JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the award dated 7.9.1993 passed under Section 140 of the Act passed by Shri Mangal Chandji Tailor, Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaisalmer in case No. 22/92. 2. The facts shorn of details and necessary for disposal of this appeal may be stated as follows. An accident occurred on 8.5.1992 at 12 O'clock near Sangar tube-well by Jonga Jeep No. RNJ-4551 which was being driven by respondent No. 5 Nakhta Ram rashly and negligently. Respondent No. 5 hit pedestrian Ratnu Dan. As a result of which he died, the legal heirs of deceased Ratnu Dan filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act. The appellant Insurance Company filed the written statement in which a specific plea was taken that the offending vehicle aforesaid was not insured at the time of the accident. The owner of the vehicle respondent No. 6 Premraj obtained the cover note at 2.00 p.m. on that day without disclosing material fact that the vehicle had met with an accident on the same day at 12 O'clock. The owner of the vehicle gave a false undertaking that no accident occurred up to that time. When respondent No. 6 moved an application for release of the above vehicle before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer, the Court, while examining the documents, found some erasing in column No. 3 of the cover note. Hence the office copy of the disputed cover note was called and it was found that the owner made the figure "9" on the figure "2". The over-writing or tampering with the latter was found apparent even by a mere perusal. The Court, therefore, seized the cover note and directed the concerned Development Officer of the appellant Company to lodge a first information report under the relevant Sections of the IPC against respondent No. 6. However, while passing the impugned order, under which a sum of Rs. 25,000/- has been awarded to the heirs of the deceased as no fault liability, the Court did not consider the above material fact. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 4. However, while passing the impugned order, under which a sum of Rs. 25,000/- has been awarded to the heirs of the deceased as no fault liability, the Court did not consider the above material fact. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has very vehemently assailed the impugned order on the ground that the appellant has been erroneously saddled with the liability to pay the amount of interim compensation. Since the cover note or the insurance policy was issued at 2.00 p.m. and the accident occurred at 12 O'clock the policy could not cover the risk arising out of the above accident which occurred admittedly before the policy or the cover note was issued to respondent No. 6. The liability of the Insurance company, even in case of no fault liability, will be based on a contract which is evidenced by the cover note or the, policy taken out by the owner of the vehicle. Since in this case the policy was issued after the accident, the appellant could not have been made liable to pay the amount of no fault liability. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following cases : 5. United Insurance Company v. Pemaram, 1997 DNJ (Raj.) 273 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jikubhai Nathuji Dabhi, 1997 ACJ 351 . 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that in case of no fault liability, the Court is not to follow the normal procedure as prescribed with regard to the adjudication of the claims under Section 110-A of the Act. In the instant case the insurance policy or cover note was issued on the same day the accident occurred. The question whether it was issued after the accident or before can only be decided after making a detailed inquiry. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order be maintained. 7. I have considered the rival contentions. It cannot be gainsaid that while passing an order for awarding a compensation under Section 92-A or Section 140 of the Act, no inquiry is to be made and the Court is not obliged to follow the normal procedure as prescribed with regard to the adjudication of claims under Section 110-A of the Act. The Court has only to see that there has an accident involving a motor vehicle. The Court has only to see that there has an accident involving a motor vehicle. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the Court can pass an interim award. However, the concept of no fault liability is relevant in respect of the owner of the vehicle who is made liable to pay the award on the legal fiction that he is the owner of the vehicle that was involved in the accident. However, the case of the Insurance Company with regard to no fault liability stands on a different footing. The Insurance Company cannot be saddled with the amount of such interim compensation unless it is proved that the vehicle involved was insured with it. In the instant case, a mere perusal of the documents filed before the learned Judge shows that in the proposal form the time "2.00 p.m." was mentioned. In the cover note or policy also the same time has been indicated. However, the figure "2" has been converted into "9" in the cover note in order to show that the cover note was issued at 9.00 a.m. so that the accident that occurred at 12 O'clock could be covered by the above document. After a perusal of the relevant documents, I am satisfied that the cover note was issued to respondent No. 6 at 2.00 p.m. after the accident. It is thus clear that at the time of the accident, the above vehicle was not insured with the appellant Company. Regarding the controversy as to from which time the above insurance policy will commence, there should be no doubt no win view of the decision rendered by this Court in United India Insurance Company v. Pema Ram (supra) in which it was held that if the time is mentioned in the policy then the policy will commence from that time of the day or date. The Apex Court, in National Insurance Company v. Jikubhai (supra) also held that when policy obtained on the day of the accident but after the accident and the policy contained a special contract that the policy would be operative from 4.00 p.m., it was held that the Insurance Company was not liable in view of the enforceability of the special contract under which the policy could be operative from 4.00 p.m. 8. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order qua the appellant. No orders as to costs.Appeal allowed. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order qua the appellant. No orders as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******