VENKATESHA MURTHY, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 has preferred this Writ Appeal challenging the dismissal of the Writ Petition wherein the constitutional validity of Section 18aa of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was challenged. ( 2 ) THE appellant Bharath Textiles and Proofing Industries which was dealing in Tarpaulin and canvas cloth filed its returns for the accounting year 1985-86 when exigibility of tarpaulin cloth for tax was disputed. Ultimately this Court accepted the contention that tarapalin cloth was not liable for sale tax. The appellant claims that he had refunded certain amounts to buyers and also deposited certain amounts to the Department. Later, the department initiated action under section 18a of the Act seeking to impose penalty in respect of tax collected on the sale of tarpaulin cloth. The assessing authority levied a penalty against the appellant which was successfully challenged before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. ( 3 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, with effect from 1-4-1992 Section 18aa of the Act was enacted. The Karnataka Appellate Tribunal took note of the provision and observed that the assessing authority would have to act in terms of Section 18aa of the Act so far as it related to refund of the tax already collected from the customers and paid to the State by the appellant herein. The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of section 18aa of the Act, in Writ Petition 2385 of 1996 and suffered the adverse order which lead to this appeal. ( 4 ) SECTION 18aa of the Act reads as follows: "18. AA. Payment and disbursement of amounts wrongly collected by dealer, as tax (i) where any amount is collected by way of tax or purporting to be by way of tax from any person by any dealer in contravention of Section 18, whether knowingly or not, such dealer shall pay the entire amount so collected, to the assessing authority within twenty days after the close of the month in which such amount was collected, notwithstanding that the dealer is not liable to pay such amount as tax or that only a part of it is due from him as tax under this Act. (2) If default is made in payment of the amount in accordance with sub-section (1), ( i) the whole of the amount outstanding on the date of default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the dealer; (ii) The dealer liable to pay the amount shall pay interest at the rate of two and one half per cent of such amount for each month of default; and (iii) The whole of the amount remaining unpaid along with the interest calculated under Clause (ii) of this sub-section shall be recoverable in the manner specified in Section 13. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, any amount paid or payable by way dealer under Sub-section (i) shall, to the extent it is not due as tax be forfeited to the State Government and be recovered from him and such payment or recovery shall discharge him of the liability to refund the amount to the person from whom it was collected. (4) Where any amount is paid or recovered by or from any dealer under Sub-section (1) or (3), a refund of such amount or any part thereof can be claimed from Government by the person from whom, it was realised by way of tax provided an application in writing in the prescribed form is made to the Commissioner, within two years from the date of the order of forfeitures. On receipt of any such application, the Commissioner shall hold such inquiry as he deems fit and if the commissioner is satisfied that the claim is valid and admissible and that the amount so claimed as refund is actually paid or recovered, he shall refund the amount or any part thereof, which is found due to the person concerned. (5) Where any amount is collected by way of tax or purporting to be by way of tax in contravention of Section 18 at any time before the commencement of the Karnataka Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1992, the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) shall apply to such amount collected. (5) Where any amount is collected by way of tax or purporting to be by way of tax in contravention of Section 18 at any time before the commencement of the Karnataka Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1992, the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) shall apply to such amount collected. " ( 5 ) THE contention on behalf of the appellant was that the resort to S. C. KASTURILAL hiralal v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AIR1987 SC 27 , JT1986 (1 )SC 749 , 1986 (2 ) SCALE708 , (1986 )4 SCC704 , [1987 ]1 SCR86 , [1987 ]64 STC1 (SC ), 1987 (1 )UJ54 (SC ) by the learned Single Judge was wrong and the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the writ petition as the provision interpreted by the Supreme Court was not in pari materia with the provision under challenge in this case. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the decision in R. ABDUL quadar v. SALES TAX OFFICER, II CIRCLE, HYDERABAD AIR1964 SC 922 , [1964 ]6 SCR867 , [1964 ]15 STC403 (SC ) and R. S. JOSHI v. AJIT MILLS air 1997 SC 2279 enunciated the law on the point and therefore the observations in AIR1987 SC 27 , JT1986 (1 )SC 749 , 1986 (2 )SCALE708 , (1986 )4 scc704 , [1987 ]1 SCR86 , [1987 ]64 STC1 (SC ), 1987 (1 )UJ54 (SC ) would not be correct. The submission on behalf of the appellant in this behalf cannot be sustained. The decision in r. S. Joshi's case referred to above at head note (F) reads as follows: "sections 37 (1) and 46, Bombay Sales Tax Act (51 of 1959) (as applicable to Gujarat State) which enact that sums collected by dealers by way of sales tax, though not exigible, shall be forfeited to the public exchequer punitively, are not beyond the ligislative power conferred by entry 54 read with Entry 65 List II and therefore not ultra vires. Nor do those provisions contravene Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Case Law considered. The forfeiture clause in Section 37 (1) cannot be charged with the vice of colourability. The word 'forfeiture' must bear the same meaning of a penalty for breach of a prohibitory direction. Nor do those provisions contravene Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Case Law considered. The forfeiture clause in Section 37 (1) cannot be charged with the vice of colourability. The word 'forfeiture' must bear the same meaning of a penalty for breach of a prohibitory direction. The fact that there is arithmetical identity, assuming it to be so, between the figures of the illegal collections made by the dealers and the amounts forfeited to the State cannot create a conceptual confusion that what is provided is not punishment but a transference of funds. In this view, the legislature, does not go outside the crease when it hits not against the dealer and deprives him by the penalty of the law, of the amount illegally gathered from the customers. The notion that a penalty or a punishment cannot be cast in the form of an absolute or no fault liability but must be preceded by mens rea must be rejected. The classical view that 'no mens rea, no crime' has long ago been eroded especially regarding economic crimes. Therefore, the contention that Section 37 (1) fastens a heavy liability regardless of fault had no force in depriving the forfeiture of the character of penalty. In a developing country, there is sufficient nexus between the power to tax and the incidental power to protect purchasers from being subjected to an unlawful burden Social Justice clauses, integrally connected with the taxing provisions, cannot be viewed. The provisions cannot also be challenged as flouting Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f ). There is no arbitrary or uncanalised power given to the authority. The plea as to contravention of Article 14 has therefore to fail. Equally untenable is the plea that the provisions contravene Article 19 (1) (f ). Section 37 (2) prescribes the procedure which makes it obligatory on the part of the commissioner to give notice to enable the assessee to show cause against levy of penalty or forfeiture. Further, there are provisions for appeal and revision against any order made by the commissioner. AIR1974 SC 2009 , (1974 )2 SCC402a , [1975 ]1 SCR1 and AIR1968 SC 445 , [1968 ]1 SCR735 , [1968 ]21 STC174 (SC ). Foll. S. C. A. Nos. 421 and 508 of 1971 (Guj) Reversed. Further, there are provisions for appeal and revision against any order made by the commissioner. AIR1974 SC 2009 , (1974 )2 SCC402a , [1975 ]1 SCR1 and AIR1968 SC 445 , [1968 ]1 SCR735 , [1968 ]21 STC174 (SC ). Foll. S. C. A. Nos. 421 and 508 of 1971 (Guj) Reversed. ( 7 ) IN R. S. Joshi's case, there is nothing which can help the case of the appellant herein. Indeed the very same complaints has been examined in MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES v. UNlon OF india AND ORS. , 2002 (83 )ECC85 (SC ), 1997 (89 )ELT247 (SC ), jt1996 (11 )SC 283 , 1996 (9 )SCALE457 , (1997 )5 SCC536 , [1996 ]supp10 SCR585 , [1998 ] 111 STC467 (SC ). and the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the legal position touching all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. ( 8 ) IT is clear that the attack on the competence of the legislature under Entry 54 of List II to enact section 18aa of the Act is untenable being conclusively pronounced upon. Consequently, the appellant cannot challenge the constitutional validity of Section 18 AA of the Act. ( 9 ) IT was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant that when the proceedings under section 18a of the Act terminated in his favour, it was not competent for the Karnataka appellate Tribunal in STA 700 of 1992 to have issued a direction to the assessing authority to complete the formality of confiscation of the excess tax collections by the appellant. Obviously at the time the levy of the tax was challenged by the appellant Section 18 AA had not been enacted. During the pendency of the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, the amended provisions was brought to the notice of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and arguments were addressed thereon on behalf of the appellant and also on behalf of the State. In paras 9 and 10 of its judgment, the various contentions pertaining to Section 18aa of the Act were examined and the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal passed the impugned order. The appellant cannot contend that it was beyond the scope of the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate tribunal to have made any order as now made in Annexure-B dated 3-8-1994 in 700 of 1992 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The appellant cannot contend that it was beyond the scope of the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate tribunal to have made any order as now made in Annexure-B dated 3-8-1994 in 700 of 1992 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. No grievance can be made of the observations of the karnataka Appellate Tribunal in Annexure-B inasmuch as the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal merely noticed the provision of law by the operation of which the appellant could not seek refund of the exgess tax collected. Even without any observation made by the Karnataka appellate Tribunal, Section 18aa was operative. The appellant was not entitled to be heard before the forfeiture of the tax paid (see para 97 of the Judgment in Mafatlal's Case) All that section 18aa did was to forfeit the amount of tax paid by the appellant and at the same time absolved the appellant herein of his liability to refund the same to the customers from whom those amounts were collected. On the other hand, the State undertook to examine and decide the claim made by the person who has paid the tax. Even if the appellant, as claimed by him, had refunded any tax to the customer, it would be open to him to avail the procedure provided in section 18aa of the Act, for seeking refund, apart from any other remedy available in law. ( 10 ) IN the light of the decisions referred to above on no ground urged constitutional validity of section 18aa of the Act, can be challenged. In the circumstances, the appeal has to fail and is dismissed with costs.