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1998 DIGILAW 402 (BOM)

Leelavati Narayan Bangera @ Kotian v. State of Maharashtra

1998-08-18

T.K.CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, VISHNU SAHAI

body1998
JUDGMENT (ORAL) Vishnu Sahai, J. - This appeal has been preferred by the State of Maharashtra under section 377 (1) Cr. P. C. for enhancement of sentence of the respondents who were tried by the Sessions Judge. Kolhapur in Sessions Case No. 44 of 1985 for offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 302 r/w 149, and 323 r/w 149 IPC and vide judgment dated 29-7-1985 were convicted and sentenced in the manner stated hereinafter. (i) Under section 147 IPC to suffer imprisonment till raising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ - each in default to undergo 3 months RI; (ii) Under section 149 IPC to suffer imprisonment till rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 100l- each in default to undergo 3 months RI; and (iii) Under section 323 r/w 149 IPC to suffer imprisonment till raising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ - each in default to-undergo 3 months RI. The respondents were acquitted for offences under section 302 r/w 149 IPC. 2. In short, the prosecution case was that on 15-12-1993, at about 9/10 a.m. the respondent no. 2 took his bullock-cart from the open space be longing to the deceased Sonabai Shankar Kamalakar and others. At that time, they objected. Respondent no. 2 paid no heed. When he was returning, there was an exchange of abuses between him and Sonabai and others. The same evening at about 7 p.m. when Sonabai Shankar Kamalakar, Maruti Dattu Kamalakar Pandurang Subhana Kamalakar, Ganpati Shankar Kamalakar and, others were sitting in front of the house of Pandurang Kamalakar and talking, the respondents armed with sticks came. The respondents no. 1 asked them as to why they had objected to the bullock-cart being taken in the morning. Sonabai and others told him that the morning incident was over and they should go back. Thereafter, the respondents with fists and kicks started assaulting Sonabai and others. They also started hurling stones. It is said that as a result of the stone being hurled by the respondent no. 1, Sonabai suffered an injury on her head. Apart from Sonabai Kamalakar, Pandurang Kamalakar. Ganpati Kamalakar. Eknath Kamalakar and Baburao Kamalakar also sustained injuries. 3. After the usual F.I.R. investigation etc. They also started hurling stones. It is said that as a result of the stone being hurled by the respondent no. 1, Sonabai suffered an injury on her head. Apart from Sonabai Kamalakar, Pandurang Kamalakar. Ganpati Kamalakar. Eknath Kamalakar and Baburao Kamalakar also sustained injuries. 3. After the usual F.I.R. investigation etc. the respondents were tried for offences detailed in para 1 and were convicted and sentenced in the manner set out in the said para. 4. Aggrieved by the inadequate sentences-awarded to the respondents by the trial Court, the State of Maharashtra has preferred the present appeal praying therein that their sentences be enhanced. 5. We have heard Mr. D.S. Mhaispurkar learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. A. Ingavale counsel for the respondents. Mr .Mhaispurkar vehemently submitted that the circumstances that as a consequence of the assault launched by the respondents, four persons received injuries and one died, warrants imposition of a stiffer sentence on the respondents. We have reflected over his submission and find no merit in it. 6. It is true that Sonabai Kamalakar succumbed to her injuries but the State of Maharashtra has not impugned the acquittal of the respondents for the offence under section 302 r/w 149 IPC. It should be borne in mind that in-the absence of an appeal against acquittal under section 378 (1) Cr. P.C. this Court by suo motu invoking its revisional powers cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and this is clear from a perusal of section 401 (3) Cr. P.C. which deals with the revisional powers of the High Court and reads thus: "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.” 7. Hence, the only question is whether the sentence awarded to the respondents on the remaining counts merits to be enhanced. To that our answer, is in the negative. It is well-settled that the question of sentence is primarily a question of discretion of the sentencing court and unless that discretion had been capriciously exercised and the sentence awarded is manifestly inadequate, the Appellate Court would not interfere. (See Bedraj v. State of U.P.1). To that our answer, is in the negative. It is well-settled that the question of sentence is primarily a question of discretion of the sentencing court and unless that discretion had been capriciously exercised and the sentence awarded is manifestly inadequate, the Appellate Court would not interfere. (See Bedraj v. State of U.P.1). If the sentences awarded to the respondents are examined on the anvil of the ratio laid down in AIR 1955 Supreme Court page 778 (supra), and it is borne in mind that nearly 15 years have elapsed since the incident took place and 13 years since the respondents were sentenced, it cannot be said that their sentences are grossly inadequate and the trial Judge has indulged in a capricious exercise of discretion in awarding them. 8. For the said reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 778.