D. M. DHARMADHIKARI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the order dated 27-1-85 passed by the Board of Revenue Annexure-A in the appeal under Section 77 of the m. P. Co-operative Societies Act, I960 whereby the Board of Revenue has allowed the appeal of the respondent No. 1 and has upheld the order of the dy. Registrar dated 13-3-1978 (Annexurea) whereby the respondent No. 1 was directed to be reinstated in service. The Board of Revenue set aside the order of the Joint Registrar dated 31-3-82 (Annexure-B) whereby the relief was denied to the respondent No. 1 by the Joint Registrar on the ground that the dispute filed by him under Section 55 (2) of the Act was barred by limitation prescribed in sub-section (2) there of. ( 2 ) THE only relevant facts are that the respondent No. 1 as an employee of the petitioner-bank was dismissed from the post of Supervisor on 29-10-1969 after holding a disciplinary enquiry against him. On the same charges, a criminal case was also instituted against the respondent No. 1. On 27-8-1974 he was acquitted by the Court of Session, Narsinghpur in appeal. ( 3 ) AFTER the decision of the criminal case in his favour, the respondent no. 1 filed a dispute under Section 55 (1) of the Act before the Dy. Registrar on 5-1-1977, claiming reinstatement in service with full monetary benefits as a result of his acquittal. The Dy. Registrar granted relief to the respondent no. 1 of reinstatement with future salary. The joint registrar set aside that order, holding that the dispute filed by the respondent No. 1 on 5-1-1977 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the Act, which was introduced by Ordinance which later became Amendment act No. 14 of 1976 with effect from 5-12-1975. Under sub-section (2)of Section 55 of the Act, the limitation prescribed for raising a dispute under section 35 (1) of the Act is 30 days from the date of the order complained of. According to the Joint Registrar the dispute filed on 5-1-1977 was clearly beyond 30 days from the date of dismissal from service of the respondent No. 1 in the year 1969 as also from the date of order of his acquittal by the criminal court in the year 1974. According to the Joint Registrar the dispute filed on 5-1-1977 was clearly beyond 30 days from the date of dismissal from service of the respondent No. 1 in the year 1969 as also from the date of order of his acquittal by the criminal court in the year 1974. The Board of Revenue, in the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1, however, came to the conclusion that on the date he was dismissed from service, in the year 1969 or the date on which be was acquitted by the criminal court in the year 1974, under the unamended provisions of Section 55, as it existed then, there was no period of limitation prescribed and hence the dispute was filed by the respondent No. 1 under section 55 (I) of the Act could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation. It is against the aforesaid decision of the Board of Revenue that the present petition has been filed by the petitioner bank as an employer. ( 4 ) THE first contention raised on behalf of the counsel for the employer bank is that the respondent No. 1 got only benefit of some technical legal defect and there was no clean acquittal by the appellate court. It is, therefore, submitted that the respondent No. 1 could not have been directed to be reinstated in service, when his misconduct was held proved in the disciplinary enquiry. The above arguments cannot be accepted. It conld not be seriously disputed that on the same charges, on which tho disciplinary enquiry was held, a criminal case was also filed. The verdict given by the criminal court therefore, has to be given effect and the same charges, on which the respondent no. 1 was acquitted by the criminal court could not form the basis of holding him guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings. No error, thenfore, can be found in the orders of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in which it has been held that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to resinstatment as a result of his acquittal by the criminal court. No error, thenfore, can be found in the orders of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in which it has been held that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to resinstatment as a result of his acquittal by the criminal court. ( 5 ) THE second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amend in prevision of Section 55 (2), providing the prescribed period of limitation, would be applicable to the case of the respondent No. 1, who filed the dispute under Section 55 (2)of the Act on 5-1-1977, much after the amendment to sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the Act had already come into force. The second contention also has DO merit. The cause of action for raising a service dispute arose first in 1969 when respondent No. 1 was dismissed from service and for the second time in the year 1974, when he was acquitted by the criminal court. As the state of law existed then, under the unamended provisions contained in Section 55 of the Act, there was no period of limitation prescribed. The subsequent amendment introduced to the said provisions in the year 1976, which provides for the period of limitation for preferring a dispute, cannot take away the vasted right of respondent No. 1 to approach the Dy. Registrar by raising service dispute under Section 55 without any restriction about the period of limitation. Any other interpretation so as to give retrospective effect to the amend provision would destory or mullify the vasted right of an employee of raising service dispute on the basis of the existing law at the time the cause of action arose for raising dispute. The provision introducted in Section 55 (2) of the Act providing for a period of limitation, has, therefore, to be held prospective in its operation and thus cannot be applied to the past cases in which the right of raising dispute arose prior to the amendment. A similar view has been taken by this court in the case of Sem Singh v. M. P. State Road Transport Corporation (1979) M. P. LJ. 750. See the following observations contained in para 6 of the said decision : "the law of limitation can be classified as a law of procedure only when it does not have the effect of destroying vasted rights or has the effect of reviving barred rights. 750. See the following observations contained in para 6 of the said decision : "the law of limitation can be classified as a law of procedure only when it does not have the effect of destroying vasted rights or has the effect of reviving barred rights. Where the new law of limitation has the effect of destroying vasted rights then the court when invited to held that the new statute has retrospective operation will struggle against the acceptance of such interpretation unless there is clearcut indication that the legislature intended in destory existing rights without notice that penelising innocent litigants. 19 IC 793 ; AIR 1922 Col. 491, AIR 1935 Raj 97 : AIR 1962 Raj 43 and AIR 1976 SC 237 Rel. ( 6 ) AS both the contentions raised by the petitioner have not found favour with this court, the petition stands dismissed. In the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to it. Petition dismissed. .