JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J.:---The petitioner is the Secretary of Kenya African Students Association (KASA) at Aurangabad (for short, hereinafter, "the Association"). Present petition is filed as a public interest litigation on behalf of the said Association in the matter of hike of tuition fees. The said Association is a registered association and the petitioner is a Kenya national. 2.The petitioner submits that there are about 700 students of Kenya and African countries taking education in the various faculties of the Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad (for short, "the Univeristy"). These students are the members of the Association. It is further submitted that there are 250 students from Kenya who are either studying in Dr. Ambedkar Law College or the M.P. Law College at Aurangabad. The present petition is, therefore, filed for the benefit of 250 Kenyan Law students at Aurangabad. 3.The petitioner states that till the academic year 1991-92 the tuition fees structure was common for the Indian students and foreign students studying in the Law faculty. It is submitted that from the academic year 1992-93, as per the directives of the State Government, the students other than the Indian students were given differential treatment in charging the tuition fees. It is submitted that in the academic year 1992-93 Indian students were charged Rs. 600/- whereas the foreign students were charged Rs. 1000/- towards tuition fees. In the year 1993-94 Indian students were charged Rs. 700/- whereas the foreign students were charged Rs. 2,000/-. In the year 1994-95 it was increased to Rs. 800/- and Rs. 4,000/- respectively. Considering the ratio, there was hike of 14.3% in case of Indian students, whereas it was 100% in case of students other than Indians. It is further submitted that in the year 1996 the respondent No. 2 State of Maharashtra directed to charge fees five times of the Indian students, in case of foreign students. This hike came into operation from the year 1997-98. The petitioner further submits that the tution fees in respect of L.L.M. Part I and Part II were also raised to Rs. 15,000/- from Rs. 3,000/- in case of foreign students. It is therefore, submitted that the hike in tuition fees was without any reasonable justification and it is exorbitant and unreasonable. The petitioner further submits that the tution fees in respect of L.L.M. Part I and Part II were also raised to Rs. 15,000/- from Rs. 3,000/- in case of foreign students. It is therefore, submitted that the hike in tuition fees was without any reasonable justification and it is exorbitant and unreasonable. 4.The petitioner further submits that the Government has issued the Resolution regarding hike in tuition fees some time in the month of November, 1996 and the Vice Chancellor issued circular in January 1997. The Government Resolution and the Circular were not made known to the foreign students till 10th July, 1997. But when the notices were published on the notice board of the college, on 10th July, 1997 they came to know about the said hike. The foreign students of Law were taken by surprise by the said notice. 5.It is further submitted that 95% of the Kenyan students studying in India are coming from an economically backward and downtrodden suppressed peasant class. They have to come to India for the purpose of education on the basis of the treaty which provided equal treatment to Kenyan students and Indian students. It is submitted that since 1970 to 1992 the Kenyan students were required to pay tuition fees equal to the Indian students. When there was hike, for the first time, in tuition fees in the year 1992-93 there was strong protest made by the foreign students and the Honourable Chief Minister intervened and promised not to raise fees for foreign students exceeding Rs. 4,000/-. It is also submitted that a writ petition was filed when there was hike in tution fees to Rs. 4,000/- but in view of the settlement between the members of the said Association and the Honourable Chief Minister, State of Maharashtra in the year 1991-92, the writ petition was withdrawn. 6.It is further submitted that section 12-A of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act of 1956") lays down certain guidelines for regulating fees structure in different Universities in India. It is submitted that the scales of fees will be determined by passing specific regulations in consultation with the Commission and Universities. It is submitted that when the fees structure was modified from time to time there was non compliance of the guidelines as laid down in section 12-A of the said Act of 1956. It is submitted that the scales of fees will be determined by passing specific regulations in consultation with the Commission and Universities. It is submitted that when the fees structure was modified from time to time there was non compliance of the guidelines as laid down in section 12-A of the said Act of 1956. 7.It is also submitted that under section 4 of the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fees) Act, 1987 (for short, "the Act of 1987"), the State Government has been empowered to frame regulations of fees structure. Sub-section (4) of section 4 of the said Act of 1987 indicates that once the fees are revised, it shall remain intact for a period of three years and if the State Government again wants to revise the fees structure, then it shall appoint a committee of experts who will recommend the revision of fees structure. It is submitted that the State Government has also not followed the procedure as contemplated under section 4 of the Act of 1987, while raising the fees after 1992-93 onwards. 8.In the circumstances, the petitioner seeks an appropriate writ to quash and set aside the impugned order of the State Government dated 13-11-1996 and circular of the University, dated 5-12-1996 and 3-1-1997 so also circular of the college dated 10-7-1997 regarding hike in tuition fees for Law course from the academic year 1997-98. 9.On behalf of the respondent No. 1 no reply is filed and the matter is argued from the available record. Shri Godhamgaonkar, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No. 1 Union of India submits that he has received communications from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development (Department of Education), New Delhi vide letters dated 18-8-1997 and 26-9-1997. As per these letters it is stated that the Ministry of External Affairs after referring to all the records available with them on Bilateral Treaties and Agreements signed by India during 1947-1973 finds no such treaty made with the Government of Kenya as mentioned in the petition. It is further urged, on basis of the communication received from the Ministry, by Shri Godhamgaonkar that the University Grants Commission has not framed any regulation as contemplated under section 12-A of the Act of 1956. It is further urged, on basis of the communication received from the Ministry, by Shri Godhamgaonkar that the University Grants Commission has not framed any regulation as contemplated under section 12-A of the Act of 1956. It is, therefore, urged that there is no substance in the statement of facts alleged in the petition that there has been non compliance of section 12-A of the Act of 1956 or treaty made with the Kenya Government by the Government of India. 10.In the facts and circumstances of the case, the principal question arises as to whether the petitioner proves that there has been violation of Article 14 read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in the matter of hike of tuition fees. 11.Shri Shelke, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the petition is maintainable, though it is filed by non-Indian citizen. It is true that Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a general provision and has to be read subject to other provisions included within the part of Fundamental Rights. The expression "any person" as appearing in Article 14 of the Constitution of India includes any person, natural or artificial, whether he is a citizen of India or alien, so as to entitle him for protection enshrined in these Articles. The real question is whether, the petitioner was denied equal protection as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, merely because the Kenyan students are required to pay higher amount of fees. 12.Shri Shelke, learned Counsel for the petitioner took us through the tabular statement incorporated in the petition, to show that there has been clear discrimination in the matter of charging of tuition fees between the Indian and foreign students. It is urged that from that point of view, the Kenyan Students being similarly situated were entitled to avail similar facilities as that was availed by the India students without any discrimination. 13.It cannot be forgotten that the principle of equality as underlined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not mean that every law must have a universal application for all persons, who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. 13.It cannot be forgotten that the principle of equality as underlined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not mean that every law must have a universal application for all persons, who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. The principle does not take away from the State its power to classify the persons for legitimate purposes. It is well settled that the classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough. In other words, differential treatment does not per se constitute violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It denies equal protection only when there is no reasonable basis for the differentiation. This rule of interpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution which is applicable in enactment challenged on the basis of the discrimination is equally applicable to regulation or ordinance or circular as the case may be. Therefore, keeping in view this principle, we have to see whether there has been discriminatory treatment in the matter of hike of tuition fees between the two well defined classes i.e. the Indian students and the foreign students. 14.It is not in dispute that there is difference in the tuition fees in case of Indian students and Kenyan students. It is also undisputed that the hike in tuition fees from the academic year 1992-93 onwards was on higher level in case of students studying in the Law faculty. 15.Shri Naik, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 6 college points out from the decision in case of (The Amalgamated Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. The State of Kerala)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 849 wherein, while considering the provisions of Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, (22 of 1950) which levied tax at a higher rate on foreign companies, on the question as to whether such provisions are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court has given reference to the case of (D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat)2, 1955(1) S.C.R. 1215 : A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 334 which related to the question of admission of students in a Medical College in the State of Madhya Bharat. According to the direction of the State of Madhya Bharat, all students admitted to the College were required to pay a prescribed fee. According to the direction of the State of Madhya Bharat, all students admitted to the College were required to pay a prescribed fee. But students who were not bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat were in addition required to pay capitation fee of Rs. 1,500/-. A student who was not a bona fide resident of Madhya Bharat challenged the capitation fee as being violative of Article 14. The majority of the Court overruled the contention. Speaking for the Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., has said. "The object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent students who are residents of Madhaya Bharat in the prosecution of their studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for State to encourage education within its borders. Education is a State subject and one of the directive principles declared in the Part IV of the Constitution is that the State should make effective provision for education within the limits of its economy..... The State has to contribute for the unkeep and the running of its educational institutions. We are in this petition concerned with a Medical College, and it is well-known that it requires considerable finance to maintain such an institution. If the State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable that it should so order the educational system that the advantage of it would to some extent at least ensure for the benefit of the State? A concession given to the residents of the State in the matter of fee is obviously calculated to serve that end, as presumably some of them might, after passing out of the College, settle down as doctors and serve the needs of the locality. The classification is thus based on a ground which has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the legislation, and is in consequence not open to attack. It has been held in the (State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh)3, 1953 S.C.R. 254 that a classification might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such classification would be eminently just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the concern primarily of the State. It has been held in the (State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh)3, 1953 S.C.R. 254 that a classification might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such classification would be eminently just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the concern primarily of the State. The contention, therefore, that the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of Article 14 must be rejected." 16.Dealing with provisions of Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, in the case of the Amalgamated Tea Estate (cited supra), the Apex Court has held: "The provisions of the Act, which levy tax at a higher rate on foreign companies are not violative of Art. 14, Constitution. There are no grounds to hold that the Statute seeks to treat as unequal companies which are equally circumstanced." It was further observed; "As a matter of fact for various reasons a domestic company may be treated differently from a foreign company in the field of taxation. It is obligation of the State to improve agriculture and consequently it has to invest considerable amount. The State is, therefore, entitled to raise revenue by taxation for investment in agriculture and animal husbandry. So it could reasonably demand 75 per cent of total income as tax from a foreign company. It could demand the same amount of tax from a domestic company also. But the rate of tax on them in lesser. But the tax relief given to them is not proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The State might have chosen to give the domestic companies protection against the foreign companies. And there seems to be yet another good reason for this. The entire income earned by a domestic company from business inside as well as outside India will remain in India. But a good part of the income earned by the foreign company inside India would be drained out of India. On these considerations it cannot be said that the classification of companies has no rational relation to the purpose of the impugned provision." 17.In case of law students, we think that similar yardstick can be applied. A student of law, after his graduation from University, is normally expected to join at Bar or to adopt any vocation/service but the very object of the said law is to render service to the people of this country in the administration of justice. A student of law, after his graduation from University, is normally expected to join at Bar or to adopt any vocation/service but the very object of the said law is to render service to the people of this country in the administration of justice. Moreover, it is undisputed that prior to the judgment of the Apex Court in case of (State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and others)4, 1995(5) S.C.C. 730 , the law colleges were allowed to be run by the private bodies without any Government aid. It is only after the decision of the Apex Court in the said case, the Government has taken a decision to award grant-in-aid to the recognized private law colleges, similar to other faculties. The purpose of such State's investment in the Law education is obviously to improve the standard of the Law Colleges so that they produce talented law graduates to cater to the need of our judicial system. 18.It may be stated that in the case cited supra, the Apex Court has observed that : "The right to free legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed fundamental rights under Article 21. Article 39-A provides "equal justice" and "free legal aid". The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice. It means justice according to law. In a democratic polity, governed by rule of law, it should be the main concern of the State, to have a proper legal system. The principles contained in Article 30-A are fundamental and cast a duty on the State to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on the basis of equal opportunities and further mandates to provide free legal aid in any way by legislation or otherwise, so that justice is not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities." 19.Therefore, it is clear that the students who graduate from the Law faculty of the University will be under an obligation to serve the State in fulfillment of the desire of the framers of the Constitution. Large number of persons trained in law are essential in the present day situation, when there is a cry for the speedy justice. Large number of persons trained in law are essential in the present day situation, when there is a cry for the speedy justice. We may, further mention that the Apex Court in the case cited supra has recognized the need of the day for a continuing and well-organized legal education reckoning the new trends in the world order, to meet the very growing challenges. It is also observed that the legal education should be able to meet the very-growing demands of the society and should be thoroughly equipped to cater to the complexities of the different situations. Specialization in different branches of the law is necessary. The requirement is of such a great dimension, that sizeable or vast number of dedicated persons should be properly trained in different branches of law, every year by providing or rendering competent and proper legal education. Therefore, keeping in view the necessity of law graduates, properly trained and equipped in all branches year after year, for service to the society, we think that by no strench of imagination it can be said that the students coming from Kenya or any other foreign country would render such services to Indian People at large. Therefore, on this consideration, it cannot be said that the classification of students, Indian and Foreigner, has no relation to the purpose of impugned resolution or circular or the object thereof. In our considered opinion, the matter of classification of students while fixing the tuition fees in case of Indian and Foreign students is rational and reasonable and does not in any way offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20.We may mention that as a matter of fact, in case of (Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and others)5, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1858, the Apex Court dealing with the fees fixed under the notification with identical differences while framing the scheme, observed that, nothing contained in the judgment shall be applicable to the case of foreign students. It is therefore, clear that in case of fixation of tuition fees or capitation fees, the classification between Indian and foreign students is permissible. 21.Not only that but in case of (Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others)6, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, it is clearly observed by the Apex Court that; "The citizens have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from Article 21. 21.Not only that but in case of (Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others)6, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, it is clearly observed by the Apex Court that; "The citizens have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and parameters have to be determined in the light of Arts. 45 and 41..... Right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State." However, from the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in para No. 178 of the said judgment, it is clear that discriminatory classification between the Indian students and the foreign students is permissible and here, in the present case, the State has charged different higher fees to the Kenyan students. The action of the State is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this context, the Supreme Court has observed. "So far as the Writ Petition 855 of 1992 is concerned, it complains of charging of double the tuition fee in case of students coming from outside the Maharashtra. The matter stands concluded against the petitioners by a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1955(1) S.C.R. 1215 . This Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed." 22.By virtue of the mandate contained in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India, we do not think that the classification in the matter of tuition fees is in any way unreasonable or un-guided or arbitrary, so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 23.We are bound by the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in case of D.P. Joshi (cited supra) in which Rules relating to the admission to Medical College were challenged on the ground of discrimination. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Rules, relating to the admission to the Medical College at Indore, and the Rule requiring payment of capitation fee from non Madhya Bharat students was held to be valid. 24.Shri Shelke, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that non-observance of the relevant provisions of section 12-A of the Act of 1956 and also section 4 of the Act of 1987, by the respondents goes to the root of the case. 24.Shri Shelke, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that non-observance of the relevant provisions of section 12-A of the Act of 1956 and also section 4 of the Act of 1987, by the respondents goes to the root of the case. We may, however, mention that as submitted by Shri Godhamgoankar, learned Standing Counsel, apart from the fact that section 12-A of the Act of 1965 is directive, no such circulars have been issued by the University Grants Commission. It is true that under section 4 of the Act of 1987, the State is empowered to provide certain guidelines. In this context, we may mention that in case of (T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others)7, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2652, it is clearly observed by the Supreme Court: "Fixing the fees is not the function of this Court. It is the function of the State Government, the affiliating Universities and the Statutory professional bodies like, University Grants Commission, Indian Medical Council and All-India Council for Technical Education.... It may also be open to the authorities to fix different fee structure having regard to the location of colleges, to wit, a college in the city of Bombay may be allowed a different level of fees than a similar college (with similar facilities) situated in a rural area...." It is therefore, clear that there cannot be any discrimination as contended, within meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, even in case of different fee structure is provided either on the basis of the geographical consideration or standard of living or the place of birth or residence and over and above, the object to be achieved under the legal education scheme. 25.It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner has failed to establish that there has been violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in the matter of hiking tuition fees as against the Kenyan students. 26The writ petition therefore, must fail and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. 27.We, however, make it clear that since the petitioner-association's students from Kenya have been permitted to complete their education, they should be given their certificate of passing on their payment of fees immediately. Petition dismissed. *****