JUDGMENT B. P Singh, J. - The petitioner herein has impugned the notification (annexure-8) issued in the name of Governor of Bihar under rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code dated 4.9.1996 whereby the Governor of Bihar in exercise of his power under the aforesaid rule has retired the petitioner from service in public interest with effect from the forenoon of 16th September, 1996 or from the date on which the notice is served upon him, whichever be the earlier, and has further directed that the petitioner will be paid in lieu of three months notice an amount equal to three months pay and allowances payable to him. The petitioner was a member of the Bihar Judicial Service and on the relevant date was holding the rank of Subordinate Judge. According to the petitioner, he was appointed to the Bihar Judicial Service as a probationer, he was appointed to the Bihar Judicial Service as a Probationary Munsif which post he joined on 16.4.1975. He was later confirmed as a Munsif with effect from 26.6.1977. He thereafter worked as Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate at Bhabhua. Later he was promoted as Subordinate Judge on 3.6.1987 with effect from 24.7.1987. He worked in that capacity at several stations till 22.1.1992. He was thereafter posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro from 29.1.1992 to 22.1.1995. When he joined at Bokaro Sri S.1. Raja was the then District Judge who was succeeded by Sri G. S. Choubey (now an Hon'ble Judge of this Court) in November 1992. On 18.10.1994 the petitioner received a copy of the adverse remarks recorded by the District Judge, Bokaro for the year 1993-94 accompanied with a letter of High Court dated 26.9.94. The petitioner was thereafter transferred to Daltonganj in the district of Palamau. On 5.8.1995 the petitioner was communicated the adverse remarks of the District Judge, Bokaro recorded on 10.6.95 for the year 1994-95. The petitioner was then posted as Chief. Judicial Magistrate, Palamau at Daltonganj. It is the case of the petitioner that apart from these two adverse remarks, no other adverse remark was communicated to him on any earlier occasion, though the petitioner had served as a Judicial Officer for 21 years. The petitioner represented to the High Court for expunction of the two adverse remarks communicated to him in which he stated that the remarks were actuated by malice in law and fact. The petitioner represented to the High Court for expunction of the two adverse remarks communicated to him in which he stated that the remarks were actuated by malice in law and fact. Certain allegations were made against the then District Judge, who according to the petitioner acted in a malicious manner. In the writ petition, the petitioner was not made the aforesaid District Judge a party respondent. These two representations were made by the petitioner in November 1994 and in September 1995. In the representations filed by the petitioner detailed submissions were made explaining that the petitioner had acted in accordance with law and the orders passed by him in the cases referred to in the adverse reports were passed in accordance with law. 2. Unfortunately by issuance of notification (Annexure-5) dated 14th March, 1996, the High Court of Patna divested him of the powers of the Chief Judicial Magistrate by issuance of another notification (Annexure-6) dated 8th April, 1996 the petitioner was also divested of the powers of Assistant Sessions Judge. Later under directions of the High Court the Registrar General by his letter dated 9th May, 1996 directed the District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj to relieve the petitioner of all judicial work forthwith. The District and Sessions Judge, accordingly, relieved him of all judicial work under Memo No. 56/C dated 8th May, 1996. Thereafter, the impugned notification (Annexure-8) was issued under the order of the Governor of Bihar in exercise of power under rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service Code retiring the petitioner from service. It is not disputed before us that the petitioner attained the age of fifty on 2nd March, 1995 his date of birth being 2.3.1945. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.2 the High Court of Judicature at Patna affirmed by the Joint Registrar (Est.). In the counter-affidavit it is stated that the order of compulsory retirement was passed taking into account all relevant circumstances and the impugned order is not vitiated by malafide on the part of the authority concerned. The order has been passed not as a punitive measure, but on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned under rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. The order has been passed not as a punitive measure, but on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned under rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. It is stated that though the petitioner was confirmed as a Munsif with effect from 26.6.1977, and was promoted to the post of Subordinate Judge with effect from 24.7.1987, he was superseded in the matter of promotion to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. Even in the matter of his confirmation as Subordinate Judge the petitioner had been superseded on 21.7.1995. The record of service of the petitioner disclosed that he had mostly been found to be an officer of average merit. In 1975-76, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1987-88 and 1988-89 he was found to be an officer of average merit. In the year 1984-85 his disposal was reported to be poor. In the year 1988-89 it was reported that there was serious complaint against the petitioner touching upon his integrity and the then District Judge observed that he required to be watched further. It was further observed by the District Judge that the petitioner should work with absolute impartiality and earn the confidence of the Bar. In the year 1993-94 there was a serious complaint against the petitioner touching upon his integrity and for passing orders on extraneous considerations. In the year 1994-95 as well there was serious complaint against the petitioner for passing orders in a case touching upon his integrity. It was in the background of such allegations against the petitioner that the Standing Committee of the High Court by its resolution dated 20.2.1996 divested the petitioner of the powers of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Since the petitioner completed 50 years of age on 2.3.1995, his case was considered under rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. All relevant materials, including his record of service were placed before the Standing Committee of the High Court for its consideration. Since the petitioner completed 50 years of age on 2.3.1995, his case was considered under rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. All relevant materials, including his record of service were placed before the Standing Committee of the High Court for its consideration. The Standing Committee having considered all the relevant materials at its meeting held on 1st May, 1996 and upon consideration of his overall record of service recommended that the petitioner should in public interest, be made to retire, and the matter be placed before the Full Court which accepted the recommended decision of the Standing Committee and decided to retire him compulsorily in public interest under the aforesaid rule after giving him three months pay in lieu of three months notice. In view of the decision of the Court the High Court recommended to the State Government vide its letter dated 9.5.1996 that the petitioner along with six others be retired compulsorily under the aforesaid rule in public interest. The State Government accepting the recommendation of the High Court issued the impugned notification which was served upon the petitioner on 12.9.1996. It is submitted that the retirement of the petitioner under the aforesaid rule is a retirement simpliciter without any stigma and all the requirements of rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service Code have been observed. No comments were offered in respect of the allegations made by the petitioner against the then District Judge, as the High Court was not in a position to make any comments on such allegations. As noticed earlier, the then District Judge, who has made the adverse comments was not made a party respondent in the writ petition. 4. In the rejoinder on behalf of the petitioner, the case as made out in the writ petition, has been reiterated. It has, however, been explained that the petitioner was superseded in the matter of promotion to the post of Additional District Judge in September 1996, whereas the Full Court had already taken a decision on 4.5.1996 to compulsorily retire the petitioner. As regards his super-session in the matter of confirmation as Subordinate Judge, it is alleged by the petitioner that the entire material facts relevant to his case were not placed before the Standing Committee. 5. As regards his super-session in the matter of confirmation as Subordinate Judge, it is alleged by the petitioner that the entire material facts relevant to his case were not placed before the Standing Committee. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged before us the following submissions :- (i) The impugned notification has been issued as a punitive measure since there are only two adverse entries against the petitioner in his long service career relating to the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 only; (ii) According to the High Court the entire service record of the petitioner was considered while recommending his compulsory retirement. This according to the petitioner, was not permissible. (iii) The petitioner had represented against the adverse report communicated to him for the two years in question, but the said representations were not disposed of; (iv) In the counter-affidavit it has been mentioned that there is an adverse report relating to the year 1988-89 in which adverse comments were made touching upon the integrity of the petitioner. Such a report was never communicated to the petitioner, and could not, therefore, form the basis for his compulsory retirement; (v) The District Judge who recorded the adverse remarks acted with malice in law and in fact. 6. Annexure-1 is the annual confidential remarks recorded by the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad for the year 1993-94. From a perusal thereof it appears that the District Judge had reported that there had been several complaints against the petitioner during the year under review including the allegation that he released three trucks loaded with coal seized in connection with Chas PS. Case No. 182/93 on production of make believe documents by the accused without proper verification. The conduct of the officer in so releasing the seized materials was suspect. The officer was also reported to be highly influenced by a coterie of lawyers belonging to his caste in B.S. City PS. Case No. 58/93 in which Police submitted F.R.T. non-cog. u/s 332 I.P.C., the petitioner took cognizance of offence u/s 332 and 341 I.PC. against two persons including the Chairman of the SAIL and kept the record in his own file for extraneous reasons. In G.R.C. Case no. Case No. 58/93 in which Police submitted F.R.T. non-cog. u/s 332 I.P.C., the petitioner took cognizance of offence u/s 332 and 341 I.PC. against two persons including the Chairman of the SAIL and kept the record in his own file for extraneous reasons. In G.R.C. Case no. 628/91 even though the Police had submitted F.R.T. and the aggrieved persons had made an application before the police that she had compromised the case with accused employees of L.P.G. dealer of Bokaro Steel City, the petitioner took cognizance against the Manager and other employees of the dealer by condoning the delay and kept the record in his own file for extraneous reasons. In his final assessment the District Judge reported that the petitioner was an officer of doubtful integrity. Similarly, for the year 1994-95 the District Judge had recorded adverse annual confidential remarks against the petitioner. The District Judge had recorded that even though the officer had invited no complaint touching his integrity, there persisted rumours that he was favouring a few selected lawyers of the station including Sri L.P Singh. Even though the High Court had declined to interfere with the proceeding in Chas PS. Case no. 191/91 and directed continuance of examination of witnesses until the stage of judgment in view of the pendency of a counter case still awaiting final form and directed the Chief Judical Magistrate to expedite submission of final form, the petitioner recalled/withdrew the said case from the file of Sri R.P. Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Chas with a view to help the accused persons under the influence of a particular lawyer whom he was showing undue favour. When this fact was brought to the notice of the District Judge, he directed him to return the record to Sri. R.P.Singh, Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner did so, but gave a direction for not delivering judgment till further orders from him. In the counter-version the police submitted F.R.T. The petitioner took cognizance of the offence and instead of making over the case to the same court where its counter version was pending trial, he transferred that case to the court of another Judicial Magistrate, obviously with an intention to help the accused in Chas P.S. Case No. 191/91 at the behest of their lawyer, contrary to the direction of the High Court to transfer it to the same court where Chas P.S. Case no. 191/91 was pending. 191/91 was pending. In his final assessment the District Judge recorded that after the communication of the adverse remarks recorded against the petitioner during the year 1993-94, the officer started behaving mischievously and instigated the lawyers whom he was reported to be favouring to get the camp court of the District Judge on 19.11.1994 boycotted. He remained absent from court on the pretext of going to his village where he was not found when a messenger was sent. 7. It is not disputed by the petitioner that the adverse remarks recorded by the District Judge were communicated to the petitioner. It cannot also be doubted that these adverse remarks do touch upon the integrity of the petitioner and provide sufficient justification for compulsorily retiring the petitioner in public interest. There was, therefore, ample material before the High Court to justify the recommendation that the petitioner be compulsorily retired from service in public interest. In these circumstance, it is difficult to accept the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that since adverse remarks were recorded in only two years of his service, the impugned notification acquires a punitive character. Admittedly, the impugned notification does not cast any stigma against the petitioner, nor is there any reference to any particular case or event forming the basis for the issuance of the impugned notification. The impugned notification proceeds on the satisfaction of the competent authority that it is necessary in public interest to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service. The impugned notification has also been issued after receiving the recommendation of the High Court in this regard. 8. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that by no stretch of imagination can the impugned action be characterised as punitive. Reliance was placed upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank Officers' Association and another vs. Allahabad Bank and others [(1996) 4 Supreme Court Case 504]. It was observed by the Supreme Court that the power to compulsority retire a Government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to wed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration. The object of compulsory retirement is to wed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration. By its very nature the power to compulsorily retire a Government servant is distinct and separate from the power to punish him by way of removal, dismissal etc. for misconduct. A Government servant compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned during the service. Thus compulsory retirement differs both from dismissal and removal, as it involves no penal consequences. It is well settled that compulsory retirement is neither a punishment nor a stigma, but if any stigma is attached to the order of compulsory retirement, then it may be treated as an order of punishment in reality. There also a formal enquiry is made on the allegation of misconduct and a finding holding him guilty is recorded and thereafter the order of compulsory retirement is passed, then such an order even, when it does not contain any allegation or stigmatic statement may be regarded as an order of punishment, attracting provisions of Article 311. The reason is that the court would infer in such cases that the real intention of the Government was not to compulsorily retire its employee but to punish him. The position in law was succinctly stated thus. "The above discussion of case law makes it clear that if the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on the Government servant in the sense that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or character, then the Court will treat that order as an order of punishment, attracting provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The reason is that as a charge of imputation is made the condition for passing the order, the court would infer there from that the real intention of the Government was to punish the Government servant on the basis of that charge or imputation and not to exercise the power of compulsory retirement. But mere reference to the rule, even if it mentions grounds for compulsory retirement, cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating the order of compulsory retirement as an order of punishment. But mere reference to the rule, even if it mentions grounds for compulsory retirement, cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating the order of compulsory retirement as an order of punishment. In such a case, the order can be said to have been passed in terms of the rule and, therefore, different intention cannot be inferred so also, if the statement in the order refers only to the assessment of his work and does not at the same time cast an aspersion on the conduct or character of the Government servant, than it will not be proper to hold that the order of compulsory retirement is in reality an order of punishment. Whether the statement in the order is stigmatic or not will have to be judged by adopting the test of how a reasonable person would read or understand it." 9. In the instant case, there is nothing n the Impugned notification casting a stigma on the petitioner. It is not the case of he petitioner that after a formal enquiry was made on the allegations of misconduct and a finding holding him guilty was recorded the impugned order was passed without containing any allegation or a stigmatic statement. The first submission urged on behalf of the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected. 10. The second submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the entire service record should not have been considered by the High Court or the concerned by the High Court or the concerned authority must also be rejected. Counsel for the respondents has drawn our notice to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. P.S. Dhillon [(1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 672] where such submission was rejected. In that case it was urged that since the respondents had been confirmed as member of the Tribunal with effect from 1.4.1985, adverse material on record prior to 1.4.1985 should have been disregarded. Negativing the contention the Court observed: "Keeping in view the circumstances attendant to his confirmation as member of the ITAT. with effect from 1.4.1985. we are unable to agree with the Tribunal that after such confirmation the adverse material on the record for the period prior to 1.4.1985 should be disregarded. In our opinion, the entire service record of the respondent including the record for the period prior to 1.4.1985 had to be taken into consideration by the appropriate authority." 11. we are unable to agree with the Tribunal that after such confirmation the adverse material on the record for the period prior to 1.4.1985 should be disregarded. In our opinion, the entire service record of the respondent including the record for the period prior to 1.4.1985 had to be taken into consideration by the appropriate authority." 11. It was then submitted that the representations made by the petitioner for expunction of the adverse comments made by the District Judge for the two relevant years were not disposed of by the competent authority. When this submission was advanced before us on 13.5.1997 we noticed that there was no such averment in the writ petition that the petitioner's representations had not been disposed of by the High Court. We, therefore, granted time to the petitioner to file a supplementary affidavit. The petitioner has not filed a supplementary affidavit, as directed averring that his representations had not been disposed of in accordance with law. In the absence of any such averment it is not possible for this Court to investigate the question as to whether the representation filed by the petitioner were not disposed of. We will assume that the representations made were disposed of in normal course in the absence of any averment to the contrary. 12. The petitioner had made allegations of malafide against the District Judge in his representations to the High Court. It was for the High Court to consider whether there was merit in the representations filed by the petitioner and since there is no averment that the representations were not disposed of by the High Court, we shall proceed on the assumption that the High Court did not find any substance in the representation made by the petitioner. Moreover, the District Judge concerned was not made a party respondent, but on the date on which the matter was being finally heard an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying that the petitioner may be allowed to implead the then District and Sessions Judge as respondent. No order appears to have been passed on that application. It is not necessary for this Court in the instant writ petition to go into the question of malafide of the District Judge concerned who had made adverse comments against the petitioner. No order appears to have been passed on that application. It is not necessary for this Court in the instant writ petition to go into the question of malafide of the District Judge concerned who had made adverse comments against the petitioner. That was a matter which was to be considered by the High Court on its administration side on the representations of the petitioner, and there is no averment that the representations were not disposed of or that the High Court found substance in the allegations of mala fide made by the petitioner against the then District and Sessions Judge. In any event, while deciding the validity of the impugned notification it has to be seen whether the competent authority issuing the notification acted with malice in law or in fact. No such allegation has been made either against the High Court or the Governor under whose orders and in whose satisfaction the notification has been issued, on the recommendation of the High Court. The impugned notification cannot be said to be vitiated by malafide when no such allegation is made in the writ petition against the competent authorities namely, the High Court and the Governor of Bihar. The allegation by the petitioner against the District Judge concerned will not have the effect of vitiating the impugned notification. 13. It was lastly submitted that in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court it was stated that an adverse comment was made by the District Judge concerned in the year 1988-89 which was not communicated to the petitioner. The said averment was made in the rejoinder and the same has not been replied to by the High Court. Even if we ignore the adverse comments said to have been made in the year 1988-89, there is still sufficient material for the appropriate authority to form the requisite opinion that further retention of the petitioner in service was not in public interest. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Chief General Manager, State Bank of India vs. Suresh Chandra Behera [(1995) 3 Supreme Court Cases 608] intervention of the High Court in respect of orders of compulsory retirement is limited. The Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Chief General Manager, State Bank of India vs. Suresh Chandra Behera [(1995) 3 Supreme Court Cases 608] intervention of the High Court in respect of orders of compulsory retirement is limited. The Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court. It would interfere only if it is satisfied that the order is malafide, or is based on no evidence or is arbitrary, in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material i.e. the order is found to be perverse. In the instant case I find that there is sufficient material to form the requisite satisfaction and the appropriate authority has not acted malafide. The order passed cannot be said to be preverse. 14. In the result, I find no reason to justify interference in this writ petition by quashing the impugned notification (Annexure-B). This writ petition is therefore, dismissed. N. K. Sinha, J. -I agree.