This is an application for grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 CrPC. There are as many as twelve accused applicants. This application was moved on 7.8.97 and on 12.8.97 the following order was passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. “Heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. N. Mahammad, learned PP, Assam. Mr. N. Mahammad, PP, Assam prays for a week's time to produce case diary. List this matter after a week. In the meanwhile, in the event of the arrest of the petitioners in connection with Kalaigaon PS Case No.60/97 under sections 147/148/149/447/427/436/379/ 326/302 IPC shall be released on interim bail on the execution of a bond of Rs. 2000/- by each of them with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting authority subject to the usual conditions as enumerated in section 438 CrPC.” 2. As is evident from the above order itself, the case diary was not available, the gravity of offence is self evident from the penal provisions as noted in the order. 3. Having sought a week's time even after six months (just short of two days) the case diary is not produced for reasons best known to the police, and the accused applicants charged with such serious offences like loot arson, abduction and murder continue to enjoy the interim bail order dated 12.8.97. 4. Let us have a look at the FIR, a copy of which has been filed by the accused petitioners as Annexure 1 to their bail petition which reads as follows : “Sir, I have to state that today on 13.7.97 at 4.30 AM about 100/150 persons from neighbouring villages namely Chanibari, Bholabari and Begar Kakh villages along with also sticks etc entered in my house breaking walls and looted 2 bags of wheat, 25 kgs of rice, 4 ploughing cows, CI sheets etc and caught fire on paddy stores. They also kidnapped my sons Joynal Abedin, Banaj Ali and Rajab Ali, took them to begu weapons killing Jaynal Abedin and Banja Ali also injured critically Rajab Ali by dao. Among them, I could identify only (i) Sarimddin Ali S/o Jaynal Munshi, vill Begarjhar, and (2) Md Sadek Ali S/o Naser Ali, vill Chanibari, others names are not known, but could be identified, if seen. So, I request you to inquire the case, early and take necessary action, please. Among them, I could identify only (i) Sarimddin Ali S/o Jaynal Munshi, vill Begarjhar, and (2) Md Sadek Ali S/o Naser Ali, vill Chanibari, others names are not known, but could be identified, if seen. So, I request you to inquire the case, early and take necessary action, please. Yours faithfully Sd/ Abdul Hussain, Village Pachim Padyaghat” 5. The informant, father of the two sons killed has moved an application under section 439 (2) and 39, under section 397 read with section 482 CrPC for cancellation of bail granted on 12.8.97. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, taking advantage of non-production of case diary and the application filed by the informant contended that the basic order dated 12.8.97 cannot be cancelled, the applicant has no locus standi and the case diary must be got produced before making any alteration in the order. 7. On merits he submitted that the accused applicants have been implicated on politically motivated grounds. Their names donot figure in the FIR. The applicants, except one, do not belong to the villages as referred to in the FIR. 8. It needs to be made clear that it is not a case of cancellation of bail granted to accused. In fact no bail as such has been granted merely an interim order was passed on 12.8.97,. when an interim order granting anticipatory bail is varied or reversed, on hearing the parties on merits, the subsequent order reversing the interim bail order, is not an order of cancellation of bail, but refusal to grant bail. This refusal cannot allowed to be construed as cancellation of earlier bail order, as such an interpretation is not only self-serving but distorting as well. 9. The insistence for production of case diary at this stage sounds rather strange, more so after having obtained an interim order of anticipatory bail, without waiting for the case diary being produced. It does not lie in the mouth of the accused to insist for production of case diary. The Supreme Court in Habeed Mohammad vs. State, AIR 1954 SC 51 has held that the police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial can be made use of by a criminal Court only for aiding it in such inquiry or trial. It is for the Court and not the accused to insist for its production. The Supreme Court in Habeed Mohammad vs. State, AIR 1954 SC 51 has held that the police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial can be made use of by a criminal Court only for aiding it in such inquiry or trial. It is for the Court and not the accused to insist for its production. If the Court sends for it, it is for its own satisfaction and not because the accused has any right to have it produce. Such production cannot be insisted for self serving ends of prolonging the life of an interim bail order. 10. Now coming to the interim bail order, as passed on 12.8.97, it needs to be emphasised that section 438 CrPC is not intended to confer a wider jurisdiction on Courts to grant bail even in such cases in which it cannot be granted in face of sub-section (1) of section 437 CrPC to an accused who has already been arrested. 11. The legislative intent behind enacting section 438 CrPC can well be gathered from the objects and reasons for adding the new provision of anticipatory bail. It was the 41st Report of Law Commission which paved the way for the introduction of this new provision regarding anticipatory bail. The object should be read as a whole and not piece-meal or in isolation. It was with a view to make it more difficult for persons accused of grave offences to get released on bail by an ex-parte order, and be in a position to hamper investigation, provision is being made that in every case where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or is triable exclusively by a Court of Sessions, no Court shall grant bail except after giving notice in writing of the application to the Public Prosecutor, if this is not done, reasons for not giving such notice are to be recorded in writing. 12. As recommended by the Commission a new provision is being made enabling the superior Courts to grant anticipatory bail i.e. a direction to release a person on bail issued even before the person is arrested. With a view to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the investigation, special provision is being made that the Court granting anticipatory bail may impose such conditions as it thinks fit. With a view to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the investigation, special provision is being made that the Court granting anticipatory bail may impose such conditions as it thinks fit. These conditions may be that a person shall make himself available to the Investigation Officer as and when required and shall not do anything to hamper investigation. The Law Commission in its 41st report observed: “Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days. In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail.” Again in its 48th Report the Commission observed : “The Bill introduces a provision for the grant of anticipatory bail. This is substantially in accordance with the recommendation made by the previous Commission (41st Report). We agree that this would be a useful addition, though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such a power should be exercised. We are further of the view that in order to ensure that the provision is not put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous petitioners, the final order should be made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor. The initial order should only be an interim one. Further the relevant section should make it clear that the direction can be issued only for reasons to be recorded, and if the Court is satisfied that such a direction is necessary in the interests of justice. It will also be convenient to provide that notice of the interim order as well as of the final orders will be given to the Superintendent of Police forthwith.”(emphasis supplied). 13. It will also be convenient to provide that notice of the interim order as well as of the final orders will be given to the Superintendent of Police forthwith.”(emphasis supplied). 13. The Joint Committee was of the opinion that certain specific conditions for grant of anticipator)' bail should be laid down in the clause itself for being complied with before the anticipatory bail is granted. 14. Reading the object as a whole, does it given the above legislative intent and stand to reason that what was intended to be more stringent and difficult for persons accused of grave offences to get released on bail after they have been arrested or detained by police without warrant, was to be made so easy as to be had on mere asking of it by those who have not yet been arrested, and asked for pre-arrest bail? Section 437 (1) (i) CrPC states that a person shall not be released on bail if there appears to be reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 439 CrPC enjoins the High Court or the Court of Sessions that before granting bail to a person who is accused of offences which is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, a notice of the application for bail shall have to be given to the Public Prosecutor and such notice can be dispensed for reasons to be recorded in writing and if the Court is of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. There is no magic or charm in the term 'notice' if no opportunity is given to Public Prosecutor to seek instructions and put for his point of view. What is intended is a reasonable opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, of course the opposition has to be on legally tenable grounds. There is no magic or charm in the term 'notice' if no opportunity is given to Public Prosecutor to seek instructions and put for his point of view. What is intended is a reasonable opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, of course the opposition has to be on legally tenable grounds. Mere supply of copy of the bail petition does not serve the purpose unless the Public Prosecutor has a reasonable opportunity of seeking instructions in the matter and invariably such instructions have to be obtained from the investigative agency, through the case diary, and this case diary is not readily available the moment an application under section 438 CrPC is moved and comes up for hearing, it is invariably required to be summoned by the Public Prosecutor from Muffasil places which necessarily takes some time and that time as of necessity should be granted to the Public Prosecutor, before the Court passes any order. It does not necessarily mean that the Court should as a stop gap arrange­ment, till such time the Public Prosecutor obtains instructions, pass an interim pre-arrest anticipatory bail order. The considerations and conditions as contained in section 437 (1) (i) CrPC still prevail and should weigh with the Court. 15. The provisions relating to bail as contained in section 436 to 439 CrPC should as a whole be kept in view and present to the mind of the Court. Reading the order dated 12.8.97, the learned Public Prosecutor prayed for time to produce the case diary and the matter was directed to be listed after a week. The next date after 12.8.97 on which the matter came to be listed was 3.12.97, almost four months thereafter and the counsel appearing for the petitioner prayed for a week's time, the prayer was granted. Thereafter it came to be listed on 19.1.98, because the learned counsel for the petitioner was not available it was directed to be listed on 28.1.98. On 28.1.98, the application filed by informant registered as Crl Misc Case No.6 of 1997 also came to be listed before the same Judge. Naturally the names of the counsel for the petitioner at that stage would not be shown in the cause list because it was a separately registered Misc Case and thereafter it came to be listed on 9.2.98. Naturally the names of the counsel for the petitioner at that stage would not be shown in the cause list because it was a separately registered Misc Case and thereafter it came to be listed on 9.2.98. In contrast, the FIR as filed by the petitioner may now be seen. The informant while lodging the ejahar had made a categorical statement that although he did not know the names of some of the accuseds, he could well identify them. Here comes the intrusion because of the interim bail order. As observed by the Supreme Court in Pukar Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 969 anticipatory bail orders do interfere with and intrude in the sphere of investigation, this case of interim bail order is to be viewed and tested in the . light of the legislative intent and on a conjoint reading of the provisions of law as contained in sections 437, 438 and 439 CrPC. 16. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that every law is designed to further the cause of justice. A mechanical interpretation of the words devoid of a concept or purpose will reduce most 'of the legislation to futility. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered by reading all the provisions together (see Organo Chemicals, AIR 1979 SC 1803 ). Chapter V containing sections 41 to 60 deals with arrest of persons and sections 41 to 43 and 43 to 44 empower the police and other authorities even a private person (in certain cases) to arrest any person who has committed cognizable offence. This power of arrest and grant of bail go together. The Supreme Court in oft cited case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 has pointed out: “Apart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels this construction, there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, on the basis of which a direction under section 438 (1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided. A blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Such an order can then, become a charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicted when the order was passed. Therefore, the Court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a vacuum.” This pointer could always be borne in mind by every Court dealing with anticipatory bail. 17. No doubt liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the Court, nonetheless, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in Shahzad Hasan Khan vs. Istiaq Hasan Khan, AIR 1987 SC 1613 : “When a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the Court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution. Liberty of the accused is not the sole concern of the Court.” 18. As for anticipatory bail, the Court has-to be cautious and circumspect in exercising its power under section 438 CrPC. As for anticipatory bail to some extent it intrudes in the sphere of investigation of the crime. Liberty of the accused is not the sole concern of the Court.” 18. As for anticipatory bail, the Court has-to be cautious and circumspect in exercising its power under section 438 CrPC. As for anticipatory bail to some extent it intrudes in the sphere of investigation of the crime. In Pokar Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 969 , the Supreme Court has observed that some very compelling circumstances must be made out for granting bail to a person accused of murder when the investigation is in progress. It was further observed that the larger interests of the community should also be borne in mind. 19. At times an argument is advanced, as indeed in the instant case, as a whole the section 438 CrPC is an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has rejected this contention in State of MP vs. Ram Krishna Balotia, AIR 1995 SC 1198 . The case law as it has developed on the subject may also be seen. 20. In one of its recent judgment as reported in Salauddin Abdul Samad Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1996 SC 1042 , the Supreme Court has indicated the procedure to be followed in case of grant of anticipatory bail. Ordinarily, the Court granting anticipatory bail should not substitute itself in the original Court which is expected to deal with the offence, it is that Court which has to consider whether having regard to the material placed before, it, the accused is entitled to bail. Needless to add that the question of following those procedures would arise only in a case when the Court comes to the conclusion, that anticipatory bail is to be granted. A Magistrate despite rejection of two earlier bail applications by the High Court granted provisional bail and this grant of provisional bail did not find favour with the Supreme Court in Bimala Devi vs. State of Bihar, 1994 Crl LJ 638, so much so, the Chief Justice of the High Court was directed to take action on administration side. 21. A Magistrate despite rejection of two earlier bail applications by the High Court granted provisional bail and this grant of provisional bail did not find favour with the Supreme Court in Bimala Devi vs. State of Bihar, 1994 Crl LJ 638, so much so, the Chief Justice of the High Court was directed to take action on administration side. 21. On a careful consideration of the provisions relating to arrest and grant of bail as contained in the Criminal Procedure Code and the legislative intent behind introducing section 438 CrPC, an order granting interim bail, pending production of case diary without considering the provisions contained in section 437 (1) CrPC and affording reasonable opportunity to the State to put forth its case does not stand the test of scrutiny of law. Invariably such interim orders, are prolonging and perpetuated by either non-production or delayed production of case diaries, undoubtedly affect fair investigation. The Courts must therefore avoid such a situation. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the application for grant of anticipatory bail is liable to be dismissed, it is accordingly dismissed.