ORDER D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner assails the order dated 18th January, 1996 (Annexure-P-1) whereby on completion of 57 years of his age he has been compulsorily retired as Assistant Professor (Veterinary Pathology( College of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandary, Jabalpur under the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya Jabalpur constituted under the provisions of Jawaharlal Nehru Vishwadyalaya Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'University' and 'the Act' respectively). The Petitioner's appeal against the order of his compulsory retirement to the Chancellor under Section 14 (2) of the Act has been dismissed by order passed on 30th September, 1996 (Annex.P/4). 2. Learned Counsel Shri R.S. Jha appearing for the Petitioner assailed the order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner mainly on two grounds. Fristly it is urged that under the provisions of the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder, the power to Compulsorily retire an Assistant Professor employed in a college under the University vests only in the Supreme Executive Body of the University which is the Board constituted under Section 25 of the Act. The contention advanced is that Vice Chancellor of the University had no authority to compulsorily retire the Petitioner. Reliance is placed on (1989) 2 S.C.C. 58 (District Collector Chittoor and Ors. v. Chittoor Groundnut Traders Association), (1990) Suppl. S.C.C. 374 (Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence v. Daniel) and (1989) 3 S.C.C. 132 (Marathawada University v. S.B.R. Chavan (A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1582). 3. In the above respect, the further contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner is that the Vice Chancellor in exercise of powers under Section 27 (xxvii) of the Act has been delegated the power of the Board of making appointments of teachers and servants of the Vishwavidyalaya, referable to Sub-clause (xxii) of the said Section, the power of appointment delegated by the Board the Vice Chancellor did not include the power of compulsory retirement. It is submitted that the screeing committee constituted by the Board for scrutinising the cases of teachers and servants falling within the zone of consideration for compulosory retirement had made recommendations against the Petitioner, but the ultimate decision to accept or reject the recommendation of the screening committee rested with the Board, A meeting of the Board to consider alongwith other subjects in the agenda the cases of teachers and sevants for compulsory retirement was scheduled for 19.1.1996. The Vice Chancellor, however, in eagerness and with malafide Intention to compulsorily retire the Petitioner, passed the order on 18.1.1996 i.e. a day before the meeting of the Board scheduled for considering recommendations of the Scneening Committee. 4. The other ground raised on behalf of the Petitioner is that the action of the Vice Chancellor deserves to be set aside on the ground of apparent malice. It is pointed out that the Petitioner was elected office bearer of Technical Staff Association of the University and was its General Secretary from 1976 to 1980. The Vice Chancellor Dr. K.S. Johar who passed the impugned order of compulory retirement had contested election against the applicant in the year 1980 for the post of office bearer of the association and was defeated. In discharge of his legitimate activities as Secetary and President of the Association, the Petitioner had challenged the appointment of Shri K.S. Johar as Dean in the College, and for that purpose had filed a writ petition in the High Court in 1980-81. The Petitioner's appointment as Major Advisor to one M.V. Sc. student Mrs. Nitu Gupta was cancelled by Dr. K.S. Johar casting aspersions on the character and conduct of the Petitioner. The Petitioner had, therefore, instituted a suit of defamation against Dr. K.S. Johar. 5. An enquiry commission was constituted to enquire into the affairs of the University on the basis of serveral complaints of commission and ommissions. The Revenue Commissioer was appointed to probe into the allegations against the University and its authorities. As office bearer of the Technical Staff Association, the Petitioner appeared before the Commissioner and gave evidence against Dr. K.S. Johar. 6. The Petitioner functioned as President of Technical Staff Association since 21st August 1995. It is alleged that because of his activities in the Association, Dr. K.S. Johar, Vice Chancellor harboured ill-will and prejudice against the Petitioner. As office bearer of the Technical Staff Association, the Petitioner appeared before the Commissioner and gave evidence against Dr. K.S. Johar. 6. The Petitioner functioned as President of Technical Staff Association since 21st August 1995. It is alleged that because of his activities in the Association, Dr. K.S. Johar, Vice Chancellor harboured ill-will and prejudice against the Petitioner. It is submitted that the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner passed in hot-haste, without placing the matter before the Board of the University, is patently malicious and outcome of ill-will harboured by Dr. K.S. Johar as Vice Chancellor against the Petitioner. To support the allegations of malice against the Vice Chancellor, reliance has been placed on a letter (Annex. P/5) which is internal correspondence between Dr. Zile Singh, Director (PPF) HAU and Professor & Head (ENT) in his official capacity with the Chancellor of the University in which there is mention of ill-will harboured by Shri K.S. Johar Vice Chancellor against the Petitioner. 7. So far as the adverse remarks in the confidential reports of the Petitioner are concerned, which have been made basis by the Screening Committee to recommend his retirement, it is submitted that those were also based on of his activities as the office bearer of the Officers Association and outcome of prejudice and ill-will harboured by the authorities against him. It is submitted that he never neglected his official duties despite his active involvement in the Association as its important office bearer. 8. Shri V.S. Shroti, learned Counsel appearing for the University defended the action of compulsory retirement taken by the Vice Chancellor. On the question of his power to make the order of compulsory retirement, the reply on behalf of the University is that the 'power of appointment' belonging to the Board stood delegated to the Vice Chancellor under the statute framed under the Act and it would include the 'power to terminate and compulsorily retire such employee whom he could appoint. Aid is taken of the provisions contained in Section 16 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957. Very strong reliance has been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra v. J.N.K.V.V. (1970 M.P.L.J. 748). Aid is taken of the provisions contained in Section 16 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957. Very strong reliance has been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra v. J.N.K.V.V. (1970 M.P.L.J. 748). It is contended that the principle underlying Section 16 of General Clauses Act is that the power to terminate is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of that power. Reliance is placed on Lekharj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shan and Ors. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 334) and State of Assam v. Kripanath Sarma and Ors. (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 459). 9. So far as the allegations of malice against the Vice Chancellor Dr. K.S. Johar is concerned, they have been denied on affidavit by the University and Dr. KS. Johar, the Vice Chancellor. It is submitted that the Screening Committee consisted of all independent persons, some of whom were not directly connected with the University. The Vice Chancellor had participated and remained present in the meeting of the Screening Committee in his official capacity by virtue of the provisions in Section 17 of the Act. The University had fixed objective norms for considering cases of employees for compulsory retirement. It is on the basis of those objective norms that the Screening Committee recommended retirement of the Petitioner. The Vice Chancellor acted on the recommendations of the Screening Committee for which he was empowered under order of delegation made by the Board. It is submitted that the overall service record of the Petitioner clearly shows that he had throughout devoted major time to the activities of the Association and neglected his offical duties. On certain occasions he was found to be extremely arrogant and had acted in a manner not expected of an Assistant Professor in an educational institution. It is on the basis of his over-all bad performance and conduct that he was recommended for compulsory retirement. The decision to compulsorily retire the Petitioner was taken bonafide on the basis of objective material and, therefore, this Court should decline to interfere. Reliance is placed on Balkunth Nath Das v. Chief Dist. Medical Officer (A.I.R. 1992 S.C.1020), Posts and Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy (A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1368), I.K. Mishra v. Union of India (1997) 6 S.C.C. 228 ) and K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India and Anr. (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 277). 10. Reliance is placed on Balkunth Nath Das v. Chief Dist. Medical Officer (A.I.R. 1992 S.C.1020), Posts and Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy (A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1368), I.K. Mishra v. Union of India (1997) 6 S.C.C. 228 ) and K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India and Anr. (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 277). 10. I shall first take up the question raised about competence of the Vice Chancellor to pass the order of compulsory retirement. To answer said question it would be necessary to examine the provisions of the Act, the statutes framed thereunder and the order of delegation of the Board issued in fovour of the Vice Chancellor. 11. Section 24 of the Act enumerates various authorities of the Vishwavidyalaya. The Board is the supreme authority of the Vishwa Vidyalaya as provided in Section 27 of the Act. The powers of the Board are also to be found in Sub-section (2) of Section 27. The relevant powers are contained in Sub-clauses (xxii), (xxvi) and (xxvii) of Section 27 which read as under: 27. Power and Duties of the Board - The Board shall be the Executive Authority of the Vishwa Vidyalaya and shall, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by or under the provisions of this Act and the statutes, exercise, the following powers and perform the following duties, namely: (xxii) save as otherwise provided by this Act, or the Statutes, to approve the appointments of officers, (other than the Kuladhipati and the Kulpati) teachers and other servants of the Vishwa Vidyalaya, to define their duties and conditions of their service and to provide for the filling of temporary vacancies in their posts: (xxvi)to lay down scales of salaries and conditions of the employment of member of the staff in the various branches of the Vishwa Vidyalaya and to ensure observance of the same. (xxvii)to delegate by regulating any of its powers to the kulpati, the Registrar or such other officer of Vishwa Vidyalaya or a Committee appointed by it as it may deem fit;.... 12. As is disclosed by the University in its additional return in Document Annexure-R/46, the Board in exerice of power under Sec .27 (xxvii) delegated the following power of the Board to the Vice Chancellor in its 119th meeting dated 27.1.90 (the order is in Hindi and needs verbatim reproduction): 13. 12. As is disclosed by the University in its additional return in Document Annexure-R/46, the Board in exerice of power under Sec .27 (xxvii) delegated the following power of the Board to the Vice Chancellor in its 119th meeting dated 27.1.90 (the order is in Hindi and needs verbatim reproduction): 13. The effect of he above quoted portion of the order of delegation of the Board is that "hereinafter the Board has conferred powers of appointment on the Vice Chancellor in respect of the posts of Teachers and Technical officers upto the rank of Assistant Professor and equivalent posts." 14. It is also brought to the notice of this Court by producing a book-let containing the delegation of administrative and financial powers at various levels in the Vishwavidyalaya that by virtue of the above deletation, the Vice Chancellor has also the power of removal or dismissal of an employee working on the teaching post of Assistant professor. 15. Statute-11 contains the provisions of compulsory retirement of the teaching staff of the University. The relevant part of Statute 11 is quoted hereunder: 11. Conditions of service etc. of other officers 1. .......... 2. .......... 3. ........... 4. All officers except the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor of the Vishwa Vidyalaya mentioned under Section 12 of the J.N.K.V.V. Act, 1963, teaching staff of the Vishwa Vidyalaya as defined under Statute 32 of the Vishwa Vidyalaya Statutes, non teaching service personnel of Class-I. Class-II, Class-III and Class-IV categories as detailed in Regulation No. 4 of the J.N.K.V.V. services' (General Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1969 shall be entitled to be in service of the Vishwa Vidyalaya until they complete the age of 60 (sixty) years, provided that- (i) all Vishwa Vidyalaya employees may, in the public interest or in the Vishwa Vidyalaya interest be retired at any time after they attain the age of 55 years or 25 years of qualifying service, on three months notice without assigning any reason or on payment of three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such a notice; (ii) the case of a Vishwa Vidyalaya employee on his completing the age of 57 years shall be screened at the end of each year with a view to determining his suitability in all respects to continue upto the age of 60 years. In case an employee is not found fit to continue beyond the age of 57 years, he shall be retired without assigning any reason on giving one month's notice of pay allowances in lieu of such a notice; (iii) the case of sue 16. In terms of Statute 11 (4) (ii) quoted above, in the order to scrutinise the case of employees within the zone of consideration for compulsory retirement, the Board of the University constituted a Screening Committee vide is residuary agenda in 141st meeting held on 2.3.1995. The relevant part of that decision reads thus: 17. The Screening Committee met on 8th and 9th January, 1996 at Bhopal in which Dr. K.S. Johar Vice Chancellor was also present in his official capacity as claimed by virtue of provisions contained in Section 17 (1) of the Act. The Screening Committee considered the cases of several employees on the criteria fixed which was as under: (i) Integrity & honesty as adjudged on the basis of overall record; (ii) Deterioration in physical fitness; (iii) Work as reflected from ACRs for the last 5 years; and (iv) Penalty imposed during the last five years in relation to work & conduct. 18. The Screening Committee after scrutiny of service records made recommedations against certain employees whose names are mentioned in its minutes of 8th & 9th January 1996 which have been placed for perusal of this Court. With respect to certain candidates such as Shri S.S. Thakur, Officer on Special Duty, Dr. M.L Goyal, Assistant Professor, Shri P.G. Mehta, Assistant, and Shri K.K. Jain U.D.C. the Committee recommended that their cases be placed before the Board. With regard to two candidates, namely, Shri G.M. Wakil. Assistant Professor and Shri T.N. Singh, U.D.C. it was recommended that their cases be placed in the next meeting of the Screening Committee. It is only in the cases of the Petitioner, Dr. P.G. Najpande, Assistant Professor and Shri B.L. Mourya, U.D.C. that the Screening Committee recommended that they should be compulsorily retired and the recommendation be placed before the Competent Authority, but there was no specific direction for placing it before the Board. 19. It is only in the cases of the Petitioner, Dr. P.G. Najpande, Assistant Professor and Shri B.L. Mourya, U.D.C. that the Screening Committee recommended that they should be compulsorily retired and the recommendation be placed before the Competent Authority, but there was no specific direction for placing it before the Board. 19. Too much emphasis is laid on the recommendations made by the Screening Committee for contending on behalf of the University that in case of employees where there were clear directions for placing their cases before the Board, they were so placed and in respect of the Petitioner Dr. P.G. Najpande and one Shri B.L. Mourya since the Screening Committee recommended their cases to be placed before the competent authority, the Vice Chancellor as the Competent Authority on the basis of recommendations of the Screening Committee could pass the order of compulsory retirement. 20. It has already been mentioned above that the order of compulsory retirement on the recommendation of the Screening Committee was passed on 18.1.1996 when the meeting of the Board had already been scheduled for the next day i.e. 19.1.1996. In its 145th meeting held on 19.1.1996, the Board on the relevant Agenda No. 20 regarding consideration of recommendations of the Screening Committee postponed the subject for consideration in its next meeting. The question of Petitioner's compulsory retirement passed on the recommendations of the Screening Committee did not come up for consideration before the Board in its next meeting as admittedly by that time the order of his compulsory retirement had already been passed by the Vice Chancellor. The order was also not placed before the Board either for approval or ratification. According to the University, the Vice Chancellor alone was compentent to make an order of compulsory retirement. The adjourned meeting of the Board was held on 17.5.1996 in which excepting the cases of the Petitioner and one B.L. Mourya, the cases of other employees, named above, were placed for consideration before the Board. The Board considered the recommendations in respect of those candidates made by the Screeing Committee and with respect to S.S. Thakur, Officer on Special Duty, took a decision that his case be placed in the next meeting after the employee Is informed of the adverse remarks against him in his confidential report With respect to G.M. Wakil, Junior Scientist, no action was taken as there was a Court case pending. With regard to K.K. Jain, U.D.C. the Board directed that he had already been punished in a departmental enquiry, therefore, no further action betaken. With regard to T.N. Singh, U.D.C. it was resolved that the report of Collector. Tikamgarh be called concerning his conduct. The recommendation of Screening Committee for compulsory retirement was accepted only with respect to Dr. M.L Goyal Assistant Professor and Shri P.J. Mehta, Assistant. The above details of the proceedings of the Board have been mentioned specifically to point out that the recommendations of the Screening Committee were duly scrutinesed and considered by the Board for accepting or rejecting the recommendations. Such an occasion did not arise so far as the Petitioner is concerned because in his case on the recommendation of the Screening Committee the Vice Chancellor had already taken a decision and action. 21. On taking thus the resume of the above proceedings and actions of the University and its authorities, the main question that falls for consideration before this Court is whether the action taken by the Vice Chancellor is in accordance with the Act and the statutes. On behalf of the University in support of its action reliance is strongly placed on the provisions of Section 16 of the M.P. General Clauses Act which reads as under: 16. Power to appoint to include power to suspend ordismiss: Where, by any enactment, a power to make any appoitment is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, the authority for the time being having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power. 22. As held as early as in Rayauappan v. Madhavi Amma (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140), Section 16 has codified the well-understood rule of general law that the power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to create. In other words, it is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to, or consequence of, the power. The authority to call an officer into being necessarily implies the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary, or to remove the Incumbent for an abuse of those functions or other causes shown. 23. The authority to call an officer into being necessarily implies the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary, or to remove the Incumbent for an abuse of those functions or other causes shown. 23. It is not disputed that power of appointment of Assistant Professor conferred by the Act on the Board stood delegated by a resolution or order issued under the Act to the Vice Chancellor. The only question is whether the power to appoint which includes the power to suspend or dismiss would also include the power to compulsorily reitre. It has been well established in law that an action of appointing authority to compulsorily retire its employee on the basis of his poor work and performance is neither dismissal nor removal nor a punitive action of any other kind. As has been held in catena of decisions, some of which have been relied upon by the University, it is a process undertaken by the employer to weed out the corrupt, indolent and inefficient employees working under it. The everall record of the employees working goes into consideration on the basis of laid down norms and performance of recent past five years may have a greater value. In that regard, see the case of K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India and Anr. (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 277). 24. As has been seen above from the details of the actions and proceedings taken by the University the Screening Committee was constituted by the Board. The Committee had, therefore, to place its recommendations before the Board. The power of compulsory retirement vests under the provisions of the Act in the supreme executive body of the University i.e. the Board. The power of compulsory retirement is not conferred on one individual but on a body consisting of several persons. That being so, that body might bring particular skills and particular point of view to bear on the making of decisions required of it. Since the power is conferred on a body of persons some of whom are independent and not directly connected with the University, it cannot easily be assumed that a power demanding good and efficient decision making would be permitted to be delegated to one individual such as the Vice Chancellor in the instant case. Since the power is conferred on a body of persons some of whom are independent and not directly connected with the University, it cannot easily be assumed that a power demanding good and efficient decision making would be permitted to be delegated to one individual such as the Vice Chancellor in the instant case. The very nature of power of compulsory retirement conferred by the Act on the Board which consists of a body of persons, demands as a matter of justice that it would not permit delegation of such a power. 25. Under Section 27 of the Act, the Executive power of the University vests in the Board which is the supreme authority. Under Section 27 (xxii) the power to approve appointments of teachers and other servants of the Vishwa Vidyalaya, to define their duites and conditions of their service vests in the Board. In the above power of the Board to make appointments and determine conditions of service of teachers and servants, the power to terminate, dismiss or compulsorily retire them is the power which could be read by implication with the aid of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. Such implied power belongs to the Board not its delegate e.g. Vice Chancellor in the instant case, unless such implied power is expressely delegated to him. 26. The Board under Section 27 (xxvii) has power to delegate its power to the vice Chancellor, the Registrar and other officers of the University or to a Committee appointed by it and that has to be done by an express order resolution. 27. The order/resolution of delegation of the Board, expressly delegates to the Vice Chancellor only the power of appointment. In Ramchandra's case (supra) the Division Bench read into the above power of Vice Chancellor the power to terminate simplicitor by implication with the aid of Section 16. It is not possible to raad into the order the delegation of power of compulsory retirement as well. 28. The power to compulsorily retire is distinct from power to terminate simplicitor or take a disciplinary action. 29. The general law of delegation as is required to be examined in this case, does not appear to have been touched by the Division Bench in the case of Ramchandra (supra) and makes it distinguishable. See the following passage from - Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 29. The general law of delegation as is required to be examined in this case, does not appear to have been touched by the Division Bench in the case of Ramchandra (supra) and makes it distinguishable. See the following passage from - Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 73., paragraph 56 at page 513: Administrative officers and bodies cannot alienate surrender, or abridge their powers and duties or delegate authority and functions which under the law may be exercised only by them; and although they delegate merely ministerial functions, in the absence of statute or organic act permitting it, they cannot delegate powers and functions which are discretionary or quasi-judicial in character, or which require the exercise of Judgment. 30. Similar statement of law may be found in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.1 para 32. Considering the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, the statement of law is as under: In accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial, or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind. 31. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with somewhat similar situation but with different language employed in the actual order of delegation contained in the resolution of the Executive Council for exercise of its power by Vice Chancellor. However, the law discussed by the Supreme Court in the context of delegation of power in that case is illuminating for the purpose of this case. However, the law discussed by the Supreme Court in the context of delegation of power in that case is illuminating for the purpose of this case. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Marathawada University v. S.B.R. Chavan (A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1582) which are pertinent are as under: Where the executive council on receiving report of Committee appointed to investigate into allegations against an officer in the discharge of duties, exenorating the officer, entrusted the question by a resolution to the Vice Chancellor, and he, purporting to act under the authority of the resolution, ordered departmental enquiry and dismissed the officer and there was also no prior approval of the Chancellor, which is mandatory, to the delegation of power by the Executive Council to the Vice Chancellor, the dismissal was not sustainable as there was no delegation in respect of action taken and the resolution delegating power was not in harmony with statutory requirement. By the power delegated he could either accept or reject the report with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any other action. In this connection, subsequent ratification of the action by the Executive Council would be of no avail. The principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with ragard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 32. In the instant case, power of approving appointment to the University being vested in the Board by the statute, the power with the Board being the Supreme executive body to terminate, dismiss of compulsorily retire the employees can be inferred by implication from the statute with the aid of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner is right in submitting that the use of word "dismissal" in Section 1'6 of the General Clauses Act would include termination simplicitor' as also a 'termination based on a disciplinary action'. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner is right in submitting that the use of word "dismissal" in Section 1'6 of the General Clauses Act would include termination simplicitor' as also a 'termination based on a disciplinary action'. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhool Chand v. Kurukshetra University (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 292) is directly on the point and its relvant part reads thus; Counsel also urged that under Section 14 of the Act power to appoint includes power to dismiss, but not determine employment. In support of that contention he urged that in relation to the tenure of service of a public servant, the expression "to dismiss" has come to mean to determine employment as a measure of punishment. But Section 14 of the General Clauses Act is general provision; it does not merely deal with the appointment of public servant. It deals with the appointments, and there is no reason to hold, having regard to the context in which the expreassion occurs, that the authority invested with the power of appointment has the power to determine employment as a penalty, but not otherwise. The expression "dismiss" does not in its etymological sense necessarily involve any such meaning as is urged by counsel for the Appellant. The implication that dismissal of a servant involves determination of employment as a penalty has been a matter of recent development since the Government of India Act 1935, was enacted. By that Act certain restrictions were imposed upon the power of the authorities to dismiss or remove members of the civil services from employment. There is no warrant, however, for assuming that in the General Clauses Act, 1898, the expression, "dismiss" which was generally used in connection with the termination of appointments was intended to be used only in the sense of determination of employment as a measure of punishment. 33. As has been seen above, from the general statement of law, action of compulsory retirement requires application of mind, exercise of discretion, and judgment by the Board. There is presumption against delegation of such quasi-judicial power unless the order of delegation expressly rebuts it. The order or resolution of delegation in the matter of execise of judicial or quash judicial power has to be construed strictly. There is presumption against delegation of such quasi-judicial power unless the order of delegation expressly rebuts it. The order or resolution of delegation in the matter of execise of judicial or quash judicial power has to be construed strictly. The Board as the delegator had express power of appointment and implied power, with the aid of Section 16 of General Clauses Act, to terminate, dismiss and compulsorily retire. The power of appointment was expressly delegted which may include as held by the Division Bench in Ramahandra's case (supra), the power to terminate simplicitor and in Bhoolchand's case (supra), the power to compulsory retire. In the absence of express conferral of power in the order or resolution of delegation the implied power of compulsory retirement vested in the Board cannot be held to have been surredered or transferred by it in favour of the Vice Chancellor. The express language of the order of delegation and the events which preceded and followed the impugned action, on the contrary, give a clear indication that the Board had not delegated its power of compulsory retirement to the Vice Chancellor. The power of compulsory retirement had to be exercised keeping in view the several factors with regard to particular individual or officers liable to be considered for retirement on completion by him of requisite period of service or age. The Board had constituted a Screening Committee consisting of independant persons and the Committee had to submit its report to the Board. The Vice Chnacellor in his official capacity was authorised to remain present at the meeting of the Screening Committee and even to participate. It has been accepted by the Vice Chancellor that he remained present in the meeting of the Screening Committee at Bhopal. The Screening Committee submitted its report to the Vice Chancellor and before the meeting of the Board took place for taking action based on the Board, the Vice Chancellor had already passed the order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner. The Board in its meeting did not at all consider the Petitioner's case of compulsory retirement. It neither approved nor dispproved the action taken by the Vice Chancellor. The Board in its meeting did not at all consider the Petitioner's case of compulsory retirement. It neither approved nor dispproved the action taken by the Vice Chancellor. From the proceedings of the Board, it appears that the Petitioner's case of compulsory retirement did not come up for consideration before the Board, may be that the report containing the recommendations of the Screening Committee were only made available to the Board. The events preceding and following the impugned action of compulsory retirement coupled with the general statement of law and the provisions of the statute impel this Court to come to conclusion that the implied power of Board to direct compulsory retirement vested in it under the Act with the aid of Section 16 of General Clauses Act did not stand transferred to the Vice Chancellor under the order or resolution of delegation. 34. Aid of Section 16 of General Clauses Act may be taken to infer such an implied power of compulsory retirement as adjunct of power of appointment with the competent authority i.e. the Board but such implied power cannot be inferred to be existing also in the Vice Chancellor as an authority acting as. a delegate, without express delegation of such a power. It is necessary that the delegation of power must be express leaving no room for any implied delegated authority. The power under consideration of compulsory retirement is not ordinary power. Its exercise requires due condideration of the service record of the concerned employee and the report of the Screening Committee. On that objective material, the competent authority has to exerise its discretion and judgment in the case of an individual. Such a power of compulsory retirement is not a purely administrative power, but it is a quasi-judicial, if not a judicial, power as it has serious civil consequence on the person against whom adverse action is contemplated. See the following passage from the book "An Introduction of Administrative Law".I Ind Edition, By Neil Hawke, paragraph 9.3 at page 128; Whether delegation is permitted, therefore, depends on the terms of any statutory powers and, in general, on whether a particular function is 'administrative' or 'judicial'. A judicial function arises where 'any body of persons have legal authority to determine question affecting the rights of subjects' (R.V. Electricity Commissioners ex.p. London Electricity Joint Committee (1924). A judicial function arises where 'any body of persons have legal authority to determine question affecting the rights of subjects' (R.V. Electricity Commissioners ex.p. London Electricity Joint Committee (1924). Only where there is a clear statutory authorisation can this type of function be delegated. (uderlining for emphasis) See also the following passage from the book on Adminitrative Law, by D.D. Basu, IV Edidion, at paga 181: If the power is quasi-judicial in nature, it must be performed by the authority in whom the power is vested, eg., the decision of objections to a scheme. "(Franklin V. Minister of Town & Country Planning, (1946) A.C. 87 (103). "In short, the power to decide a question cannot be delegated, unless it is authorised by statute, expressly or by implication." (Vine V. National Dock Labour Board, (1956) 3 Ail E.R. 939 (951) H.L. and Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board (1953) 2 O.B. 18). 35. Thus, where the statute entrusts a power to a Board, consisting of large body of members, it must be performed by that body jointly and such a power, unless expressly delegated, cannot be exercised by the Vice Chancellor alone. Neither the provision of the statute i.e. the Act not the order of delegation express any indication by its language, scope or object to confer such a power. Reliance on Section 16 of the M.P. Clauses Act is, therefore, misplaced. 36. In decision making process, where a statute confers a power on a particular authority, it has to be exercised by that authority and by no one else. This however, does not mean that the authority conferred with the power in the statute has no right to delegate Its power if that course is permissible in law from where he derived the power. But as commented by Professor S.W.R. Wade in his 'Administrative Law' 5th Edn., at page 325 - A statutory power to delegate funcltions, even If expressed In wide general terms, will not necessarily extend to everything. Thus it has been held that the general Medical Council must it self exercise its disciplinary power over dentists and cannot delegate them to its Executive Committee even though it has express statutory power through such a committee for the purpose of its functions under the Dentists Act. In the case of important judicial and disciplinary functions, the Court may be disposed to construe general powers of delegation restrictively. In the case of important judicial and disciplinary functions, the Court may be disposed to construe general powers of delegation restrictively. (underlining for emphasis) 37. So much has been said above as heavy reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra's case (supra) which is, for the aforsaid reasons, distinguishable. In that case the legal aspect discussed above on the general law of delegation did not come up at all for consideration. 38. Admittedly, no express power of compulsory retirement has been delegated by the Board to the Vice Chancellor. In service law, suspension, dismissal, compulsory retirement are all different acts of the appointing authority requiring to tally different exrcise of power and discretion. As has been seen above some recommendations of the Screening Committee against certain employees were not accepted by the Board. It was, therefore possible for the Board to accept or reject the recoommendations of the Screening Committee. It is not possible to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the University that only such cases of certain employees were placed before the Board where there were specific directions of the Screening Committee and in case of the Petitioner since the Screening Committee did not specifically direct that it be placed before the Board, the Vice Chancellor as competent authority could take the final decision. 39. In respect of the above argument, it may be stated that the matter of compulsory retirement and the procedure to be followed for the purpose have to be regulated by the provisions of the Act and the Statutes and not by the recommendations, made by the Screening Committee. The function entrusted to the Screening Committee is merely to scrutinise the service records and make its recommedations or advice. It is for the competent authority to accept or reject those recommendations. The exercise of such power required a decision making process involving consideration of the service records of individual employee and the recommendations made by the Screeing Committee with due regard to the objective criteria laid down for compulsory retirement. Such a power to take a decision to compulsory retire on the recommendation of the Screening Committee was never delegated to the Vice Chancellor and such power cannot be impliedly inferred in favour of the Vice Chancellor on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 16 of the M.P. General Clauses Act. Such a power to take a decision to compulsory retire on the recommendation of the Screening Committee was never delegated to the Vice Chancellor and such power cannot be impliedly inferred in favour of the Vice Chancellor on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 16 of the M.P. General Clauses Act. The scheme of the Act and the Statute and the order of delegation also do not warrant any such inference of existence of any implied power of compulsory retirement with the Vice Chancellor. As has been quoted from the order of delegation, only the power of appointment was expressly conferred on the Vice Chancellor. For the exercise of power of compulsory retirement, Screening Committee was constituted by the Board and the former was answerable to the Board. The Screening Committee had no authority to select cases of some employees and teachers for being placed before the Board and of others before the comeptent authority or the Vice Chancellor. Such a power to pick and choose cases of employees for being placed before the Board is not to be found in any provisions of the statute or resolution under which the said committee was constituted. 40. In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, the Vice Chancellor transgressed his powers and usurped the powers of the Board by passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner without placing it before the Board which was the supreme authority to take final decision in the matter. 41. Since I have held that the Vice Chancellor had no authority to pass the order of compulsory retirement, I do not consider it necessary to express opinion one way or the other on the allegations of malice. It has not been denied that the Vice Chancellor was present in the meeting of the Screening Committee, may be that he did not participate in it. The Vice Chancellor passed the order of compulsory retirement a day before the scheduled date of meeting of the Board. 42. Consequently, the petition succeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner (Annex.P/1) dated 18th January, 1996 passed by the Vice Chancellor and the order passed in appeal dated 30th September, 1996 (Annex. P/4) of the Chancellor both are quashed. The Petitioner's date of birth is stated to be 25.3.1938. 42. Consequently, the petition succeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of compulsory retirement of the Petitioner (Annex.P/1) dated 18th January, 1996 passed by the Vice Chancellor and the order passed in appeal dated 30th September, 1996 (Annex. P/4) of the Chancellor both are quashed. The Petitioner's date of birth is stated to be 25.3.1938. He attained the age of 60 years on 25.3.1998 and would have been retired on superannuation on 31.3.1998, As a result of the setting aside of the order of compulsory retirement, he would, therefore, be entitled to consequential monetary benefits upto the age of 60 years. The Respondents are directed to treat him to have retired on superannuation of the age of 60 years on 31.3.1998. His pay and pension be worked out accordingly and paid to him within a reasonable period of four months from the date of this order. In the circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to costs.