Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 31.1.91 contained in Annexure 2 to the petition, by which the Disciplinary Authority has forfeitted 1/5th of the pension of the petitioner for a period of three years. (2). Petitioner who was working as Tehsildar, retired on 30.10.1987. He was served with charge-sheet dated 1.6.88 under rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, ``the Rules, 1958) with the allegation that when he was working as Tehsildar, he had verified a false certificate in favour of one Nopa Ram, on the basis of which he had been allotted the land which was illegal. The petitioner had filed a reply to the said charge-sheet. After holding the full-fledged enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry - report contained in Annexure 1, by which the enquiry officer found him guilty for favouring said Shri Nopa Ram by verifying the certificate, on the basis of the false verification, said Nopa Ram had been allotted the land which could not have been allotted to him. However, the petitioner was exonerated on the other charge, in which it was alleged that Nopa Ram had been his direct relative as the said charge could not be proved for want of evidence. The competent authority agreed with the enquiry officer and passed the impugned order dated 31.1.91. Hence this writ petition. (3). Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. (4). It is settled proposition of law that a person, if aggrieved by some order, must exhaust the statutory remedy as has been held by the Honble Apex Court in the case of G. Virappa Pillai vs. Raman & Raman Ltd. (1); and H.B. Gandhi vs. Gopi Nath (2). In the instant case, an appeal against the impugned order lies to the Secretary to the Government under rule 23 of the Rules, 1958 and further a review lies under rule 34 of the said Rules before His Excellency the Governor of the State. The petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedies and approached this Court straight-away. In the instant case, an appeal against the impugned order lies to the Secretary to the Government under rule 23 of the Rules, 1958 and further a review lies under rule 34 of the said Rules before His Excellency the Governor of the State. The petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedies and approached this Court straight-away. However, looking to the special facts and circumstances of the case, as the matter is pending before this Court for last eight years, it is not desirable at this stage to ask the petitioner to seek the statutory remedies in view of the judg- ment of the Supreme Court in Dr. B.P. Agrawal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (3), and the matter is heard on merit. (5). Mr. Sharma could not assail the procedure adopted by the respondents authority while holding the enquiry and it is settled law that the right lies against the procedure of decision making and not against the decision. However, Mr. Sharma has submitted that the petitioner was not served with a copy of the enquiry report before passing the impugned order. It is settled proposition of law that even the non-supply of the copy of the enquiry report is not fatal unless the delinquent employee satisfies the Court that due to non-compliance of this requirement the cause of the petitioner has been materially prejudiced as the validity of the order is to be tested on the touch-stone of prejudice. (Vide Managing Director ECIL Ltd. vs. B. Karunakar (4); State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (5); Maj. G.S. Sondhi vs. Union of India (6) ; and S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India (7). (6). It has further been submitted by Mr. Sharma that the order of allotment of land made in favour of Nopa Ram under rule 13-A of the Rajasthan Colonisation Rules, 1975 had been challenged before the Appellate Court and the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 25.3.89 contained in Annexure 1 to the petition. It is submitted that once the allotment has been found proper by the Appellate Authority, the respondents could not have initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It is submitted that once the allotment has been found proper by the Appellate Authority, the respondents could not have initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. However, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that it is not so and if the conduct of the petitioner creates doubt in respect of his integrity, the Disciplinary Authority was competent to initiate disciplinary proceed- ings and pass appropriate order of punishment against the petitioner. (7). The issue involved here in no more res integra. This issue has been considered by the Supreme Court in S. Govinda Menon vs. Union of India (8), wherein it was observed as under :- ``...........It is not necessary that a member of the service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duty as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or omission is such as to reflect the reputation of the officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, there is no reason why dis- ciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him for that act or omission........The test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable occasion with nature and condition of his service or where the act or omission has caused any reflection upon the reputation of the member of the service for integrity or devotion of duty as a public servant.......The proposition put forward was that quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated under the provisions of the Act, are final and binding and cannot be questioned by the executive government through disciplinary proceedings.......The charge is, therefore, one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions......But in the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge of his duty as Commissioner. The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his function, he acted in uttar disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his function, he acted in uttar disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharges his function that brought up in these proceedings......It is manifest, therefore, that though the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be question in appeal or revision under the Act, the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary act if there is proof that the Commissioner has acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power. (8). Thus, the aforesaid judgment is an authority that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee in respect of the action, even if it pertains to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. (9). While deciding the aforesaid judgment in S. Govinda Menon (supra) the Honble Supreme Court had relied upon the judgment in Pearce vs. Foster (9), wherein it had been held as under :– ``If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. (10). The Supreme Court, in Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan (10), very heavily relied upon its earlier judgment in S. Govind Menon (supra) and observed that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person, is not acting as a Judge and in the disciplinary proceedings it is the conduct of the officer in discharge of his official duties and not the correctness or legality of his decisions or judgments which are to be examined as the legality of the orders can be questioned on appellate or revisional forum. In such case the Government cannot be precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. In such case the Government cannot be precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The Court summarised some circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken, which are as under:- ``(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Govern- ment servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party, (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bri- be may be because Lord Coke said long ago ``though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great. (11). The Court further observed that the said instances were not exhaustive. However, it was further observed by the Supreme Court that each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case and no absolute rule can be postulated. (12). The Honble Supreme Court had examined this issue earlier in Union of India & Ors. vs. A.N. Saxena (11), and by taking the same view the Court observed that where the actions of an officer ``indicate culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or improper motive, there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken, even if the officer was performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in discharge or purported to discharge the said functions. (13). Similarly, in Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (12), the Honble Supreme court rejected the averment that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated again- st an officer if it relates to his acts or omission which pertains to the exercise of his judicial or quasi-judicial powers. (14). In the instant case, the petitioner had gone out of way to help Nopa Ram and verified the certificate which was false, therefore, even if the order of allotment of land has been affirmed by the competent Authority, that would not exonerate the petitioner from his liability of disciplinary proceedings. (15). In view of the above, the contention of Mr. In the instant case, the petitioner had gone out of way to help Nopa Ram and verified the certificate which was false, therefore, even if the order of allotment of land has been affirmed by the competent Authority, that would not exonerate the petitioner from his liability of disciplinary proceedings. (15). In view of the above, the contention of Mr. Sharma is devoid of any merit and no fault can be found with the impugned order dated 31.1.93 (Annexure 2). (16). No other point has been urged before me. (17). Thus, the petition is devoid of any merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The interim order passed earlier, stands discharged.