JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The only question that arises for consideration in this writ application is whether direction given by the Investigating Officer to an accused during investigation to give his specimen signature is a testimonial compulsion and violative of protection given under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India (in short, 'Constitution'). 2. Factual position is almost undisputed and is as follows: Petitioner was directed by the Officer-in-charge, Banki P.S. to appear before the Tahasildar, Banki and give his specimen signature. It appears that a complaint was lodged by one Basant Kumar Prusty to the effect that somebody has impersonated him and filed an application for withdrawal of his nomination before the Election Officer in respect of election to Banki Central Co-operative Society under the provisions of Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (in short, 'Co-operative Act'). The case was registered as GR Case No..69 of 1998 in the Court of SDJM, Banki. Petitioner was arrested, remanded to custody in connection with said case and subsequently released on bail. In connection with said case, impugned direction was given. 3. It is stated by the Petitioner that under the provisions of Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, 'Evidence Act') the Court may direct any person in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words and figures so written by him vis-a-vis any word or figures alleged to have been written by the said person. Impugned direction is not of that nature. Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the pivotal provision round which the controversy revolves is in the following terms. No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against him. 4. In M.P. Sharma and Others Vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Others while considering the scope of Article 20(3) it was held that there is no inherent reason to construe that ambit of this fundamental right as comprising a very wide range. Nor would it be legitimate to confine it to the barely literal meaning of the words used, since it is a recognised doctrine that when appropriate, a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed so as to advance the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention. Nor would it be legitimate to confine it to the barely literal meaning of the words used, since it is a recognised doctrine that when appropriate, a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed so as to advance the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention. The right under Article 20(3) was held to consist of the following three components: (1) It is a right pertaining to a person "accused of an offence (2) It is protection against "compulsion to be a witness, and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence against himself. 5. Dealing with mainly scope and connotation of the second of the three components it was held that protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase "to be a witness" is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room, but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available, therefore, to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. The Supreme Court further held: Considered in this light, the guarantee under Article 20(3) would be available in the present cases to these Petitioners against whom a First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them. The question then that arises next is whether search warrants for the seizure of such documents from the custody of these persons are unconstitutional and hence, illegal on the ground that in effect they are tantamount to compelled production of evidence. It is urged that both search and seizure of a document and a compelled production thereof on notice or summons serve the same purpose of being available as evidence in a prosecution against the person concerned, and that any other view would defeat or weaken the protection afforded by the guarantee of the fundamental right. This line of argument is not altogether without force and has the apparent support of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in (1984) US 116 (B), In The State of Bombay Vs. This line of argument is not altogether without force and has the apparent support of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in (1984) US 116 (B), In The State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others it was hold that in order that a testimony of an accused person may be said to have been self incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the constitutional provisions, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. The Supreme Court further held that: (1) To be a witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing made or given in Court or otherwise. (2) To be a witness" in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in Court. Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of Court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (3) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made. 6. Both the aforesaid decisions were also taken note of in Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah and Another Vs. D.K. Guha and Others. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Government that the Petitioner had not been specifically named as an accused in the First Information Report and, therefore, he is not entitled to the protection under Article 20(3). Holding that the Petitioner is a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3) the Supreme Court held that the only protection that said Article gives to him is that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, but this does not mean that he need not give information regarding himself which do not tend to incriminate him. Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to set aside the summons and held that the Petitioner must appear before the Deputy Director and answer such questions as do not tend to incriminate him. 7. Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to set aside the summons and held that the Petitioner must appear before the Deputy Director and answer such questions as do not tend to incriminate him. 7. In K. Joseph Augusthi and Others Vs. M.A. Narayanan, Official Liquidator, Palai Central Bank Ltd. it was observed by the apex Court that the basic principle f Clause (3) is the presumption of innocence of the accused, casting the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove the guilt. 8. In Kathi Kalu Oghad's case (supra) the following propositions of law were summed up regarding the scope of the words "to be a witness: (1) To be a witness" is not equivalent to "furnishing evidence" in its widest significance, that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statement but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (ii) Giving thump impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression "to be a witness". (iii) To be a witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing made or given in Court or otherwise. (iv) "To be a witness" in its ordinary grammatical sense, means giving oral testimony in Court. The expression, however, bears a wider earning, namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of Court by a person accused of an offence orally or in writing. 9. In order to bring the evidence within the inhibitions of Clause (3) of Article 20, it must be shown not only that the person making the statement was an accused at the time he made it and that it had a material bearing on the criminality of the maker of the statement, but also that he was compelled to make that statement. 'Compulsion' in that context, must mean what in law is called 'duress'. 'Compulsion' in that context, must mean what in law is called 'duress'. In the Dictionary of English Law by,Earl Jowitt, 'duress' is explained as follows: Duress is where a man is compelled to do an act by injury, beating or unlawful imprisonment (sometimes called duress in strict sense) or by the threat of being killed, suffering some grievous bodily harm, or being unlawfully imprisoned (sometimes called menace, or duress' per numbers). Duress also includes threatening, beating or imprisonment of the wife, parent or child of a person. The compulsion in this sense is a physical objective act and not the state of mind of the person making the statement, except where the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process as to render the making of the statement involuntary and, therefore, extorted. Hence, the mere asking by a police officer investigating a crime against a certain individual to do a certain thing is not compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). Hence, the mere fact that the accused person, when he made the statement in question was in police custody would not, by itself, be the foundation for an inference of law that the accused was compelled to make the statement., of course, it is open to an accused person to show that while he was in police custody at the relevant time, he was subjected to treatment which, in the circumstances of the case, would land itself to the inference that compulsion was in fact exercised. In other words, it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it. 10. The apex Court in Kathi Kalu Oghad's case (supra) as indicated above inter alia came to the conclusion that giving specimen writings is not included in the expression "to be a witness". "To be a witness" is not equivalent to furnishing evidence in its widest significance that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements, but also production of documents or giving other materials. 11. In view of the aforesaid position of law enunciated by apex Court, it cannot be said that direction given by the Investigating Officer to the Petitioner to give his specimen signature is violative of protection of article 20(3) of the Constitution. The writ application fails and is dismissed. 11. In view of the aforesaid position of law enunciated by apex Court, it cannot be said that direction given by the Investigating Officer to the Petitioner to give his specimen signature is violative of protection of article 20(3) of the Constitution. The writ application fails and is dismissed. P.K. Mishra, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed