to the Manual aforesaid and it was pointed out that the said Manual has laid down detailed procedure for appointment, termination and renewal of the tenure of the District Government Counsel. It was pointed out, that different paragraphs of the Manual require, first to consider the existing incumbents for extension and renewal of their tenure and to take steps for fresh appointment in their place if the existing incumbents were not found suitable in comparison to more suitable persons available for appointment at the time of the renewal. It was pointed out, that different paragraphs of the Manual require, first to consider the existing incumbents for extension and renewal of their tenure and to take steps for fresh appointment in their place if the existing incumbents were not found suitable in comparison to more suitable persons available for appointment at the time of the renewal. " ( 14 ) THE controversy in the present case, has accordingly to be considered in the light of the judgment in Harpal Singh Chauhan's case. It must be stated here that the provisions contained in U. P. Manual, as extracted in the judgment of the Supreme Court, are different from those contained in the W. B. Manual with respect to the appointment and renewal of the term. Paras 7. 06 and 7. 08 of the U. P. Manual enumerate in detail, how for the purpose of initial appointment, extension or renewal, the District Judge is to give his estimate of the quality of work of the counsel from judicial stand point and the District Officer i. e. the District Magistrate is to report about the suitability of such person from the administrative point of view. It is also prescribed that the procedure for renewal of the term, the exercised shall be initiated at least three months before the expiry of the term. The W. B. Manual, however, as can be seen from paragraph 96 (supra) does not so prescribed the procedure in detail for renewal nor is there any requirement to first consider the existing incumbent for renewal of his tenure and to take steps for fresh appointment in his place only if the existing incumbent is not suitable. Paragraph 96 (B) of W. B. Manual merely fixes the period of appointment as not exceeding three years which may be renewed if the incumbents are found fit and efficient. ( 15 ) IN Harpal Singh Chauhan's case the Supreme Court has held that the procedure prescribed in the Manual can be observed and followed as supplemental to the provisions of section 24 of the Code. In case of conflict, then section 24 of the Code being statutory in nature will override the procedure prescribed in the Manual. ( 15 ) IN Harpal Singh Chauhan's case the Supreme Court has held that the procedure prescribed in the Manual can be observed and followed as supplemental to the provisions of section 24 of the Code. In case of conflict, then section 24 of the Code being statutory in nature will override the procedure prescribed in the Manual. It was further held that the mandate of sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Code which speaks about the preparation of a panel out of which appointment have to be made is required to be followed. As regards preparation of the panel, it was held that the District Judge and the District Magistrate are required to consult and discuss the names of persons fit to be included in the panel and to include such names in the panel. It was further held that section 24 of the Code does not speak about the extension or renewal of the term and that merely because there is a provision in the Manual for extension or renewal of the term, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right but that such incumbents, it was held, can make a grievance that either they have not received the fair treatment or that the procedure prescribed in the Code and in the Manual have not been followed. ( 16 ) THE petitioners in the instant case, in either of the two writ petitions cannot, in the circumstances, claim as a matter of right that their terms should be extended. The contention of Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate for the writ petitioner in C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 that unless the petitioner is found unfit and inefficient, he is entitled to renewal of the term or that the petitioner is entitled to such further renewals until he attains the age of 60 years, have to be rejected in the light of the observations of the apex court in Chauhan's case. ( 17 ) AS regards the validity of the impugned order being Memo No. 290-A dated 18. 1. 93, whereby the Legal Remembrancer requested for compliance of the provisions of Rule 96 of the Manual and for preparation of a panel is concerned, from the narration of facts, it will be noticed that Mr. ( 17 ) AS regards the validity of the impugned order being Memo No. 290-A dated 18. 1. 93, whereby the Legal Remembrancer requested for compliance of the provisions of Rule 96 of the Manual and for preparation of a panel is concerned, from the narration of facts, it will be noticed that Mr. Alok Kumar Mondal, writ petitioner in W. P. No. 7979 (W) 1993 continued in the post of Public Prosecutor ever since his appointment on 31. 7. 84 without any extension or renewal of the term after the expiry of the initial term of three years which expired on 31. 7. 87. It was only on 16. 1. 92 when the State, perhaps realised the irregularity it issued various orders. The first such order in this chain is the order in Memo No. 455-A/gp-15/65 dated 16. 1. 92 whereby ex-post facto extension of the term of Shri Alok Kumar Mondal as Public Prosecutor was granted for the period 31. 7. 88 to 31. 12. 91 and by another order of same date i. e. 16. 1. 92 being Memo No. 465-A/gp-15/65, the said term was extended by 12 months upto 31. 12. 92 and thereafter by the Memo dated 12. 1. 93, the same was extended for further period of six months with effect from 1. 1. 93 and by the impugned Memo dated 18. 1. 93, procedure in the Rule 96 of the Manual was directed to be followed for preparation of the panel for filling up the post of Public Prosecutor. It appears that on 28. 12. 92, the District Judge informed the Legal Remembrancer that since the performance of Shri Alok Kumar Mondal is satisfactory, his appointment may be extended for a another term beyond 31. 12. 92. ( 18 ) DURING the pendency of this writ petition the panel was prepared and Shri Shyam Sundar Das, was neither impleaded in the writ petition No. 7979 (W) of 1993 nor any steps were taken to question the said appointment. The said lapse is fatal to the maintainability of the writ petition being No. 7979 (W) of 1993 for the reason that unless the panel so prepared and the appointment of Shri Shyam Sundar Das as Public Prosecutor is held either illegal or is set aside, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief of continuation in the post of Public Prosecutor. Effect having been given to the impugned order being W. P. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 praying for a direction not to give effect to that order is really rendered infructuous. ( 19 ) WE shall, however, not rest our decision on the said technicality. ( 20 ) AS already noticed, the chain of orders passed by the respondent authorities were in effect to regularise the irregularity in the continuation of Shri Alok Kumar Mondal as Public Prosecutor, after initial term of appointment of three years expired, the same was not renewed by following the procedure as prescribed by the Manual nor any panel was prepared as per mandate of section 24 (4) of the Code. On the other hand, ex-post facto extension not postulated either under the Code or Manual was granted. The whole exercise, by the State has, therefore, to be regarded as one to regularise the illegality and the culmination is the impugned order whereby directions were issued to prepare a panel. If so construed, as it must be that the effort of the State was to regularise the illegality and for filling up the post of Public Prosecutor in accordance with the law, in impugned order being Memo dated 18. 1. 93 is for the said reason not open to the charge of illegality. ( 21 ) TO my mind, the petitioner, Alok Kumar Mondal having benefited by the said irregularity for so many years cannot be heard to say that he has not received fair treatment. The benefit of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed by the W. B. Manual, has been reaped by Shri Alok Kumar Mondal and any grievance as is now sought to be made out is, therefore, misconceived and untenable. ( 22 ) NOW, let us turn to the contentions raised by Mr. P. K. Roy, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, Shri Shyam Sundar Das in W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997. ( 23 ) IT is the submission of Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner that Shri Shyam Sundar Das, writ petitioner has been validly appointed as Public Prosecutor by the Order dated 23. 6. 93 and effect should be given to the said order. ( 23 ) IT is the submission of Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner that Shri Shyam Sundar Das, writ petitioner has been validly appointed as Public Prosecutor by the Order dated 23. 6. 93 and effect should be given to the said order. Writ petition being W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1997 is filed for a direction in the nature of mandamus for directing the respondent authorities to give effect to the said order of appointment dated 23. 6. 93. ( 24 ) THE supervening circumstances whereby the petitioner, Shri Shyam Sundar Das could not function as Public Prosecutor despite his appointment as such have already been noted above. The question now for consideration is whether after the expiry of the term of three years, notwithstanding that he could not function as such, whether any writ can be issued with the directions as prayed for. ( 25 ) MR. Roy contended that the appointment is for a period of three years and the term can also be renewed. The petitioner has not been allowed to assume charge or function as such until 28. 11. 97 when he started functioning as Public Prosecutor on and from 28. 11. 97 as per the interim order of Justice Altamas Kabir until the Division Bench vacated all interim orders by Their Lordships order dated 3. 12. 97. Mr. P. K. Roy contends that the term of three years is to be reckoned from the date of assumption of charge and is to be for a period of three years thereafter. I cannot accede to the said contention. The order of appointment dated 23. 6. 93 itself states that the appointment of Shri Shyam Sundar Das as Public Prosecutor is with effect from 1. 7. 93. The Manual fixes the term of appointment as not exceeding three years which expired on 1. 7. 96. The period having so expired, the petitioner is not entitled to continue in the said post. Any order or direction by this court, if granted, as prayed for would be conferring a fresh appointment upon the petitioner, the same would not be either in compliance with the mandate of section 24 (4) of the Code or in accordance with the Manual. Any order or direction by this court, if granted, as prayed for would be conferring a fresh appointment upon the petitioner, the same would not be either in compliance with the mandate of section 24 (4) of the Code or in accordance with the Manual. ( 26 ) THE petitioner, Shri Shyam Sundar Das, it is true, could not discharge the function of the post of Public Prosecutor on account of certain interim orders of court and the term for which the appointment was to ensure, thus expired. The writ petitioner Shri Shyam Sundar Das himself have to share the blame for the laches since he did not take any action, namely, impleading himself in the pending writ petition being W. P. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 nor filed the present writ petition until July, 1997 that is after the expiry of the term. The said post of Public Prosecutor, Midnapore has in the circumstances now to be filled up in accordance with the law. The statutory requirement of section 24 of the Code and the procedure as mandated by sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Code for preparation of a penel by the District Magistrate in consultation with the District and Sessions Judge is required to be followed and complied with. As the W. B. Manual does not require first to consider the existing incumbents for extension or renewal of their term and thereafter for taking steps for fresh appointment in their place as in the case of the U. P. Manual, a panel would have to be prepared in terms of sub-section 4 of section 24 of the Code and if the existing incumbent is also so empanelled and is found more suitable in comparison to other persons available for appointment, it is certainly open to the appointing authority to exercise the power vested in it under sub-para 8' of para 96 of the Manual for renewing the period. The requirement of the preparation of a panel, however, cannot be dispensed with. ( 27 ) MR. Roy, however, relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court (i) in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Balwant Singh and Ors. , reported in 1996 (4) Supreme 696 and (ii) in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors. ( 27 ) MR. Roy, however, relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court (i) in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Balwant Singh and Ors. , reported in 1996 (4) Supreme 696 and (ii) in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors. , reported in 1997 (8) Supreme 254 and (iii) a judgment of the learned single Judge of this court in Matter No. 2980 of 1994, in support of his contention that the petitioner does not loose the right to be considered for appointment from the panel which expired during the pendency of the legal proceedings and that the period covered by the interim orders is liable to be concluded for computing the terms of office. ( 28 ) IN Balwant Singh's case (supra) it was held that the seniority of candidates cannot be given with retrospective effect from the date of selection of the candidate but from the date of actual joining notwithstanding that they could not join the service due to the pendency of the legal proceedings. The instant case is not one relating to seniority or determination of seniority. The said case is of no assistance to the petitioner. ( 29 ) LICHHO Devi's case arose out of land acquisition proceedings and construction of section 11a of Land Acquisition Act. The court in that case held that the period during which the stay order was in operation had to be excluded for computing the prescribed period under section 11a of the Act. This case can have no application to the facts of the present case. ( 30 ) AS regards the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Matter No. 2980 of 1994 is concerned, the same dealt with the validity of a panel which expired during the pendency of legal proceedings, and it was held that the claim of those in the panel cannot be defeated on the ground that the panel has lost its validity. The instant case is not one relating to the life of the panel but is one relating to the expiry of the tenure of post. The said case is thus also distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The instant case is not one relating to the life of the panel but is one relating to the expiry of the tenure of post. The said case is thus also distinguishable on the facts of the present case. ( 31 ) IN the result, both the writ petitions i. e. C. O. No. 7979 (W) of 1993 and W. P. No. 9584 (W) of 1993 be and are hereby dismissed. The State respondents are directed to fill up the post of Public Prosecutor, Midnapore District in accordance with section 24 of the Code read with relevant paragraphs of W. B. Legal Remembrancer's Manual within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. ( 32 ) IT may only be clarified here that no opinion has been expressed on the question of eligibility, suitability or efficiency of the petitioners herein in the respective two writ petitions. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed