Judgment :- S. Sankarasubban, J. This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the order dated 31.5.1997 in I.A. No. 988/96 and I.A. No. 2050/96 in O.S. No. 148/88 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram. Revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.148/88. The plaint' B' Schedule property forms part of 'A' schedule property. It is having an extent of 40 cents. The plaintiff is the owner of the same. 2. The marriage of the plaintiffs daughter was fixed to be conducted on 25.10.1987. Since he was short of funds, the plaintiff approached the defendant for a loan of Rs. 30,000/-to be paid back within three months. The defendant demanded Rs. 20.000/- by way of interest for the three months. In the circumstance, the plaintiff had to agree for the same. Accordingly, the plaintiff received Rs. 30.000/- on 20.10.1987. The defendant was not agreeable for the execution of hypothecation deed or promissory note as security. He wanted a sale deed in respect of 'B' schedule property. Accordingly, Ext. Al sale deed was executed on 20.10.198 7 in favour of the defendant. On the same day, the defendant executed an agreement, Ext. A2, by which he agreed to reconvey the property to the plaintiff on the repayment of the loan with interest. The plaintiff approached the defendant with the amount, but the defendant refused to reconvey the property. Therefore, the suit was filed for a declaration that Ext. Al sale deed was only a security bond and to set aside the same by releasing the encumbrance on deposit of the loan amount and interest. 3. Defendant contested. He said it was only an outright sale. Further during the pendency of the suit, he trespassed into 'B' Schedule property and got it into his possession. The trial Court, after considering all the issues, declared that Ext. Al sale deed was a security bond. It granted a decree for recovery of possession and also held that the encumbrance will be deemed to be relinquished, if an amount of Rs. 50.000/-with interest at 12% per annum was paid within four months. The defendant was directed to surrender the property immediately after the amount was deposited. The decree further stated that if the amount was not deposited as directed, the terms in the decree in favour of the plaintiff will become ineffective. 4. 50.000/-with interest at 12% per annum was paid within four months. The defendant was directed to surrender the property immediately after the amount was deposited. The decree further stated that if the amount was not deposited as directed, the terms in the decree in favour of the plaintiff will become ineffective. 4. As per the decree, the period for payment was to expire on 30.3.1995. Before that, plaintiff moved an application and got the time extended till 30.5.1995. He did not deposit the money on 30.5.1995. On the other hand, the present two I. As. were filed subsequently. According to him, he was laid up a peculiar-disease Having painful swelling all over the body especially at the joints. The body was bloated due to swelling and he was unable to attend to his normal avocations and unable to move about within the house. He was under the continuous treatment with absolute rest from 25.5.1995 to 5.2.1996. He was at the treatment of Dr. N. Viswanathan, M.D. Government Ayurveda College, Thiruvananthapuram. On 6.2.1996 I.A. No. 988/96 was filed praying for extension of time for deposit till 16.3.1996. The decree amount and interest totaling to Rs. 98,000/- as on 16.3.1996 was deposited and the challan receipt produced. I.A. No. 2050/96 was filed stating that the time sought for in LA. No. 988/96 was upto 16.3.1996 and not upto 19.3.1996. The petition was objected to by the respondent. The Court below, by the impugned order, rejected the application. Hence this revision is filed. 5. Counsel for the petitioner Shri. Harun-Al-Rashid highlighted the trouble undergone by the plaintiff in this case. According to him, it is a case where a debtor was victimised to the maximum extent. The petitioner had agreed to pay at exorbitant rate of interest considering the fact that the marriage of his daughter was fixed. Further, when he went to return the amount to the defendant, he refused to give back the documents and even police cases were taken against the plaintiff. The defendant also trespassed into the plaint schedule property in the suit. The defendant contended that the documents in question were for outright sale. The 40 cents of property were valued in 1988 at Rs. 1.5 lakhs. The defendant wanted the property at cheap rate. The defendant also trespassed into the plaint schedule property in the suit. The defendant contended that the documents in question were for outright sale. The 40 cents of property were valued in 1988 at Rs. 1.5 lakhs. The defendant wanted the property at cheap rate. Counsel further contended that it was due to the illness of the petitioner that he could not deposit the amount in time and that now the entire amount with interest has been deposited. Hence, the counsel submitted that it was not right on the part of the court below to have refused extension of time. 6. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the amount was given by the petitioner as early as in 1987. The decree clearly states that if the amount was not paid in time, the plaintiff will lose all the benefits of the decree. In spite of this, he had agreed for extension. He further contended that there cannot be any extension of time, because the Court has become functus officio. He also contended that the lower court has not believed the medical certificate and hence, the petitioner is not entitled to any indulgence in this case. 7. After hearing the argument on both sides, I am of the view that it is a case where extension of time should have been granted to the petitioner. Here is a case when the plaintiff was ready to return the amount, the defendant refused to accept the amount, instead wanted the property of the plaintiff. The value of the property was nearly 3 or 4 times more than the value of the amount, which was borrowed. The plaintiff had approached the court to get a declaration that the property was given only as a security. It is true that the court had fixed 4 months time originally for payment of the amount. The decree also states that if the amount was not paid within the time, the plaintiff will lose all the benefits in the decree. Subsequently, the time was extended by two months. The court below took the view that the court has become functus officio, because the period had already expired. This court is not powerless to extend the time if it is satisfied that the plaintiff was in a predicament in which he could not comply with the direction in the decree in time. The court below took the view that the court has become functus officio, because the period had already expired. This court is not powerless to extend the time if it is satisfied that the plaintiff was in a predicament in which he could not comply with the direction in the decree in time. It is using the inherent power that the Court granted four months time. The court cannot change that time or extend the time, unless it is satisfied that circumstances exist. Courts exist for the purpose of doing justice. By refusing to extend the time, the person benefited will be the defendant. He will become the full owner of the property. The property will have a value of 3 or 4 times more than the amount, which the plaintiff was directed to pay. 8. It is true that the extension of time does not come under S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the inherent power, the Court can exercise its power to meet the ends of justice. It cannot be said that the court has become functus officio. Now, there are decisions to the effect that even when the original period fixed had expired, the court was not powerless to extend the time. It is true that sympathy towards a party, who had placed himself in an unfortunate position, should not affect the judgment. It has been said that'sentiment is a dangerous will-o-the-wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles'. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das - AIR 1961 SC 882 - Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed thus: "They do not, however, completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed". 9. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed". 9. I went through the evidence of the Ayurvedic Physician as well as the medical certificate. The Court below had disbelieved the evidence on the ground that the Physician was a neighbour. I don't think that is a circumstance to disbelieve the evidence of the Doctor. In a city or town, which is thickly populated, Doctors are bound to be neighbours and because of that, one cannot say that evidence of the Doctor cannot be accepted. Further, in most of the cases, Doctors became friends of the patients. Can one disbelieve the evidence of the Doctor, because he has been treating a person for a long time. 10. In the above view of the matter, I accept the evidence of the Doctor and I hold that the petitioner was incapacitated to comply with the directions in the decree within the extended time. Now, since the petitioner has deposited the amount, I allow the above two I. As. and hold that the plaintiff has performed his part of the decree in time. If the respondent does not surrender possession, the plaintiff can move for execution of the decree for return of the property. Civil Revision Petition is allowed.