JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J.: The petitioner No. 1 is a Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, of the stage carriage bus operators. The said Society has been constituted with an object to organise the road transport services in the District of Birbhum and to uphold and/or look after the rights and interest of its members relating to their business. The petitioner Nos. 2 to 6 are members of the 1st petitioner. The members of the 1st petitioner used to apply for and had been granted temporary permits by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as also for use of their vehicles under private contract on certain occasions like short tour, marriage purpose etc. 2. By reason of this writ application the petitioners, inter alia, has sought for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to follow the provision of Rule 128(1) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 for the purpose of imposition of fees in case of issue of any temporary permit, irrespective of the fact whether such permits are granted under section 87(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act or under section 88(8) thereof. They have also prayed for declaration that Rule 128(2) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. The grievances of the petitioners in this writ application appears to be that different fees are charged in respect of the permit granted under section 87(1) and 88(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioners have contended that whereas by reason of provision of Rule 128(1) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules only Rs. 15/- is charged per vehicle per region per week or part thereof; they are being asked to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- by way of a fee when a special permit is being granted. 4. Mr. Amal Sen, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. 15/- is charged per vehicle per region per week or part thereof; they are being asked to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- by way of a fee when a special permit is being granted. 4. Mr. Amal Sen, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. The learned Counsel submits that when a temporary permit is granted in respect of a route which may covered more than one region, the permit is required to be counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authorities of all regions whereas in a case where permit is granted under section 88(8) of the said Act, which does not require counter-signature by other Regional Transport Authorities, they have to pay a much higher rate i.e. at the rate of Rs. 200/- for every issue of permit in West Bengal and Rs. 400/- for every permit outside District. The learned Counsel submits that the said rules are contrary to or inconsistent with each other and in any event is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as by reason thereof no service is rendered to the Bus Operators. In support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on The State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory reported in AIR 1975 SC 846 and Tile Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. reported in AIR 1975 SC 2037 . 5. Mr. Khan the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that permit granted under section 87(1) and 88(8) being for different purposes, the impugned levy is valid in law. 6. Before adverting to the question raised in this application the scheme of the Act may be considered. 7. Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act relates to control of transport vehicles. Section 66 of the said Act puts an embargo upon any owner of any motor vehicle to use the same as a transport vehicle without any valid permit. Section 67 of the said Act reads thus:- "Power to State Government to control road transport. 7. Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act relates to control of transport vehicles. Section 66 of the said Act puts an embargo upon any owner of any motor vehicle to use the same as a transport vehicle without any valid permit. Section 67 of the said Act reads thus:- "Power to State Government to control road transport. – (1) A State Government, having regard to- (a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport, (b) the desirability of coordinating road and rail transport, (c) the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system; and (d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among holders of permits, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, issue directions both to the State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authority- (i) regarding the fixing of fares and freight (including the maximum and minimum in respect thereof) for stage carriages, contract carriages and goods carriages: (Provided that the fares and freights in respect of such stage carriages, contract carriages and goods carriages operated by battery, compressed natural gas or solar energy shall be fixed by the owner or operator.) (ii) regarding the prohibition or restriction, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the directions, of the conveying of long distance goods traffic generally, or of specified classes of goods by goods carriages; (iii) regarding any other matter which may appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for giving effect to any agreement entered into with the Central Government or any other State Government or the Government of any other country relating to the regulation of motor transport generally, and in particular to its co-ordination with other means of transport and the conveying of long distance goods traffic: Provided that no such notifications in respect of the matters referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii) shall be issued unless a draft of the proposed directions is published in the Official Gazette specifying therein in a date being not less than one month after such publication, on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and any objection or suggestion which may be received has, in consultation with the State Transport Authority, been considered after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard. (2) Any direction under sub-section (1) regarding the fixing of fares and freights for stage carriages, contract carriages and goods carriages may provide that such fares or freights shall be inclusive of the tax payable by the passengers or the consignors of the goods, as the case may be, to the operators of the stage carriages, contract carriages or goods carriages under any law for the time being in force relating to tax on passengers and goods." 8. With a view to exercise control of transport vehicles permits are granted. Both sections 87 and 88 are within Chapter-V of the said Act. The provisions contained therein along with Chapter-VI are complete code in themselves. Chapter-VIII relates to control of traffic. Sections 87 and 88(8) of the said Act read thus: “87. Temporary Permits. – (1) A Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in section 80, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period which shall, not in any case exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily – (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and may attach to any such permit such condition as it may think fit: Provided that a Regional Transport Authority or, as the case may be, State Transport Authority may, in the case of goods carriages, under the circumstances of an exceptional nature, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant a permit for a period exceeding four months but not exceeding one year. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a temporary permit may be granted thereunder in respect of any route or area where – (i) no permit could be issued under section 72 or section 74 or section 76 or section 79 in respect of that route or area by reason of an order of a Court or other competent authority restraining the issue of the same, for a period not exceeding the period for which the issue of the permit has been so restrained; or (ii) as a result of the suspension by a Court or other competent authority of the permit of any vehicle in respect of that route or area, there is no transport vehicle of the same class with a valid permit in respect of that route or area, or there is no adequate number of such vehicles in respect of that route or area, for a period not exceeding the period of such suspension: Provided that the number of transport vehicles in respect of which temporary permits are so granted shall not exceed the number of vehicles in respect of which the issue of the permit have been restrained or, as the case may be, the permit has been suspended." “Section 88, Validation of permits for use outside region in which granted. – (1)................................. – (1)................................. (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act by the Central Government, the Regional Transport Authority of anyone region or, as the case may be, the State Transport Authority, may, for the convenience of the public, (grant a special permit to any public service vehicle including any vehicle covered) by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of this section for carrying a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract, express or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract, and in every case where such special permit is granted, the Regional Transport Authority shall assign to the vehicle, for display thereon, a special distinguishing mark in the form and manner specified by the Central Government and such special permit shall be valid in any other region or State without the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other State, as the case may be.” 9. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would clearly go to show that permits under section 87 and 88(8) are given for different purposes; whereas a temporary permit is granted to a Bus Operator for the purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) thereof, a permit in terms of sub-section (8) of section 88 is granted for special purposes; whereas for operating on a route on the basis of the permit granted under section 87(1) the permit holder may allow any passenger to board the Bus, while permit is granted under sub-section (8) of section 88, the Bus being plied for a specific purpose, the person who had hired them is known and only such passengers who are travelling for the said particular purpose can board the bus No. comparison, therefore can be made between the permits granted under section 87(1) and 88(8) of the Act. The State Government for the purpose of the said Chapter was entitled to make rules inter alia in respect of levy of fees be paid with regard to application for permit, duplicate permit and plates etc. as would appear from section 96(2)(vii) of the said Act. 10. The State Government for the purpose of the said Chapter was entitled to make rules inter alia in respect of levy of fees be paid with regard to application for permit, duplicate permit and plates etc. as would appear from section 96(2)(vii) of the said Act. 10. Section 211 also falling in Chapter-XIV empowers the Central Government or the State Government to provide for levy of such fees in respect of such applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, countersignatures, authorisation, etc. or matter involving the rendering of any service by the officers or authorities under this Act or any rule made thereunder as may be considered necessary. 11. Fees, therefore, can be levied both for the purpose of rendition of service as well as for the purpose of regulating the traffic. Although a distinction exists in the matter of tax and fee, it is now well known, that in each case the element of quid pro quo need not be satisfied with mathematical exactitude in the matter of levy of fee. It is further well known that in case of a regulatory fee as for example fees for grant of permit, licence, etc. the element of quid pro quo becomes totally irrelevant. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Apex Court in The Corporation of Calcutta & Anr. vs. Libery Cinema reported in AIR 1965 SC 1107 . The Apex Court in that case was considering levy of license fee on cinema house by the Corporation of Calcutta under Calcutta Municipal Act. The Apex Court held: “This contention was sought to be supported by the argument that section 443 occurred in a Part concerning public health, safety and convenience and therefore the intention was that the levy authorised by the section would be in return for work done for securing public health, safety and convenience and was hence a fee. We are wholly unable to accept this contention. Whether a particular levy is a fee or tax has to be decided only by reference to the terms of the section as we have earlier stated. We are wholly unable to accept this contention. Whether a particular levy is a fee or tax has to be decided only by reference to the terms of the section as we have earlier stated. Its position in the Act cannot determine its nature; an imposition which is by its terms a tax and not a fee, which in our opinion the present imposition is, cannot become a fee by reason of its having been placed in a certain part of the statute.” The Apex Court observed :– “The conclusion to which we then arrive is that the levy under section 548 is not a fee as the Act does not provide for any services of special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licencee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service. The levy is a tax. It is not disputed, it may be stated that if the levy is not a fee, it must be a tax.” In The State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory reported in AIR 1975 SC 846 , the Apex Court observed :– “Thus, two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.” The Apex Court in that case was considering the Bombay Public Trusts Act which was enacted with a view to render special services for the benefit of the trust by way of pre-precautionary measures, fee was levied to see that public trusts are administered for the purposes intended by the authors of the trusts and exercising control and supervision with a view to preserve the trust properties from being wasted or misappropriated by trustees. It was in that situation held that the levy in question was not tax but a fee. It was in that situation held that the levy in question was not tax but a fee. The Apex Court distinguished the decision of Liberty Cinema (supra) in the following manner :– “It was, however, argued on behalf of the respondent on the basis of the decision in Corporation of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema (1965) 2 SCR 447=( AIR 1965 SC 1107 ) and Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi vs. Durga Das Bhattacharya, (1968) 3 SCR 374 = ( AIR 1968 SC 1119 ) (supra) that the exercise of the power of supervision and control of public trusts under the provisions of the Act would not be special services, that performance of the statutory functions and duties under the Act is owed to the public and cannot be regarded a special benefits to the public trusts in the State for which a fee can be exacted as consideration.” In The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., reported in AIR 1975 SC 2037 , the Apex Court followed the decision in The State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory, reported in AIR 1975 SC 846 . In that case the levy of permission fee was imposed by a Gram Panchayat under the Gram Pnachayat Act was declared invalid on the ground that in that case not a word existed showing the element of quid pro quo in the imposition of fee. In that case also the court was not concerned with a case of regulatory fee. The traditional concept of quid pro quo had, however, undergone a transformation in recent cases. See S.C.T. vs. State of A.P., reported in AIR 1983 SC 1246 , paragraphs 33 and 38. Kishan Lal Lakshmi Chand vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1993 (4) SCC 461. In Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. vs. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd., reported in 1995(1) SCC 655 , the Apex Court has laid down 9 categories of difference between a tax and a fee in paragraph 21 therein, Clauses 6 and 7 whereof read thus :– “6. There is really no generic difference between tax and fee and the taxing power of the State may manifest itself in three different forms, viz., special assessments, fees and taxes. Whether a cess is tax or fee, would depend upon the facts of each case. There is really no generic difference between tax and fee and the taxing power of the State may manifest itself in three different forms, viz., special assessments, fees and taxes. Whether a cess is tax or fee, would depend upon the facts of each case. If in the guise of fee, the legislature imposes a tax it is for the Court on a scrutiny of the scheme of the levy, to determine its real character. In determining whether the levy is a fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specific area or classes. It is of no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it. The amount of the levy must depend upon the extent of the services sought to be rendered and if they are proportionate, it would be unreasonable to say that since the impost is high it must be a tax. Nor can the method prescribed by the legislature for recovering the levy by itself alter its character. The method is a matter of convenience and though relevant, has to be tested in the light of other relevant circumstances. 7. It is not a postulate of a fee that it must have relation to the actual service rendered. However, the rendering of service has to be established. The service, further cannot be remote. The test of quid pro quo is not to be satisfied with dose or proximate relationship in all kinds of fees. A good and substantial portion of the fee must, however, be shown to be expended for the purpose for which the fee is levied. It is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the payers of the fee but some special benefit must be conferred on them which has a direct and reasonable co-relation to the fee. While conferring some special benefits on the payers of the fees, it is permissible to render service in the general interest of all concerned. The element of quid pro quo is not possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude. But it must be established broadly and reasonably that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom the burden of the fee falls. The element of quid pro quo is not possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude. But it must be established broadly and reasonably that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom the burden of the fee falls. There is no postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authorities to each individual to obtain the benefit of the service. The element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee. The element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax. It is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general co-relationship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied though no single payer of the fee receives direct of personal benefit from those services. It is immaterial that the general public may also be benefited from some of the services if the primary service intended is for the payers of the fees.” 12. Even a levy can be treated, in part, as a fee and, in part as a tax as stated in Orissa Cement vs. State of Orissa, reported in (1991) Supp. (1) SCC 430 (para. 56). 13. Yet again recently in P. Kannadasan & Ors. vs. State of T.N. & Ors., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 670 , the law has been stated in the following terms :– “The sixth contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants-petitioners is premised upon the supposition that Parliament is bound to utilise the taxes realised under the impugned Act only for the purpose of regulation of mines and mineral development. It is on this supposition, it is argued, that inasmuch as the Union has not established that the impugned levy is required for the purpose of the said regulation and development, the imposition is incompetent. In our opinion, the very supposition is misplaced. What is levied under the impugned enactment is a tax/cess and not a fee. It is on this supposition, it is argued, that inasmuch as the Union has not established that the impugned levy is required for the purpose of the said regulation and development, the imposition is incompetent. In our opinion, the very supposition is misplaced. What is levied under the impugned enactment is a tax/cess and not a fee. Even in the matter of fees, it is not necessary that element of quid pro quo should be established in each and every case, for it is well settled that fees can be both regulatory and compensatory and that in the case of both regulatory fees, the element of quid pro quo is totally irrelevant. (See Corpn. of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1107 ). Taxes are raised for argumenting the general revenues of the State and not for any particular purpose-much less for rendering a particular service.” 14. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.