Judgment A.K.Ganguly, J. 1. These two Letters Patent Appeals are directed against a judgment dated April 28, 1995 passed by a learned single Judge of this : Court in C.W.J.C. No. 911 of 1990 (R) whereby the Award dated January 29, 1990 passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur was quashed. 2. L.P.A. No. 244 of 1995 (R) was filed by the Workman in whose favour the Award was passed. L.P.A. No. 246 of 1995 (R) was filed by M/s. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company (hereinafter called the said Company) in respect of certain directions of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment about payment of salary to the appellant/workman from the date of dismissal till the date of judgment and an additional sum of Rs. 50,000. Both the appeals were heard together as both were directed against the same judgment of the learned Single Judge noted above. 3. The genesis of the factual aspects of this case is noted below: On April 14, 1985, which was a Sunday, a General Body meeting of TELCO Co-operative Society (hereinafter called the. said Society) was held in the new canteen hall. The said meeting was held as per the bye-laws of the said Society and the issue of bifurcation of the said Society came up for discussion in the general body meeting. The said General. Body meeting was attended by a large number of workers, some officers of the said Company and the authorities from the Co-operative Department, Government of Bihar. It has been also stated that the Officer-in-charge of local police station was present. 4. It is common ground that in the said meeting a confusion prevailed leading to a pandemonium and one Sri M.P. Mishra who was the Convenor of the said Society had to lodge a first information report before the police that the said Sri Mishra along with the Chairman of the said Society and also the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Department, Government of Bihar, were assaulted by five persons, namely, Mahesh Mishra, Gurdayal Sinha, K.P. Singh, Jitendra Prasad Singh (Appellant) and N.P. Mishra. A complaint was also lodged by Shri Mishra before the management of the said Company in which the allegation was levelled against four workmen including the appellant about assaulting him in the said canteen ball and on his way to the Security room of the plant. 5. A complaint was also lodged by Shri Mishra before the management of the said Company in which the allegation was levelled against four workmen including the appellant about assaulting him in the said canteen ball and on his way to the Security room of the plant. 5. The police after investigation, which was taken on the basis of the F. I. R., submitted a final report without finding any material against the accused persons. It is also stated that neither the Chairman of the said Society nor the Assistant Registrar of Department of Co-operation, Government of Bihar supported the allegation of Sri Mishra that they were assaulted by the workers of the said Company. It is not in dispute that the said final report was accepted by the Court and the police investigation came to an end. But on the basis of the complaint filed by Sri Mishra to the management of the said Company, charge-sheets were issued against four persons who were named in the complaint to the said Company. They were M/s. K..P. Singh, N.P. Mishra, Gurdayal Sinha and J.P. Singh (Appellant). In reply to the charge-sheet, the Workmen gave their reply denying the allegation levelled against them. A domestic enquiry was held by the management where charges against K.P. Singh, Gurdayal Sinha and Jitendra Prasad Singh (Appellant) were held to be proved. It is further stated that the management punished K.P. Singh with only one months suspension while Gurdayal Sinha and the appellant were dismissed from service. 6. These two dismissed Workmen raised Industrial disputes against such order of dismissal and the appropriate Government referred their case under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The case of the appellant was numbered as Reference Case No. 2 of 1987 whereas that of Gurdayal Sinha was numbered as Reference Case No. 3 of 1987. 7. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur (hereinafter called the said Tribunal) after hearing the parlies in the said Reference gave an award dated January 29, 1990 holding therein that the dismissal of the services of the appellant was not proper and justified and further directed that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with all consequential benefits. 8. Against the aforesaid Award, a writ petition was filed by the Management out of which the present appeals arise. 8. Against the aforesaid Award, a writ petition was filed by the Management out of which the present appeals arise. By the impugned judgment dated April 28, 1995 the learned Single Judge quashed the Award and -gave certain consequential directions for payment of compensation to the appellant which are noted above and against those directions the said Company filed an appeal. 9. It may be noted that in respect of Reference Case No. 3 of 1987 concerning Gurdayal Sinha, the said Tribunal passed an award dated August 1, 1992 and the order of dismissal of Gurdayal Sinha was set aside and it was directed that he be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits within a particular time frame. Against the said Award dated August 1, 1992 the Management of the said Company filed a Writ Petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1673 of 1993 (R). A Division Bench of this Court heard the matter and dismissed the said writ petition with costs assessed at Rs. 5,000. Against the said order of dismissal passed by a Division Bench, the management of the said Company went up in appeal by filing Special Leave Petition before the Hon ble Supreme Court and the Hon ble Supreme Court by an order dated April 29, 1994 dismissed the said Special Leave Petition. It is not in dispute that after that Gurdayal Sinha has been reinstated in service. 10. Several questions have been urged in these appeals by the learned Counsel for the parties but there are certain broad questions on which the arguments have been advanced. Those questions are indicated below: (a) Whether the learned Single Judge in quashing the Award of the Tribunal passed under Sec. 11-A of the said Act in exercise of his jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution acted properly especially when there is no finding by the learned Single Judge that the conclusions of fact reached by the Tribunal are perverse? (b) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the Tribunals appreciation of the ratio in the case of Glaxo Laboratory was erroneous? (b) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the Tribunals appreciation of the ratio in the case of Glaxo Laboratory was erroneous? (c) Whether the learned Single Judge can differ from the judgment given by a Division Bench of this Court affirming the Award passed in respect of Gurdayal when it is not in dispute that the factual basis of the charges against both Gurdayal and the appellant are identical alleging violation of the same clause of Standing Order? Apart from that the domestic enquiry held against both the workers and the order of reference against both the workmen is identical? (d) Whether by setting aside the Award of the Tribunal in his judgment, the learned Single Judge offended the principle of equal justice which is also a facet of Article 14? (e) Whether the reasons given by the learned Single Judge for differing with the judgment delivered by the Division Bench are tenable in the eye of law? (f) Whether the learned Single Judge is right in rejecting the Tribunals finding that in matters of imposing punishment, the management acted in a discriminatory manner by dismissing the appellant whereas a very light punishment was imposed on K.P. Singh, who is guilty of similar charges which were proved in the domestic enquiry. 11. For the convenience of discussion, the questions (a) and (b) are taken up together. In the Award given by the Tribunal the following findings of fact have been arrived at on appreciation of the evidence. (i) The meeting was held in the New Canteen Hall which forms part of Telco works. But the meeting was of the Society, not of the Company. The meeting place was not a working place like workshop or office (para 26 of the Award). (ii) Transactions in the meeting had nothing to do with the affairs of the said company but they were about the affairs of the said Co-operative Society and the issue of bifurcation of the said Society. (iii) Sri Mishra was present in the meeting not as an Officer of the Company but as a Convenor of the said Society. (iv) Sri Mishra was not on duty while he was attending the said meeting. (v) The appellant was also not on duty at the time when the incident took place in the meeting. The meeting was held on Sunday which was an off day. (iv) Sri Mishra was not on duty while he was attending the said meeting. (v) The appellant was also not on duty at the time when the incident took place in the meeting. The meeting was held on Sunday which was an off day. (vi) The transaction in the said meeting had nothing to do with the working condition of the Workmen or any term of employment in the said Company. (vii) The said Society is governed by the Bihar & Orissa Co- operative Societies Act and the said Society is a body corporate and has a separate entity. (viii) The allegation of assault on Sri Mishra by the appellant, as Sri Mishra was about to go out of the hall, stands corroborated. (ix) The allegation against the appellant for assaulting Sri Mishra on the road has not been corroborated. 12. On these conclusion of facts, the Tribunal came to the finding that the allegation of assault on Sri Mishra by the appellant, even if it is believed to be true, it was held outside the duty hours of both the appellant and Sri Mishra and also in connection with the affairs of the said Society which had nothing to do with the working condition of the workmen or even their terms of employment, cannot be called misconduct within the meaning of the relevant Standing Order. In coming to this finding, the Tribunal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Glaxo Laboratories reported in (1984-I-LLJ- 16). 13. In coming to the said finding the Tribunal has also held, relying on the decision in Glaxo (supra) that the relevant clauses of the Standing Order are penal in nature and, therefore, penal clauses must be interpreted strictly in the sense that unless the act of misconduct comes within the relevant clauses of its Standing Order squarely and specifically, the workmen cannot be punished on the basis of remote effects of the alleged act of misconduct even committed outside the works of the Appellant Company. 14. There are also findings by the Tribunal that the management of the said Company has indulged in discrimination in the manner of awarding punishment of dismissal against the appellant whereas on the same allegation they have imposed only 30 days of suspension to Sri K.P. Singh. 14. There are also findings by the Tribunal that the management of the said Company has indulged in discrimination in the manner of awarding punishment of dismissal against the appellant whereas on the same allegation they have imposed only 30 days of suspension to Sri K.P. Singh. The Tribunal has found that the allegation against Sri K.P. Singh is no less serious than that of the appellant. 15. It cannot be disputed that the Tribunal in this case gave its Award after incorporation of Sec. 11-A in the said Act. Prior to incorporation of Section 11-A of the said Act the law was that the conduct of disciplinary proceeding and imposition of punishment are managerial function with which the Tribunal has no power to interfere, unless the findings are perverse or the punishment imposed leads to the inference of unfair labour practice. Now after incorporation of Sec. 11-A of the said Act, the Tribunals jurisdiction has been substantially widened. The wording of Sec. 11-A of the said Act clearly indicates that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to re-appraise the evidence adduced in a domestic enquiry. 16. In order to satisfy whether the evidence relied on by the employer establishes the misconduct against the workmen, the Tribunal is at liberty to consider not only whether the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry are correct, but it has also been clothed with the jurisdiction to differ from the finding and punishment awarded by the management. 17. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Firestone, Tyre and Rubber Company of India V/s. The Management, reported in (1973-I-LLLJ-278) (SC). At page 295 of the judgment the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have made it clear that what previously was the satisfaction of the employer has ceased to be so and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. Therefore, the Tribunal is now given the jurisdiction to substitute its own view on punishment in place of the managements wisdom, if it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified in the facts of the case. 18. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Machine Tools Limited, Bangalore V/s. Mohd. Usman and Anr., reported in (1983-II- LLJ-386)(SC). 18. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Machine Tools Limited, Bangalore V/s. Mohd. Usman and Anr., reported in (1983-II- LLJ-386)(SC). In the said judgment the Supreme Court after taking into note the nature of the powers conferred under Sec. 11-A of the said Act held that the absence of" any important legal principle", the High Court or the Supreme Court would not undertake "to re-examine the question of adequacy or inadequacy of material for interference by the Labour Court". 19. Again the question relating to width of power under Sec. 11-A of the said Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor V/s. Shri Baidyanath Aytirved Bhawan Limited and Anr., reported in (1984-II-LLJ- 10)(SC). While delivering the judgment for the Court, JUSTICE RANGANATH MISRA, as His Lordship then was, held in paragraph 4 that "advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstance of the case". His Lordship further held that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India "does not enjoy such power as a superior Court. Its power is one of superintendence". His Lordship, however, held that in an appropriate case the High Court can scrutinise the orders of the Tribunal within well accepted limitations, and it can quash the Award and thereupon remit the matter for fresh decision in accordance with law and with necessary directions but the High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute the Award in place af the one made by the Tribunal. 20. It cannot be disputed that in the instant sase the Award of the Tribunal is reviewable by the High Court only in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. There is no question of issuance of mandamus or Prohibition in the instant case. Therefore, this Court has to examine whether the learned Single Judge has set aside the Award after exercising the power within the "well accepted limitations" and on some "important legal principles". 21. Before I do that, the recent judicial trend both in the Apex Court and in the Courts in England in judicial review may be noticed. Therefore, this Court has to examine whether the learned Single Judge has set aside the Award after exercising the power within the "well accepted limitations" and on some "important legal principles". 21. Before I do that, the recent judicial trend both in the Apex Court and in the Courts in England in judicial review may be noticed. The trend is one of restrain in the exercise of the powers of judicial review unless the case squarely falls within the well known parameter of such review. The general scope of such review has been very succinctly put in "JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION by DE SMITH, 5th Edition, in the following words: "The scope of the prerogative orders reflects the general principle that it is not the rule of the High Court in Judicial Review proceedings to substitute its decision for that of the original decision maker." (p. 698) 22. Specially in respect of the decision by specialised Tribunals the Courts have held that judicial restraint is the order of the day except in cases where the decision under review is patently perverse. In the case of Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity V/s. C. Maurice & Company Limited reported in 1969 2 All ER page 37, the following observation occurs in the judgment of LORD PEARSON where the learned Judge held as follows in page 43 of the report: "The decision at the first instance is entrusted by the Act and Regulations to the Industrial Tribunal, which is a specialised Tribunal likely to have some special knowledge and experience of "the organisation and structure of industry and trade as it exists within the United Kingdom", with which the classification was prepared to conform. The Tribunal decide on the evidence, using their special knowledge and experience, whether activity or set of activities falls under this heading or that heading of the minimum list. That is a decision partly of fact but also partly of law, because it involves the interpretation and application of the titles and descriptions which compose the headings concerned. But the element of fact is permanent, and a Court will naturally be disinclined to reverse the decision of the Industrial Tribunal on a question of industrial classification unless the decision is shown to be unreasonable". 23. But the element of fact is permanent, and a Court will naturally be disinclined to reverse the decision of the Industrial Tribunal on a question of industrial classification unless the decision is shown to be unreasonable". 23. The limits of interference in such cases are normally on two grounds as has been summed up by House of Lords in the decision of Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairston and Anr., reported in 1955 3 All ER page 48. The relevant passage indicating those two grounds in the judgment of LORD RADCLIFFE at page 57 of the report is extracted below: "If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad in law and which hears on the determination, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the Court must intervene." 24. The same principle has been put in slightly different form by House of Lords again in 1986 in the decision of Puhlidfer and Anr. V/s. Hillingdon London Borough Council, reported in 1986 1 Appeal Cases page 484. At page 518 of the report, LORD BRIGHTMAN has discerned the principle in the following words: "Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the Court to leave the decision of the fact to the Public Body to whom the Parliament has entrusted the decision making power save in a case where it is obvious that the Public Body, consciously or unconsciously are acting perversely. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Sadhuram V/s. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (1983-II-LLJ-383) has echoed the same principle about interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matters relating to decisions by the Tribunal under a Special legislation. In that case the Supreme Court has laid down the principle of interference by the High Court against the order of the Industrial Tribunal. In that case the Supreme Court has laid down the principle of interference by the High Court against the order of the Industrial Tribunal. Elaborating the principle in paragraph 3 the learned Judges of the Apex Court have laid down the law as follows: "We are afraid, the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate Court over Tribunals constituted under special legislation to resolve the disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to re-adjudicate upon question of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicated that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is, therefore, impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court." 26. Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, when this Court considers the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it cannot but hold that the interference by the learned Single Judge with the Award passed by the Tribunal has not been made keeping in view the correct principles of judicial interference in these matters. The findings of fact which have been set out above, have not been reversed by the learned Single Judge nor has the learned Single Judge held that the aforesaid findings of fact reached by the Tribunal are perverse or based on no evidence. The learned Single Judge has also not held that there is any defect of procedure in the decision making process by the Tribunal nor has the learned Single Judge held that there is any error of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal in arriving at its finding. 27. The learned Single Judge has also not held that there is any defect of procedure in the decision making process by the Tribunal nor has the learned Single Judge held that there is any error of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal in arriving at its finding. 27. On a scrutiny of impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, this Court finds - (a) in paragraph 25 the learned Single Judge held that the learned Counsel for the Management was right in his contention that even if the misconduct is in the vicinity of the premises of the Establishment then also it is punishable without any reason in: support thereof. This finding has been recorded only in the first sentence in paragraph 25 and thereafter the learned Single Judge went on recording the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Management except in the last sentence where it was found that the submission of the Counsel is supported by paragraph 18 in Glaxo case. (b) In paragraph 27 of his judgment the learned Single Judge held that in the case of Glaxo Laboratories (supra) the Supreme Court has taken a view opposite from the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Oil Mills and and Mulchandanis case. This cannot be called a finding. In fact the learned trial Judge cannot take an exception to the laying down by the Supreme Court in Glaxos case (supra), the ratio of its two previous judgments. It is well settled that when the Apex Court in a later judgment discusses its previous judgments and pronounces upon the ratio of the previous judgments, the ratio as declared in the latest judgment is always binding. Therefore, whatever ratio of the Supreme Court judgments in the case of Tata Oil Mills and Mulchandanis case has been declared in Glaxo must be understood to be correct ratio of those previous judgments. (c) In paragraph 30 of the judgment the learned Single Judge came to the finding that in the instant case the assault was not a purely private matter between the workmen and the Assistant Personnel Manager and even if it be so, since it took place within the premises of the Company, it is squarely covered by Order No. 24 of the Standing Order of the TELCO as a disorderly act which is subversive of discipline. In coming to this finding the learned Single Judge has not reversed the findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal as discussed above. If those findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal are not held to be perverse by the learned Single Judge men it is not open to the learned Single Judge, having regard to the well known norms of judicial review, to come to a totally different finding altogether. The findings of fact are said to be perverse only when no reasonable person or authority properly instructed in the law could have arrived at such finding. Even if on the selfsame facts, a different conclusion is possible, that is also not a ground to hold that the other conclusion is perverse. But in the instant case the findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal are on a proper appreciation of evidence and cannot be just brushed aside by the learned Single Judge and a totally contrary finding can be arrived at unless it is held that those findings are perverse ex facie. The learned Single Judge has not held that those findings arrived at by the Tribunal are perverse but has proceeded on the basis as if the learned Single Judge is at liberty to arrive at his own conclusion or substitute the findings arrived at by the Tribunal. Such a course is clearly not legally impermissible. (d) The other findings of fact in paragraph 38 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge will be discussed separately as they fall under other questions framed hereinabove. The learned Judge has also misdirected himself in law by trying to appraise the evidence himself as would appear from paragraph 40 of the judgment. Therefore, on these findings of the learned Single Judge, his conclusions at paragraph 46 of the judgment, with great respect, cannot be sustained. This Court is of the considered opinion that in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge, with great respect, has not adhered to the well defined norms of judicial review and has exercised his jurisdiction without properly appreciating the impact and effect of Sec. 11-A of the said Act. (e) Learned Single Judge has held that the Tribunals appreciation of the ratio in Glaxos case was erroneous. (e) Learned Single Judge has held that the Tribunals appreciation of the ratio in Glaxos case was erroneous. From a perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal it appears that the Tribunal has considered the Glaxos case (supra) only in paragraph 34 of the Award where the Tribunal has quoted paragraph 18 of the judgment in Glaxos case (supra) and after quoting the said paragraph 18 the Tribunal has held that the Standing Order must be understood as penal provision and it has also held that the Tribunal has to see whether the occurrence. alleged conies not only within the words of the said Standing Order but it should also come within its spirit and its remote effect on TELCO or its effect as offences under the Indian Penal Code is of no consideration. This Court is of the opinion that having regard to the ratio in Glaxos case (supra) the aforesaid conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous at all far less they can be considered ex facie bad in law. In fact the ratio in Glaxos case holds the field even today and has been subsequently approved by the Supreme Court also in some other cases, namely, in the case of Babulal Nagar and Ors. V/s. Shri Synthetics Limited, reported in AIR 1984 SC page 1164, in paragraph 10 and also in the case of A.L. Kalra V/s. The Projects and Equipment of India Limited, reported in (1984-II-LLJ-186) (SC) and also in the case of Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel V/s. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Ors., reported in (1985-I-LLJ-527) (SC) in paragraph 4. 28. From the ratio in the case of Glaxo Laboratories (supra) the following propositions are quite clear: (a) The employers have no extra territorial jurisdiction over the activities of the employees. (b) The employer is not the custodian of the law and order in general and if for any act of an employee unconnected with his employment any law and order situation is created outside the Works of Factory premises, the same does not come within the purview of misconduct unless specifically included or specified. (c) The employer is not the Guru or mentor of the employee. (d) What constitutes vicinity of an establishment will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case (paragraph 14 of Glaxos judgment). (c) The employer is not the Guru or mentor of the employee. (d) What constitutes vicinity of an establishment will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case (paragraph 14 of Glaxos judgment). (e) The provisions of Standing Order are penal in nature and as such must be strictly construed. (f) The concept that misbehaviour of the worker committed outside may amount to misconduct if it manifests in itself in the factory premises has been watered down by holding that there must be some causal connection between the misconduct alleged and the employment of workman. (g) This causal connection has been further explained to mean that such connection must be real and substantial, immediate and approximate and not remote or tenuous. (h) The Acts of misconduct must be specifically defined and enumerated in the Standing Order and an employee cannot be punished on the basis of some ex-post facto interpretation of a conduct as a misconduct by the employer. 29. This Court holds that in view of the aforesaid ratio in Glaxo case (supra) the Tribunal has understood the aforesaid decision in Glaxo Laboratories correctly. Therefore, the interference by the learned Single Judge with the Award of the Tribunal holding that the Tribunal was in error in understanding the ratio in Glaxos case (supra) is not correct and cannot be approved. 30. Questions (c), (d) & (e) - All these questions are discussed together. But before dealing with these questions, the following facts are noted: 31. The allegation levelled against the appellant Jitendra Prasad Singh in the charge-sheet is set out below: "It is alleged that on Sunday, April 14, 1985 at 11.45 a.m. after the General Body meeting of the Telco Co-operative Society was over, you alongwith others assaulted Mr. M.P. Mishra, Asst. Personnel Manager (Forge) who was on duty there (in the Telco New Canteen premises). When he was escorted and was being taken to the Security Room of PL. II gate, you rushed towards him and bodily pushed him. As a result, he fell down on the road. You along with others again assaulted him with fists, blows and kicks." 32. The allegation levelled against Mr. Gurudayal Sinha in the charge-sheet is set out below: "It is alleged that on Sunday, April 14, 1985 at about 11.45 a.m after the General Body meeting of the Telco Co-operative Society was over, you along with others assaulted Mr. You along with others again assaulted him with fists, blows and kicks." 32. The allegation levelled against Mr. Gurudayal Sinha in the charge-sheet is set out below: "It is alleged that on Sunday, April 14, 1985 at about 11.45 a.m after the General Body meeting of the Telco Co-operative Society was over, you along with others assaulted Mr. M.P. Mishra, Asst. Personnel Manager (Forge) who was on duty there (in the Telco New Canteen premises). When he was escorted and was being taken to the Security Room of PL. II gate, you rushed towards him and bodily pushed him. As a result he fell down on the road. You along with others again assaulted him with fists, blows and kicks." 33. Standing Order No. 25 Sub-clause (XVI) of the Works Standing Orders of the said Company on the basis of which both the above charges are framed are set out below: "... riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour or any acts subversive of discipline..." 34. The terms of Reference in respect of the case of appellant Jitendra Prasad Singh is set out below: "Whether termination of services of Shri Jitendra Prasad Singh, T. No. 020/66426/2, Workman of M/s. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Limited, Jamshedpur (hereinafter to be referred to as Telco) is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement/or any other relief? 35. The terms of Reference in the case of Sri Gurudayal Sinha is set out below: "Whether the termination of services of Shri Gurudayal Sinha T/No. 1160/01008/1, Workman of M/s. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd, Jamshedpur is justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement/or any other relief." 36. The Tribunal which has passed the Award in favour of Gurudayal has come to the conclusion that the charges against Sri Guru Dayal are not within the purview of the Standing Order inasmuch as the alleged incident had taken place outside the factory premises, away from the workshop and outside the working hours. After holding that in paragraph 31 of the Award the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it is not necessary to give a finding as to the exact nature of the incident. The Tribunal also held assuming it had taken place, if at all, it had not taken place in the premises of the Company and within the duty hours. 37. The Tribunal also held assuming it had taken place, if at all, it had not taken place in the premises of the Company and within the duty hours. 37. This finding of the Tribunal has been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench of this Court has replied the contention made on behalf of the said Company by giving the following observations: "We do not find any merit in the contention raised that the finding of the Labour Court is against the Standing Order. The finding in the present case is finding of facts. The conclusion arrived at is also finding of fact. There is no question of any perverse order having been passed in this case. This is not a Court of appeal. The writ Court , cannot appropriate evidence and cannot correct any error of fact even if there is any. The whole intention is to harass the workman concerned. We dismiss this application as there is no merit in the same". 38. It is not in dispute that against the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, a Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court was dismissed. These facts were brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who 1 came to different finding about the appellant. The reasons given by the learned Single Judge for not accepting the judgment of the Division Bench are indicated in paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal. The said paragraph is set out below: "I am unable to accept this contention of Sri Sinha that the decision in Gurudayals case should be followed in this case also. It may be noticed that the judgment in Gurudayal Singhs case has not taken notice of elaborate argument made before this Court in the instant case on the Standing Order under consideration. The fact in this case is quite distinguishable from that of Gurudayal Singhs case against whom charge had not been proved". 39. In this aspect the question which troubles the conscience of the Court is whether two persons i.e. the appellant and Gurudayal being charged with identical allegations arising out of the same incident which led to the dismissal of both in a domestic enquiry and resulting in identical reference of dispute to an Industrial Tribunal can be treated differently. 39. In this aspect the question which troubles the conscience of the Court is whether two persons i.e. the appellant and Gurudayal being charged with identical allegations arising out of the same incident which led to the dismissal of both in a domestic enquiry and resulting in identical reference of dispute to an Industrial Tribunal can be treated differently. Apart from that, in case of both the employees, the Tribunal has given an Award quashing the dismissal order passed in the domestic enquiry principally on the ground that the charges do not amount to misconduct under the purview of the Standing Order. This finding has been arrived in the case of both the employees by the Tribunal. In case of Gurudayal, this finding was upheld right upto the Hon ble Supreme Court and Gurudayal has been reinstated in service. 40. In this background, can the learned Single Judge disregarding all these which have attained finality, arrive at a diametrically opposite conclusion holding that the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is not correct and thus quash the Award. 41. Apart from the question of judicial propriety and offending the doctrine of precedent, such view of the learned Single Judge, with due respect, is not consistent with the concept of equal justice enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 42. Concept of equality recognised and declared under Article 14 is a kind of human right norm. So what has been said about human right can also be applied to this principle of equality (See WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND, P. 121). The learned author has recognised this principle of equality before law as a general human right concept. 43. jUSTICE LAUTERPECHT also is of the same view and puts it very lucidly in the following words in his treatise (AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHT OF MAN, P. 115) "The claim of equality before the law is in a substantial sense the most fundamental of the rights of man. It occupies the first place in most written Constitutions. It is the starting point of all other liberties". 44. Judging from these angles and also keeping in mind, the dynamic interpretation given to this Equality concept by the Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the principle of equality is virtually in the nature of natural law. It occupies the first place in most written Constitutions. It is the starting point of all other liberties". 44. Judging from these angles and also keeping in mind, the dynamic interpretation given to this Equality concept by the Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the principle of equality is virtually in the nature of natural law. This concept of equality, as political scientists have put it, exists independently of the will of State and cannot be abolished by .any Constitution. The reason is that tbis concept is so fundamentally interwoven in the conscience of any reasonable man that it may appropriately be called "Natural law" in contrast to any "positive law". So, all democratic countries wedded to Rule of Law must confirm its existence in their Constitution. The role of the State is not to create it as it is already there. It is just to be declared as has been done under Article 14 of the Constitution. 45. Therefore, as a principle, it is of a Supra Constitutional dimension and must be placed at the highest pedestal in any hierarchical system of law. All laws including the Constitution, must be framed in obedience to and in conformity with this natural law Principle. 46. The facts of this case would show that at the end of the day Gurudayal, being accused of the same charges, after experiencing the trauma of legal proceedings right upto Supreme Court, is happily reinstated in service whereas the appellant has the misfortune of the Award passed in his favour being quashed by a judgment delivered much after Gurudayals case was decided by the Supreme Court. This certainly shocks the equality concept and also the concept of fairness. 47. The reasons given by the learned Single Judge in support of this different treatment in paragraph 38 of the judgment have been quoted above. Both these reasons are very weak as would appear from the discussion given below: 48. The Tribunal in its Award in Gurudayals case held, and in my view rightly, that it is no longer necessary to find whether the actual incident of assault took place or not once the finding is reached that misconduct does not come within the purview of Standing Order. The Tribunal in its Award in Gurudayals case held, and in my view rightly, that it is no longer necessary to find whether the actual incident of assault took place or not once the finding is reached that misconduct does not come within the purview of Standing Order. The learned Judge failed to appreciate this approach of the Tribunal in trying to discern a difference between the Award in the case of the appellant and that of Gurudayal. 49. The other reasons are equally unsustainable. Novelty of argument is never a ground for not accepting the previous decision as binding. A judgment will not lose its authority merely because it was "badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned" (SALMOND on JURISPRUDENCE, 11th Edition Page 215.) This age old dictum has been followed by the Supreme Court in several decisions, namely, in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in AIR 1980 SC page 1762. The said Constitution Bench judgment has been followed also by another three Judge judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Yadav V/s. J.M.A. Industries Limited, reported in (1993-II-LLJ-696). Therefore, on these principles the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 38 of the impugned judgment that elaborate argument which was made before him was not advanced before the Division Bench in Gurudayals case and, therefore, the judgment in Gurudayals case need not be followed by him is certainly not a reason which is acceptable to this Court. 50. In this case learned Counsel for the respondents has cited some decisions on the questions of precedent and ratio deciendi of a case. Those questions relating to ratio and precedent, strictly speaking, have not fallen for consideration in this case. In this case we are concerned with the broad principle that Courts of Co-ordinate jurisdiction are to express consistent opinion in respect of identical set of facts and if different opinions are expressed on identical set of facts by different Courts, then instead of achieving harmony in judicial system this will lead to judicial confusion and anarchy. (See 1993 3 SCC page 114, paragraph 10 in Hari Singh V/s. - State Haryana). 51. (See 1993 3 SCC page 114, paragraph 10 in Hari Singh V/s. - State Haryana). 51. So in the instant case when on identical set of facts, a decision of the Division Bench which has become final right upto Supreme Court, was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge, it is expected that the learned Single Judge will follow the same, instead of trying to depart from the same on the basis of the aforesaid reasons which are not acceptable to this Court. So on this ground also the judgment of the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. 52. Question f - On the question of discrimination on the part of the dismissal in awarding punishment of dismissal in favour of the appellant and Gurudayal whereas not imposing a much lesser punishment in case of K.K. Mishra, the Tribunal has given an elaborate finding in paragraph 57 of the Award. In paragraph 57 of the Award, the Tribunal has given a categorical finding that the charge against K.P. Singh and the appellant was the same. The seriousness of allegation against all the three employees was the same. The Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry against K.P. Singh also found him guilty of the charges levelled against him but the punishing authority awarded K.P. Singh, only the punishment of 30 days suspension adjustable against the period of suspension already undergone whereas passed orders of dismissal against the appellant. This shows that the Management indulged in discrimination and victimisation. These findings have been given in paragraphs 57 and 60 of the Award after quite elaborately considering various material facts and the evidence on record. But these findings of the Tribunal on facts have not been accepted by the learned Single Judge without coming to any conclusion that the aforesaid findings of fact are either perverse or based on no materials. As such here also the judgment of the learned Single Judge has been arrived at without properly appreciating the limits of judicial review in a writ petition in respect of an award passed by the Tribunal which is empowered to act under Sec. 11-A of the said Act. 53. So judging from all these points of view, this Court is unable to affirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Thus the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. 53. So judging from all these points of view, this Court is unable to affirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Thus the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. L.P.A. No. 244 of 1995 (R) filed by appellant Jitendra Prasad Singh is thus allowed. 54. The other appeal, namely, L.P.A. No. 246 of 1995(R) which has been filed by the management was not actually passed at the time of argument. On the other hand learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Management has repeated the same terms of offer of compensation which has been recorded by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. Since L.P.A. No. 246 of 1995(R) has not been pressed by the Management, the said appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. B.P.Singh, J. 55 I have had the benefit of perusing the very well-considered opinion prepared by brother GANGULY, J., and I agree with him that the appeal preferred by the concerned workmen should be allowed, and the appeal preferred by the management should be dismissed. I, however, wish to say a few words as to the true import and scope of applicability of the ratio in Glaxos case. In my view, the principle laid down in Glaxos, that there must be some causal connection between the misconduct alleged and the employment of the workmen, is of significance in cases where the alleged misconduct is committed outside the factory or the works premises. I have my doubts as to whether that principle will apply to cases of misconduct committed within the factory premises, if under the certified Standing Orders disorderly, riotous, or indecent behaviour of any act subversive of discipline is a misconduct. In my opinion, if such behaviour is misconduct, if committed within the premises of the factory, the existence of a causal connection between misconduct alleged and the employment of workman may not be of much significance. For example, if a workman not on duty chooses to enter the factory premises and assaults an officer within the factory premises for reasons purely personal and unconnected with his employment, in my view he must be held guilty of misconduct, if the Standing Orders provide that disorderly, or indecent, behaviour being an act subversive of discipline, is a misconduct. For example, if a workman not on duty chooses to enter the factory premises and assaults an officer within the factory premises for reasons purely personal and unconnected with his employment, in my view he must be held guilty of misconduct, if the Standing Orders provide that disorderly, or indecent, behaviour being an act subversive of discipline, is a misconduct. Applying the ratio in Glaxos case, it must be held that such misconduct is specifically included by incorporation in the certified Standing Orders. In the instant case, even the Tribunal has found that the workman had assaulted Shri Mishra while he was about to leave the hall. However, in an appropriate case this aspect of the matter may have to be considered. In the case in hand, since as many as three workmen on almost identical charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection with the same incident, though in separate proceedings, and one was punished with only one months suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is singled out for punishment by way of dismissal from service. L.P.A. No. 224 of 1995(R) filed by the appellant-workman must, therefore, be allowed, while L.P.A. No. 246 of 1995(R) preferred by the Management be dismissed.