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1998 DIGILAW 419 (CAL)

Raj Kumar Sardar v. Union of India

1998-09-15

SATYABRATA SINHA

body1998
Judgment The petitioners, who are four in numbers are working as Cooks and Helpers at Bose Institute, School Hostel, have prayed for following reliefs in this application:- “(a) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents and/or their agents to regularise the services or the petitioners in permanent capacities under the said institute with all regular benefits and also an order commanding the respondents and/or their agents to treat the petitioners as Group-D employees with regular monthly salaries and allowances as admissible under the Central Government retrospectively at least from 4th June, 1993 and to pay the Bonus and Puja Advance of the year 1995.” 2. The petitioner contends that Bose Institution was originally founded by Sir Jagadish Chandra Bose in 1917 and is now a Society registered under the West Bengal Society registration Act, 1961. It is an autonomous organisation. Allegedly the Ministry of Science and Technology of Government of India is in full and complete budgetary or financial control of the said institute and also exercises administrative power for determination of the policies and directions of the institute. 3. It has further been averred that both the academic and non-academic staff also enjoy pay scales and allowances as admissible to Central Government employees and it is subject to a scrutiny and audit by the Accountant General, Central Revenue. It is alleged that as per Regulations of Bose Institute the Board of Directors the Council which is in-charge of the General Superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the institute is dominated by the Central Government as also the Government of West Bengal as also their nominees Allegedly from the Memorandum of Association it would appear that the Government operates from behind the veil of the Society which is engaged in a function of vital importance viz. advancement of knowledge by means of research, diffusion by organising discourses demonstrations and lectures to be given by original workers/staff in it as well as world renowned thinkers to do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the objects or any of them. It is stated that the Rules and Regulations of the Bose Institute can be altered and modified only with the previous approval and sanction of the Central Government. 4. It is stated that the Rules and Regulations of the Bose Institute can be altered and modified only with the previous approval and sanction of the Central Government. 4. In the affidavit-in-opposition it is alleged that the respondent No. 2 is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 5. Only because an Institute is under the financial control or administrative control to some extent by itself cannot be said to be a ground for holding that it will be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 6. In (1) Anupam Ghosh v. Union of India and Others reported in 1991 Lab IC 2261 : 1991(2) CHN 451 it has been held that a trading company is not a 'State' within the meaning of the provision of the said Article. 7. In (2) Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Jadavpur & Ors. v. Ashoke Kumar Roy & Ors. reported in 1992(1) CLJ 319 , a division bench of this Court held that Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science is not an instrumentality of the State in support whereof reasons have been stated in Paragraph 3 of the said decision although therein also scientific laboratories are maintained and the institute is entitled to cultivate science found equip and maintain scientific laboratories, establish and maintain collections of natural History, Mechanical, Scientific and Philosophical inventions instruments or designs and take all proper and necessary steps for diffusion and Cultivation of Science in all departments. 8. In the instant case, despite the fact that the petitioners have referred extensively from the bye-laws and/or Article of Association, they have not placed the same before the Court. It is admitted that not only the nominees of the Central Government but also nominees of the State of West Bengal are amongst the Board of Director. Other person can also be inducted to the Board and, thus, possibility of the private persons being in the Board of Directors cannot be ruled out. The Division Bench in IACS (supra) inter alia, in the case of Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science relying on or on the basis of the Supreme Court in (3) Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training & Ors. The Division Bench in IACS (supra) inter alia, in the case of Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science relying on or on the basis of the Supreme Court in (3) Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training & Ors. reported In AIR 1992 SC 76 , inter alia, held that the said Association is not a State. 9. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in (4) Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India reported in 1975 (1) SCC 485 held that Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It may be noticed that although in (5) P.K. Ramchandra lyer v. Union of India reported in 1984 (2) SCC 141 : AIR 1984 SC 541 the Apex Court held that Agricultural and Scientific Research is a State, the said decision was distinguished in Chander Mohan Khanna (supra) holding that the said organisation was earlier a department of Ministry of Agriculture. 10. Keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court in Chander Mohan (supra) I am of the opinion that Bose Institute is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, thus, no writ is maintainable. Furthermore, in this case a disputed question of fact arises for consideration. The petitioner contends that the Hostel maintained by the institute is a part of the establishment and, thus, the petitioners although were appointed by mess committee, they would be deemed to be the employees of the second respondent. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on certain documents for the purpose of showing that direct payment has been made to the petitioners by the Registrar of Institute. However, in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been averred that such payment has been made by one, the then Registrar A.J. Dutta, on the eve of his retirement with out any authority in law and as soon as the same was detected the same had been withdrawn. It is the case of the petitioner that in effect and substance the petitioners have been engaged in a job of perennial nature, their services regularised. The respondents however, in their affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that they had neither been appointed by the respondent No. 2 nor there exists any relationship of employer and employee between then and the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that in effect and substance the petitioners have been engaged in a job of perennial nature, their services regularised. The respondents however, in their affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that they had neither been appointed by the respondent No. 2 nor there exists any relationship of employer and employee between then and the petitioner. It is categorically stated that the appointment is made by mess committee and payments to the petitioners are also made by the said committee. However, it has been averred that only grant of some facilities or financial assistance granted to mess committee cannot lead to the conclusion that the petitioners who were appointed by the mess committee have become employees of the respondent No. 2. It has further clearly been averred :- "The mess committee was formed by Resident Research Scholar in which the respondent No. 2 had no rule. The allegations of suffering monetary loss is wholly misconceived. The writ petitioner were under the direct control of the mess committee. The deduction as has been restored to in the paragraph under reply 15 made by the mess committee and as stated previously the contention of the respondent has been made clear with regard to relationship with the institute and the mess committee. In the circumstances, the question of absorption of the writ petitioners does not arise at all." 11. It has further been averred :- "Payments, advance or otherwise is made by the mess committee. The writ petitioners have not stated from whom they actually received such moneys since it is the mess committee who as the employers have paid the money in each of the writ petitioners." 12. Despite the fact that the respondent No. 2 had called upon the petitioners to produce their letters of appointment they have failed to do so. 13. The question which arises for consideration, thus, is as to whether the respondents are entitled to any relief. 14. It has been contended by Mr. Basu that although in view of the several decisions of the Supreme Court of India including (6) Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa reported in 1978 (2) SCC 213 , the respondent No. 2 would be an industry as correctness thereof was doubtful, the matter has been referred to a larger beach in (7) Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin v. Indira Devi, P.S. & Ors. reported in 1998 (3) SCC 259 . 15. In a case of this nature, inter alia, two questions may arise:- (1) Whether the hostel can be said to be a canteen; and the respondent No. 2 had any statutory liability to establish such canteen and/or recognise the same ? The answer to the said question must be rendered in negative. The affairs of the respondent No. 2 is not governed by any statute. The bye-laws framed by the respondent do not have any statutory force. Provision of establishment of a hostel which incidentally may have been to rendered service to the researchers by itself do not give rise to a liability on the part of the institute to reader canteen facilities within the meaning of decision in (8) M.M.R. Khan and Others v. Union of India and Others reported in AIR 1990 SC 937 or (9) Parimal Raha v. Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in AIR 1995 SC 1666 . The matter has recently been considered by the Apex Court in (10) Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen reported in 1996 (3) SCC 267 , in the following terms:- “As per the agreement the Bank has detailed the subsidy and other facilities afforded by it to run the canteen and has also stipulated certain conditions necessary for conducting the canteen in a good, hygienic and efficient manner like insistence of the quality of food, supply of food, engagement of experienced persons etc. Such conduct cannot in any manner point out any obligation in the Bank to provide 'canteen' as wrongly assumed by the Tribunal. Since the distinguishing featured mentioned in M.M.R. Khan case are not present in this case, the Tribunal by a negative process was inclined to hold that though the canteens may be non-statutory and non-recosnised in nature they "could to said to be" non-statutory recognised ones and so they will be entitled to get all the benefits like the recognised canteens. This is a wrong approach to the issue. We have already held that non-statutory recognised canteens to the instant case are not similar to the non-statutory recognised canteens considered in M.M.R. Khan case. This is a wrong approach to the issue. We have already held that non-statutory recognised canteens to the instant case are not similar to the non-statutory recognised canteens considered in M.M.R. Khan case. If the workers in the non-statutory recognised canteens themselves cannot be considered to be workmen under the Bank, by the same taken, the workers employed by the contractors, even if they are considered to be non-statutory recognised canteens as held by the Tribunal, will not be entitled to get any benefit. It is only by holding that the canteens run by contractors are similar to non-statutory recognised canteens, the Tribunal has given the same benefit as was given to the workman in the recognised canteens. It should also be noticed that the various factors noticed in para 38 of the judgment in M.M.R. Khan case were adverted to by this Court to deny the plea that the canteen workers "are not railway servants" in the context of the various provisions contained in the Railway Establishment Manual and other documents. The said decision rested on its own facts." 16. It may be noticed that all the aforementioned decisions were considered in the light of the liability of all establishment to maintain a canteen under the provision of any statute or under a policy decision taken by employer itself. No such case has been made out herein. 17. The second question which would arise is as to whether in view of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 the contract system should be abolished. 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in (11) The Workmen of the Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Food Corporation of India reported in AIR 1985 SC 670 wherein a direct payment system was introduced was rendered in an industrial dispute and an award was made that the concerned worker had become the workmen of the Corporation. The aforementioned decision ex facie has no application to the facts of the present case, as in the affidavit-in-opposition it has clearly been stated that the then Registrar Sri A.J. Gupta with whom the respondent No. 2 was no a litigating term, payment had been made to the petitioners without any authority whatsoever and as soon as the mistake was detected the same had been rectified. The said statements have not been controverted by the petitioner in their affidavit-in-reply. 19. The said statements have not been controverted by the petitioner in their affidavit-in-reply. 19. Furthermore, whether in a given situation the mess committee or a Contractor is merely a body of straw or a mere screen can be judged only by an Industrial Tribunal if and when an industrial dispute is raised, as was done in Food Corporation's cast (supra) or in (12) Hussainbhai, Calicut v. Alath Factory Ehezhilali Union reported in 1978 Lab IC : AIR 1978 SC 1410 : 1978 (4) SCC 257 . 20. The employment of contract labour in an industrial undertaking can be abolished only by the Central Government in terms of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. This Court has no such power. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered in (13) Hari Sankar Sharma & Ors. v. M/s. Artifician Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India & Ors. reported in 1997(76) FLR 838 and (14) K. Ramakrishnan & Ors. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. reported in 1997 Lab IC 3078. 21. In (15) Indian Iron Steel Co Ltd. v. U.C.W.U. reported in 73 FLR 1056. It has been held:- "We have already indicated that whether the job is perennial or not it requires factual investigation under the parametre of the said Act and if there is any dispute as to such investigation, then it should be gone into by the appropriate Government being the prescribed authority under the said Act." 22. The submission of Mr. Bssu that in a gives case this Court can exercise its jurisdiction in such matter cannot be accepted for more than one reason. It is now well settled that this Court cannot controvert itself into an industrial Court. 23. This aspect of the matter has been considered in (16) Basant Kumar v. Eagle Foiling Mills reported in 1995(1) PLJR 43 ; (17) Gopi Lal Teli v State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1995 Lab IC 1105 ; (18) Tapas Mondal & Ors. v. Eastern Cool Fields Ltd. reported in 1995 Lab IC 1433; (19) Mohini v. General Manager, Syndicate Bank reported in 69 FLR 1061; (20) Thakur Majhi & Anr. v. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1995(2) Cal LJ 127 and (21) Arindam Chatterjee v. Coal India Limited & Ors. reported in 1996 Lab IC 416. 24. v. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1995(2) Cal LJ 127 and (21) Arindam Chatterjee v. Coal India Limited & Ors. reported in 1996 Lab IC 416. 24. The petitioner may, therefore approach the appropriate Government for issuance of a notification under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act or raise an industrial dispute. The reference thus, apparently made to a larger bench by the Supreme Court in 1998(3) SCC 259 keeping in view the fact that the definition of service as has been interpreted in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage (supra), is of no moment. 25. So long the Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is not over ruled by a larger bench the same is binding on this Court. In any event, this Court keeping in view the disputed question of fact involved in the matter particularly when the respondent No. 2 is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot entertain such writ application, as the question involved can only be decided by adduction of oral and documentary evidence. Reference in this connection may be made to (22) Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi reported in AIR 1959 SC 942 and (23) Thansingh v. Superintendent of Taxes reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 . For the reasons aforementioned the writ application being devoid of any merit is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.