ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. In this application under section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the petitioner, Wild Life Protection Society of India through its Vice-President calls in question the propriety of the order passed by the learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in bail application No. 157/97 whereby in exercise of jurisdiction under section 439 (1) of the Code he has enlarged the accused-non-applicant no. 1 on bail. 2. The factual matrix as has been unfurled by the petitioner is that the non-applicant no. 1 was taken to custody in connection with crime No. 77/97 of City Kotwali, Satna, registered for offences punishable under section 43, 49, 51 & 52 of the Wild Life Conservation Act and Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. He was produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Satna and his application for bail was rejected by the said court on 1.2.97. Being unsuccessful before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Satna he preferred an application under section 439 of the Code before the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge who by order dated 11.2.97 has enlarged him on bail. While passing the bail order the Addl. Sessions Judge has taken into consideration the nature of offences, the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the aforesaid offences and the previous antecedents of the accused. 3. Seeking cancellation of the aforesaid order, Mr. Gangele, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the Society which is represented by its Vice-President is a registered Society and has been constituted for the purpose of the protection of wild life of the country, and it has launched a crusade against the poachers and other traders. It is also contended by him that the Society has been taking part in various litigations in many courts of the country against those people who are involved in poaching. Submission of the learned counsel is that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has not taken into consideration the gravity of the offence inasmuch as the investigating agency had seized 78 skins and 105 horns estimated at Rs. 25 lacs in the international market. It is also highlighted by him that the seized materials include 11 leopard skin, 25 jackal skin, 21 Sambhar' skin, and 9 of fox besides horns of several animals. It is strenuously urged by Mr. 25 lacs in the international market. It is also highlighted by him that the seized materials include 11 leopard skin, 25 jackal skin, 21 Sambhar' skin, and 9 of fox besides horns of several animals. It is strenuously urged by Mr. Gangele that the accused is involved in the business of smuggling of animals skin which has a nation wise net work. In a nutshell, the order granting bail is challenged solely on the ground that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has exercised his discretion in an injudicious manner and the order smacks of arbitrariness. 4. Resisting the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is contended by Mr. T.S. Ruprah, learned counsel for the non-applicant no. 1 that the petitioner has no locus standi to seek cancellation of the order granting bail in favour of the accused-non-applicant no. 1 inasmuch as the said Society cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person. It is further contended by him that when the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on consideration of the entire gamut of facts and the material on record and the antecedents of the accused has enlarged him on bail the order passed by him cannot be regarded as erroneous or arbitrary. It is also canvassed by him that after being enlarged on bail the accused-non-applicant no. 1 has not abused his liberty and has conducted himself with utmost propriety and in absence of any overwhelming supervening circumstance the order granting concession of bail does not warrant interference. It is further proponed by Mr. Ruprah that the accused was enlarged on bail on 11.2.97 whereas application under section 439 (2) of the Code was presented before this court on 15.9.97, almost 7 months after his release. 5. Miss Alka Pandya, learned Dy. G.A. appearing for the State-non-applicant no. 2 has fairly stated that the State has not preferred any application for cancellation of bail and nothing has been brought to the notice of the police authorities or any competent authority that the accused-non-applicant has abused the concession of bail. 6. Though the learned counsel for the accused-non-applicant raised the preliminary objection with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner to prefer this application, as the counsel for the parties addressed the Court on merits, I am inclined to dispose of the matter on merits without addressing myself with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner. 7. 6. Though the learned counsel for the accused-non-applicant raised the preliminary objection with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner to prefer this application, as the counsel for the parties addressed the Court on merits, I am inclined to dispose of the matter on merits without addressing myself with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner. 7. It is well settled in law that power of the court u/s 439 (2) of the Code can be exercised in absence of any supervening circumstances, if the bail is granted illegally or improperly by erroneous and arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion. It is also to be borne in mind that rejection of bail stands in a different footing than that of cancellation of bail. In this context I may refer to the decision rendered in the case of The State through the Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 961 wherein the Apex Court laiddown as under - Rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing, cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-boilable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can be and large be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. In the case of Bhagirath Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 372 it was observed by the Apex Court that cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancellation of an order granting bail. Yet in another decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Daulatram and others v. State of Haryana, 1995 (1) S.C.C. 349 their lordships registered the view as under - Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with due course of administration of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with due course of administration of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. At this juncture I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, AIR 1996 SC 2176 , wherein the Apex Court while considering the propriety of the order cancelling bail by the High Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment observed as follows - The ground regarding suppression of facts is still weaker. In the first place, knowledge of two bail applications of the co-accused having been rejected has been imputed to the accused without valid basis. Secondly, the fact that the co-accused had applied for bail and had later not pressed the application, had been disclosed since it was known to the accused. That was sufficient indication that the co-accused had not been enlarged on bail. His decision not to press for bail would be indicative of the fact that the Court was disinclined to grant bail or, he did not see sufficient grounds to press the bail application. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Court was aware that the co-accused was not granted bail. That was sufficient for the Court when it considered the accused's application for bail. Besides, it was the prosecution/complainant's duty to bring to the Court's notice that two applications of the co-accused for bail were rejected. If the accused did not mention it, nothing prevented the opposite side from placing it on record. It seems to be an omission on the part of the prosecution/complainant's side but, for that it would be wrong to charge them with having suppressed facts. If the accused did not mention it, nothing prevented the opposite side from placing it on record. It seems to be an omission on the part of the prosecution/complainant's side but, for that it would be wrong to charge them with having suppressed facts. So also for the accused, more particularly because, there is no positive evidence to attribute knowledge to the accused. Hence we think this ground is unsustainable. It is also relevant to state here that in paragraph 12 of the said judgment the Court observed that there was no evidence of the accused having threatened anyone while on bail. 8. The present factual matrix has to be considered on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles of law. Mr. Gangele, as has been stated earlier, has submitted only with regard to propriety of the order. On a perusal of the impugned order. I find that the Addl. Sessions Judge while enlarging the accused-non-applicant no. 1 on bail has considered number of factors which include the nature of the offence, the maximum imposable sentence and his conduct and antecedents. There is no material on record that the valuation of the seized articles was brought to the notice of court while dealing with the application for bail. That apart, there is nothing on record to indicate that the accused was previously involved in any other offence of this nature and that he is the king-pin of any racket. Quite apart from the above, this Court cannot ignore the fact that there is no allegation whatsoever against the non-applicant no. 1 that he has misused or abused the concession of bail. It is also to be taken note of that though the order of bail was passed on 11.2.97, the defensibility of the same was called in question after expiry of more than 7 months. True it is, if an accused has been allowed to remain at large for a considerable length of period by itself cannot be the sole ground to reject an application for cancellation of his bail but definitely that would be a factor to be taken into consideration. 9. In view of my preceding analysis, I am of the considered view that the impugned order granting concession of bail to the accused-non-applicant no. 1 does not warrant any interference under section 439 (2) of the Code. 9. In view of my preceding analysis, I am of the considered view that the impugned order granting concession of bail to the accused-non-applicant no. 1 does not warrant any interference under section 439 (2) of the Code. However, keeping in view of the totality of the circumstances and alleged involvement of the accused-non-applicant no. 1 in the crime and the impact of such crime, I am inclined to direct that the trial court would do well to dispose of the trial as expeditiously as possible preferably by end of May, 1998. The prosecution should extend full co-operation by producing the witnesses on the date fixed for hearing and would not seek unnecessary adjournments. The accused shall personally remain present on each date of hearing. 10. Resultantly, the application is dismissed. Application dismissed