J. C. MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) ORDER :- This petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the criminal proceeding in complaint No. 9 of 1997 Shervani Syndicate Limited v. Hafeez Ullah Khan pending in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad. It is admitted that the petitioner was an employee of Jeep Industrial Syndicate Limited and in the year 1976 he was transferred to Sherwani Sugar Syndicate Limited. It is further admitted that the said company served a notice of termination dated 3-8-93 on the petitioner. ( 2 ) IT is admitted that the petitioner was posted at Delhi and was provided an accommodation at Flat No. E-273 Pockett E. Mayur Vihar, Phase-II, Delhi-91 by the Company. ( 3 ) AFTER serving notice for termination of service of the petitioner the Sherwani Sugar Syndicate Limited filed a complaint in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad under Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 and Section 406, I. P. C. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement under Section 200, Cr. P. C. and finding that a prima facie, case was made out directed issuance of summon on 28-2-97. The summon was not received after service and, therefore, the Magistrate directed issuance of another summon by order dated 2-4-97. On 29-4-97 the summon was received after personal service. The Magistrate directed issuance of non-bailable warrant. ( 4 ) THE petitioner apprehending that he will be required to vacate the aforesaid accommodation in pursuance of termination of his service filed Original Suit No. 489/1996 Hafeez Ullah Khan v. M/s. Sherwani Sugar Syndicate Limited and its General Manager and Chairman for award of permanent injunction restraining the defendants to evict him from the above mentioned premises located in Mayur Vihar. The company filed written statement. ( 5 ) THE petitioner filed this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. on 7-5-97. ( 6 ) THE petitioner prayed for quashing the criminal complaint primarily on the ground that the Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since premises in question was situated in Delhi; the petitioner was in employment at Delhi and his services were also terminated at Delhi. It has been stated that since the cause of action had not arisen at Allahabad the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. It has been stated that since the cause of action had not arisen at Allahabad the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. It has also been stated that the Magistrate had passed the summoning order in mechanical manner and without application of mind. ( 7 ) THE company filed counter-affidavit. The petitioner filed rejoinder affidavit. ( 8 ) HEARD Sri M. A. Quadeer, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the allegations contained in the complaint no offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act is made out and secondly the Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. ( 10 ) SHRI Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned counselfor the contesting respondent contend that since the Head Office of the company is situated at Allahabad and after termination of his service the petitioner had no power to withhold the premises and he was supposed to return the keys at the company headquarter. The Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance on the complaint filed by the company. ( 11 ) IT is an admitted fact that the premises, which was given by the company in lieu of his employment, is situated at Delhi. It is also admitted the petitioner was posted at Delhi. In paragraph 7 of the rejoinder affidavit it has been stated that the lease of the house in dispute was settled at Delhi and the petitioners services were also terminated at Delhi. ( 12 ) THUS, the controversy, involved for determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, lies in a very narrow sphere. It cannot be disputed that the Courts at Delhi had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint. The question is whether the complaint could be filed at Allahabad also on the ground that the company, who had employed the petitioner and provided a free accommodation has its Head Office at this place. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Section 177 of the Code in support of his contention that the complaint could be filed at Delhi alone. Section 177 provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Section 177 of the Code in support of his contention that the complaint could be filed at Delhi alone. Section 177 provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. ( 14 ) SECTION 177 is general provision and as the word ordinarily denotes this provision is a general provision and will be subject to other provisions contained in Chapter XIII. ( 15 ) SECTION 181 (4) provides that any offence of criminal mis-appropriation or a criminal breach of trust may be enquired into or tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused persons. In view of this provision for the offence specified complaint would be filed in the Court within whose local jurisdiction the property with which the offence was committed was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for. The learned counsel for the respondent relying on the aforesaid provision contended that as the premises in question was to be vacated and given in possession of the company by handing over the case at the Head Office the Courts at Allahabad had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case on the complaint filed by the company. In support of his contention he relied on a decision of a Calcutta High Court in T. S. Satya Nath v. J. Thomos and Company, reported in 1985 volume 57 at page 648. In that case the petitioner was an employee of the respondent company having its Head Office at Calcutta and he was allowed to reside in certain premises belonging to the company in Cochin. He retired from service and he was appointed for a period of one year to act as Advisor at Cochin. In December, 1980 the company wrote to the petitioner terminating his advisorship. On 31/03/1981 the petitioner filed a suit at Cochin for continuous possession of the premises and obtained an interim injunction. He retired from service and he was appointed for a period of one year to act as Advisor at Cochin. In December, 1980 the company wrote to the petitioner terminating his advisorship. On 31/03/1981 the petitioner filed a suit at Cochin for continuous possession of the premises and obtained an interim injunction. The company after satisfying some claims filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta under Section 630 (1) (b) of the Companies Act, 1930 and the Magistrate directed issue of process. ( 16 ) THE petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the criminal proceeding on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Calcutta High Court considered the provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act, Sections 177 and 181 (4) of the Cr. P. C. and observed that the Company Act does not expressly or impliedly confer jurisdiction on Criminal Courts in respect of the acts punishable under that Act. So using Section 4 of the Code, as key, the Magistrate was preferably justified in resorting to the provisions of Section 181 of the Code. Ordinarily under Section 177 of he Code an offence is to be tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed. "ordinarily" in Section 177 means except as otherwise provided in the Code. From Section 177 an inference is permissible that an offence shall be invariably without exception be tried by the Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. Such an interpretation of Section 177 was made in thecase of Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 at page 1593 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 728 ). An offence under Section 630 (1) (b) of the Companies Act as obvious similarities with an offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust defined in the Indian Penal Code. Now, Section 181 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, after making reference to offence of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust, provides that such offence will be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. ( 17 ) AFTER considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Calcutta High Court concluded that subsequent to termination of appointment as advisor of the company the petitioner became accountable to the company for delivery of possession of the property situate at Cochin and he could discharge his obligation by sending a letter to the company at its Head Office at Calcutta noting that he had delivered possession. In token thereof he could perhaps send the key of the property to the Head Office. ( 18 ) IT is needless to express any opinion on the controversy whether the Magistrate had territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case or not since the entire record are not available and none of the parties has filed copy of the statement under Section 200, Cr. P. C. It would be proper that this question be considered by the Magistrate concerned. It may be pointed out that in Kailash Chaudhary and others v. State of U. P. and another reported in 1993 All Cri R 430 : (1994 Cri LJ 67) it was held that it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued and the Magistrate may drop the proceeding if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. ( 19 ) COMING to the second argument that no offence is made out it may be pointed out that Section 630 of the Companies Act permits the company to file complaint against any officer or employee of a company who having any such proper property in his possession wrongfully withholds it. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that though the premises in question was actually held by the petitioner as he was provided accommodation in lieu of services but after termination of the services he had no right to withhold it. The learned counsel contended that even after termination of the services the company had permitted the petitioner to live in it for few months on compassionate grounds but after expiry of the extended period the petitioner had no right to occupy it. Instead of vacating the premises after expiry of the extended period the petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction and obtained an injunction. Instead of vacating the premises after expiry of the extended period the petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction and obtained an injunction. The suit, however, was dismissed in default by order dated 4-3-97. The learned counsel contended that since the petitioner wrongfully withheld the premises after the termination of his employment and extended period and continues to occupy it the case clearly fell under Section 630 of the Companies Act and the complaint is competent. ( 20 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since according to the complaint the petitioner had ceased to be an employee of the Company the ingredients of Section 630 of the Companies Act are not attracted and, therefore, no offence can be said to have been made out on the allegations contained in the complaint. This contention is devoid of any force. This controversy is concluded by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to below. ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court in Amrit Lal Chum v. Devoprasad Dutta Roy, AIR 1988 SC 733 approved the earlier decision in Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of India Limited, (1987) 4 SCC 361 : AIR 1987 SC 2245 , wherein the Supreme Court had placed a beneficent construction on the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 630 of the Companies Act and according to it the term officer or employee in sub-section (1) of Section 630 must be interpreted to mean not only the present officers and employees of a company but also to include the past officers and employees of the company. It has also taken the view that the words any such property in Clause (b) thereof qualify the words any property of Company appearing in Clause (a ). The Supreme Court observed that as observed inbaldev Krishna Sahais case Section 630 of the Act plainly makes it an offence if an officer or employee of a company who was permitted to use the property of the company during his employment, wrongfully retains or occupies the same after the termination of his employment. It is the wrongful withholding of such property, meaning the property of the company after termination of the employment, which is an offence under Section 630 (1) (b) of the Act. ( 22 ) THE ratio decidendi laid down in the aforesaid pronouncement is applicable to the facts of the case before us. It is the wrongful withholding of such property, meaning the property of the company after termination of the employment, which is an offence under Section 630 (1) (b) of the Act. ( 22 ) THE ratio decidendi laid down in the aforesaid pronouncement is applicable to the facts of the case before us. The petitioner was admittedly an officer of the company and was occupying the accommodation in lieu of his services. His services were terminated by the company and notice was given to handover the vacant possession of the accommodation to the Company. On this allegation there is no doubt that he is withholding the Companys property which is punishable under Section 630 of the Companies Act. ( 23 ) THE petitioner despite his service did not appear before the Magistrate and consequently non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the petitioner is admittedly residing at Delhi his appearance is likely to cause not only inconvenience but unnecessary harassment. He contended that in respect of directing the petitioner to appear personally the Magistrate should have dispensed with his personal attendance and permitted him to appear by his pleader. Section 205 of the Cr. P. C. provides that whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. This provision was enacted for the benefit of the accused who finds considerable difficulty in attending the Court and their presence is not necessary at earlier stages of the trial. ( 24 ) IT is unfortunate that our Magistrates rarely take recourse to the provisions of Section 205, Cr. P. C. which empowers them to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused and permit him to appear through his pleader. This concept of allowing an accused to appear through his counsel is not unique for Section 205 alone. Reference may be made to Chapter XXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure which speaks of recording of evidence in enquires and trials. Section 273 under the chapter requires that all evidence taken in the course of a trial or other proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the accused or when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader. Section 273 under the chapter requires that all evidence taken in the course of a trial or other proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the accused or when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader. This section, however, puts a rider that the provisions would be applicable except as otherwise expressly provided. This is a provision which applies in general to all trials and other proceedings in a Criminal Court including a proceeding under Chapter VIII of the Cr. P. C. There is yet another provision in the Cr. P. C. permitting appearance of an accused not personally but through his counsel and this is contained in Section 317, Cr. P. C. It provides for enquiries and trials being held in the absence of an accused in certain cases and states that at any stage of enquiry or trial under this Code if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interest of justice or that the accused persistently disturbs the proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may if the accused is represented by a pleader dispense with his attendance and proceed with such enquiry or trial in his absence and may at any subsequent stage of the proceeding direct the personal attendance of such accused. This again is a provision applicable after initiation of the enquiry or trial. ( 25 ) SEEN in the light of the provisions under Section 273 and 317, Cr. P. C. regarding directions for appearance of an accused not personally but through his pleader, the real importance of Section 205, Cr. P. C. could be appreciated. What a Magistrate could (rather should) do during a trial, could well be done even at the stage of issuance of summonses and the language of Section 205 states that whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may if he sees reasons so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. It further provides that when after the enquiry or trial has commenced it would be discretion of the Magistrate at any stage of the proceeding to direct personal attendance of the accused and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided. It further provides that when after the enquiry or trial has commenced it would be discretion of the Magistrate at any stage of the proceeding to direct personal attendance of the accused and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided. This provision must not, therefore, be read as an empty formality. It has certain purpose behind it. The Magistratewhile issuing summons must apply his mind to see if there were reasons to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and if he sees reasons so to do, it becomes his duty to direct appearance of the accused through his pleader. ( 26 ) THERE could be cases where the case is of a trivial nature which may end in fine only. There could be an accused who is too ill to attend the Court or too old a person to stand the trial troubles of attending the Court from a distance. There could be persons whose absence from a factory or an industry would seriously hamper industrial production and whose personal attendance might not be necessary unless a question of identification or like is involved. ( 27 ) OUR experience further puts as on a guard against frivolous complaints which is not known in our country. The Courts often come across cases wherein criminal cases are instituted for disputes which are basically civil in nature and there are cases lodged against business houses due to business rivalry. At times it is a sadistic pleasure of a complainant to bring his opponent in other walks of life to a Court of law for the purpose of mere harassment. It is true that the Magistrate is empowered to look to such frivolous complaints and to weed them out at the threshhold. But certain cases are so wisely drafted that a Magistrate could not but take up the proceedings. There are yet persons who live at a long distance and for the mere personal attendance have to bear financial and physical troubles. Our experience further dictates that in cases of torture against married women, many a female relatives of the husband are also roped in. ( 28 ) IN all these cases although cognizance is taken on the prima facie nature of the allegations, it is still to be looked into by the Magistrate whether he would demand personal appearance of the accused or would direct through counsel. ( 28 ) IN all these cases although cognizance is taken on the prima facie nature of the allegations, it is still to be looked into by the Magistrate whether he would demand personal appearance of the accused or would direct through counsel. A direction to appear through counsel may not really hamper the proceedings as it is always open for the Magistrate to call the accused at any future point of time if his personal attendance was felt necessary. Normally, at the time of framing charge or for examination of the accused under Section 313, Cr. P. C. the personal attendance of the accused is insisted. There could be cases in which personal attendance might be necessary even during trial. But for those eventualities it would be too hard for an accused in cases illustrated above to attend personally on all the dates. The discretion has been given to the Magistrate who issues the summons and, in my view, this discretion must be exercised at the time the summons are issued. The Court, however, must look to the nature of the case, the status of the accused, the distance from which he or she is expected to come. The Court must also, from the prima facie material present before him, be satisfied whether there was any possibility of impersonation or chance of abscondance due to passage of time. These factors, however, do not absolve the Magistrate from applying his mind to the question whether summons would be issued for personal attendance or for attendance through pleader. ( 29 ) ONCE this discretion is exercised and in certain cases appearance through pleader is directed that would not only enure to the benefit of the particular accused but it would also save the Courts, which are normally overburdened with work, from unnecessary exercise of demanding bail bond from each accused, to get them verified and then to accept the same. It would also save the Courts time from unnecessary adjournments on the ground of absence of one or other accused and would, thus, expedite the progress of the trial. I must, however, utter a note of caution for the guidance of a Magistrate that if the offence involved is of serious nature or is suggestive of moral turpitude, then the discretion under Section 205 to allow appearance through counsel must be avoided. I must, however, utter a note of caution for the guidance of a Magistrate that if the offence involved is of serious nature or is suggestive of moral turpitude, then the discretion under Section 205 to allow appearance through counsel must be avoided. But the order directing issuance of summons should indicate what was the reason for not directing appearance through counsel. ( 30 ) NOT only the instant case, but also for other cases and not only for the Magistrate concerned but also for the general guidance of Magistracy law has been set out interpreting Section 205 as above. ( 31 ) THE petition is partly allowed. The order issuing non-bailable warrant against the applicant, is set aside. The applicant may, if so advised, either personally or through counsel file objection before the Special Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad including objection regarding territorialjurisdiction on which it is being stated that the criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed. If such an objection is filed it shall be disposed of after hearing the parties in accordance with law by a reasoned order. In case objection is filed within one month the appellant shall not be arrested in connection with the said case till the disposal of the objection. The Magistrate may also exercise powers under Section 205, Cr. P. C. after the disposal of the objection. ( 32 ) LET a copy of this order be circulated to all districts for the future guidance of the magistracy and strict compliance of the directions. Petition partly allowed.