Arun Kumar, J. ( 1 ) THE facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition are:the Delhi Development Authority (for short "dda") put up anadvertisement on 7/06/1989 in the newspapers announcing the auctionof a plot for 2/3 star hotel at Pitam Pura, New Delhi. The plot was to be. auctioned as per certain terms and conditions. There is no dispute betweenthe parties about the terms and conditions of the auction including the factthat the auction was on the basis of perpetual leasehold rights and theprovisions of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developednazul Lands) Rules, 1981 would be applicable. The material terms of auctionfor purposes of the present petition are : " (IV) The officer conducting the auction shall normally accept thebids subject to confirmation by the Competent Authority. Thei highest bid offered at the fall of hammer at the auction and theperson whose bid has been accepted shall pay earnest money,a sum equivalent to 25% of his bid either in cash or by bank draftin favour of the DDA. The amount of earnest money is to bedeposited in Central Bank of India, Vikas Sadan, INA Colony,new Delhi. If the earnest money is not paid, the auction alreadyheld in respect of that plot shall be cancelled by the Officer conducting the auction. (v ). . . . . (vi) The highest bidder is required to collect the allotment-cumdemand letter on the very next working day of the date ofauction from the special counter. Main Reception, Groundfloor, Vikas Sadan, INA Colony, New Delhi between 4. 00 p. m. to 5. 00 p. m. The highest bidder is required to make thepayment of the balance 75% amount, demanded vide saiddemand letter referred to above, within 90 days from the dateof issue of the demand letter by Bank Draft/pay orders only inthe Branches of Central Bank of India/state Bank of India,vikas Sadan, INA Colony, New Delhi. In case the bidder failsto collect the demand letter on the next working day the dateof issue of the demand letter will be treated the same. If the bidis not accepted, the earnest money will be refunded to thebidder without any interest unless it may have been forfeitedunder para (vii) below. In case the bidder failsto collect the demand letter on the next working day the dateof issue of the demand letter will be treated the same. If the bidis not accepted, the earnest money will be refunded to thebidder without any interest unless it may have been forfeitedunder para (vii) below. Four copies of perpetual lease deed alongwith the copy of thesite plan indicating the amount of stamp duty/transfer dutywill be supplied to the highest bidder at the time of issuedemand letter to get the lease deed papers stamped from thecollector of Stamps. Thereafter the lease deed will be executedand registered after receipt of full payment and handing overof possession. Provided that the Vice-Chairman, DDA may extend the lastdate of payment, where he is satisfied that sufficient reasonsexist for doing so, upto a maximum of 90 days subject topayment of interest the balance amount @ 18% per annumwhere the delay is 30 days or less and 25% per annum for aperiod exceeding 30 days. " (VII) In case the payment is not received within the stipulated periodindicated in the demand letter the auction bid shallautomatically stand cancelled and the 25% earnest money shallstand forfeited. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner was the highest bidder for the said plot. Against its bidfor Rs. 3. 30 crores the petitioner deposited Rs. 85 lacs with the respondenttowards 25% of the bid amount as earnest money on 5/07/1989, i. e. thedate of auction. On 6/07/1989 the respondent issued a demand notice tothe petitioner for payment of the balance amount of Rs. 2 crores 45 lacswithin three months, i. e. by 4/10/1989. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner the site of the hotel plot was found to betotally undeveloped and not fit for carrying out the construction of the hotel. The DDA had committed a breach of contract inasmuch as a totallyundeveloped plot had been auctioned and sold to the petitioner. Thepetitioner filed a suit in this Court on 29/09/1989. The petitionerprayed that in view of the fact that the plot was undeveloped and there wasbreach of contract on the part of the DDA he was not liable to pay the balanceamount of the auction price. Thepetitioner filed a suit in this Court on 29/09/1989. The petitionerprayed that in view of the fact that the plot was undeveloped and there wasbreach of contract on the part of the DDA he was not liable to pay the balanceamount of the auction price. The prayers in the suit were cleverly wordedinasmuch as mandatory injunction was sought against the DDA to direct itto develop the plot in question and the perpetual injunction was also soughtrestraining the DDA from cancelling the allotment of the plot in question infavour of the plaintiff. This Court appointed a Local Commissioner in thesaid suit who is said to have given a report that the plot was undeveloped. Subsequently another Local Commissioner who was a retired Chief Engineerof CPWD was appointed for the same purpose and accoing to his reportthe petitioner could start construction on the plot even though somedevelopment still remained to be done. The petitioner thus failed to ward offits liability to pay the balance 75% of the auction price. The petitionerthereafter sought extension of time to pay the balance amount which thedda declined to grant. The period of 90 days to deposit the balance 75%amount expired on 4/10/1989. The petitioner did not pay the amount. As per terms of the auction extension for payment could be granted for onemonth on payment of interest 18% per annum on the amount due and fornext two months on payment of interest @ 25% per annum failing which thebid would stand automatically cancelled and the amount already depositedwould stand forfeited. On 4th December, 1990 the request of the petitionerfor grant of extension of time to pay the balance 75% amount was rejected bythe DDA. The effect of rejection of the request of the petitioner was thatauction in favour of the petitioner stood automatically cancelled and theamount already deposited by him stood forfeited as per the terms of theauction. The petitioner then filed a writ petition in this Court being C. W. No. 3967190 seeking extension of time to pay the balance amount. In the said writpetition an order was passed on 10/10/1991 operative part whereofis reproduced as under : "having gone to the facts of this case and having been that thepetitioner has been committing defaults again and again in making thedeposit of the balance 75% of the bid amount, we find no ground to :interfere in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. In the said writpetition an order was passed on 10/10/1991 operative part whereofis reproduced as under : "having gone to the facts of this case and having been that thepetitioner has been committing defaults again and again in making thedeposit of the balance 75% of the bid amount, we find no ground to :interfere in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Still in the interests of justice we give two months time to the petitioner to pay the balance 75% of the bid amount alongwith 18% per annum interest for the first month and thereafter 25% per annum till payment strictly in terms of the order dated 9/08/1990 and in case this is done the automatic cancellation and forfeiture of the amount already deposited by the petitioner shall not stand in the way of the petitioner and in case this is not done then that will take effect. With this order and direction the writ petition stands disposed of. " ( 4 ) AN S. L. P. filed by the petitioner against the said order of this Courtwas dismissed on 13/12/1991. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner moved an application dated 17/03/1992 under Section 41 (3) of the Delhi Development Act to the Centralgovernment praying for relief on same terms as was granted to certain otherauction purchasers of plots auctioned by the DDA. While the aforesaidapplication of the petitioner was still pending with the Central Governmentthe petitioner filed another writ petition in this Court being C. W. No. 2115of 1992 seeking direction to the Central Government for deciding thepending application and for restraining the DDA from auctioning the plotin question. This Court directed the Central Government to decide theapplication of the petitioner within six weeks vide order dated 13/07/1993. However, no stay of auction of the plot was granted. The Central Govt. ultimately decided the application of the petitioner vide order dated 3/02/1994. The application of the petitioner was dismissed. It was heldthat the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner for grant of relief similarto the relief granted in other cases were different. The facts in the case ofpetitioner and the other cases were not similar according to the Centralgovernment Subsequently the Writ Petition No. 2115/92 filed by thepetitioner in this behalf was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 7/03/1994. The order is reproduced as under : "present: Mr. Sandeep Sethi for the petitioner. Mr. Ravinder Sethi, Sr. Adv with Mr. The facts in the case ofpetitioner and the other cases were not similar according to the Centralgovernment Subsequently the Writ Petition No. 2115/92 filed by thepetitioner in this behalf was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 7/03/1994. The order is reproduced as under : "present: Mr. Sandeep Sethi for the petitioner. Mr. Ravinder Sethi, Sr. Adv with Mr. J. P. Singh for the respondentcm202194 and CW2115192by a detailed order the previous writ petition, C. W. 3967/90 wasdisposed of by this Court on 10/10/1991. It was found that thepetitioner had not no cause and this Court would not interfere, yet inthe interest of justice, the petitioner was granted two months time topay the balance 75% of the bid amount alongwith 18% p. a. interest forthe first month and thereafter alongwith interest at the rate of 25% p. a. till payment strictly in accordance with the order dated 9/08/1990, which was an order in the suit filed by the petitioner and it wasspecifically stated that in case this was done the automatic cancellationand forfeiture of the amount already deposited by the petitioner wouldnot stand in the way of the petitioner and in case this was not done thenthat would take effect. In spite of this the petitioner did not comply withthe order, and instead moved a petition under Section 41 of the Delhidevelopment Act, which has not been dismissed during the pendencyof this writ petition, vide order dated 23/02/1994, whereby thiswrit petition was filed on 28/05/1992. We are of the opinion that filing of this writ petition was an abuse of theprocess of the Court. Earlier order passed by this Court would showthat first, the petitioner filed a civil suit in which he obtained ex parteinjunction, which was vacated by the leaned Single Judge givingfurther two months time to comply with the order and second time thepetitioner obtained similar relief in the writ petition referred to above. The plea taken in Section 41 proceedings was that some other similarsituated persons had been given refund of the earnest money in certaincases referred to in para 19 of the writ petition. One such case is of 1989. The petitioner should have raised all these points in the earlier writpetition. Peacemeal raising of points and pleas is not permissible in law. Accordingly, we decline to interfere and dismiss this writ petition withcosts. One such case is of 1989. The petitioner should have raised all these points in the earlier writpetition. Peacemeal raising of points and pleas is not permissible in law. Accordingly, we decline to interfere and dismiss this writ petition withcosts. " ( 6 ) THE petitioner filed a special leave Petition in the Supreme Courtagainst the said order which was dismissed on 11/07/1994. Before thesupreme Court the Counsel for the petitioner stated that he wished tochallenge the order dated 23/02/1994 regarding dismissal of theapplication under Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act by the Centralgovernment by appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. The Courtobserved that if the law gave the petitioner any Forum to challenge the orderdated 23/02/1994 he could do the same. ( 7 ) ON the strength of the said observation the present writ petition wasfiled in this Court on 16/09/1994. The prayers of the petitioner inthe present writ petition are : " (A) Issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorariquashing the order dated 23. 2. 1994 passed by the Secretary,ministry of Urban Development and restraining respondentno. 2 from re-auctioning or otherwise alienating the subjectplot. (B) Issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamusdirecting the respondents to grant to the petitioner the samebenefits and treatment as given by them in other identicalcases. " ( 8 ) DURING the course of hearing of this writ petition the learned Counselfor the petitioner confined his argument to challenging the forfeiture of thesum of Rs. 85 lacs. It was urged that the forfeitue was wholly unreasonableas could not be sustained in law. Relying on the provisions of Section 74 ofthe Contract Act it was submitted that even though the amount of penaltywas specified, the Court could go into the question of reasonableness of theamount and could restrict the penalty/forfeiture to a reasonable amount. Thus the forfeiture clause contained in the terms and conditions of contractis not as such challenged. What is challenged is the action in forfeiting theentire amount. It is prayed that the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 85 lacs which was 25% of the auction price deposited with the DDA was unjustifiedand could not be sustained. An affidavit was filed by the petitioner stalingthat in the meanwhile the plot had been reauctioned in December, 1996 andit had fetched a price of Rs. It is prayed that the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 85 lacs which was 25% of the auction price deposited with the DDA was unjustifiedand could not be sustained. An affidavit was filed by the petitioner stalingthat in the meanwhile the plot had been reauctioned in December, 1996 andit had fetched a price of Rs. 7 crore 77 lacs, which showed that the DDA hadmade a huge profit in re-auction of the plot in question and for that reasonalso forfeiture of a sum of Rs. 85 lacs deposited by the petitioner with thedda was liable to be struck down. In support of his contention that in -matters of forfeiture of earnest money also there ought to be reasonableness,i. e. , the amount to be forfeited should be reasonable, the learned Counsel forthe petitioner mainly relied on the provisions of Section 74 of the Indiancontract Act and certain decisions of the Apex Court. Section 74 is reproducedas under: "74. Compensation for breach of contract when penalty stipulatedfor.-When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contractas the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contractcontains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complainingof the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is provedto have been caused thereby to receive from the party who has brokenthe contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount sonamed or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for. Explanation.-A stipulation for increased interest from the date ofdefault may be a stipulation by way of penalty. Exception.-When any person enters into any bail-bond, recognizance or other instrument of the same nature, or, under the provisions of anylaw or under the orders of the Central Government or of any Stategovernment, gives any bond for the performance of any public duty oract in which the public are interested, he shall be liable, upon breach ofany condition of any such instrument, to pay the whole sum mentionedtherein. Explanation.-A person who enters into a contract with Governmentdoes not necessarily thereby undertake any public duty, or promise todo an act in which the public are interested. ( 9 ) IT is submitted that employer is only entitled to a reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount quantified by way of penalty fromthe party which has broken the contract in view of the aforesaid provisionof the law. ( 9 ) IT is submitted that employer is only entitled to a reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount quantified by way of penalty fromthe party which has broken the contract in view of the aforesaid provisionof the law. In this connection reliance was placed on the judgment of thesupreme Court in Maula Bux v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1955 . This wasa case of deposit of an amount by way of security guaranteeing dueperformance of contract for supply of goods. The Government who had toreceive the supplies, forfeited the amount deposited by the contractor byway of security in view of the failure of the contractor to supply the stores. It was observed that whether under the terms of the contract the party inbreach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of moneywhich he has already paid as security, for granting due performance of thecontract to the party complaining of the breach of contract, the undertakingis of the nature of penalty. It is not necessary in every case of breach ofcontract that the aggrieved party must suffer actual loss or damage beforeit can claim compensation for breach of contract. The Court is competent toaward reasonable compensation in such cases even if no actual damage isproved as having been suffered in consequence of breach of contract. It was observed: "but the expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is proved tohave been caused thereby" is intended to cover different classes ofcontracts which come before the Courts. In case of breach of somecontracts it may be impossible for the Court to assess compensationarising from breach, while in other cases compensation can be calculatedin accordance with established rules. Where the Court is unable toassess the compensation the sum named by the parties if it be regardedas a genuine pre-estimate may be taken into consideration as themeasure of reasonable compensation, but not if the sum named is in thenature of a penalty. Where loss in terms of money can be determined,the party claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by him. "a distinction was pointed outbetween amount being deposited as earnestmoney and and amount being deposited as security for due performance ofcontract. Where loss in terms of money can be determined,the party claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by him. "a distinction was pointed outbetween amount being deposited as earnestmoney and and amount being deposited as security for due performance ofcontract. ( 10 ) AN observation by the Judicial Committee in (Kanwar) Chiranjitsingh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 Privy Council (1), Was quoted in this context: "earnest-MONEY is part of the purchase price when the transaction goesforward: it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason ofthe fault or failure of the vendee. "in para 7 it was observed : "forfeiture of earnest money in a contract for sale of property -movable or immovable - if the amount is reasonable, does not fallwithin Section 74. "this was taken as a settled preposition of law on the ground that forfeitureof a reasonable amount paid as earnest money does not amount to imposinga penalty but if forfeiture is of the nature of penalty. Section 74 applies. Incase of deposit by way of security for due performance of the contractagreeing to have it forfeited in the event of breach of contract, it was held thatthat will be in the nature of penalty. ( 11 ) THE same concept is found in the Union of India v. Rampurdistillery b Chemical Co. Ltd. , AIR 1973 SC 1098 . Mania Bux (supra) wasrelied upon. It was observed that the amount deposited by way of securityfor guaranteeing due performance of the contract cannot be regarded as earnest money. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court point out thedistinction between deposit of money as security for due performance of thecontract and agreeing to have the same forfeited in the event of breach ofcontract and the cases of payment by way of earnest money which is liable to be adjusted as part of the price. Sec. 74 of the Contract would apply in theformer case whereas it would have no application in the latter. ( 13 ) SHREE Hanuman Cotton Mills and Another v. Tata Air Craftlimited, AIR 1970 SC 1986 , contains a detailed discussion regarding themeaning of the words earnest money . On a review of various decisions thefollowing principles were laid down: " (1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract isconcluded. ( 13 ) SHREE Hanuman Cotton Mills and Another v. Tata Air Craftlimited, AIR 1970 SC 1986 , contains a detailed discussion regarding themeaning of the words earnest money . On a review of various decisions thefollowing principles were laid down: " (1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract isconcluded. (2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, inother words, "earnest" is given to bind the contract. (3) It is part of the purchase price when the transaction is carriedout. (4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason ofthe default or failure of the purchaser. (5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of thecontract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller isentitled to forfeit the earnest. " ( 14 ) IN the above case as per conditions of the contract between the parties, the buyer was liable to deposit with the supplier 25% of the totalvalue of the stores at the time of placing the order. The deposit was to remainwith the supplier as earnest money and was to be adjusted in the final bids. No interest was payable on the deposit to the buyer. Thus the buyer wasbound to pay the full value of the stores supplied to it minus the amount ofdeposit before taking delivery of the stores. In case of default by the buyer,the supplier was entitled to forfeit unconditionally the earnest money paidby the buyer and cancel the contract. The amount representing earnest money was primarily a security for the performance of the contract and inthe absence of any provision to the contrary in the contract, the securityamount was liable to be forfeited. Applying the above principles it was heldthat the forfeiture of 25% deposit in accordance with the contract could notbe faulted. ( 15 ) FROM the above mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court, itclearly emerges that when the earnest money or the deposit by way of earnest is liable to adjustment in the total price, it will not be a case falling under Section 74 of the Contract Act and the forfeiture has to be accepted asjustified by the terms of the contract. ( 16 ) IN the present case the deposit of 25% of the auction price was as perthe terms of the contract and was to form part of the total auction pricebecause the buyer, i. e. , the petitioner had only to deposit the balance 75%price. As per the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, theforfeiture of the 25% deposit by way of earnest money, therefore, cannot becalled in question. ( 17 ) EVEN the question of reasonableness of the amount sought to beforfeited cannot be challenged in the facts of the present case. Firstly the 25%deposit by way of earnest money in matters relating to immovable propertiescannot be said to be an unreasonable amount. This has been upheld by thecourts in various cases. The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of 25% ofthe price of goods in the case of Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills (supra ). Thiscourt has upheld forfeiture of similar 25% deposit in M/s. Aggarwalassociates (Promoters) Limited v. Delhi Development Authority andanother, 69 (1997) DLT 716. Secondly, the learned Counsel for DDA hasrelied on the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazulland) Rules, 1981 to contend that the 25% deposit by way of earnest moneyand its forfeiture on account of non-payment of the balance 75% price hasstatutory force. Rules 29 and 32 of the aforesaid Rules provide for deposit of25% amount as earnest money at the time of fall of hammer by the successfulbidder. These Rules further lay down the time frame within which thebalance 75% amount of the auction price is to be paid. Rule 32 lays down theconsequence of failure to pay the balance price within the specified period. According to this Rule, the 25% amount which already stands deposited byway of earnest money is liable to be forfeited in such a case. The submissionof the learned Counsel for the DDA in this behalf is that these Rules havebeen framed under statutory powers and, therefore, have the force of law. Because of this it does not remain merely a case of terms of contract. Theseterms of contract (auction) have statutory force and, therefore, cannot becalled in question. This is especially so because there is no challenge to theserules in the present case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to meetthis argument by saying that the Rules contain enabling provisions and aremerely by way of guidelines for the Department. Theseterms of contract (auction) have statutory force and, therefore, cannot becalled in question. This is especially so because there is no challenge to theserules in the present case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to meetthis argument by saying that the Rules contain enabling provisions and aremerely by way of guidelines for the Department. When we consider thequestion of reasonability of the amount being forfeited, this cannot be theanswer to the argument advanced on behalf of the DDA in view of the factthat the relevant terms of the auction find force from the statutory Rules, atleast the question of their being reasonable or not cannot be raised. ( 18 ) THE argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that in thepresent case the DDA did not suffer any loss, rather it made a substantialprofit on re-auction of the plot and, therefore, the forfeiture is not at alljustified, cannot be sustained. The forfeiture clause cannot be made dependenton the outcome of re-auction of a property. The re-auction may not take placefor years. In the present case itself the initial auction was in the year 1989while the re-auction took place in December 1996. Apart from the measureof the price fetched at the time of re-auction, it is difficult to expect anyevidence on the question of reasonability of the amount to be forfeited. Themoment one goes into the question of what is the material for determiningthe reasonable amount to be forfeited, the necessary corollary would be thatthe matter will have to be settled through litigation. ( 19 ) IN this connection we would like to mention that normally whenparties enter into a contract, the natural expectation is that the parties wouldabide by it. The parties have to maintain the solemnity of the contract. Thedeposit of earnest money and its forfeiture in the event of failure to performthe remaining part of the contract is a condition really meant to ensure thedue performance of the contract. The liability on account of forfeiture of 25%of the price is intended to be a deterrent against breach of contract, i. e. , nonpayment of the balance 75% price. We find nothing unreasonable, unjust orarbitrary in this. The liability on account of forfeiture of 25%of the price is intended to be a deterrent against breach of contract, i. e. , nonpayment of the balance 75% price. We find nothing unreasonable, unjust orarbitrary in this. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon Hazi Abdulsattar v. M. P. State Minor forest Produce Ltd. , Bhopal and Others, AIR1989 M. P. 7 in support of his argument that the forfeiture of 25% earnestmoney was unreasonable and unjust. This is a case of deposit of money byway of security for due performance of contract and not a case of deposit byway of earnest money liable to be adjusted in the price of the goods. Therefore, this case has no relevance so far as the facts of the present case areconcerned. ( 21 ) THE learned Counsel also relied on Workers Trust and Merchantbank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. , (1993) 2 All ER 370. This was a case ofdeposit of 25% of sale consideration of a piece of land by way. of earnestmoney and there was a forfeiture clause in the contract in the event of failureto pay the balance amount within 14 days of the auction. The followingextract from the headnote brings out the ratio of the judgment: "a deposit by the purchaser on a contract for the sale of land showedthat the purchaser was in earnest in performing the contract and, assuch, forfeiture of the deposit in the event of failure to complete the saledid not fall within the general rule that a penalty payable in the eventof a breach of contract was unlawful unless the provision for thepayment or forfeiture of a sum of money in the event of breach Was agenuine pre-estimate of the loss which the innocent party would incurby reason of the breach. Accordingly, a deposit could be validlyforfeited even though the amount of the deposit bore no reference to theanticipated loss to the vendor flowing from the breach of contract. However, the amount of the deposit had to be reasonable and, havingregard to usage which had been established over a long period that thecustomary deposit was 10% of the contract price, a vendor who soughtto obtain a larger amount than 10% by way of for feitable deposit had toshow special circumstances which justified such a deposit, otherwisethe deposit would be held to be a penalty intended to act in terrorem. Since the 25% deposit required by the -bank was not a true deposit byway of earnest, the provision for its forfeiture was a plain penalty andhad to be repaid. "from the above extract it will be seen that the judgment proceeded on thebasis as to whether 25% by way of earnest was a genuine pre-estimate of theloss flowing from breach of contract. It was also felt that customary depositby way of earnest was 10% which would be a reasonable amount to forfeit. While discussing the question of reasonableness, we have noted that depositof 25% of the auction price is customary in this country and has been upheldby Courts. Further in the facts of the present case the 25% deposit is as perthe norms laid down in statutory rules to which there is no challenge. Therefore, this case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner in thepresent case. ( 22 ) IN Delhi Development Authority v. Grihsthapana Co-operativegroup Housing Society Limited, 1995 Supp 1. (1) SCC 751, the Supreme Courtheld the forfeiture clause relying on its earlier decision in Shree Hanumancotton Mills case (supra ). Subsequently in Delhi Development Authority v. Shilpa Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited, (1996) 8 SCC 119 =62 (1996) DLT 421 (SC), the earlier decision in Delhi Development Authority v. Grihsthapana Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited, 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 751, was distinguished on the basis that in the instant case the Societyhad accepted the offer of payment of enhanced premium. It was held that theentire earnest money due was liable to be forfeited. However, keeping inview of the peculiar facts of the case, some relief was allowed to the Societyby reducing the amount. These cases really did not proceed on the argumentbased on Sec. 74, Contract Act. Whereas Sec. 74, Contract Act is the mainstayof the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the present case. ( 23 ) IN the result, we find no merit in the contention raised on behalf ofthe petitioner that the respondent is not entitled to forfeit the 25% of theauction price deposited by the petitioner as earnest money in view of thefailure of the petitioner to pay the balance 75% price. In the earlier part of thisjudgment, we have given facts leading to the filing of the writ petition. In the earlier part of thisjudgment, we have given facts leading to the filing of the writ petition. Thosefacts show that right from the beginning the petitioner has been dillydallying on the aspect of payment of 75% auction money. He has been tryingto find excuses for not paying the amount. He has been all along trying togain time in this behalf and even the indulgence shown by this Court ingranting him further time to pay the balance amount was not utilised. Firsthe tried to gain time regarding payment of balance price. When he failed toavail of the opportunity granted by way of extension of time, he startedchallenging the forfeiture of the 25% amount which he had deposited bywayof earnest money. In fact there is merit in the contention raised by the learnedcounsel for the respondent that the conduct of the petitioner in the presentcase totally disentitles him from seeking any relief under Article 226 of theconstitution of India. ( 24 ) WE would like to note here another argument raised by the learnedcounsel for the respondent by way of preliminary objection. Since we haveexamined the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner andwe did not want to throw the petitioner out on the basis of the preliminaryobjection, we did not choose to discuss this in the earlier part of thisjudgment. As the argument was raised, we would like to note the same at thisstage before we conclude this judgment. The argument is that in view of theorder passed by this Court in an earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner,it was not open to the petitioner to raise the points which have been raisedat the time of hearing of this petition. Rather it was submitted that thispetition was not maintainable in view of previous order of this Court. Theorder relied upon in this behalf is the order dated 10/10/1991,operative part whereof we have quoted earlier. In the said writ petition, thepetitioner had approached for extension of time to pay the balance 75% ofauction money. The DDA had already declined to grant extension by thattime and, therefore, the forfeiture clause had become operative as per termsand conditions of the auction. In the said writ petition, thepetitioner had approached for extension of time to pay the balance 75% ofauction money. The DDA had already declined to grant extension by thattime and, therefore, the forfeiture clause had become operative as per termsand conditions of the auction. This Court while disposing of the writ petitiongranted further two months time to the petitioner to pay the balance 75%orthe bid amount alongwith interest @ 18% p. a. for the first month andthereafter @ 25% p. a. till payment. It was further observed that in case thepetitioner complied with the order, the automatic cancellation and forfeiture jof the amount already deposited by the petitioner shall not stand in the wayof the petitioner. In case the petitioner failed to comply with the order, theforfeiture would take effect. The petitioner admittedly failed to comply withthe said order. The learned Counsel for the DDA submitted -that as a resultof this it was not open to the petitioner to challenge forfeiture of the 25% ofthe bid amount any more and the present writ petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. There is great force in this submission madeon behalf of the respondent. This Court has already held that if the petitionerfailed to pay the amount within two months from the date of the said order,the forfeiture of 25% of the bid amount would stand. This order of this Courtwas confirmed because the special leave petition against the order wasdismissed by the Supreme Court. It would follow that the forfeiture of the 25% of the bid amount was no more open to challenge in view of the saidorder. However, in view of the nature of the controversy raised before us. during the Course of hearingof the present petition and in order to hopefullyput an end to the litigation, we considered it appropriate to deal with themain question raised before us rather than dismiss the petition on the basisof the preliminary objection. ( 25 ) THE result of the above discussion is that the writ petition fails anis hereby dismissed with costs. Costs quantified at Rs. 20,000. 00