JUDGMENT : D.M. Patnaik, J. - The revision is against the order dated 3.1.1998 of the S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar rejecting prayer of the accused for his release on bail as provided u/s 167, Code of Criminal Procedure 2. The Petitioner has been in custody on being forwarded to the Court On 3.11.97 for alleged offences under Sections 498-A 304-B, I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The petition for bail under the provisions of Section 167(2) proviso (a) (ii) was filed on the 62nd day by which the charge-sheet was not submitted. The S.D.J.M. rejected prayer for bail holding that the offence u/s 304-B, LP.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life and therefore the case is covered u/s 167(2) proviso (a) (i) where the prosecution could file charge-sheet within 90 days and not within 60 days as prayed for by the Petitioner. 3. Mr. G.N. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner advanced extensive argument touching the point and relied on the decisions reported in 1993(6) OCR 714 (Bijay Kumar Rout v. State of Orissa); 1997(13) OCR 327 (Ashok Kumar Sharma and Lala v. State); 1992 (1) OCR 276 (Kusum Devi v. State); 1997 (2) CCR 90 (Om Prakash Gabbar v. State of Punjab); and Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat and others. The main contention of Mr. Mohapatra is that Section 167(2) Proviso (a) (ii) is applicable to the present case since the Magistrate is competent to pass a sentence and impose punishment of imprisonment for 7 years which is less than 10 years as prescribed under Proviso (a) (i) and therefore 60 days limitation is applicable to the present case. 4. Mr. P.K. Nanda, learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, strenuously urged that if it is permissible for the Court to impose a punishment for more than 10 years the case will come within 90 days limitation and in the present case since the Court is empowered to impose punishment upto life, 60 days limitation would not be applicable to the present case. The rival contention needs examination. 5. Since it is the question of interpretation of the provisions of Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure That portion of the section which is relevant for our purpose is quoted below: Section 167- Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. The rival contention needs examination. 5. Since it is the question of interpretation of the provisions of Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure That portion of the section which is relevant for our purpose is quoted below: Section 167- Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. Sub-section (1) xxx xxx xxx Sub-section (2)- The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody.as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exists for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an of female punishable with death, imprisonment for life-or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, whether the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter. A bare reading of the provisions as quoted above shows that a Magistrate if satisfied that adequate ground exists for doing so may authorise detention of an accused beyond 15 days, but he cannot authorise detention beyond the period of 90 days for investigation into a case that relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years as provided under Sub-clause (a) and (i) of the Proviso and 60 days when the investigation relates to any other offence and on the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. 6. We may first take up to discuss the decision cited by Mr. Mohapatra in support of his argument that in the present case 60 days limitation is applicable. In my view none of the decisions cited support the view advanced by Mr. Mohapatra since in all these cases the investigation related to the offence punishable with imprisonment upto 10 years. Such are the offences for which under no circumstances, the Court is competent to impose a penalty for more than 10 years and not even a day more. In the case of Smt. Kusum Devi (supra) where the Court was dealing with the case u/s 306, I.P.C., the offence is punishable for a term which may extend to 10 years. In the case of Om Prakash Gabbar (supra) the offence was u/s 367, I.P.C. which is punishable with imprisonment which may extend up to 10 years. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) the offence was u/s 307, First Part which prescribed punishment of imprisonment for either description for a term upto 10 years. It may be noted that on analysis Court held that the case was not covered by the second part. So also in the case of Bijay Kumar Rout (supra) where the offence alleged was one u/s 392 I.P.C. for which punishment prescribed is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and so far as the factor that case is concerned, the Court observed that the offence so alleged came within the first part of that section. In this case this Court accepted the view of Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Kusum Devi (supra) and held that the words 'upto 10 years' and not less than 10 years' should not be confused as they are applicable to different situations. I have not quarrel over the proposition laid down in all these decisions. Mr. Nanda also does not dispute the proposition. I am also of the view that whenever punishment is prescribed for imprisonment for either description for a period upto 10 years, certainly there is no doubt that Section 167(2) Proviso (a) (ii), i.e. 60 days limitation would be applicable. There is also no difficulty in making 90 days limitation applicable to a case where offence is punishable with not less than 10 years which means it must in all cases be more than 10 years. This position is also not disputed by Mr. Mohapatra. But the present case at hand according to Mr. Mohapatra stands on a different footing since it is prescribed thereunder that punishment imposed for imprisonment for either description shall not be less than 7 years. It is the contention of Mr. Mohapatra that in such case since the Magistrate is competent to impose a sentence of less than 10 years Proviso (a) (ii) to Section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable. Mr. Mohapatra wants to fortify this argument of his, on the ground that it would be incorrect to interpret a statute by adding or omitting any word employed in the section and that the words employed in the Statute should be given their plain and simple meaning to serve the purpose and the purpose in the present case is not to curtail the liberty of a person. This argument is countered by Mr. Nanda submitting that if such an interpretation would be accepted, then in all serious offences, the accused person would be enlarged on bail which will be contrary to the principle of granting bail u/s 167(2). Therefore, I may examine whether the contention of Mr. Mohapatra is to be accepted or not. 7. I fully agree what has Mr. Mohapatra stated about the plain and simple meaning conveyed by the language of the Statute. Therefore, I may examine whether the contention of Mr. Mohapatra is to be accepted or not. 7. I fully agree what has Mr. Mohapatra stated about the plain and simple meaning conveyed by the language of the Statute. But it is also the cardinal rule of interpretation that the words of the' Statute' are to be construed so as to ascertain the mind of the Legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used. Salmond's view on the point is quoted on the following words: The essence of the law, lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it... They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the mest is the first principle of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it... 8. In the case of U.S. v. Petteridge (1942) 43 F Supp. 53 56, the Court held that penal statutes must be construed in the sense, which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. The more correct version of the doctrine appears to be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed and faithfully applied according to the intent of the Legislature, without unwarrantable severity on the one hand or unjustifiable levity on the other, in cases of doubt the Courts inclining to mercy, A penal statute has no doubt to be construed strictly but the intention of the Legislature must govern in the construction of penal statute inasmuch as in any other statute. (Page 610 Chapter XL-N 12 Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 1984 Seventh Edition): It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that a statute must be construed as a whole, notwithstanding that every section in a statute is a subjective enactment in itself, vide decision reported in Lakshmi Narain Gupta Vs. A.N. Puri and Another. In the case of Heydenfeldt v. Daney etc. Mining Co 23 L.ed 1995, the Court held that in construing a statute the Court is not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in order to arrive at the intention of the law-makers. A.N. Puri and Another. In the case of Heydenfeldt v. Daney etc. Mining Co 23 L.ed 1995, the Court held that in construing a statute the Court is not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in order to arrive at the intention of the law-makers. If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate unjustly, or lead to absurd result or be contrary to the widest meaning of the Act taken as a whole, it should be rejected. The Court has always to ascertain the intention of the Legislature of the whole enactment and it sometimes becomes necessary to do a certain amount of violence to the language in which a particular passage is couched in order to, give effect to the intention to be gathered from the enactment as a whole, vide Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes (supra). A statute should not be given such a construction the way Mr. Mohapatra submitted, if such construction is contrary to the legislative intention and leads to absurd conclusion. 9. The apparent intention of the Legislature in providing two types of limitation and that too separately is that the offence which are graver in nature should take more time for completion than offences of lesser gravity. A case of dowry death is no doubt a grave offence. It will be inappropriate to hold at this stage of the investigation whether the Court would chose to impose a sentence less than 10 years or more than 10 years. This can be done only on trial. If the intention of the Legislature is to give more time to the Investigating Officer to investigate a dowry death case which is punishable with imprisonment for life, the period to complete the investigation should be 90 days and not 60 days. If I accept the contention of Mr. Mohapatra, it will frustrate the intent and purpose for which the period of limitation has been prescribed for such grave offence. If I accept the contention of Mr. Mohapatra, it will frustrate the intent and purpose for which the period of limitation has been prescribed for such grave offence. I further make it clear and hold that where punishment is prescribed for imprisonment upto 10 years, then 60 days limitation would be applicable and in any case where it is competent for the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for more than 10 years, then 90 days limitation would be applicable notwithstanding the fact the section makes it permissible to impose punishment of imprisonment for less than 10 years. I therefore with great respect unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mohapatra. In the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another where dealing with Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure and its application to the offence under the Customs' Act and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act the Supreme Court held in para-32 of the judgment as follows: In the given circumstances, it is permissible for Courts to have functional approaches and look into the legislative intention and sometimes may even necessary to go behind the words and enactment and take other factors into consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and to the purpose and spirit of the enactment so that not an absurdity or practical inconvenience may result and the legislative exercise and its scope and object may not become futile. Thus the provisions of the FERA and Customs Act were passed not for any other purpose rather than their ostensible any other purpose rather than their ostensible purposes, the vital of which being to economic development of the country and augmentation of revenue. The Court observed in the above manner while considering the provisions of the two Acts so far they related to the commission of offences under the relevant section and investigation made by the Customs Official under the Customs Act and whether production of the persons before the Magistrate would attract the provisions u/s 167, Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that the provisions of the two Acts were passed not for any other purpose rather their ostensible purposes, the vital of which being the economic development of the country and augmentation of revenue. 10. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed