State of U. P. v. Samar Singh — 1998 DIGILAW 424 (ALL)

Judgment S.K. Phaujdar, J.C. Misra, JJ. 1. The present contemner was noticed from this Court under an order dated 8.9.1997 asking him to appear on 20.10.1997 and to show cause why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court in view of the allegations made in the letters dated 19.6.1996, 15.7.1996 and 16.7.1996 of Sri Chaturbhuj, the then Ist Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, to the District Judge, Ghaziabad, indicating how Samar Singh had been threatening the said Presiding Officer to pass orders in his favour and otherwise to face consequences, as indicated in the said letters. 2. The first letter dated 19.6.1996 by Sri Chaturbhuj was addressed to the District Judge, Ghaziabad, in relation to Case Crime No. 73 of 1996, State v. R.D. Plastic, under Section 39/40 of the Indian Electricity Act relating to P.S. Kotwali, district Ghaziabad, concerning conduct of Sri Samar Singh, Advocate, on behalf of the accused in that case. The letter indicated that on 19.6.1996 when the Judicial Officer was busy in his Court, an application was presented by the Advocate, upon which a report from the A.P.O. was sought and it was directed to be put up with the records. Upon this, the Advocate, Samar Singh, allegedly uttered some uncivil words APSABD and went out of the Court room. Again, at about 3.15 p.m., when the application was placed along with the records, Sri Samar Singh was not present. The learned A.P.O. drew attention of the Court to para 2 of the application wherein allegations against the Presiding Officer, touching his integrity, were made. The Presiding Officer then remembered that on the same day at about 9.30 a.m., Sri Samar Singh had threatened him over telephone for having decided a case allegedly without hearing him. He also allegedly threatened the Judicial Officer that he was to reap the consequences therefor. When asked over phone as to who was speaking, he disclosed his name as Thakur Samar Singh. In the application, that was filed in the concerned case on that date, it was indicated that the High Court was being approached for an enquiry against the Judicial Officer. Thus, Thakur Samar Singh by his threats over phone and by his presenting such application had lowered the prestige of the Court. In the application, that was filed in the concerned case on that date, it was indicated that the High Court was being approached for an enquiry against the Judicial Officer. Thus, Thakur Samar Singh by his threats over phone and by his presenting such application had lowered the prestige of the Court. Letter dated 19.6.1996 further indicated that Samar Singh had first appeared in the concerned case on 2.5.1996 and had presented an application, but the application was never pressed. The application was appended with a copy of the order of the appellate court and the application was put up for hearing on 10.5.1996 in terms of the direction of the appellate court. None appeared on 10.5.1996 or on the adjourned date of 14.5.1996. The allegation of Samar Singh that he was not given an opportunity of hearing was, thus, baseless. Another letter was sent by Sri Chaturbhuj to the District Judge, Ghaziabad, concerning telephonic threats by Samar Singh to him and of threat of moving the High Court with an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. It was stated that Samar Singh claimed himself to be an Advocate practising in the High Court and usually he telephoned the Judicial Officer between 5.30 and 6.00 p.m. every day and used to brag that he would not allow him to be in Judicial Service unless he acted according to his wishes. On 13.7.1996 at 7.00 a.m., a person came to the residence of the Judicial Officer and posed himself to be an employee of the High Court and left certain papers with the private servant of the Judicial Officer. After sometime Samar Singh telephoned him and asked if he had read the papers. Samar Singh further told him that if the Judicial Officer did not decide the case of R.D. Plastic as dictated by him, he would file an application against the Judicial Officer under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and a copy of the application was sent in advance to the Judicial Officer indicating that it was to be moved before the High Court in Court No. 43 on 15.7.1996. On 14.7.1996 again at about 5.00 p.m. a telephone came to the Judicial Officer asking him if he had recorded the order, otherwise he would proceed to Allahabad and present the petition before the High Court. 3. The third letter of Sri Chaturbhuj is dated 16.7.1996. On 14.7.1996 again at about 5.00 p.m. a telephone came to the Judicial Officer asking him if he had recorded the order, otherwise he would proceed to Allahabad and present the petition before the High Court. 3. The third letter of Sri Chaturbhuj is dated 16.7.1996. Through this letter, he informed the District Judge that at 6.30 a.m. on that day when he came back to his residence after morning walk, his wife told him that Sri Samar Singh, Advocate, had telephoned to tell him that the Section 482, Cr. P.C. application had been filed in the High Court and the application would be not pressed if an order in favour of R.D. Plastic was recorded that day, failing which Chaturbhuj Sahib would be a victim of his own obstinacy. 4. These three letters were forwarded by the District Judge, Ghaziabad, to the Registrar on 31.7.1996 with his opinion that proceedings for Contempt of Court against Sri Samar Singh, Advocate, should be initiated. A note was placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and it was directed that the matter be placed before the appropriate Bench in the judicial side. This order was passed on 15.5.1997, but the office did not place it before the Bench till 8.9.1997 and the Division Bench of Hon. G. Malaviya, J. and Hon. B.K. Sharma, J., took strong exception to it and directed that the concerned persons should explain their conduct for this delay. It was made clear by the Division Bench by its order dated 8.9.1997 that the allegations were such which prompted it to take cognizance under Article 215 of the Constitution of India suo motu and thereafter a show-cause notice was issued. The contemner, Samar Singh, appeared in person and filed a counter-affidavit. It was stated that he had carefully gone through the letters of Sri Chaturbhuj dated 19.6.1996, 15.7.1996 and 16.7.1996 and understood the contents thereof. It was stated that one Ram Autar was granted bail on 1.3.1996 and certain conditions were imposed upon him directing him to make payment of Rs. 5 lacs and odd within one month to the State Electricity Board, failing which the bail order was to be deemed cancelled. The time for payment was, however, extended for a month. It was stated that one Ram Autar was granted bail on 1.3.1996 and certain conditions were imposed upon him directing him to make payment of Rs. 5 lacs and odd within one month to the State Electricity Board, failing which the bail order was to be deemed cancelled. The time for payment was, however, extended for a month. Thereafter a revision was preferred and certain directions were given and the Magistrate relaxed the condition of payment directing payment to the tune of 1/4th of the said sum in cash and the rest 3/4th by way of security of immovable property or bank guarantee. This order was recorded by the Magistrate on 14.5.1996. The contemner further stated "that after making enquiries the deponent felt something in entire happening and moved an application in this Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as he did not want to get it decided by Mr. Chaturbhuj". It was stated that the order dated 14.5.1996 was passed to make hands clean and to defeat the directions of the High Court. It was stated that an application dated 19.6.1996 was made before the learned Magistrate wherein more allegations were made but no relief was claimed from the learned Magistrate, Sri Chaturbhuj. 5. In relation to the letter dated 19.6.1996, it was stated that the allegations of using disrespectful language and of threatening on phone were wrong and were denied. He never stated that a complaint was to be made against the Judicial Officer in the High Court, rather it was stated that he was moving an application dated 19.6.1996 to be disposed of directly by the High Court and for institution of enquiry to find out under what circumstances tampering was made in the judicial record and by whom. It was admitted by the contemner that "no relief was sought from the learned Magistrate in the application dated 19.6.1996 and it was requested to keep the same on record only." The contemner denied that he did not turn up on 19.6.1996. He asserted that he was there from 2.00 p.m. till 4.30 p.m. and the Presiding Officer did not take seat in Court after lunch on 19.6.1996. It was further asserted that although a complaint was made on 19.6.1996 to the District Judge, the Presiding Officer had not forwarded the application dated 19.6.1996 to the District Judge. He asserted that he was there from 2.00 p.m. till 4.30 p.m. and the Presiding Officer did not take seat in Court after lunch on 19.6.1996. It was further asserted that although a complaint was made on 19.6.1996 to the District Judge, the Presiding Officer had not forwarded the application dated 19.6.1996 to the District Judge. The allegations of threats, according to the contemner, were all false and beyond normal probabilities of human behaviour. 6. In relation to the letters dated 15.7.1996 and 16.7.1996, the contemner stated that the allegations of threats made by him were false. It was asserted that two copies of the petition (proposed to be filed before the High Court) were sent to the Magistrate, one by courier service and another by ordinary post. The copies were sent, according to him, without any malice and in a bona fide action as the contemner intended that one should have knowledge what was being done so that the Magistrate may choose to defend himself. The other allegations were denied. According to him, there was no telephonic call by him on 13th or 14th July, 1996. It was further stated that the allegations made in the letter dated 16.7.1996 were also not true. The deponent claimed that he was having 16 years standing as a practitioner of law before the High Court and the alleged conduct was beyond normal probabilities. In good faith and after due care and caution, the petitioner had a telephonic talk with the Magistrate on 18.6.1996 at the behest of the A.D.G.C. conducting the prosecution case. He alleged that the Magistrate called him into his Chambers and desired that he should act as his agent and on his refusal, the letter dated 19.6.1996 was written. The Section 482, Cr. P.C. application was really filed in Court and it was registered as Case No. 2502 of 1996. The same was disposed of with a direction that the applicant may approach the Court below for deletion of conditions of payment. The contemner claimed that he paid high regards to the Court and Presiding Officers and had never any intention to interfere with due administration of justice or obstruct the course of justice by any action of his. He, however, insisted that the application dated 19.6.1996 was made bona fide with due caution and care. He appended a copy of his application dated 19.6.1996 as Annexure-'CA 2'. He, however, insisted that the application dated 19.6.1996 was made bona fide with due caution and care. He appended a copy of his application dated 19.6.1996 as Annexure-'CA 2'. After the contemner had filed his counter-affidavit, the concerned Magistrate, now posted in Dehradun, was directed to submit a report and he had submitted his report dated 6.3.1998 by 7.3.1998 which was forwarded to the High Court through the District Judge, Dehradun, and appears to have been received here on 16.3.1998. In this report, the concerned Judicial Officer alleged that the statements in the counter-affidavit of Samar Singh were not true. It was asserted that on 19.6.1996, when Sri Chaturbhuj was engaged in judicial work, an application was submitted in Case No. 73 of 1996 by the counsel for M/s. R. D. Plastic. Report from the A.P.O. was called for and the Advocate left the place after uttering uncivil words. In fact, in this report the Judicial Officer reiterated his allegations made in his report dated 19.6.1996. In further paragraphs of this reply, it was indicated that in Case No. 73 of 1996 bail was granted on condition of deposit of Rs. 5 lacs and odd within a month and a revision application was preferred and the matter was remitted back to the Court below by an order dated 1.5.1996. Upon the order of the revisional court, an application was filed for modification of the bail order dated 1.3.1996 and it was placed for hearing on 14.5.1996. On that date, the matter was called out at 10.30 a.m., 12.00 noon and again at 2.00 p.m., but none responded on behalf of the accused. The counsel for the other party pressed for dismissal of the petition but in terms of the order of the Sessions Judge, the order dated 1.3.1996 was modified, but even this modification order was not complied with by the accused persons and a Criminal Misc. Application No. 2502 of 1996 was preferred before the High Court suppressing the order of the revisional court dated 1.5.1996. The order dated 14.5.1996 was set aside by the High Court directing a fresh hearing. An application was preferred on the basis of the order of the High Court dated 24.7.1996 and it was placed for hearing on 2.9.1996 after deleting the order of deposit of Rs. 5 lacs and odd in the order dated 1.3.1996. The order dated 14.5.1996 was set aside by the High Court directing a fresh hearing. An application was preferred on the basis of the order of the High Court dated 24.7.1996 and it was placed for hearing on 2.9.1996 after deleting the order of deposit of Rs. 5 lacs and odd in the order dated 1.3.1996. On 2.9.1996 Ram Autar (on behalf of the accused) submitted an affidavit denying the allegations of corruption against Sri Chaturbhuj. Sri Samar Singh appeared for the accused on 2.5.1996 and he tried to influence the judicial decisions of the Presiding Officer. It was asserted by Sri Chaturbhuj that the affidavit of Ram Autar itself would show that the allegations made against Sri Chaturbhuj were all creation of Samar Singh. On 13.7.1996 Samar Singh sent some papers to the Judicial Officer with a note that "this petition shall come up on Monday, i.e., 15.7.1996 by mention in Court No. 43". The copy of this was sent to the District Judge along with complaint of Sri Chaturbhuj dated 15.7.1996. Sri Chaturbhuj denied the averment that he did not take seat in Court on 19.6.1996. He asserted that his complaints to the District Judge were made on correct facts. 7. We may now turn to the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Under this Act 'Contempt of Court' means 'Civil Contempt' and 'Criminal Contempt'. A 'Criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act, whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court ; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings ; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. Section 3 protects innocent publication and distribution of matter from the operation of the Contempt. Section 5 protects from the operation of the Act, a fair criticism of any judicial act. Section 3 protects innocent publication and distribution of matter from the operation of the Contempt. Section 5 protects from the operation of the Act, a fair criticism of any judicial act. Section 10 empowers the High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts and states that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. No High Court, however, is to take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Section 12 deals with punishment for Contempt of Court. 8. The procedural aspects have been dealt with in Section 14 onwards of the Act. Section 15 speaks that in the case of a criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court. THE reference made in this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. Section 17 of the Act deals with the procedure after cognizance. It requires that notice of every proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act shall be served personally on the person charged and the notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the reference when proceedings are annexed on a reference. This section also permits the person charged with contempt to file an affidavit in support of his defence and the Court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act gave a limitation for actions for contempt and states that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Section 23 empowers the High Court to make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Section 23 empowers the High Court to make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Article 215 of the Constitution declares a High Court to be a Court of record and gives to it all the powers of the Court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. 9. The Allahabad High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, has framed set of rules. Rule 4 requires that every case of 'Criminal Contempt' coming under Section 15 of the Act shall be presented before the Bench of not less than two Judges constituted for the purpose. Reference relating to contempt of court received on administrative side from the subordinate courts shall along with the office report with respect thereto, be laid before the Chief Justice, who shall have the discretion to file the same or to order that the same be laid before the Bench concerned, for further proceeding in connection with the case. Rule 5 states that when allegations contained in the petition appear to make out a prima facie case of Contempt of Court against the person, it shall be reduced into charge or charges by the Court against such person and notice shall be issued only with respect to those charges, but no Court shall issue notice if more than a year has elapsed from the alleged act of Contempt of Court. The case before us may be looked into from two angles. Firstly, it may be seen if the alleged acts made out a case of contempt of court, and secondly, the Court is to see whether the procedure stands on the way of punishing the alleged contemner. 10. The allegations against the contemner have been indicated in detail and in short, it may be synopsised, to say, that he used to threat the Judicial Officer over phone and he had filed petition before the Court for no apparent reason than to pressurise him to record an order in favour of the client of the contemner. THE alleged contemner denied the allegations of contact over phone and of giving out threats to the Judicial Officer, but he had justified his act of sending a copy of a petition to the Court when the petition was really meant to be moved before the High Court. THE alleged contemner denied the allegations of contact over phone and of giving out threats to the Judicial Officer, but he had justified his act of sending a copy of a petition to the Court when the petition was really meant to be moved before the High Court. Concerning the telephonic threats, consistent applications were made by the concerned Judicial Officer to his immediate superior authority, the District Judge. The alleged contemner relied on an affidavit by one Ajay Kumar filed in a Criminal Misc. Application before the High Court. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit, it was indicated that on 19.6.1996 an application was filed before Sri Chaturbhuj, the Judicial Officer concerned. In paragraph 10 of this affidavit, it has been clearly indicated that prior to moving the application (dated 19.6.1996), the counsel for the applicant made a telephonic call to the concerned Judicial Officer concerning recording of an order dated 1.3.1996 despite a request by the counsel through his junior. The language of paragraph 10 of this affidavit is quoted in toto : "10. That prior to moving the application, the counsel for the applicant made a telephone to the opposite party No. 3 wherein he enquired about the fact that inspite of his request through his junior attending his cases at Ghaziabad, why the order was passed amending the order dated 1.3.1996 granting bail to the applicant." This assertion in the affidavit, which was relied on by the contemner, clearly proves that the contemner had talked to the concerned Judicial Officer on a matter touching administration of justice. A counsel, however, senior he might be, had no business to lift the telephone to make a call to a Judge of whatever rank to have any discussion about any judicial matter. This, by itself, demolishes the defence that no telephonic call was ever made. Even if it is not accepted that there were threats given to the concerned Judicial Officer, the contents of the affidavit clearly suggest that the telephonic call by the contemner was certainly an interference or an act tending to interfere with due course of a judicial proceeding. The action of the contemner, therefore, clearly comes within the definition of 'Criminal Contempt' as given in Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The second aspect of contempt relates to giving a copy of proposed petition before the High Court to the concerned Judicial Officer. The action of the contemner, therefore, clearly comes within the definition of 'Criminal Contempt' as given in Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The second aspect of contempt relates to giving a copy of proposed petition before the High Court to the concerned Judicial Officer. This copy was admittedly given by the present contemner and the copy is on record before us. While it is accepted that a person has a right to be aggrieved by a Judicial Order and has a further right to seek redress in a higher forum, it is beyond any comprehension that a Judicial Officer would be given a copy of the proposed petition for the High Court before the matter is placed in the High Court. This was, in fact, an action coming within the definition of 'Criminal Contempt' as the attempt was nothing less than browbeating the Court to get an order in favour of the client of the contemner. This not only lowered the authority of the Court but also tended to interfere with the course of judicial proceeding. On both the courts, therefore, the contemner's action was not only condemnable but also punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act. Unfortunately, the procedure stands on the way of punishing the petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act for his actions. Section 20 speaks clearly that a Court shall not initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed. The alleged contempts in this case were committed on 19.6.1996 as also on other dates ending with July, 1996. The reference was made in proper time. Hon'ble the Chief Justice made an endorsement on the administrative side on 15.5.1997. There was, however, a delay on the part of the office to place the matter before the appropriate Bench and it came to the judicial side only on 8.9.1997. The Division Bench was aware of this delay and had made an oblique remark against the office for having caused the delay and for having allowed the period of one year to elapse. The Division Bench was aware of this delay and had made an oblique remark against the office for having caused the delay and for having allowed the period of one year to elapse. But the Division Bench was of the view that "Having perused the record of the case, this Court still feels that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction vested in the Court under Article 215 of the Constitution can suo motu proceed in the matter of contempt even at this stage." Only after exercising this power, the Division Bench directed the contemner to appear in person on 20.10.1997 and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. No charge was framed but the order itself indicated that the contemner was required to explain the allegations that the contemner had been threatening the Presiding Officer, Sri Chaturbhuj, to pass orders in his favour or to face consequences. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act bars initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the High Court, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of one year from the date of alleged contempt. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, therefore, even a suo motu action could not have been taken after the expiry of the limitation period. This interpretation of law is also supported from the Allahabad High Court Rules, concerning Contempt of Court, framed under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Rule 5 forbids a Court from issuing a notice to a contemner after a year has elapsed from the date of alleged act of contempt. The Division Bench appears to have resorted to the constitutional right to proceed for Contempt of Court under Article 215 of the Constitution. This Article declares that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The alleged act was contempt of the subordinate court and not of the High Court and we are of the view that the High Court could not have resorted to Article 215 of the Constitution of India to proceed against the contemner. The alleged act was contempt of the subordinate court and not of the High Court and we are of the view that the High Court could not have resorted to Article 215 of the Constitution of India to proceed against the contemner. It is true that in this very proceeding, at an earlier stage, a Division Bench had exercised certain jurisdiction but that alone may not clothe us with the jurisdiction to punish a contemner or even to proceed against him after the lapse of one year from the date of alleged contempt. Article 225 of the Constitution speaks of the rule-making power of the High Court concerning administration of justice in the Court. Rules have been framed concerning the Contempt of Courts Act but not concerning Article 215 and in our view, as already observed, Article 215 may not be invoked for punishing a contemner when contempt is committed in respect of the subordinate courts. The contemner had not indicated any remorse or repentence in his counter-affidavit nor did he indicate anywhere in writing that he was tendering an apology, but in the course of arguments, rather, at the end of his arguments in the Court, he had verbally tendered unconditional apology. This, in our view, was only an attempt to ward off any punishment that could have been awarded to him and not a bona fide one. 11. This tender of apology may not, therefore, purge him of the 'Criminal Contempt' that he had committed. The delay was caused in this case by the office and the Division Bench by its order dated 8.9.1997 directed the office to explain why the petition was not listed in time. The office explanation was submitted on 18.10.1997 and there was a clear admission "as a matter of fact the delay on the part of the office is only lies on for a period of nearabout two months in which the period of June is also included as a vacation". The office 'highly regretted' this delay. No judicial order is there concerning acceptance or rejection of this explanation. The order dated 19.1.1998 by a Division Bench of other two Hon'ble Judges also indicates callousness on the part of office in complying with certain other order of the Court. The Registrar was directed to make an enquiry and to fix responsibility for this delay. No judicial order is there concerning acceptance or rejection of this explanation. The order dated 19.1.1998 by a Division Bench of other two Hon'ble Judges also indicates callousness on the part of office in complying with certain other order of the Court. The Registrar was directed to make an enquiry and to fix responsibility for this delay. The office had on the next date prayed for mercy and tendered unqualified apology. The judicial order dated 10.2.1998 indicates that the responsible person was censured. There is, however, nothing on the record to indicate if any action was taken against the person responsible for delayed presentation of the matter initially before the Division Bench. The Registrar will look into the matter and take appropriate measures against the person responsible for not presenting the contempt reference before the Division Bench despite a direction of Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 14.5.1997. Although we may not be able to punish the contemner under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act because of the ban imposed under Section 20 read with Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules made under the Contempt of Courts Act, we must condemn the act of the contemner, who is said to be a legal practitioner having quite a good standing to his credit, and we direct the Registrar to make a reference of the matter to the Bar Council of U. P., so that appropriate administrative action may be taken against Sri Samar Singh, Advocate, practising at Ghaziabad, for his actions as aforesaid. In the interest of administration of justice, it is further directed that a copy of the present judgment be sent to the District Judge, Ghaziabad, with a direction that he may circulate the judgment amongst the Judicial Officers there and may also send a copy thereof to the Bar Association, Ghaziabad, for information of the members thereof.