C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) ADMITTED, Mr. D. H. Vaghela appears and waives service of notice of admission. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the matter taken up for final hearing. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is filed against mandatory interim order passed by the learned Single judge in Special Civil Application No. 1599 of 1998 on March 19, 1998. That petition was filed by the respondent - original petitioner No. 1 being one of the employees of upaleta Municipality and No. 2 as office leader of trade Union Registered under the trade Union Act. The case of the petitioners was that they were working with the municipality on permanent basis. On extraneous considerations and with malafide motive and without authority of law, their services came to be terminated in violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by way of unfair labour practice and victimisation. They, therefore, approached the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot. In the industrial Tribunal, the matter was compromised between the parties and a consent award was passed. In spite of the award, Appellant No. 1, new President of the Municipality illegally terminated their services by passing the impugned order on 7th February, 1998, which was illegal and contrary to law. The petitioners, therefore, filed Regular Civil Suit nos. 13 to 37 of 1998 on February 9, 1998. The suits, however, came to be dismissed on february 18, 1998 by the learned Civil Judge, (S. D.), Upaleta on the ground that Civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter. They, therefore, approached this Court by filing special Civil Application No. 1599 of 1998 on March 4,1998. The Municipality had filed a Caveat and it appeared in the matter. On 19th March, 1998, the learned Single Judge issued Rule and granted mandatory injunction directing the Municipality to reinstate the petitioners. The operative part of the order reads thus: "by way of interim order, the respondent Municipality is directed to reinstate the concerned workmen in this petition, whose services have been terminated without following the procedure of law, within a week from to day, which if course, is subject to the rights and contentions of the respondent Municipality to challenge the award passed by the Tribunal before the higher forum and the appropriate orders that may be obtained by it. ( 3 ) THE Chief Officer of the Municipality to submit report before this Court about the compliance S. O. to 27th March, 1997, DS permitted. The present Letters Patent Appeal is filed against that order. We have heard both the parties. Time was also granted to file further affidavit to the parties and with consent of the parties, the matter was finally heard. 3. The case of the appellant-Municipality was that all the petitioners came to be appointed only in 1997 and that too, without following proper procedure of law and without complying with the Rules for recruitment and conditions of service of Employees of appellant Municipality. It was alleged that they had not completed 240 days in a year and were not entitled to regularisation. It was further alleged that almost all the employees were related either to past President or to Councillors and in flagrant violation of Rules and by way of back door entry, they came to be appointed. It is asserted that since the recruitment was contrary to law and without considering financial conditions of the appellant Municipality they were apointed, a special general meeting was called on november 21, 1997 for considering the question of removal of workmen. By a resolution no. 30, it was resolved that the employees recruited after July 29, 1997 be removed with effect from November 21, 1997 and authority was given to the President for taking appropriate action in that regard, it is alleged that though such resolution was passed the then President of the Municipality did not take action. ( 4 ) MEANWHILE, the petitioners approached Industrial Tribunal and certain references came to be made to Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot. It is alleged that though references were comperatively recent and notices were issued by the Industrial Tribunal by making them returnable in February, 1998, as the President was to vacate office on 15th January, 1998, the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot was requested to prepone the cases. Accordingly the matters were taken on Board. On 9th January, 1998, compromise terms were arrived at and the award was passed. Accordingly the matters were taken on Board. On 9th January, 1998, compromise terms were arrived at and the award was passed. It is further stated that the then President, was not given power to settle the matter and a decision which was taken in general meeting of the appellant municipality vide resolution No. 112 on 10th January 1997, did not pertain to the employees who were appointed in 1997, i. e. , to the cases of the petitioners and yet by abuse of power, the President entered into compromise against the interest of the appellant Municipality and hence it was unanimously decided to terminate services of the petitioners. The President, however, did not take any action. After his term was over on 15th January, 1998, and new President came to be elected that he took the impugned action which is legal and valid. It is contended that the order passed by the Municipality is, in consonance with law and the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in granting mandatory relief and that too at interlocutory stage. ( 5 ) WE have been taken to the relevant averments in the petition as also in the Letters patent Appeal. We have also been taken to various decisions cited by both the sides. At the outset, we may state that the learned Single Judge himself has observed that he was conscious of the fact that during the pendency of the matter ordinarily no mandatory relief should be granted. According to the learned Single Judge, however, the case on hand was such which required grant of mandatory relief and accordingly, he granted such relief. While granting mandatory relief, the first fact weighed with the learned Single Judge was that the President of the Municipality was "duly authorised" by a resolution of the General board of the Municipality to enter into a settlement and accordingly settlement was arrived at and the compromise was legal, valid and lawful. On the basis of such compromise, award was passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot. On the basis of such compromise, award was passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot. The learned Single judge also considered the fact that the respondent Municipality did not think it fit to challenge the award passed in favour of the workmen but as soon as new President took over the office, without following proper procedure of law and without challenging the award, by a stroke of pen, he terminated the services of the workmen, which could not have been done and hence it was a fit case to grant mandatory relief. ( 6 ) REGARDING alternative remedy available to the workmen by approaching the tribunal against termination, it was observed by the learned Single Judge that if such submission would be upheld, it would amount to asking parties to move from pillar to post indefinitely despite the fact that the services of the workmen have been terminated without following procedure of law and despite the fact that the award was in their favour. ( 7 ) THE learned Single Judge also indicated in the order that with a view to satisfy the conscience of the Court, he called for the records and proceedings of the case and having gone through the settlement arrived at between the parties and accepted by the Tribunal, interim relief was called for. Accordingly, interim relief was granted. Since the main matter is pending before the learned Single Judge, it would neither be appropriate nor advisable for us to make any observation on merits which may affect one of the parties to the litigation. We, therefore, refrain from entering into various questions raised before us and will deal with only points touching the grant of mandatory reliefs by the learned Single Judge. ( 8 ) LOOKING to the statement of facts in the Letters Patent Appeal, it appears that almost all the petitioners came to be appointed only in 1997. It is alleged that one of the petitioners was appointed by following Rules of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of the Employees of Upaleta Municipality. It is also alleged that most of them were relatives of former President, Councillors or employees of the Municipality and they have been taken by back doors. It is alleged that one of the petitioners was appointed by following Rules of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of the Employees of Upaleta Municipality. It is also alleged that most of them were relatives of former President, Councillors or employees of the Municipality and they have been taken by back doors. It is further the case of the appellant Municipality that the Collector has passed an order under Sec. 258 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 directing the municipality not to make any recruitment on any post and even thereafter a number of appointments were made. Regarding power conferred on the then President of the municipality to enter into compromise/settlement, it is contended on behalf of the municipality that the said power was in connection with the cases pending before the industrial Tribunal, in respect of workmen who had completed more than 240 days in a year. Resolution No. 112 which was passed on January 10, 1997 was in respect of those employees. It was stated that those disputes have already been settled, the cases have been finalised and the services of those employees have been regularised. It is, however, contended that the instant cases did not fall within Resolution No. 112 of January 1997, inasmuch as all the petitioners came to be appointed therefore. By taking undue advantage of Resolution No. 112 and under the guise of the powers given to the President by that resolution, the then President exercised power of compromise/settlement of the cases of the petitioners which were subsequently filed and in respect of which no power was given to him. He could not have entered into settlement and the settlement cannot be said to be legal and valid. A material circumstance which was brought to our notice is also eloquent, namely, that though notices were issued in January, 1998 and were made returnable in february, 1998, a prayer, was made to take the matters on Board. As per the prayer, the matters were placed on Board on January 9, 1998 and compromise was arrived at between the parties, terms of settlement were reduced in writing and produced on record at Exh. 5 on the same day and award was passed in terms of the compromise. As per the prayer, the matters were placed on Board on January 9, 1998 and compromise was arrived at between the parties, terms of settlement were reduced in writing and produced on record at Exh. 5 on the same day and award was passed in terms of the compromise. The allegation of the municipality is that it was done by the President of the Municipality in connivance with the petitioners with a view to favour them as the President was to retire and to leave office after 15th January, 1998. This may or may not be correct. But in our opinion, it is also one of the considerations which will have to be borne in mind and during the pendency of petition, interim relief of a mandatory nature ought not to have been granted by the learned Single Judge. ( 9 ) THE learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was also not right in observing that the president, without following proper procedure of law and without challenging the award, abruptly terminated the services of the petitioners. ( 10 ) AS stated above, the award was passed on 9th January, 1998. The petition was filed on 4th March, 1998 and interim order impugned in this appeal was passed by the learned Single Judge on 19th March, 1998. We are told at the Bar that when the petition was filed, the award was not published in the Gazette. It was published in the third week of March, 1998. Mrs. Pahawa, learned counsel for the appellants stated that time was very much there for the appellant Municipality to challenge the legality and validity of the award and the assumption on which the learned Single Judge proceeded to pass mandatory interim relief that the award was not challegned, was not well founded. Equally ill founded was the fact that President of the Municiaplity was duly authorised by the General Board to enter into settlement. The Counsel submitted that even if there was an award which was not challenged and had become final or that the challenge was not successful, the law provides remedy and such award could be enforced in accordance with the provisions of law and the petitioners could not have filed a petition for implementation and/or execution of such award. The Counsel submitted that even if there was an award which was not challenged and had become final or that the challenge was not successful, the law provides remedy and such award could be enforced in accordance with the provisions of law and the petitioners could not have filed a petition for implementation and/or execution of such award. Similarly, if an action is taken of terminating the services of the appellant, the said action could have been challenged by taking appropriate proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and not by approaching this Court by invoking Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 11 ) MR. Vaghela, relying on various decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as well as of this Court contended that even if alternative remedy is available, this Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. There cannot be two opinions about legal position. It must be conceded that an alternative remedy is not a bar in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The question is not of jurisdiction, but of discretion. When an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to an aggrieved party, normally, a High Court would not exercise extra ordinary powers and grant relief and that too at interlocutory stage. It is also submitted by Mr. Vaghela that the settlement was arrived at and it culminated into a binding award. Unless and untill the said award is set aside, it was obligatory on the part of the Corporation to give effect to such award and a public authority cannot act contrary to law either by refusing to implement it or by terminating the services in violation of such award. As stated above, the legality and validity of the action itself is challenged by the Municipality. When it is contended that the President was not authorised to settle the matter and that with a view to oblige the petitioners, the outgoing President abused and misused his position and by getting the matter fixed earlier, a settlement was arrived at and the award was passed, in our opinion, interim relief ought not to have been granted by the learned Single Judge. ( 12 ) IT was finally submitted by Mr. ( 12 ) IT was finally submitted by Mr. Vaghela that, one hand, the appellant No. 1, terminated the services of the petitioners on the ground that they were illegally appointed, and on the other hand, after terminating services, of the petitioners, he himself has appointed a number of daily wagers/temporary employees at his sweet will without following proper procedure and without adherance to recruitment rules. He, therefore, submitted that in such an eventuality, the services of the petitioners should not be terminated. ( 13 ) ON this question, Mrs. Pahawa, stated that it is not true that any person is appointed by appellant No. 1, new President. She further submitted that no such appointment will be made and the Court may issue appropriate order and/or direction for such an eventuality. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we are clearly of the opinion that mandatory interim relief during the pendency of the petition granted by the learned Single Judge was not called for and hence the said order requires to be interfered with. The Letters Patent appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge, is quashed and set aside. It is, however, clarified and directed that during the pendency and final disposal of the petition, neither appellant No. 1 President of the Municipality nor appellant No. 2 Municipality will make any appointment in the Municipality without prior permission of the Court. It is also directed that if temporary and/or stop gap arrangement is to be made and any appointment is necessary in the interest of administration of the Municipality, an opportunity must be given to the petitioners and no person is appointed from any other source without extending opportunity to the petitioners. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 16 ) BEFORE parting with the judgment, we must observe that all the observations made by us herein above have been made only for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and as and when the matter will be placed for final hearing before the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge will decide the same on its own mertis without being influenced by the observations made by us in this judgment as also in the interim order impugned in this appeal. Since we are interfering with the interim relief granted by the learned Single judge, and relief granted by the learned Single Judge is vacated by us, we grant liberty to the learned Counsel for the petitioner to request the learned Single Judge for early expeditious disposal of the matter. Order accordingly. .