Judgment :- 1. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ of certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records of the respondent dated 9.10.1997 in his proceedings Na.Ka.c3/100521, and quash the same, and consequently direct the respondent to renew the ‘C Form licence of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is a lessee of a property, wherein he is conduct a cinema theatre by name ‘Muthiah Talkies’ at Cuddalore. It is his case that he was exhibiting cinematography exhibition in the said theatre without any break and he has obtained the licence, the period of last licence was expired on 17.9.1991. Before the expiry of licence, he applied for renewal of the ‘C Form licence to the respondent with all necessary certificates. But no order has been passed by the respondent on the application for renewal of ‘C’ form licence not ‘E’ permit has been granted pending disposal of the above application. The petitioner was therefore, compelled to move this Court in W.P.No. 15076 of 1991. As per order dated 29.10.1991, learned Judge of this Court directed the respondent to pass final orders on the renewal application within ten days, and if no order could be passed within that time, the authorities were directed to issue ‘E’ permit. In spite of that direction, no order has been passed by the respondent on the renewal application and they started issuing’ E’ permit every month. On 18.9.1996, that was also refused to be given. It is said that Chief Electrical Inspectors Certificate and Structural Soundness Certificate continue to remain valid till date, and there is no prohibition on in granting the ‘C Form licence. Repeated demands have been made for renewal of the ‘C Form licence, which have not been considered by the respondent. On 15.10.1996, a legal notice was also issued. But the same was also not taken seriously by the respondent, and therefore, another writ petition was also filed as W.P.No. 15324 of 1996 before this Court. As per order dated 18.10.1996, learned Judge of this Court again directed the respondent to consider and dispose of the application of the petitioner for renewal of the ‘C Form licence, within a period of one month and in the meanwhile also issue ‘E’ Form permit. In spite of the order of this Court, the grant was not given. On 12.11.1996, again the petitioner issued lawyers notice to the respondent. In spite of the order of this Court, the grant was not given. On 12.11.1996, again the petitioner issued lawyers notice to the respondent. A contempt application was also filed before this Court and on 18.11.1996, the respondent wanted the petitioner to file certain documents to consider his renewal application. The petitioner appeared in person and filed the documents. On 20.11.1996, the petitioner received a communication, stating that he was given ‘E’ permit for a continuous period of five years, and therefore, there cannot be any further action on the application for renewal. The same was objected to by the petitioner by various representations. It is said that ‘E’ form permit has been given from time to time only pending consideration of the application for renewal of ‘C Form licence, and the respondent is purposely avoiding the passing of orders on the same. The renewal of the lease deed was also submitted and the same was returned to the petitioner by the communication dated 5.12.1996. The order dated 20.11.1996 of the respondent was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.133 of 1997. An order was again passed by a learned Judge of this Court, staying the communication dated 20.11.1996, and the same was also communicated to the respondent. The petitioner also made a representation on 28.2.1997. The petitioner again filed W.P.No.5100 of 1977, before this Court, to compel the respondent to pass orders on the renewal application. Learned Judge directed the respondent to pass final orders within a period of two months. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed on 9.10.1997, stating that the application is not in proper form. The respondent relies on Rule 120 of the Cinema Regulations Rules, and was of the view that the application has not been made by the proper person and therefore, renewal cannot be granted. The said order is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. Notice of motion was ordered on 20.10.1997, and after getting notice, the learned Additional Government Pleader argued the matter, he also placed before court, the instructions which he received from the respondent. 4. I do not think that the impugned order could be supported in any way. The respondent relies on Rule 120 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957, which reads thus: “120. 4. I do not think that the impugned order could be supported in any way. The respondent relies on Rule 120 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957, which reads thus: “120. When the holder of a licence in Form ‘C’ desires to transfer or assign his license to some other person, he shall, together with the person to whom he desires to make the transfer or assignment, make a joint application in writing to the licensing authority, which granted the licence, setting forth the reasons for the proposed transfer or assignment, and giving the particulars required in Form T.” In this case the petitioner has not transferred the licence or intended to transfer his licence to another person. The person who obtained the licence in 1969 has come to this Court with a prayer that the earlier licence may be directed to be renewed. There is no scope for any joint application by licensee along with the proposed licensee. The very basis of the order goes, learned Additional Government Pleader sought to support the order for some other reasons, which are not seen in the impugned order. I do hot think that he will be justified in supporting the order for some other reasons. But, I will consider that argument also. 5. Counsel for the respondent submitted that this petitioner was never a ‘C Form licencee. It is further contended that the petitioner is having only a lease right over the property and the period of lease also expired and all the lessors are dead, and some of the legal heirs of the lessors have objected to the renewal of ‘C’ Form licence. For these reasons the licence cannot be renewed. I do not think that the above arguments have any merit. In the writ petition, the petitioner has unequivocally stated that he was the licencee, ever since the theatre began to function, and the licence granted to him expired on 17.9.1991. After 1991, this is the 5th or 6th writ petition filed by the petitioner. In all the writ petitions, the petitioner has specifically contended that he is the licensee and he is entitled to get the renewal. The respondent has no case at any point of time that the petitioner is not the licencee. After 1991, this is the 5th or 6th writ petition filed by the petitioner. In all the writ petitions, the petitioner has specifically contended that he is the licensee and he is entitled to get the renewal. The respondent has no case at any point of time that the petitioner is not the licencee. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that he is paying the entertainment tax and the permit has also been granted to him. In the permit No.4/82-83, the Entertainments Tax Officer has answered till 17.9.1996, which stands in the name of petitioner only. In all these writ petitions, the orders was to pass final orders on the renewal application filed by the petitioner, and even in the impugned order, the respondent has no case that the petitioner is not the original licensee. 6. One more reason is also mentioned in the impugned order, i.e., the period of lease has expired and it is the rule that the lease will have to be renewed by a document executed by all the owners of the property. A definite case has been put forward in the writ petition that the renewal lease deed has also been filed before the respondent and the same was returned to him. Apart from the same, I do not think that the said contention also could be accepted. Even assuming that the lease has expired, the possession of the petitioner cannot be stated as ‘unlawful’. 7. In the decision reported in KrishnaKishore Firm v. The Government of A.P. Krishna Kishore Firm v. The Government of A.P. Krishna Kishore Firm v. The Government of A.P. , A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2292. their Lordships considered, what is meant by ‘Legal possession’ under the Andhra Pradesh Cinemas (Regulations) Act, 1955. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment are relevant for our purpose, which read thus: “4. True the appellant was neither owner nor lessee. Yet was his possession forbidden in law. Was there no excuse for his possession The error committed by High Court was to “equate lawful with legal. Legal and lawful, normally, convey same sense and are usually interchangeable. What is legal is lawful. But what is lawful may be so without being formally legal. “The principal distinction between the terms ‘lawful’ and ‘legal’ is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. Legal and lawful, normally, convey same sense and are usually interchangeable. What is legal is lawful. But what is lawful may be so without being formally legal. “The principal distinction between the terms ‘lawful’ and ‘legal’ is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an act that it is lawful implies that it is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law” (Blacks Law Dictionary) Same thought about lawful has been brought out by Pollock and Wright by explaining that “Lawful possession” means a legal possession which is also rightful or at least excusable. Thus that which is not strictly legal may yet be lawful. It should not be forbidden by law. In fact legal is associated with provisions in the Act rules etc., whereas lawful visualises all that is not illegal against law or even permissible lawful is wider in connection than legal. Although provision in Specific Relief Act empowering a person tenant to recover possession if he has been evicted forcibly by the Landlord may be juridical and not lawful or a tenant holding over is no in lawful possession unless landlord agrees or acquiecscences expressly or impliedly but that does not alter the legal position about possession of a person not legal yet not without interest. The provision in Specific Relief Act is founded more on public policy than on jurisprudence. But concept of lawful as opposed or in contra distinction to litigious assumes different dimension. M. C. Chockalingam v. M.Manickavasagam M. C. Chockalingam v. M.Manickavasagam M. C. Chockalingam v. M.Manickavasagam , A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 104: (1974)2 S.C.R. 143 is of no help as it was concerned with possession which could not be said to be warranted or authorised by law. Distinction between nature of possession of lease after expiry of period of lease can better be explained by resorting to few illustrations. For instance a lessee may before expiry of lease acquire entire lessors interest resulting in ‘drowning’ or ‘sinking’ of inferior right into superior right. That is right of one merges into another. It has been statutorily recognised by Sec.l11(d) of Transfer of Property Act. Similarly a tenant alter expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquires in his continuance expressly or impliedly. That is from conduct of lessor the tenants possession may stand converted into lawful. That is right of one merges into another. It has been statutorily recognised by Sec.l11(d) of Transfer of Property Act. Similarly a tenant alter expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquires in his continuance expressly or impliedly. That is from conduct of lessor the tenants possession may stand converted into lawful. The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the lease nor he may acquiesce in his continuance. Such a lessee cannot claim any right or interest. His possession is neither legal not lawful. Such was the Chockaligams case, the court held that continuance of lessees possession after expiry of period of lease was not lawful for purpose of renewal of licence under Madras Cinema Regulation Act, 1955 obviously because lessee was left with no interest which could furnish any excuse or give it even colour of being legal. 5. Yet another illustration may be, not very common where lessee acquires some interest in part of the undivided property as in present case. Can it be said in such a case on ration of A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 104, authority that possession of such lessee or to be more specific of appellant was unwarranted or contrary to law; Share of V.V. in 7,000 Sq Yds. was half. He had agreed to sell his half interest. V.V. was joint owner with his son and grandson. He had “both single possession and a single joint right to possess (Pollock and Wright). Whether such joint owner could transfer his share even when he was not in exclusive possession and what would be effect of such transfer need not be gone into as title suit is pending between parties but when a person having physical control acquires an interest to hold or continue by virtue of an agreement of sale, it cannot be said that he had no interest and his possession was forbidden by law. The High Court lost sight of the fact that virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him not any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. The High Court lost sight of the fact that virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him not any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. In law he was entitled to file suit for specific performance if there was any threat to his right or interest by V.V. Such right or interest could not be termed as litigious. It was at least not without any excuse or forbidden by law. In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 25A 2nd reprint 1976 a somewhat similar situation was described as not litigious: “Where client conveyed undivided half interest in land to attorney in consideration of attorneys rendering services and paying court costs, giving irrevocable power of attorney to sus, settle, or compromise, attorney received good title as third person purchasing upon faith or public records, precluding reformation as against attorney, on the strength of an instrument recorded after deed to attorney and client claimed title, as against contention that attorney acquired a ‘litigious right’.” 8. The said decision was followed by a Division Bench of our High Court in a decision reported in Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamilnadu and four others Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamilnadu and four others Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamilnadu and four others , (1993)2 L. W. 569 wherein it has been held that the licensee who is having a joint right over the immovables is entitled to get ‘C’ Form licence, since he is entitled to be in possession of the machineries. 9. In Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian, (1994)2 MLJ. 9. In Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai attached To-Sri Venkatchalapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian, (1994)2 MLJ. 239 a learnedJudge of this Court held that “for the purpose of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 particularly Rule 13 of the Rules, merely because the lease period had expired, the tenant who overstays cannot be considered to be in unlawful possession In other words, even in such a situation, Rule 13 is satisfied and such a tenant will be entitled to a renewal.” In that case, the learned Judges further held that merely because the landlord demanded back possession, the possession does not become unlawful. 10. In this case, none of these contingencies arises. The renewal lease deed has been submitted before the authorities and has been returned, and even according to the respondent only some of the legal heirs of the lessors have objected to the grant of renewal. It is not the case of the respondent that any of the person sought eviction of the petitioner from the property or anyone wanted possession back. Even though the lease has expired, the possession of the petitioner cannot be said to be unlawful. There is no basis for refusing the grant of renewal. The impugned order is, therefore, quashed. 11. Under normal circumstances, I can only direct the authorities to consider and pass final orders on the renewal application within a fixed time. But in this case, I do not think that such a procedure should be adopted. This is the fifth or sixth writ petition filed by the petitioner, and in all the cases, this Court directed the respondent to pass final orders on the renewal application of ‘C Form licence. But the authorities refused to do it, and even contempt proceedings had to be initiated and finally or untenable grounds they have passed the impugned order. Under the above circumstances, I can assume that the respondent is not going to pass any order in accordance with law. I am constrained to observe in that way, in view of the prior conduct of the respondent, which is evident in this case. Under the above circumstances, I can assume that the respondent is not going to pass any order in accordance with law. I am constrained to observe in that way, in view of the prior conduct of the respondent, which is evident in this case. They are not even having any respect to the orders of this Court, and the allegation of the petitioner is that in spite of the legal opinion given to them by their own Government Pleader, the authorities refused to act on the same and they agreed with the opinion of their. Subordinate Officers while passing the impugned order. Since the respondent has no respect to the orders of this Court and he is continuously disobeying the orders of this Court for one reason or other, I feel it is proper to direct the respondent to issue ‘C Form licence to the petitioner within a period of 15 days from today. If any amount is to be paid for issuing the ‘C Form licence, the same shall be collected from the petitioner at the time of issuing the same, for which prior notice has to be given to the petitioner. The petitioner shall also pay the amount on such demand. But the non-payment shall not delay the issuance of ‘C’ Form licence. 12. I further direct that the order shall be complied with and reported to this Court on the expiry of 15 days. The petitioner is also entitled to costs personally from the respondent. Advocate fee Rs.2,500 The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. Consequently, no order is necessary in the connected W.M.P. Call on 6.2.1998 for reporting compliance.