D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is tenants Revision under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent act (for short "the Act" ). ( 2 ) BRIEF facts are that the respondent landlord filed Suit for eviction of the tenants revisionists on the ground that the tenant created nuisance in the suit accommodation and further that the tenant had built a new building and thereby acquired vacant possession of suitable residence after coming into operation of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. Eviction was also sought on ground of non-payment of rent. ( 3 ) THE Suit was resisted by the revisionist on the ground that he was not in arrears of rent and that he did not commit any nuisance in the suit accommodation. He also pleaded that no doubt he constructed four storied building, but the said building was for commercial purpose and it was let out to various tenants for being used as shop and office and that no portion in the building was available for occupation of the landlord and that this building was not suitable for residence. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court did not find the plea of nuisance having been established by the landlord. Likewise the claim for eviction on ground of arrears of rent was also not found established. The Trial Court, however, found that the revisionist had built a building consisting of four stories and at least four rooms, two on the second floor and two on the third floor with facility of water, electricity, lavatory and bath-room were available to the tenant revisionist. Hence Decree for eviction was passed under Sec. 13 (1) (1) of the bombay Rent Act. ( 5 ) AN Appeal was preferred which was dismissed. It is, therefore, this Revision. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties were heard at length. The judgments of the two courts below were carefully scrutinised. The only point pressed by the learned Counsel for the revisionist was that the two Courts below committed manifest error of law in applying the provision of Sec. 13 ( 1) (1) of the Act. ( 7 ) IT is a case of concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below that the tenant had built a suitable accommodation for his residence and it was in his occupation on the date of the Suit. ( 7 ) IT is a case of concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below that the tenant had built a suitable accommodation for his residence and it was in his occupation on the date of the Suit. Hence he could be evicted under Sec. (13) (2) (1) of the Act. The concurrent finding of fact renders scope for interference in revision very much limited. However, the learned Counsel for the revisionist contended that the two courts below should have determined that the so called four rooms respectively on the 2nd and 3rd floor were suitable for being used as residence by the tenant - defendant No. 1 and then only the provision of Sec. 13 (1) (1) could be applied. He further contended that the matter is to be examined in the light of three essential conditions. According to Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Counsel for the revisionist the first point to be considered is whether the revisionist was a tenant when he constructed building used for commercial purpose or he was in some other capacity like licensee as in the case of the plaintiff. The second condition, according to him, is that the building should have been acquired or built by the tenant and not by the licensee. The third condition, according to him, is that the building so constructed is suitable for residence of the tenant. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for the revisionist unless these three conditions are satisfied the Suit could not be decreed under Sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Act. ( 9 ) COINING to the first condition it was argued by the learned Counsel for the revisionist that even according tr the case of the respondent the revisionist was a licensee from the beginning and that he was accepted to be tenant by the landlord only through notice dated 24. 9. 1979 and since the building was constructed in the year 1978 it cannot be said that on that date the revisionist was a tenant of the landlord. 9. 1979 and since the building was constructed in the year 1978 it cannot be said that on that date the revisionist was a tenant of the landlord. ( 10 ) THE question whether on the date of the notice or on the date of the Suit or on some prior date there existed a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is a pure question of fact and since both the Courts below have recorded concurrent finding that the revisionist was tenant of the landlord on the relevant date and this finding is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record it hardly requires any interference in this revision. Shri S. M. Shah contended that in the notice dated 24. 9. 1979 it was the case of the landlord that prior to this stage the revisionist was his licensee. However, this contention could not be supported from any such recital in the notice. He next argued that there is such recital in Para : 3 of the plaint that the licence was created on 1. 9. 1970. However, the learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that initially there was dispute about the status of the tenant and a suit was filed for eviction of the revisionist earlier in 1977 alleging that he was a licensee. That Suit was dismissed on grounds of jurisdiction because it was filed in the Small Causes Court. The matter was dropped and was not taken up further. She further argued that in 1977 an application was given by the revisionist for fixation of standard rent if he was not tenant he could not have moved such application for fixation of standard rent. She further rightly contended that in the notice dated 24. 9. 1979 the rent from 1. 9. 1976 was demanded. If the rent was demanded in the notice since 1. 9. 1976 it can hardly be said that in the said notice the landlord accepted the revisionist to be tenant since 24. 9. 1979. Thus, testing the findings of the two Courts below on this touch stone I find that on the date of the suit and since 1. 9. 1976 the revisionist was tenant of the respondent. The first condition is, therefore, established that the revisionist was tenant before the institution of the Suit. ( 11 ) COMING to the second condition, viz. Thus, testing the findings of the two Courts below on this touch stone I find that on the date of the suit and since 1. 9. 1976 the revisionist was tenant of the respondent. The first condition is, therefore, established that the revisionist was tenant before the institution of the Suit. ( 11 ) COMING to the second condition, viz. that the tenant had acquired a building. This condition is also fulfilled, because even according to the revisionist new four storied building was constructed by him. It was argued that there was ancestral property which was partitioned amongst the brother and the revisionist in which the revisionist got some land over which he constructed four storied building. Thus, it is also established that the building was constructed by the revisionist in the capacity of tenant between 1978 to 1980. ( 12 ) THE next condition, according to Mr. S. M. Shah, is that the building so constructed should be suitable for the residence of the tenant. On this point submission has been that the building was constructed for commercial purpose and not for residential purpose. He further contended that the building is situated in Dandi Bazar which is business locality and it is not situated in the residential locality and as such the building is not fit and suitable for residence. He also contended that there are two rooms on the 2nd floor and two rooms on the 3rd floor, but there is no facility of latrine, bath-room, kitchen, etc. which are essential amenities for residence and in this view for matter four rooms could not be used for residential purpose. ( 13 ) TIME and again it has been held that intention of the tenant to construct the building is not relevant and material. It is not his intention or voilition to construct the commercial building which is to be taken into consideration. Likewise it has been held time and again that if the building is constructed in commercial area or market area and it is fit for residence there is in prohibition for using the same as residence and the landlord cannot be refused decree for eviction against the tenant simply on this insistence of the tenant. ( 14 ) ANOTHER contention of Mr. ( 14 ) ANOTHER contention of Mr. S. M. Shah has been that no portion of this building was available for occupation nor any portion was in occupation of the revisionist on the date of the Suit and the relevant date is the date of the Suit. Hence also Sec. 13 (1) (1) could not be applied. ( 15 ) SECTION 13 (1) (1) provides that the tenant, after coming into operation of this Act, has built, acquired,vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. ( 16 ) IN the instant case it is established that the tenant had build four storied building between 1978 and 1980 i. e. alter coming into operation of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. The only thing to be seen is whether accommodation is suitable for residence or not and it is further to be seen whether any portion in the new building was available for occupation by the revisionist or any portion was actually in his possession on the date of the Suit. It may be noticed that in the disputed accommodation under the tenancy of the revisionist there are only four rooms. As pointed out earlier there are four rooms in the new building, two on the second floor and two on the third floor. ( 17 ) MR. S. M. Shah, pointed out that the ground floor was constructed on 1. 12. 1977 and completion certificate was granted by the Municipal Board on 9. 12. 1977. He further pointed out that first floor was completed on 12. 5. 1978 and completion certificate was granted by the Municipal Board on 12. 9. 1978. Regarding 2nd and 3rd floor he pointed oul that these floors were completed on 1. 3. 1979 and completion certificate by the Municipal board was granted on 21. 7. 1980. The Trial Court found from the evidence on record and observed that the suit was filed in September, 1980, but this is incorrect finding. The judgment of the Trial Court itself shows that the suit was registered on 5. 12. 1980. The trial Court further found that the two rooms on the 2nd floor and two rooms on the 3rd floor were in possession of defendant No. 1 in 1980. The judgment of the Trial Court itself shows that the suit was registered on 5. 12. 1980. The trial Court further found that the two rooms on the 2nd floor and two rooms on the 3rd floor were in possession of defendant No. 1 in 1980. This is also a finding of fact which is supported from the statement of the revisionist as well as from the entries in the municipal assessment of the relevant year. It is therefore difficult to accept the contention from the side of the revisionist that the entire building was let out and no portion was vacant till the suit was filed. Of course the ground floor and first floor portions were let out to various tenants, but from the entries in the municipal assessment it is obvious thai 2nd and 3rd floor were not let out and no tenant was found in occupation till December. 1980. Since the defendant revisionist obtained completion certificate of 2nd and 3rd floor on 21. 7. 1980, the revisionist cannot be heard to say that the entire building was constructed- in 1978 and that it was let out in 1978. From the municipal Assessment Register it is further clear that only first floor and ground floor were previously let out to the various tenants. In the assessment register of 1980-81 Ex. 52 there was no mention of any tenant being in occupation on the 2nd and 3rd floor. So is the case with the assessment of 1981-82. However, in the Assessment Register of 1982-83 tenants were found entered on the 2nd and 3rd floor of the building. It is thus menifest that the 2nd and 3rd floor were let out during pendency of the suit and not either on the date of the suit or prior to that. If the tenant decided to let out 2nd and 3rd floor during pendency of the suit he cannot be permitted to say that these four rooms on the 2nd and 3rd floor were not in his occupation or were not available for his occupation. No evidence has been given by the revisionist that on the date of the Suit these two floors were let out and if so what were the names of the tenants occupying these portions. It is thus difficult to accept the contention of Mr. No evidence has been given by the revisionist that on the date of the Suit these two floors were let out and if so what were the names of the tenants occupying these portions. It is thus difficult to accept the contention of Mr. S. M. Shah that on the date of the suit no portion was available for occupation by the revisionist or that no portion was in his occupation. In the absence of cogent evidence that the 2nd and 3rd floor were let out before institution of the Suit it can be inferred that these portions were available to the revisionist and these portions were actually vacant for the purpose of the Revisionist. ( 18 ) COMING to the suitability of the accommodation for residential purpose it is true that it is the duty of the Court to see whether alleged accommodation built by the tenant is suitable for residence or not. As pointed out earlier there are only four rooms in the disputed portion whereas there are four rooms in the newly constructed building on the 2nd and 3rd floor. Jt was also found by the Trial Court that these four rooms are quite big rooms with open space. It has also been found by the Trial Court that there is facility of lavatory, bath-room, water tank and electricity for these four rooms. The contention to the contrary of Shri S. M. Shah that only one urinal has been constructed for the use of persons attending the commercial premises cannot be accepted. The Trial Court found from the evidence on record that the defendant No. 1 admitted that the passage and staircase are common for his building and also for the adjoining building of his brother. He further admitted that there are lavatories in the passage on the staircase of each floor. In lace of this admission of the defendant No. 1 in the witness box the contention that only one urinal has been constructed cannot be accepted. The defendant No. 1 further admitted that there is water tank on the terrace on the third floor of new building and there is water supply to lavatory and bath room from water tank. The defendant No. 1 further produced one agreement in the Trial Court which was entered into between him and his brother rajendra Ex. 104, under which the revisionist had paid Rs. The defendant No. 1 further produced one agreement in the Trial Court which was entered into between him and his brother rajendra Ex. 104, under which the revisionist had paid Rs. 1500/- to his brother for user of lavatory and bath room situated in the passage. On these admissions and evidence the trial Court rightly concluded that there is facility of lavatory, bath-room and electricity in the new building constructed by the tenant. ( 19 ) SO far as the question of kitchen is concerned since it is found that these four rooms are big rooms the tenant can use portion of one of such room by making temporary partition as kitchen. Such temporary construction in these days of scarecity of accommodation is not something unusual. ( 20 ) TO sum up therefore it can be concluded that on the date of the suit and before the revisionist had already constructed four storied building and in the said four storied building two rooms on the 2nd floor and two rooms on the 3rd floor were available for vacant possession by the revisionist. These four rooms had facility of latrine, bath-room. electricity. Temporary kitchen can be made as suggested in the foregoing portion of the judgment. This accommodation was available in vacant stage on the date of the suit which was subsequently let out by the revisionist during the pendency of the Suit. As such Sec. 13 (1) (1) was rightly applied by the two Courts below and the decree for eviction was rightly passed. There is thus no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. .