T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE first Plaintiff is the appellant. The suit for declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner and possessor of the suit property and a decree for possession by evicting the defendants was decreed by the trial Court. But on appeal came to be dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence the Plaintiff is before this Court in this regular second appeal. ( 2 ) ). The suit property is a land measuring 9 acres 38 guntas and a residential house bearing No. 3/70 originally belong to the mother of the Plaintiff namely Khasimbi. It was claimed that the properties were given to the mother in lieu of the Mehar. The Plaintiff's mother died 31 years prior to the filing of the suit and the plaintiff is the only survied heir. He was minor at the time of the death of the mother and his father was managing the property till his father was dispossessed illegally by the defendants. Defendants-1 and 2 were not related to each other. Defendant-2 has been married to one Badesab and later she was divorced by him. It appears, his father had a suit filed against him in O. S. No. 156/72 by the defendants-1 and 2 and decree for injunction was granted. On 26-10-1977, the defendants forcefully dispossessed the plaintiff. Consequently the present suit O. S. No. 56/1980 came to be filed. ( 3 ) WHILE denying the averments, the defendants 1 and 2 contended that the father of the first defendant was in possession of the suit property till his death as a owner. The plaintiff is not the son of late Khasimsab. On the other hand the first defendant is the son of the said Khasimsab and the 2nd defendant is a widow of the said Khasimsab. Defendant-1 is the step son of defendant-2 and 1st defendant's mothers name is also Khasimbi and she was the second wife of Khasimsab. Defendant-2 no doubt married one Badesab and had him divorced. After the divorce, she married the deceased Khasimsab about 20 years prior to the filing of the suit. The suit in O. S. No. 156/1972, res judicata, there is no question of dispossessing of plaintiff as the plaintiff has not been in possession at all. On the death of Khasimsab, the defendant alone became his heirs and succeeded to the properties. The suit in O. S. No. 156/1972, res judicata, there is no question of dispossessing of plaintiff as the plaintiff has not been in possession at all. On the death of Khasimsab, the defendant alone became his heirs and succeeded to the properties. The Plaintiff's mother Khasimbi who is the daughter of Madansaheb; while the defendant's mother (Ashinsab) was no doubt married the Khasimsab but was divorced on 10-12-1350 (Fasli corresponding to 11-9-1941) in the presence of a Khazi. The divorce was accepted by the Plaintiff's mother and at the time of decree of earlier suit in O. S. 236/1951, the mother of the plaintiff was a divorced wife. The suit is also barred by limitation. Thus the suit was resisted. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court accepted the case of the plaintiff that the properties were given to his mother in lieu of dower and the plaintiff alone suceeded to the property from which he has dispossessed on 26-10-1977 and consequently the declaration of title and possession was granted negativing the plea of res judicata. The first Appellate Court however reversed the findings and held that the earlier suit was res judicata. The appellate 4court found that from the certified copy of the decree passed in O. S. No. 236/1951, apart from copies of the written statement and the plaint in that suit which were marked as Exhibit. P. 1 to 3 and when the plaintiff's-mother herself (Khasimbi) filed a suit for declaration of her ownership and restoration of possession on 5-12-1951, a consent written statement was filed by the husband admitting the relationship of Plaintiff's mother and the aforesaid Kahasimsab who was a defendant therein. The Mehar was fixed at Rs. 700/- at the time of marriage. In lieu of Mehar amount, the suit properties were given in possession of the plaintiff. It was specifically stated in the written statement filed therein that Khasimsab had no objection for decreeing the suit. Consequently the decree was passed on 10-12-1951. But unfortunately the first Appellate Court has failed to understand the validity of the decree so passed and held that the decree is not a registered one and the title has not passed through the plaintiff's-mother. This is an erroneous approach. Declaration of a right in immovable properties made in decree does not require registered instruments to convey the title. But unfortunately the first Appellate Court has failed to understand the validity of the decree so passed and held that the decree is not a registered one and the title has not passed through the plaintiff's-mother. This is an erroneous approach. Declaration of a right in immovable properties made in decree does not require registered instruments to convey the title. Registration of such decree is optional under the provision of the Registration Act. Section-17 (vi) which is as follows:- "any decree or Order of a Court except a decree or Order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceedings: ( 5 ) IF any dictum is needed, it is seen in AIR 1988 Delhi 260 P. K. Nangia v. Land and Development Officer, New Delhi. Wherein it is held:-"a consent decree is exempt from registration if it does not comprise immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit. Thus a consent decree which operates as a release of the immoveable property in suit does not require registration. "it is unfortunate that the appellate Judge is not aware of the law on the law on the point and held otherwise that effecting the rights of the plaintiff. This finding is therefore prima facie an error apparent on the face of record and such findings has to be set aside without any hesitation. In other subsequent suit after this suit namely, O. S. 156/1972 cannot operate as res judicata. In fact the plaintiff who is claiming through his mother is certainly entitled to the property and there cannot be any two opinion about the same. ( 6 ) IN this view, answering the question of law raised at the time of the admission of the second appeal in favour of the appellant, and also that the plaintiff is entitled to the property, the second appeal is allowed by restoring the decree of the trial Court with cost. --- *** --- .