JUDGMENT Petitioner has filed this revision against the order of the revisional Court whereby the order passed by the trial Court to summon the respondents is quashed. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint under sections 147, 148, 451, 506B and 323 of the India Penal Code was filed by police of police station Vidisha in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class. At the time of framing charge Maluk Chand and Rajendra Kumar were discharged and charges were framed under sections 323, 451 and 506 Indian Penal Code against the remaining accused persons. The evidence of complainant Pramila Soni was recorded on 26.3.1996. After the deposition of complainant Pramila Soni, Public Prosecutor moved an application under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for taking cognizance against the respondents who were earlier discharged. The trial Court subsequently allowed the application and directed summoning the respondents. This order was challenged in revision and revisional Court held that once Court has discharged the accused, they cannot be summoned again under section 319 of the Code. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for respondents as to the maintainability of revision by the: petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner being a complainant has no locus standi to file the revision. The remedy of revision, if any, was with the State. Counsel for the respondents referred to the judgment in the case of Soadhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in 1989 (II) MPWN 123 = 1987 MPLJ 465 . Learned counsel submitted that private party is not entitled to challenge the order whereby application under section 319 of Code is rejected. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that a revision is maintainable under section 397 of the Code. He submitted that in sub-section (3) of section 397 it is provided that if an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Court of Session Judge. He submitted the words any person while connotation the complainant is also inclused in it as any person. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived as sub-section (3) relates to power of second revision. He submitted the words any person while connotation the complainant is also inclused in it as any person. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived as sub-section (3) relates to power of second revision. However, under section 401 of the Code, it is provided that in the case of any proceeding comes to the notice of the knowledge of the High Court the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers. Therefore, an intimation to the High Court is sufficient in respect of any order passed by the trial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kaptansingh and others v. State of M.P. and another, reported in (1997) 6 Supreme Court Case 185, and submitted that in this case revision against acquittal was entertained by the High Court and the order of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Now the law is settled that if the complainant is an aggrieved party he has a right to challenge any order, which may affect the case of prosecution. Section 397 read with section 401 of the Code provides that even on acquiring knowledge of the order, this Court has ample power to interfere in revision. The short question involved in the case is whether after the respondents were discharged the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance under section 319 at the subsequent stage in the same proceedings. The respondents were discharged earlier. In view of the above, the only question involved is whether after discharge the Court can take cognizance at a subsequent stage. The question is considered in the case of Sohanlal and another v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 580. In this case it is held that after a person is discharged application under section 216 is not maintainable. However, the question is considered by the Apex Court about the scope of section 319 and it has been held that the provisions of section 319 are to be read in consonance with section 398 of the Code and discharge is subject to revision under section 398 of the Code and the powers under section 319 cannot be invoked against a person already discharged. In this case the applicants, who were made accused, have been discharged. In this case the applicants, who were made accused, have been discharged. Therefore, they cannot be prosecuted again by allowing application under section 319 of the Code. In a subsequent judgment reported in the case of Kishunsingh and others v. State of Bihar [(1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 16], it is held that section 319 can be invoked by the Court having jurisdiction in respect of persons not named as offenders. In the present case, applicants were joined as accused but trial Court discharged them at the time of framing of charge. As discussed above, no infirmity is committed by the revisional Court in holding that in facts of the case, provisions under section 319 of the Code cannot be invoked. The revision falls and is dismissed.