K. S. Gupta,j. ( 1 ) PETITIONER filed application under Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 alleging that it is a joint stock company and, inter-alia, carries on business as carriers by sea. Respondent is a limited company and carries on business as can alysing agents for import and export- of minerals and metals including rock phosphate. By a charter party dated 10th October, 1988 petitioner s Vessel m. v. mir was let out for carriage of bulk rock phosphate of the quantity not exceeding 13,650 M. Ts. and not less than 12,350 M. Ts. from % Safe Berths Aqaba to 1 or 2 Safe Berth (s) or 2 Safe Port (s) Anchorages India. Disputes having arisen between the parties regarding computation of allowable time at load port and discharge port, the matter was referred for arbitration. Petitioner appointed K. P. Patel while the respondent appointed G. N. Saxena as the Arbitrators. Arbitrators held a preliminary hearing on 14th March, 1992 in New Delhi on which date they issued directions to the parties to file the statement of claims/reply etc. Arbitrators further informed at the preliminary hearing that they have appointed H. M. Singh as the Umpire. Accordingly, petitioner filed their statement of claims. Next hearing in the matter was held in Bombay on 8th September, 1992 on which date respondent sought an adjournment on the ground that they were negotiating a settlement with the petitioner. Since the settlement was not arrived at, the Arbitrators held a further hearing on 25th August, 1994 at New Deli. Respondent s Counsel in that hearing raised the objection that as four months period for making and publishing the award had already expired the Arbitrators had become functus officio. It is further alleged that the respondent is yet to file their reply to the statement of claims filed by the petitioner and the respondent is trying to stall the arbitration proceedings as much as possible. It was prayed that time for making and publishing the award by the Arbitrators be extended for a further period of six months. It is further alleged that the respondent is yet to file their reply to the statement of claims filed by the petitioner and the respondent is trying to stall the arbitration proceedings as much as possible. It was prayed that time for making and publishing the award by the Arbitrators be extended for a further period of six months. ( 2 ) IN the reply respondent has not denied the referring of the disputes in regard to the computation of allowable time at the load port and discharge port to K. P. Patel and G. N. Saxena, Arbitrators and the nature of the proceedings which took place on 14th March, 1992, 8th September, 1992 and 25th August, 1994, as alleged. However, it is stated that the petitioner after 8th September, 1992 did not even bother to attend to the matter as a result whereof for about 2 years there was absolutely no hearing in the arbitration case. It is denied that the petitioner is entitled to the extention of time as prayed for. ( 3 ) SUBMISSION advanced by the learned Counsel of the petitioner was that on 8th September, 1992 instead of filing reply to the petitioner s statement of claims, adjournment was sought by the respondent on the ground of negotiating a settlement with the petitioner and on the subsequent date of hearing on 25th August, 1994 an objection was raised on respondent s behalf of the Arbitrators having become functus officio for their haying not made and published the award within a period of four months of their entering upon the reference. Thus the respondent by their conduct are stopped from opposing the extension of time sought for in the application. On the other hand, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel of the respondent was that there is a time gap of about 14 months in between the filing of the present application and the arbitration proceedings lastly held on 25th August, 1994 and the petitioner has not furnished any reason whatsoever in regard to the late filing of the application. According to him, discretion under Section 28 of the Act has to be exercised in a judicious manner and for cogent reasons by the Court. According to him, discretion under Section 28 of the Act has to be exercised in a judicious manner and for cogent reasons by the Court. Strong reliance was placed on J. W. Oliver v. Mian Dost Mohammad, AIR 1935 Lahore 191; M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Amarnath Sharma, AIR 1971 Ori 288 ; M/s. Mohinder Singh and Co. v. UOI and Ors. , AIR 1972 Jamuu and Kashmir 63 and M/s. Lila Kishan Kailash Kumar v. DDA, AIR 1985 NOC 121 Delhi. ( 4 ) IN J. W. Oliver s case (supra) it was held by a Division Bench thus: "the Indian Arbitration Act prescribes a procedure for the expeditious and speedy settlement of disputes by private Tribunals especially those arising in commercial transactions, and the Legislature has, in the schedule, fixed a period of three months for the delivery of awards in cases where no time is fixed in the reference. The Court has no doubt a discretion to extend time under Section 12, but it will do so only if cogent reasons are forthcoming. Obviously the discretion cannot be exercised in favour of a party who himself has been negligent and has been guilty of dilatory tactics. " ( 5 ) SAID ration in/w. Steel Ltd, s case (supra) and in para No. 10 of the report it was held : "the impugned order comes directly within the mischief of the aforesaid dictum. Though in 1966 parties were called upon to have extension of time, the opposite party filed the application under Section 28 (1) of the Act about three years after. Delay and dilatory tactics have not been explained by any cogent reason as the opposite party was doing his contract work at Burla in 1968 and could have taken steps for extension of time. ( 6 ) IN remaining two decisions in M/s. Mohinder Singh and Co. and M/s. Lila Kishan Kailash Kumar s case (supra), the view taken was that the power to extend time for making award being discretionary must be exercised judicially by the Court. ( 7 ) WHILE dealing with the discretion in the matter on page 320 of Russel on the Law of Arbitration (20th edition) it has been observed : "the power conferred by the section is entirely discretionary and will not be exercised unless the Court thinks fit in each particular case. ( 7 ) WHILE dealing with the discretion in the matter on page 320 of Russel on the Law of Arbitration (20th edition) it has been observed : "the power conferred by the section is entirely discretionary and will not be exercised unless the Court thinks fit in each particular case. Where there has been inexcusable delay in applying for an enlargement, the application will, as a rule, be refused. " ( 8 ) INDISPUTABLY, present application was filed on 18th October, 1995 and it is absolutely silent about the reasons of late filing thereof by about 14 months beyond 25th August, 1994. In my opinion, conduct of the respondent in seeking time for negotiating with the petitioner before the Arbitrators could have assumed importance only when the petitioner had disdosed cogent reasons of the late filing of the application by about 14 months. Taking note of the law laid down in the Authorities referred to above, in the absence of reasons to the said effect the petitioner cannot be said to have made out a case for extension of time for making and publishing the award as prayed for. Application thus deserves to be dismissed. Dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed. ( 9 ) THE admitted facts, therefore, on the above basis which will emerge are that the motor cycle was being used by three persons including the driver and that was not within the permissible limit as laid down by Section 85 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is also incorporated in Section 128 of the 1988 Act. The carrying of more persons on a vehicle will certainly make the ride somewhat unstable which may contribute to the accident. Moreover the Tribunal has considered the other evidence on record also to arrive at a conclusion that there was some contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the motor cycle and I am not inclined to reverse that finding in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The same is accordingly affirmed. ( 10 ) THE Tribunal lastly directed that the 60% of amount in one case and 50% in the other two cases as awarded shall be put in the fixed deposit receipts in scheduled Bank fora period of/years with liberty to draw interest quarterly. The same is accordingly affirmed. ( 10 ) THE Tribunal lastly directed that the 60% of amount in one case and 50% in the other two cases as awarded shall be put in the fixed deposit receipts in scheduled Bank fora period of/years with liberty to draw interest quarterly. This direction is usually given in the nature of each case when the parties interest is required to be protected. In the present case the claimants are well educated and are in a position to handle the awarded amount in the best possible manner they deem proper and appropriate. Moreover the accident took place as far back as on 30th April, 1984 and it will be in the interest of justice to release the awarded amounts in favour of the claimants. The entire amounts including the amounts lying in the fixed deposit receipts shall be released to the claimants by the respective Banks within four weeks from today. This will also include balance amounts including interest till date @ 15% as awarded by the Tribunal as due in terms of the Award dated 1st December, 1995 from respondents 2 and 3 which will be disbursed within two months from today. In view of the aforesaid, the FAO Nos-177/96,178/96and 179/96 are allowed and FAONos. 161/96,166/96 and 168/96filed by the Union of India are dismissed with consolidated costs which are quantified at Rs. 5,000. 00.