Judgment J.C. Gupta, J. 1. This is tenant's petition for quashing the order dated 8-1-1998 and 19-2-96 passed by respondents No. 1 and 2 respectively. 2. Facts, admitted or found to have been established by the Court below may be put in brief. Father of respondents No. 3 to 7, Ram Narain, moved an application under Section 21(l)(a) of Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the Act', for the release of the disputed accommodation against the petitioner. By means of the order dated 20-1-89, the Prescribed Authority allowed the said application. The petitioner filed rent appeal No. 12 of 1989 in the court of District Judge which was transferred for hearing and disposal to the court of Respondent No. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, Ram Narain landlord died on 14-1-95. On 30-8-95 an application was moved on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased landlord for dismissing the appeal on the ground of not bringing legal heirs of the deceased landlord on record. This application was accompanied with an affidavit and the death certificate of Ram Narain. A copy of the said application was also served upon the Counsel for the appellant. Till 12-2-96, no objections were filed on behalf of the appellant to the aforesaid application nor any application was moved for substitution. Arguments on the aforesaid application were heard on 12-2-96 and 19-2-96 and ultimately appeal was dismissed on the same day, i.e. 19-2-96. The said order was not challenged by the petitioner in any court of law. However, on 4-4-96, an application alongwith an affidavit was moved for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased landlord, after condoning the delay. It was stated therein that the application for substitution had been prepared on 13-2-95 itself but the same was filed in a wrong court due to the mistake of the clerk of the Counsel. The appellant had been searching the said application and after rinding out the same he has filed this application. Alongwith the substitution application, another application was moved for recalling the order dated 19-2-96 dismissing the appeal. Objections were filed on behalf of the respondents No. 3 to 7 and the court below summoned the record of the Oath Commissioner and also the witnesses whose affidavits were filed in support of the petitioner's case. Alongwith the substitution application, another application was moved for recalling the order dated 19-2-96 dismissing the appeal. Objections were filed on behalf of the respondents No. 3 to 7 and the court below summoned the record of the Oath Commissioner and also the witnesses whose affidavits were filed in support of the petitioner's case. It has been found by the court below that the petitioner's assertion itiiat the substitution application had been prepared on 13-2-95 was not correct rather the finding is that a forgery appears to have been committed in the affidavit and it has been antedated. It has also been found by the court below that it was highly doubtful that the said application had been filed in a wrong court and was returned to the appellant after the dismiss al of the appeal. With these findings, the Court below had rejected the petitioner's application. Aggrieved by the impugend order dated 8-1-98, the petitioner has come up in this writ petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended before this court since provisions of Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Act are merely directory, there fore, even if the substitution application had not been moved within time, the appeal should not have been dismissed as abated. It has also been argued that the view taken by the court below that the application for recalling the order dated 19-2-96 amounted to reviewing the order was not correct as through that application a prayer was made for setting at naught a wrong order passed earlier by the court. Learned Counsel argued that Rule 25 simply provides for substitution of the names of the heirs or legal representatives of any person who was a party to the proceeding and died during the pendency of the same and it nowhere states about the consequences which were to follow for not moving the application for substitution in time and this provision is unlike the provisions contained in Order 22, C.P.C. wherein it is specifically provided that failure to bring legal representatives of the deceased party may result in abatement of suit or appeal as the case may be. In sup port of his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Saxena v. Prescribed authority, 1981 ARC 247. In sup port of his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Saxena v. Prescribed authority, 1981 ARC 247. If this case it was held that Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Act provides a period of one month for making an application for substitution for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party. This Rule, however, does not state anywhere of the effects if such an application is not made within time. There is nothing in this Rule to indicate that the proceedings will abate if no application is made within a month of the date of the death of a party. Since the Rule is silent in this regard the provisions of this Rule can at best be directory and not mandatory. In this case the landlord had filed an application for ejectment of the original tenant Ram Chandra Saxena under Section 21 of the Act. During the pendency of the same Ram Chandra Saxena died. The landlord moved an application for substitution of the names of only two sons of the deceased tenant namely Kailash Chandra Saxena and Subhash Chandra Saxena. The said application was allowed on 22-5-1976. Subhash Chandra Saxena, the petitioner before the court thereafter filed an objection stating that since some of the legal representatives were deliberately avoided to be impleaded as party, the release application was liable to be dismissed. The landlord thereupon moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) framed under the Act for the impleadment of the two other sons of the deceased tenant. This application was al lowed and against this order writ petition was filed in this court. It is in the light of these facts that the order allowing impleadment of the other two heirs beyond the time prescribed under Rule 25 was held not to be in contravention of law and the proceeding not to have abated. 3. Reliance has also been placed upon Dr. Purshottam Das Dwivedi v. District Judge, Jalaun at Oral, 1996 (28) AIR 234, 1996 (2) JCLR 477 (All). Hon'ble Sudhir Narain, J. held in the said decision that neither Section 34 nor Rule 25 provides for abatement of the proceedings in case of death of the tenant or landlord who is a party in the proceedings. Purshottam Das Dwivedi v. District Judge, Jalaun at Oral, 1996 (28) AIR 234, 1996 (2) JCLR 477 (All). Hon'ble Sudhir Narain, J. held in the said decision that neither Section 34 nor Rule 25 provides for abatement of the proceedings in case of death of the tenant or landlord who is a party in the proceedings. It was further held that in case, the party in the proceedings dies and on the date of hearing of the case, there is no application for substitution, the Court, may pass appropriate order in accordance with law, taking into consideration the death of such party. In case, application is filed for substitution of the heirs of the deceased after expiry of the period of limitation as provided under Rule 25(1) the Court may consider it keeping in view that this provision is directory. In that particular case, the Court accepted the version of the petitioner that, steps for filing the substitution application had been taken within the prescribed period of limitation and that version was not disbelieved by the courts below. It was further found that the applicant had acted in good faith and the mistake was bond fide. It was due to the mistake of the clerk of the Advocate that the application for substitution could not be moved within time. In these circumstances, the order dismissing the appeal as abated was set aside. Reliance has also been placed on a decision rendered by the same Hon'ble Judge in the case of Mis. G.R. Bhargava and Sons v. The Prescribed Authority and others, 1995 (2) AIR 128 wherein it was held that even if the substitution application was filed beyond the period of limitation of one month as provided under Rule 25, still it has to be considered and may be allowed. 4. From the respondent side reliance has, however, been placed upon the case of Deena Nath and another v. Special Judge/a. D.J., Azamgarh, 1995 (1) AR. C. 30 wherein it was held that it is true that Rule 25of the Rules framed under the Act does not make a mention of abatement but even so the proceedings could not be kept pending for all times to come in the expectation of someone appearing and filing a substitution application some day. C. 30 wherein it was held that it is true that Rule 25of the Rules framed under the Act does not make a mention of abatement but even so the proceedings could not be kept pending for all times to come in the expectation of someone appearing and filing a substitution application some day. The learned Judge further held that the p' that proceedings under Section 21 of the Act could not be treated as having abated despite substitution not having been made and the matter would have had to be kept pending is not tenable. Learned Counsel for the respondent further invited the attention of the Court to the decision of the case of Puran Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1996 SC 1092 . This decision was of course rendered in relation to the writ proceedings but in my opinion the ratio laid down therein can conveniently be applied to the provisions of Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Act. In that case the death of a party had occurred during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court. The Apex Court proceeded to deal with the problem on the basis of the provisions contained in Order xxii of C.P.C., are not applicable to writ proceedings. Their lordships held "even if it is held that Order XXII of the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings or writ appeals, it does not mean that the petitioner or the appellant in such writ petition or writ appeal can ignore the death of the respondent if the right to pursue remedy even after death of the respondent survives. After the death of the respondent it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner or the appellant to substitute the heirs of such respondent within a reasonable time "as no time limit is provided in the Rules, it was further observed that in the absence of any prescribed period what should be a reasonable time, the Court may take note of period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased defendant or the respondent which is 90 days. The Supreme Court further observed that there is no question of automatic abatement in such proceedings and if such an application is field beyond the period of 90 days of death of such respondent, the Court may take into consideration the facts and circumstances of that particular case for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal representatives and this power has to be exercised on well know and settled principles in respect of exercise of discretionary power by the High Court. If the court is satisfied that the delay, if any, in substituting the heirs of deceased respondent was not intentional and sufficient cause has been shown for not taking timely steps, the Court can substitute the legal representatives and proceed with hearing or the case. At the same time the High Court has to be conscious that after lapse of time of valuable right accrues to the legal representative of the deceased respondent and he should not be compelled to contest a claim which due to the inaction of the petitioner or the appellant has become final. 5. The position of law which emerges out is that Rule 25 of the rules framed under the Act simply provides a period of one month for making an application for substitution for bringing on record the legal representatives of any person who was party to the proceedings and died during the pendency of the same. It nowhere states of the effects for not moving such an application within the prescribed period. There is no automatic abatement of the proceedings like the one as contained in Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, the rule is only directory. However, it does not mean that the proceedings could be continued against a dead person and could be kept pending for all times to come in the expectation of filing of an application for substitution. Since there is no automatic abatement, if an application for substitution is made even after the expiry or prescribed time of one month, the Court may allow the same. Since there is no automatic abatement, if an application for substitution is made even after the expiry or prescribed time of one month, the Court may allow the same. Such an application may even be allowed where the proceedings or the appeal have been dropped or dismissed as the case may be, where it is shown that the party applying for substitution had a sufficient cause and acted in good faith in not moving the substitution application within the prescribed period. What could amount to 'sufficient cause', will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast formula can be laid down in this regard. The power of condone the delay is to be exercised on well known and settled principles in respect of discretionary powers of the Court. As the provision of Rule 25 are only directory, the exercise of the discretion should be liberal but not arbitrary. 6. In the present case it has to be seen whether the petitioner's case could be brought under the category of 'sufficient cause'. During the pendency of appeal filed by the petitioner, the sole respondent died on 14-1-1995. Undisputedly no application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased landlord was moved by the tenant appellant within one month from the date of death of the landlord. When no such steps were taken by the petitioner-appellant, the legal representatives of the landlord themselves moved an application on 30-8-95 to dismiss the appeal. Despite this, neither any objection nor any substitution application was filed on behalf of the petitioner till 19-2-96 and on this date the appellate court dismissed the appeal. It was only on 4-4-96 that an application was moved for substitution with the allegations that the application for substitution had already been drafted and prepared earlier but the same could not be filed in time before the appellate court on account of the mistake committed by the clerk of the lawyer as he filed that application in a wrong court. Had this assertion been found correct with the court it could be argued that the petitioner had a sufficient cause and was entitled to get the order of dismissal of the appeal set aside. Had this assertion been found correct with the court it could be argued that the petitioner had a sufficient cause and was entitled to get the order of dismissal of the appeal set aside. However, the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that it was not proved that the application for substitution had infact been prepared on the date as alleged by the petitioner. The Counsel who is alleged to have drafted the said application was not produced in court nor he was asked to give any statement at the Bar. Affidavit of the alleged clerk of the Counsel was of course filed and as per the stand of landlords, that clerk was not attached with the Counsel who was representing the petitioner at that time. On the application moved by the respondent-landlord, the lower appellate court ordered production of the said clerk for cross-examination but he was not produced and the court has rightly drawn an adverse inference against the petitioner. The clerk of the court where the application for substitution is alleged to have been wrongly moved, was produced for cross-examination and the court below has given congent and convincing reasons to disbelieve him. In addition to the reasonings advanced by the lower appellate court for disbelieving his evidence, it may also be stated here that under the rules framed for the subordinate court, any petition, application or documents in any court can be returned to the party concerned only under the orders of the court and not otherwise. Undisputedly there is no such order of the court on the application and affidavit alleged to have been returned to the petitioner by the clerk of the said court. It need not be repeated again that lower appellate court has specifically found as a fact that during the relevant period, the clerk whose affidavit was filed by the petitioner was not posted in that court where the application is alleged to have been moved. The court below on examination of facts and circumstances has found that forgery has been committed in Oath Commissioner's register as well as in the affidavit and originally the date was put at some places as 13-2-96 and there has been interpolation in the figure of the year. The court below on examination of facts and circumstances has found that forgery has been committed in Oath Commissioner's register as well as in the affidavit and originally the date was put at some places as 13-2-96 and there has been interpolation in the figure of the year. It has been rightly pointed out by the lower appellate Court that had the application and affidavit been prepared on 13-2-95, there was no question of the date being mentioned as 13-2-96 which date was yet to arrive after one year. It was not a mistake of a past date. I find no reason to differ with the view taken by the lower appellate court that infact no such application or affidavit had been prepared on 19-2-95 as alleged by the petitioner and no steps were deliberately taken for bringing legal representatives on record despite the above fact having brought to the notice of the petitioner by the respondents through their application dated 30-8-95. The, appeal was dismissed on 19-2-96. During the period from 30-8-95 to 19-2- 96 also no steps were taken nor it was asserted before the lower appellate court that application for substitution has been moved in a wrong court and the same was being traced. It appears that when appeal was dismissed on 19-2-96, all these papers were forged and thereafter the instant applications were got moved on behalf of the petitioner on 4-4-96. It is well settled law that when a person approaches the Court of equity in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, he must come with clean hands. In the present case, the petitioner is guilty of manipulating documents by committing forgery and in this view of the matter, this Court will be loath in granting the discretionary relief to the petitioner. 7. In the present case, the petitioner is guilty of manipulating documents by committing forgery and in this view of the matter, this Court will be loath in granting the discretionary relief to the petitioner. 7. In the case of K.B. Agrawal v. Smt. Chandrawati, 1975 AIR page 580 it was held that an application for substitution under Rule 25 has to be moved within the prescribed period of one month from the date of death of the party and that the legal representatives of the deceased party have a right to claim that any application moved-beyond the prescribed period should be rejected Of course, the application for substitution even if moved after the prescribed period of limitation be allowed m a particular case a case of sufficient cause has been made out but then it will depend upon facts of each case whether or not the sufficient cause existed which prevented the party concerned to move substitution application within time. In the case of Hakim Singh v. District Judge and others, AIR 1982 All 108 , it was held that the sufficiency of cause for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a matter which rests within the jurisdiction of lower courts as it has to be made after appraisal of evidence and the High Court in writ jurisdiction does not interfere with such orders passed on appraisal of evidence on record. In the present case, the court below has appraised the evidence and other material on the record and has recorded a categorical finding that there was no sufficient cause for not moving the substitution application within time though the petitioner had even been apprised by the respondents that his appeal was liable to be dismissed on account of not bringing legal heirs of the deceased on record. 8. For the above reasons, the impugned order does not call for interference and the appeal filed by the petitioner before the court below 'has rightly been dismissed. 8. For the above reasons, the impugned order does not call for interference and the appeal filed by the petitioner before the court below 'has rightly been dismissed. Though Order XXII, C.P.C. in terms may not be applicable to the proceedings under the Act but as pointed out above, the proceedings could not be kept pending for an indefinite period and when has been found by the lower court that the petitioner had failed to establish that he had a sufficient cause in not moving substitution application earlier to the dismissal of the appeal on 19-2-96 and was guilty of committing forgery, the application m question were rightly rejected. For the above reasons and discussions this writ petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.