G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition under Article 226 the writ petitioners have challenged the award dated the 29th August, 1996 passed by the Labour Court, Andaman and Nicobar Islands at Port Blair as published in the Andaman and Nicobar Gazette dated the 31st December, 1996, Annexure-G to the writ petition. The said award was passed by the Labour Court on a reference made to the said court by the Lieutenant Governor, Andaman and Nicobar administration on 6th December, 1994 under section 10 (1) read with section 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The notification about the said reference is Annexure-D to the writ petition. The matter that was the subject of reference was formulated in the said notification by the Lieutenant Governor (Administrator), Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the following form:'whether the action of the management of Central Agriculture Research Institute in retrenching 42 Majdoors as per annexure with effect from 1. 8. 86 is legal and justified. If not, to what relief are the concerned workmen entitled?' ( 2 ) THE said reference was disposed of by the Labour Court by passing the following award after hearing:"that the action of the management of Central Agriculture Research Institute in retrenching 42 Majdoors as per annexure to the reference with effect from 1. 8. 86 is illegal and unjustified. The 42 first party workmen cannot be treated to be disengaged from 1. 8. 86. The second party will give employment to those of 42 first party workmen who have not been given job after 31. 7. 86 on daily rated basis. They should be treated as regular employees as and when regular vacancy arises. As regards the back wages the second party will pay Rs. 10,000 (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) to each of the workmen in full and final settlement of their claim towards back wages. " ( 3 ) THE concerned 42 workmen of the Central Agricultural Research Institute, Port Blair were represented before the Labour Court through their union, namely, the Plantation Crops Workers Union. the said reference was contested by the management, namely, the management of the Central Agricultural Research Institute. In the present writ petition the said institute is the writ petitioner No. 1 and its Director is the writ petitioner No. 2. the said reference was contested by the management, namely, the management of the Central Agricultural Research Institute. In the present writ petition the said institute is the writ petitioner No. 1 and its Director is the writ petitioner No. 2. The case of the concerned workmen before the labour court was that the concerned workmen being daily wage workers were engaged under the Director of Central Agricultural Research Institute in different agricultural farms on different dates, mostly starting from 1. 7. 80 and all of them continued their services till 31. 7. 86 and that as they completed 240 days continuous service in a year they were entitled to get themselves registered under the nominal master rolls, but the management did not give the benefit which the workmen were entitled to and their union approached the management and the Labour Commissioner but the management never turned up in the conciliation proceeding arranged by the Labour Commissioner and the Workers' Union representing the daily rated workers took recourse to strike on 30. 7. 86 after giving one months notice to the management for one day strike. It was also the case of the workers that the management did not allow them job on and from 31. 8. 86 and rather recruited new persons in place of those workers and published advertisement in newspaper for taking more workers and although the Majdoors under reference approached the management once again they were not recruited and instead new Majdoors from Kamraj Multipurpose Labour Contracts Cooperative Society Ltd. were recruited. It was also the allegation of the concerned workers that the management was in constant need of Majdoors and the jobs performed by the workers under reference were permanent in nature and those Majdoors were entitled to get increased pay with effect from 1. 4. 83 in terms of circular dated 5. 3. 83. The allegation of violation of the provisions of sections 25n, 25f, 25b and 25g of the Industrial Disputes Act was also made against the management. ( 4 ) THE management contested the reference before the Labour Court alleging that the reference being a second reference on the same point which was earlier disposed of by an award was not maintainable. The allegation of violation of the provisions of sections 25n, 25f, 25b and 25g of the Industrial Disputes Act was also made against the management. ( 4 ) THE management contested the reference before the Labour Court alleging that the reference being a second reference on the same point which was earlier disposed of by an award was not maintainable. It was contended on behalf of the management before the labour court that none of the workers under reference had completed continuous service of 240 days as per the provisions of section 25b of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the contention raised by the concerned workmen that they were retrenched from service was not tenable and they were not entitled to get any relief under section 25. The management also categorically denied that 7 named workmen out of the oncerned workmen were ever in the employment of the management. ( 5 ) IN disposing of the reference the labour court held that all the concerned workmen including the disputed seven were engaged by the management and they were also daily rated labourers under the management. The labour court also held that all the 42 workmen were the employees under the management and they were not in employment since 1. 8. 86 and that they were disengaged on and from 1. 8. 86 and such disengagement amounted to retrenchment. It was further held that such retrenchment was illegal and unjustified and they should not be treated to be disengaged. Ultimately, on the basis of its findings the labour court passed the award which I have already quoted earlier. ( 6 ) IN challenging the said award the writ petitioner has taken up several points. One of the principal contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner is that the Lieutenant Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands is not the 'appropriate Government' under the Industrial Disputes Act. He submits that in view of section 2 (a) I. D. Act, 1947 the appropriate government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government is the Central Government and not the Lieutenant-Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. He submits that in view of section 2 (a) I. D. Act, 1947 the appropriate government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government is the Central Government and not the Lieutenant-Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It is submitted by him that before Independence and till the advent of the Constitution, Andaman and Nicobar Islands was administered as Chief Commissioner's province under the Governor-General in terms of section 94 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and thereafter this territory was administered by the President of India through Chief Commissioner under Article 243 (1) till 30. 10. 56 when the Constitution (Seventh Amendment), Act, 1956 came into force with effect from 1. 11. 56. It is his further submission that on the commencement of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution with effect from 1. 11. 56 Andaman and Nicobar Islands became a Union Territory and came to be administered by the President under Article 239 (1) through an administrator designated as the Chief Commissioner till the 11th November, 1982. It may be mentioned here that with effect from the 12th November, 1982 the designation of the administrator for the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands has been changed to 'lieutenant Governor' from 'chief Commissioner'. It has already been noted that under the Government of India Act, 1935 Andaman and Nocobar Islands was administered as a Chief Commissioner's province. Section 94 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided that a Chief Commissioner's province would be administered by the Governor-General acting, to such extent as he might think fit, through a Chief Commissioner to be appointed by him in his discretion. In the Constitution of India, when it came into force on 26. 1. 50, Andaman and Nicobar Islands was included as a territory under Part-D of the First Schedule of the Constitution. Article 243 (1) as it stood at that time was as follows:"243 : (1) Any territory specified in Part-D of the First Schedule. . . shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent, as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or other authority to be appointed by him. Article 243 (1) as it stood at that time was as follows:"243 : (1) Any territory specified in Part-D of the First Schedule. . . shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent, as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or other authority to be appointed by him. (2) The President may make regulations for the peace and good Government of any such territory and any regulation so made may repeal or amend any law made by Parliament or any existing law which is for the time being applicable for such territory and when promulgated by the President, shall have the same force and effect as an act of Parliament which applies to that territory. " ( 7 ) AT that time Article 239 related to Part-C States, such as, Azmir, Bhopal, Bilaspur, Durg, Delhi etc. , but not Andaman and Nicobar Islands which was included in Part-D. It was provided in Article 239 (1) as it existed at the time that subject to the other provisions of that part a State specified in Part-C of the First Schedule would be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thought fit, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant Governor to be appointed by him or through the Government of a neighbouring State. Subsequently, the 7th Amendment of the Constitution came into force with effect from 1. 11. 56. By that Amendment Part-C and Part-D were abolished inter alia and in their place Union Territory was created. Andaman and Nicobar Islands was included therein as a Union Territory. Since Part-C and Part-D of the First Schedule were abolished with creation of Union Territory, Article 239 and Article 240 were also suitably modified by the 7th Amendment of the Constitution and the Article 239 (1) as it now stands after the 7th Amendment of the Constitution runs thus:"s. 239 (1)save as otherwise provided by the Parliament by law every Union Territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify. " ( 8 ) BY that Amendment Article 240 was also amended and on such amendment Article 240 stands thus:-"240: (1) The President may make regulations for the peace, progress and good Government of the Union Territory of (a) the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, (2) Any regulation so made may repeal or amend any Act made by Parliament or any other law, which is for the time being applicable to the 'union Territory' and, when promulgated by the President, shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament which applies to that Territory. " ( 9 ) ARTICLE 243 was repealed by the 7th Amendment but section 29 (2) of the Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 made it clear that notwithstanding the repeal of Article 243 all regulations made by the President under that Article and which were in force immediately before such repeal would continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. It is argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that in view of the existing provision of Article 239 (1) every Union Territory including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is now administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify, and therefore the Lieutenant -Governor as administrator appointed by the President will have only such power as may be assigned to him by the President under Article 239 (1) but the cannot exercise any power which has not been so assigned or delegated to him by the President under the said Article. He further submits that since the power of making reference for adjudication of an Industrial dispute under the I. D. Act in respect of a dispute relating to an establishments under the control of the Central Government rests with the Central Government in view of section 2 (a) read with section 10 of the I. D. Act it is the Central Government which can make the reference in respect of such dispute and not by the Lieutenant-Governor, particularly when there has been no delegation of such power in favour of the Lieutenant-Governor after the introduction of the existing Article 239 by the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. He further submits that since the Lieutenant-Governor is not the successor of the erstwhile Chief Commissioner exercising power before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution, the power which might have been delegated to the Chief Commissioner earlier before the advent of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution, will not be available to the administrator appointed under Article 239 after the introduction of the 7th Amendment. In this connection he also relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986)1 SCC 133 wherein it was held that the Lieutenant-Governor (of Delhi) was not the successor of the Chief Commissioner. In our present case however the question whether the Lieutenant-Governor, Andaman and Nocobar Islands can make a reference in respect of an industrial dispute relating to a Central Government establishment can be decided even accepting the position that the administrator of Andaman and Nicobar Islands is not a successor of the Chief Commissioner acting before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. In view of Article 367 of the Constitution, the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies for the interpretation of the Constitution. In view of this constitutional provision read with section 3 (58) (b) 'state' also includes Union Territory. Section 3 (59) (c) of the General Clauses Act defines 'state Government' to mean the Central Government in a Union Territory as respect anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (7th Amendment) Act,1956. Be that as it may, since in this case the'appropriate Government' for making reference under the Industrial Disputes Act is the Central Government the question is whether the Lieutenant-Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands has the power to make such reference. The learned advocate for the petitioner attracts my attention to the notification of the impugned reference dated the 6th December, 1994 Annexure-D to the writ petition and submits that in the said notification, a notification dated the 28th June, 1947 of the Government of India, Department of Labour has been referred to by the Lieutenant-Governor (Administrator) as a source of the power he was exercising in making that reference and it is submitted that the Lieutenant Governor cannot avail of any such notification of 1947 because he is not a successor of the erstwhile Chief Commissioner and there has not been any fresh authorisation in his favour after the commencement of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. It is however now a settled proposition of law that a wrong reference to any provision of law or notification while exercising a power will not make such exercise per se bad or unlawful if it is found that such power really exists in law although not expressly mentioned while exercising that power. Therefore even if it is assumed that the 1947 notification referred to in the impugned reference was available to the Lieutenant-Governor yet the reference will not be bad for that reason alone if it is found that such power of reference actually rests with the Lieutenant-Governor in law. The notification dated the 28th June, 1947 referred to in the inpugned reference of the Lieutenant-Governor runs thus:-"new Delhi, the 28th June, 1947. Notification no. LR- (9): In pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 94 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Labour No. LR 1 (9) dated the 14th May, 1947, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the functions of the provincial Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) with the exception of the functions discharged under section 38 thereof, shall, in respect of every Chief Commissioner's province other than British Baluchistan, be discharged by the Chief Commissioner. " ( 10 ) THERE is however a subsequent notification also dated the 13th December, 1955 which runs thus:-"dated, New Delhi, the 13th December, 1955. Notification no. LR. 1 (59) : In pursuance of clause (1) of Article 243 of the Constitution, the President hereby directs that the Cnief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, shall, subject to the control of the President, exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Central Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947)except section 38 thereof. " ( 11 ) THIS notification is therefore a clear delegation of power in favour of the Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Islands to make a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act by exercising the powers and functions of the Central Government under the said Act. But the learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that no such power was subsequently delegated to the administrator after the commencement of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution which came into force on 1. 11. 56. But the learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that no such power was subsequently delegated to the administrator after the commencement of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution which came into force on 1. 11. 56. As we have seen, earlier Article 243 contained provisions relating to the administration of Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a territory included in Part-D of the First Schedule. The above-mentioned notification dated the 13th December, 1955 authorising the Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Islands to exercise the powers and functions of the Central Government under the I. D. Act was issued in pursuance of Article 243 (1 ). By 7th Amendment of the Constitution which came into force on 1. 11. 56 Article 243 was however repealed and therefore it is contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the authorisation under Article 243 in favour of the Chief Commissioner which was made earlier was no more available after the 7th Amendment of the Constitution by which the Article 243 was itself repealed. This contention at the first blush no doubt appears forceful. But I must say that it fails to bear close scrutiny. It will be seen that although by the 7th Amendment of the Constitution Article 243 was repealed yet the provisions contained therein were re-enacted with some modification and incorporated in Articles 239 and 240 by the same 7th Amendment of the Constitution. That being so, even had there been no fresh authorisation after such amendment in favour of the administrator of Andaman and Nicobar Islands under Article 239 yet in view of the principle of section 24 of the General Clauses Act the earlier authorisation by notification dated the 13th December, 1955 in favour of the Chief Commissioner for exercising the powers of the Central Government under the I. D. Act would have continued to operate as if issued under the re-enacted provision of Article 239 authorising the administrator of Andaman and Nicobar Islands to exercise the powers of the Central Government under the I. D. Act, and this is the position irrespective of the fact that the administrator appointed under Article 239 after the 7th Amendment is not the successor of the Chief Commissioner through whom the President used to administer the territory under Article 243 as it existed before the 7th Amendment. However, in the instant case we do not even require the aid of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, because there was a specific and fresh notification authorising the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of the post-7th Amendment era to exercise the same power which the Chief Commissioner of the pre-7th Amendment era was empowered to exercise. This notification is the notification dated the 1st November, 1956 which has been quoted in the Supreme Court decision in Express Newspaper v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 (at p. 209 ). The Notification runs thus:-"new Delhi-2, the 1st November, 1956. S. R. O. In pursuance of Clause (1) of Article 239 of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the President hereby directs as follows: where, by virtue of any order made in pursuance of Article 239 or as the case may be, Article 243 of the Constitution as in force immediately before the 1st day of November, 1956 or any other power under the Constitution, any powers and functions were, immediately before that day, the powers and functions of-* * * * * * * * * * (c) the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Such powers and functions shall, on and after the said day, be exercised and discharged respectively by-* * * * * * * * * * (iii) the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. subject to the like control by the President, as were exercisable by him before the said day over the Lieutenant Governor or as the case may be, the Chief Commissioner referred to in clause (a), (b) or (c ). " ( 12 ) IT may be noted here that the expression 'chief Commissioner as used in the said notification with reference to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of the post-7th Amendment era is an assigned designation for the constitutionally contemplated 'administrator' in Article 239 (1 ). That assigned designation of the 'administrator' was subsequently changed as Lieutenant-Governor in 1982. It is needless to say that such change of assigned designation does not effect the identity of the constitutionally contemplated 'administrator' under Article 239 (1) and the power delegated to such 'administrator (describing him by his assigned designation at any particular point of time. That assigned designation of the 'administrator' was subsequently changed as Lieutenant-Governor in 1982. It is needless to say that such change of assigned designation does not effect the identity of the constitutionally contemplated 'administrator' under Article 239 (1) and the power delegated to such 'administrator (describing him by his assigned designation at any particular point of time. This notification dated the 1st November, 1956 authorising the administrator (Chief Commissioner) of Andaman and Nicobar Islands to exercise the same powers as were delegated to the Chief Commissioner earlier is a complete answer to negative the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that after the 7th Amendment the administrator of Andaman and Nicobar Islands has not been authorised afresh to exercise any delegated power of the Central Government under the I. D. Act. Therefore even without the aid of section 24 of the General Clauses Act the administrator, whether designated as Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant- overnor, continued to enjoy the same powers as were earlier delegated to the Chief Commissioner before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. As I have already noted, in 1982 the designation of the administrator was changed by the President as 'lieutenant-Governor' in place of the earlier designtion 'chief Commissioner'. Such change of nomenclature, it is to be reiterated, obviously does not effect the power which was vested in the administrator after the 7th Amendment of the Constitution by the notification dated the 1st November, 1956 continuing the authorisation earlier made. In the result I find that the Lieutenant-Governor, even without being the successor of the erstwhile Chief Commissioner existing before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution, continued to enjoy the powers of the Central Government under the I. D. Act in view of the authorisation made by the President in 1955 and continued by the President by a fresh notification dated 1. 11. 56 in the backdrop of the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. I therefore, find that the Lieutenant-Governor acting as an appropriate Government, with due authority, validly made the impugned reference under the I. D. Act. ( 13 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner also submits that in this case the Conciliation Officer had not the authority to discharge the function of the Conciliation Officer in view of certain notification of the Central Government, namely, the notification dated 29. 1. ( 13 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner also submits that in this case the Conciliation Officer had not the authority to discharge the function of the Conciliation Officer in view of certain notification of the Central Government, namely, the notification dated 29. 1. 91 and as such, the reference made on consideration of such report is bad in law. It is however to be noted here that this point that the Conciliation Officer had not the authority in this case to act as Conciliation Officer was however not taken not only before the Labour Court but also in the writ petition or in the supplementary affidavit filed in this writ proceeding. That being so, this point in my opinion cannot be properly considered as the same has been taken up only during the hearing, particularly during the reply in course of hearing. In this connection the learned advocate for the petitioner also referred to an unreported decision of a learned Judge of this court dated 31. 7. 97 in C. O. 42 (W) of 1997 (Chief Engineer v. Lieutenant-Governor and Ors. ). That decision, it appears, did not specifically examine as to what will be the effect of the reference even if the person acting as the Conciliation Officer was not the authorised person for the purpose. Section 10 (1) of the I. D. Act empowers the appropriate Government to make the reference if it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Section 12 relates to the duties of the Conciliation Officer. Sub-section (5) of section 12 however provides that the appropriate Government may make a reference after considering the report of the Conciliation Officer. Reading section 10 (1) and section 12 together it will appear that there is no mandatory requirement that before making the reference the appropriate Government must take into consideration the report of the Conciliation Officer. The appropriate Government can form an opinion and refer a dispute under section 10 (1) for adjudication by the industrial tribunal/labour court even without any report from the Conciliation Officer. Report of the Conciliation Officer is not a sine qua non for referring the matter for adjudication. Reference of a dispute under section 10 (1) I. D. Act can be made by the appropriate Government if it 'is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. Report of the Conciliation Officer is not a sine qua non for referring the matter for adjudication. Reference of a dispute under section 10 (1) I. D. Act can be made by the appropriate Government if it 'is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. There is no restriction on the method of forming the requisite opinion except the implied restriction that such opinion must be based on consideration of matters germane to the issue. Section 12 relates to the duties of the Conciliation Officers. Sub-section (1) of section 12 says that where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the Conciliation Officer may or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and notice under section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. It will thus be seen that the conciliation process is also not a mandatory requirement except if at all in a limited case mentioned therein. Sub-section (5) of section 12 says that if on consideration of the report of the Conciliation Officer the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference, in that case it may make such reference. The power to make a reference under section 10, it has to be appreciated, is not dependent upon compliance of section 12. Section 12 is an independent procedure which allows an opportunity to bring about a settlement of dispute, if possible, through the instrumentality of the Conciliation Officer who submits his report to the appropriate Government. On consideration of that report the appropriate Government may make a reference. Section 12 is an independent procedure which allows an opportunity to bring about a settlement of dispute, if possible, through the instrumentality of the Conciliation Officer who submits his report to the appropriate Government. On consideration of that report the appropriate Government may make a reference. In the Delhi High Court decision in Sital Prasad Jain v. Punjab National Bank, 1982 (44) FLR 242 it has been held that it is well settled that the powers conferred on the appropriate Government under section 10 of the Act is an administrative power and that the formation of the opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its functions does not make it any the less an administrative act and that the jurisdictional fact on which the appropriate Government may act or the formation of an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended undoubtedly is a subjective one, but the next step of making a reference is an administrative step and further that the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. In the Delhi High Court decision in New Delhi Tailoring Mazdoor Union v. S. C. Sharma and Co. , 1979 (39) FLR 195 also it was held that the forming opinion of the Government before referring the dispute with regard to its existence or apprehension is an administrative power and there must be some material before the Government on which it forms its opinion and that the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. In the Bombay High Court decision in Jaslok Hospital v. B. V. Chavan 1983 (46) FLR 209 it was held that under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 10 it is open for the Government to make a reference to the appropriate authority for adjudication even though the conciliation proceedings had not commenced or had commenced but are not still disposed of. It was also observed that even assuming that the holding of conciliation proceedings prior to making of order of reference was necessary, still, the provisions must be construed as merely directory and not mandatory and, therefore, failure to hold conciliation proceedings would not result into the award being null and void. It was also observed that even assuming that the holding of conciliation proceedings prior to making of order of reference was necessary, still, the provisions must be construed as merely directory and not mandatory and, therefore, failure to hold conciliation proceedings would not result into the award being null and void. If that is so in respect of a case filling under the second proviso to section 10 (1), that is even more so in respect of a case falling outside the scope of the said second proviso. In the Calcutta High Court decision in Machinery Manufacturers Corpn. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 1982 (44) FLR 304 (at 307) decided by G. N. Ray, J. (as his Lordship then was) it was observed thus:-"in my view, there was no necessity for the State Government asking for a report and views of the Labour Commissioner on the basis of the subsequent representation made by the Union. The power under section 10 can be exercised even without having any conciliation proceeding and even in a case where the State Government at some point of time held the view that no reference was warranted. " ( 14 ) ON a careful consideration of the matter I am in respectful agreement with the above noted decisions in the matter. It is also to be noted here that in the unreported decision in C. O. 42 (W) of 1997 (supra) all these decisions referred to above and their effect have not been at all considered, apart from the fact that the said decision did not deal with the question as to what would be the effect of the consideration of the report of a Conciliation Officer not authorised to act as such Conciliation Officer in the matter. The said unreported decision has therefore no binding effect and this decision is a decision per incuriam. The said unreported decision has therefore no binding effect and this decision is a decision per incuriam. On a proper study of the relevant provisions of the I. D. Act and supported by the other judicial pronouncements referred to above, I am of the clear opinion that reference under section 10 (1) can be made even without a report from the Conciliation Officer and that being so even if in any particular case the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer is one rendered by an officer not empowered to act as Conciliation Officer yet consideration of that report by the appropriate Government will not per se make the reference bad in law. The cardinal point of requirement in this context is the formation of 'opinion' by the appropriate Government based on matters germane to the issue and not the authority of the Conciliation Officer submitting report. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, the most formidable point that has been urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner, the Central Agricultural Research Institute, Port Blair (CARI, for short) is not an industry within the meaning of the term defined in the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the Industrial Disputes Act is not at all applicable in this case and that being so the impugned reference, award of the labour court and the entire proceedings are bad in law being wholly without jurisdiction. There is no doubt that if CARI is not an industry within the meaning of the term as defined in the I. D. Act in that case the concerned dispute between the CARI and the private-respondents will not come within the sweep of industrial dispute under the I. D. Act and the labour court to which the impugned reference was made also will have no jurisdiction to embark upon an adjudication of any such dispute and therefore the whole proceeding before the labour court and the award passed by the labour court will be wholly without jurisdiction and will be liable to be quashed for that reason