JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal from a summary decree for eviction passed on 9. 394 by the Hon'ble Justice Ruma Pal, under chapter XIIIA of our Original Side Rules. 2. THE tenant came into possession under a registered Indenture of lease dated 1965 where under the term was limited for 21 years with an option to renew for a further period of five years being given to the lessee. The initial period expired with the expiry of 31.10.86. Rent @ Rs. 950/- only per month was thereafter also paid and accepted for five years. 3. THE premises in suit is a flat with servant quarters and garage, the carpet area of the flat being 1800 square foot in one Of the best localities in Calcutta, The rent is perhaps a little on the very low side. 4. BE that as it may. in support of the appeal resisting the summary decree two points were urged by Dr. Banerjee, the arguments being thereafter taken up by Mr. Deb. These were the points of fraudulent pecuniary valuation of the suit seeking to invoke the pecuniary jurisdiction of this court wrongfully, and a point of holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of property Act 5. DR. Banerjee's submission was that on both these grounds his clients were entitled to have leave to defend. So for as the ground of fraudulent inflation of the pecuniary claim of the plaintiff is concerned, we are of the clear opinion that the summary decree passed in the court below cannot be upset on this ground. It is true that if the court is of opinion that the claim of the plaintiff as made in the plaint is absurd and has been made absurdly high to deprive the proper lower court of its jurisdiction, then and in that event the suit can be dismissed on that ground. But for success of a plea of this nature the plaintiffs case has to be very bad, as indeed all fraudulent cases must be. In the Instant case the flat under occupation has a carpet area of 1800 sft. The area is one of the best in our metropolis. The monthly rent of Rs. 950/- is an old rate and is commercially unobtainable today. Mesne profits are claimed in the suit at the rate of Rs. 60. 000/- per month. In the Instant case the flat under occupation has a carpet area of 1800 sft. The area is one of the best in our metropolis. The monthly rent of Rs. 950/- is an old rate and is commercially unobtainable today. Mesne profits are claimed in the suit at the rate of Rs. 60. 000/- per month. It might be high, it might be excessive but it is nowhere near fraudulent. The matter is so clear that allowing the whole suit to go to trial on an issue of this nature would be improper and unjust. The defence in this regard, therefore, was correctly ruled out summarily in the court below and we abide by the first court's reasoning in this regard. 6. IN regard to inflation of jurisdiction Dr. Banerjee relied on the case of Nandita Base, reported at AIR 1987 SC 1947 . Following the dicta in that case we have absolutely no hesitation in opining that claim of Rs, 60. 000/- per month made toy the plaintiff here was in no manner a fanciful claim. It might not succeed at trial (because the money part of the claim is not the subject matter of the summary decree, it being limited only to eviction) but defeating the entire suit on the ground of the claim for mesne profits being of a fraudulent nature would be impossible order to make. Thus, the summary decree for eviction cannot be resisted on this ground. We next come to the point of holding over. Dr. Banerjee's simple submission was that after the period of 21 veal's was over after 31.10.86. his clients did nothing which could be treated as an exercise of the option to renew for the further period of 5 years. There was no letter. There was no oral conversation, nothing at all. Thus, Dr. Banerjee argued, the payment of monthly rent thereafter raised a fresh monthly tenancy as between the landlord and the tenant. This raising of monthly tenancy is in the same nature as is raised by the landlord and tenant agreeing to create a monthly tenancy simply by payment and acceptance of monthly rent, month by month. Dr. Banerjee gave us the case of Delhi Development authority, reported at (1973) 2 SCC S25, alternatively at AIR 1973 SC 2609 . He said on the basis of the observations here that a lease upon renewal is a fresh lease. Dr. Banerjee gave us the case of Delhi Development authority, reported at (1973) 2 SCC S25, alternatively at AIR 1973 SC 2609 . He said on the basis of the observations here that a lease upon renewal is a fresh lease. He submitted that there being no fresh lease here, and yet a payment and acceptance of monthly rent, the court must hold that there was a monthly tenancy and no fresh lease on renewal for a further period of five years. 7. DR. Banerjee then gave us the case of Burmah-Shell, reported at air 1988 SC 1470 . That case involved a sub-lessee occupying the leased land after the first limited period of 10 years of lease was over. The lessee had lost interest in the matter. There was no written instrument executed for grant of a fresh period of five years although a clause to renew for that further period had been provided for in the lease itself. The court held that a 5 year lease could only be made by a written registered instrument Section 107 of the transfer of Property Act was considered the court then opined that there being no written registered instrument, the payment and acceptance of rent month by month had raised a monthly tenancy. We note however, that in the end the court had passed a decree in favour of the landlord even on the footing that a monthly tenancy had arisen. Dr. Banerjee submitted on this basis that here also the further renewal period permitted at the option of the lessee was for five years; here also there was no registered or written instrument: here also there was a payment of rent month by month. Therefore it is at leas an arguable case that a monthly tenancy had arisen. If such were the case, the rent legislation would protect the defendant lessee from an eviction decree. 8. APART from these two cases. Dr. Banerjee also gave us the case of biswabani Private Ltd. , reported at AIR 1980 SC 226 where, the attempt to enter into a fresh lease not being successful, and rent being accepted an inference of tenancy followed. Dr. Banerjee thereafter relied on the single Bench judgment in the case of Rasiklal, reported at AIR 1976 Madras 194. Dr. Banerjee also gave us the case of biswabani Private Ltd. , reported at AIR 1980 SC 226 where, the attempt to enter into a fresh lease not being successful, and rent being accepted an inference of tenancy followed. Dr. Banerjee thereafter relied on the single Bench judgment in the case of Rasiklal, reported at AIR 1976 Madras 194. He submitted that here also it was held that the renewed lease is also to be by a registered instrument and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act does not cease to apply just because the least in question is brought about by exercise of an option to renew. Then Dr. Banerjee gave us an old Division Bench judgment of our court in the case of Bengal National Bank, reported at AIR 1927 Cal 725. He relied on passages from the judgment of Rankin, CJ. And also passages from the judgment of Buckland, J. 9. MR. Mitter, in opposition to these arguments of law cited several authorities including the two mentioned in this regard in the judgment of the first court. He raised several points of distinction and also made certain straight forward simple arguments. Were we to enter into a balancing of authorities, and were we to find that upon a balancing of authorities cited by Dr. Banerjee and the authorities cited by Mr. Mitter the scale of Mr. Mitter's client is heavier, then, this would be no case for passing of a summary decree. It is well known that a summary decree can be supported only when there is absolutely no defence whatsoever which has any likelihood of success at trial. If the defendant's case is not thoroughly bad, the defendant is entitled to have leave to defend and have the luxury of suffering a decree at trial, if that indeed is to be the ultimate fate in the suit. 10. BEFORE we enter into the law of the matter, or such as there is to this case, let us see the facts once more. The defendant went into possession in 1965. It had a long innings thereafter for 21 years to borrow a phrase from the Burmah shell case, para 13) and this long period came to an end on 31.10.86. The defendant went into possession in 1965. It had a long innings thereafter for 21 years to borrow a phrase from the Burmah shell case, para 13) and this long period came to an end on 31.10.86. The lessee had an option to surrender at any time after 10 years after 1965, This option to surrender was never exercised, least so on or after 1.11.86. 11. WITHOUT doing anything whatsoever to show that the lessee intended no longer to occupy the flat under the registered Indenture of lease, the lessee tendered rent in November 1986. 12. THE rent was Rs. 950/ -. This rent was accepted by the landlord. If the lease had continued for 21 years and one month instead of for 21 years from 1965, exactly this identical set of events would have taken place. It is true that the lessee never exercised in writing its option to renew the lease. But the law in this matter is so obvious and clear, we would hot have thought that it is necessary to state it in so many words, had die controversy not been raised before us. 13. THE law is that an option to renew a lease might be exercised by the lessee in any lawful manner which might be prescribed by the parties in their agreement contained in the lease; in the absence of any prescribed mode of exercise of such option, it might be exercised in any lawful manner at all. 14. THE tender by the lessee of the rent fixed by the registered lease is all that is needed for exercise of the lessee's option in this case. Even if parties go to trial after long processes of discovery and inspection are over, and even if parties' witnesses learn a lot of things to say on both sides when they go into the box at that delayed trial, the fact will remain that neither the lessee nor the lessee did anything at all for five years after 31.10.86, other than pay and accept rent and go on in the same manner as before. We specifically do not mention two letters written near the end of four years from 31.10.86 which were relied on by Mr. Mitter in support of the landlord's case. We specifically do not mention two letters written near the end of four years from 31.10.86 which were relied on by Mr. Mitter in support of the landlord's case. If we were to rely on letters and come to decisions on matters which required detailed examination we would not be in a position to pass a summary decree. 15. IN this context it is important to note that a case of holding over under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act can arise if and only if the original lease has come to an end. It cannot be that the original lease and the fresh periodic lease by way of holding over subsist together there is nothing to show that either the lessee or the lessee evinced their constitution not to abide by the terms of the original Indenture. We quote in this regard a passage from the judgment of Rankin, CJ. In the above case of Bengal National Bank (AIR 1907 Cal at 730) : the tenant continuing in occupation under a special agreement for a further lease is a different case from the tenant holding over roes-sly by consent, but if for any reason his agreement has to be disregarded he can call back upon the landlords' mere consent and claim his rights under section 116" 16. IN this case we have searched and searched in vain for any reason why the lessee's original agreement of 1965 has to be disregarded and he has to be assigned the status of a monthly tenant Whether the further period of five years could be more solidly occupied by the tenant by compelling the lessor to execute a lease for five years upon the exercise of the option to renew, is, it is important to note, a complete side issue. The tenant has occupied for five years on payment of the rent mentioned in the registered Indenture Whether he could have got a registered lease for five years, or whether he should have got it is a mater of no importance now. 17. IN the Burma Shell case, the court opined that there being no registered written instrument in that case, a case of monthly tenancy had arised. It is settled law that judgments, even Supreme Court judgments, are not to be read like Acts of Parliament. The ratio has to be extracted upon a whole reading of the case. 17. IN the Burma Shell case, the court opined that there being no registered written instrument in that case, a case of monthly tenancy had arised. It is settled law that judgments, even Supreme Court judgments, are not to be read like Acts of Parliament. The ratio has to be extracted upon a whole reading of the case. Reading this part of the case we have found the ratio to be this that a renewal clause, if exercised, cannot override the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Properly act requiring leases above one year to be registered and further that in the facts of that case (the Supreme Court having mentioned the phrase twice, once at the end of paragraph 5 and once again in the middle of paragraph 7), a monthly tenancy had arisen between the lessor and sub-lessee. It would, in our opinion, be a serious misreading of the case to deduce from there, the thoroughly unacceptable legal proposition that in any and every case, if the period of renewal upon exercise of option by the lessee is not made the subject matter of a written and registered lease, then and in that event, in every such case' without exception, the payment and acceptance of monthly rent will raise a case of holding over and the creation of a periodic tenancy under section 116 of the Transfer of property Act. The result of this proposition of law being right would be so absurd that the proposition itself is shown as such. It did not form the ratio of the Supreme Court ease, which proceed, with respect, on all normal, accepted and well known principles of tenancy law. 18. THE tenant having clearly continued possession after expiry of 31.10.86 on the basis of the written registered original instrument, and the case of a fresh monthly tenancy at the rate of Rs. 950/- per month freshly entered into by a meeting of minds between the landlord and the tenant at that period of time being throughly absurd, having regard to the location and area of the flat in question (not to mention the garage and the servants' quarters) we rule out any defence to the claim for the landlord's delivery of possession as being thoroughly non-existent and moonshine. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs before us and in the court below assessed compendiously at Rs. 60. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs before us and in the court below assessed compendiously at Rs. 60. 000/ -. 19. STAY of operation of this decree is prayed for but is refused. 20. AUTHENTICATED copies of the judgment may issue on the usual undertakings, so that the parties, the department and all others concerned might act thereupon without any delay. Appeal dismissed.