B. BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the defendants in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd court, Burdwan in Title Appeal No. 19/2 of 1986 thereby affirming those dated December 6, 1985 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Kalna in Title Suit No. 119 of 1979 since re-numbered as Title Suit No. 74 of 1983. ( 2 ) THE respondents No. 1 to 10 filed the aforesaid suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the present appellants from disturbing their alleged peaceful possession in the suit property. The case made out by the plaintiffs may be summarised thus :- (A)the suit property originally belonged to one Adwaitya Mondal, who died leaving his wife, Nandarani as his sole limited owner prior to the coming into operation of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. (B)nandarani after inheriting the suit property as a limited owner executed a deed of Arpannama on May 31, 1951 in favour of Sri Sri Shridhar Jew Thakura being defendant No. 8 in the instant suit. According to this Arpannama, Nandarani became Sebait of the deity for life and after her death, her husband's brother would become next Sebait and thereafter Sebaitship will be inherited by the heirs of the said brother of the husband. (C)on March 10, 1958 Nandarani executed a sale deed in favour of Tara Pada Banerjee, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the previous Arpannama was a void document. (D)the said Tarapada Banerjee and thereafter the plaintiffs were all along in possession of the suit property as owner. (E) the defendants who are heirs of the husband's brother of Nandarani were threatening dispossession of the plaintiffs, hence the suit. The aforesaid suit was contested by the present appellants by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint and the defence of the appellants are as follows :- (a) the suit was barred by limitation inasmuch as the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the Arpannama dated May 31, 1951 by filing a suit in the year 1979. The aforesaid suit was contested by the present appellants by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint and the defence of the appellants are as follows :- (a) the suit was barred by limitation inasmuch as the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the Arpannama dated May 31, 1951 by filing a suit in the year 1979. (b)nandarani having divested herself by executing Arpannama dated May 31, 1951 could not subsequently transfer the self-same property in favour of Tarapada Banerjee and as such by the alleged sale deed executed by Nandarani, Tarapada acquired no right, title or interest in the suit property. (c)the plaintiffs had no right, title or possession in the suit property. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record held that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the Arpannama executed by Nandarani was a void document as such by virtue of the sale deed executed by Nandarani in favour of Tarapada, the plaintiffs' aforesaid predecessor acquired title to the suit property. ( 4 ) BEING dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge, the appellants preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 19/2 of 1986 which was ultimately heard by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Burdwan and the learned Additional District Judge by the judgment and decree impugned in the instant second appeal dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 5 ) BEING dissatisfied, the defendants have preferred the instant second appeal. ( 6 ) MR. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised a pure question of law. ( 7 ) THE point advanced by Mr. Mukherjee is that the Arpannama executed by Nandarani on May 31, 1951 can at best be described as a voidable documents if the allegations of the plaintiffs in the plaint are true. But unless the said document is challenged by Nandarani herself within three years from the date of execution of the same, a subsequent suit, after lapse of 28 years at the instance of her transferee was barred by limitation. ( 8 ) MR. But unless the said document is challenged by Nandarani herself within three years from the date of execution of the same, a subsequent suit, after lapse of 28 years at the instance of her transferee was barred by limitation. ( 8 ) MR. Roychowdhury, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has on the other hand supported the judgment of the learned courts below and has contended that the deed executed by Nandarani was a sham transaction and as such was invalid and void ab initio. Being void ab initio, there was no necessity of praying for setting aside the said deed and as such Article 59 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the fact of the present case. According to Mr. Roychowdhury in the instant case Article 58 has got application and the suit was within the period of limitation being three years from the date when the appellants started creating disturbance in the possession of the plaintiffs. ( 9 ) MR. Roychowdhury further contends that the father of the appellants having executed a Nadabi deed on April 3, 1958 in favour of Nandarani, the present appellant cannot contend that by virtue of the Arpannama they are entitled to the property as Shebait of the deity. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the only point which is required to be decided by this court is whether a deed of Arpannama executed by Nandarani prior to 1956 can be said to be a void document. ( 11 ) IN my opinion, any deed executed by a Hindu widow having limited estate if executed not for legal necessity cannot be said to be a void document but is voidable at the option of reversioner. (See Ramgowda Annagowda Patil v. Bhausaheb and Ors. reported in AIR 1927 Privy Council page 227 ). ( 12 ) SIMILARLY if a limited heir executes a deed of Arpannama thereby giving substantial amount of the property inherited by her in favour of a deity, the same can be described as a voidable document and unless avoided within the period of limitation, the executant herself or any person claiming through her cannot dispute its validity. In this case by the Arpannama the Sebaitship right has been given ultimately to the heirs of the reversioners viz. the present appellants. In this case by the Arpannama the Sebaitship right has been given ultimately to the heirs of the reversioners viz. the present appellants. The reversioners are not disputing the legality and validity of the said document but are relying upon the same. Thus, after execution of the said Arpannama Nandarani herself not having avoided the said deed within the period of limitation, the present plaintiffs being heirs of her transferee cannot dispute its legality. ( 13 ) THEREFORE, I find substance in the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the suit not having been brought within the period of limitation as mentioned in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiffs could not dispute the legality of the Arpannama 28 years after the execution of the same. Therefore, the suit is patently barred by limitation and the learned courts below erred in law in holding that there was no necessity of claiming a declaration that the deed of Arpannama was invalid. ( 14 ) REGARDING the deed of Nadabi executed by predecessor of the present appellants, there is no dispute that Netai, the second Sebait mentioned in the deed of Arpannama died during the life time of Nandarani and as such in 1958 when the alleged Nadabi patra was executed by Netai, at that point of time he had no authority to execute such Nadabi as Nandarani was the then Sebait. Over and above by execution of Nadabi deed by a future sebait, dedication in favour of a deity cannot be revoked. Thus, I find no substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. ( 15 ) MR. Roychowdhury cited several decisions viz. (1) Kamala Debi and Anrs. v. Bachulal Gupta and Ors. AIR 1957 SC 434 ; (2) Mst. Sheo Kuer v. Nathuni Prasad Singh AIR 1976 1976 SC 709; (3) Durga Prasad v. Sri Sri Rameswar Jew Shib Thakur 85 CWN page 499 and (4) Kanailal Das v. Jiban Kanti Das AIR 1977 Calcutta page 189 in support of the contention that the Arpannama executed by Nandarani was invalid document. AIR 1957 SC 434 ; (2) Mst. Sheo Kuer v. Nathuni Prasad Singh AIR 1976 1976 SC 709; (3) Durga Prasad v. Sri Sri Rameswar Jew Shib Thakur 85 CWN page 499 and (4) Kanailal Das v. Jiban Kanti Das AIR 1977 Calcutta page 189 in support of the contention that the Arpannama executed by Nandarani was invalid document. As indicated above, even if the said Arpannama was invalid those decisions do not say that such document is void and as such unless, the invalid Arpannama being a voidable document was avoided by Nandarani within a period of limitation, the validity of the said document cannot be challenged by her transferee in the instant suit and as such those decisions are of no avail to Mr. Roychowdhury's clients. ( 16 ) THUS, I find substance in the contention of Mr. Mukherjee and I hold that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents is barred by limitation and as such the judgment and decree passed by the learned courts below are liable to be set aside and the suit should be dismissed being barred by limitation. ( 17 ) THE appeal is thus allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be however no order as to costs. Appeal allowed