S. B. SINHA J. ( 1 ) ARE the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expection applicable in the case of the petitioners who were Chief Engineers and Engineers in Chief working with the first respondent in the matter of bifurcation of duty is the question involved in this application. ( 2 ) THE petitioners claim themselves to be appointed in terms of an advertisement as contained in annexure 'a' to the writ application. The respondent, however, contends that out of 20 writ-petitioners, 9 have been appointed by way of transfer or through Calcutta Dock System/establishment, and 6 were appointed after the advertisement and thus only 5 were appointed pursuant to the said advertisement. In terms of the aforesaid advertisement as contained in annexure 'a' to the writ application, Chief Engineer was to receive a gross emoluments including allowances at the minimum of the scale of Rs. 4400/- and Engineer in Chief at Rs. 3750/ -. The petitioners in the writ application have alleged that they were serving in the Merchant Navy and only in view of the aforementioned promise made in the said advertisement, they chose to join the services of the first respondent. According to the petitioner, earlier the consistent practice was that although the Chief Engineers and Engineers in Chief would be allotted duty for 12 hours wherefor they would get overtime allowances for four hours, however, the said practice has recently been changed and the duty hours have been fixed at 8 hours and only in case of actual overtime, they would be entitled to overtime allowance. Bifurcation of such duty hours, according to the petitioners, violates not only their fundamental rights as contained in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, but also is contrary to the doctrine of legitimate/reasonable expectation and/or promissory estoppel. The fact that the petitioners are at present getting much more higher salary is not disputed. Unfortuantely, neither the petitioners nor the respondents have annexed any chart to show as to how and in what manner their minimum gross emoluments albeit approximate had been calculated. ( 3 ) BEFORE adverting to the question aforementioned, relevant provisions of Major Port Trust Act, 1963 may be taken note of thereinafter referred to as the 'said Act' ). Unfortuantely, neither the petitioners nor the respondents have annexed any chart to show as to how and in what manner their minimum gross emoluments albeit approximate had been calculated. ( 3 ) BEFORE adverting to the question aforementioned, relevant provisions of Major Port Trust Act, 1963 may be taken note of thereinafter referred to as the 'said Act' ). The said Act was enacted to make provision for the Constitution of Port Authorities for certain major ports in India and to vest the administration, control and management of such ports in such authorities and for matters connected therewith. Section 5 of the said Act provides that the Board is to be a body corporate and can sue or be sued in its own name. Chapter III of the said Act provides for the recruitment of the staff of the Board. Section 23 provides for preparation and sanction a schedule of the employees of the Board who it deems necessary and proper to maintain for the purpose of the said Act and as such, schedule shall indicate therein the designations and grades of employees and the salaries, fees and allowance which are proposed to be paid to them. It is admitted that a regulation has been framed in terms of section 28 of the Major Port Trust Act with the sanction of the Central Government under sub-section (1) of section 124 of the Act known as Calcutta Port Trust Employees' (Haldia Dock Complex) (Recruitment, Seniority and Promotion) Regulation, 1985. The said regulation was amended in the year 1991 as would appear from the Gazette of India published on 24th July, 1991 wherein salary of the Chief Engineer has been shown as 2090/- to 3190/-, the post being a selection post. No fees and allowance which are proposed to be paid to them had been stated therein. Admittedly, in terms of section 28 (E) read with section 124 of the Act, the Board was entitled to make regulation for the purpose of regulating the appointment and the condition of service of its employees. The regulation has been defined in section 2 (W) of the Act to mean regulation made under the said Act. Section 123 (e) also provides for the regulation under the general power of Board, inter alia for the efficient and proper administration of the Board. The regulation has been defined in section 2 (W) of the Act to mean regulation made under the said Act. Section 123 (e) also provides for the regulation under the general power of Board, inter alia for the efficient and proper administration of the Board. However, the same is subject to the restriction contained in section 124 of the Act. Central Government has also been empowered to make the first regulation in terms of section 126 thereof. The fact that duty hours and/or provisions for over time allowance had not been made in the said regulation is neither in doubt nor in dispute. ( 4 ) MR. Bhunia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, inter alia, submitted that the first respondent being a creature of the statute could fix condition of service of its employees only in exercise of its regulation making power and in absence of any provision, the respondents were bound to adhere to the practice of 12 hours on and 12 hours off duty. The learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contention has relied upon a decision of the learned single Judge of this court in Arvind Kumar Dhanuka v. Board of Trustees and Ors. reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 377. The learned counsel contends that in any event keeping in view the gross emoluments (although approximately) having been stated in annexure "a" to the writ application, the respondents are bound thereby, as according to the learned counsel, overtime allowance would also come within the purview of the Allowance. It has further been submitted the respondents' action in bifurcation of the duty hours would be hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel and in support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed in State Madhya Pradesh v. Hari Duttsharma reported in 1993 (2) SCC 192 ; Siben Kumar Mondal v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Anr. reported in AIR 1995 Cal. 327 ; Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board of Trustees, Calcutta Port Trust and Ors. reported in 1982 (1) CLJ 286 ; Rabindra Nath Sadhukhan and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1994 (1) CHN 294 and Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trust of the Port of Bombay reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 . ( 5 ) MR. reported in 1982 (1) CLJ 286 ; Rabindra Nath Sadhukhan and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1994 (1) CHN 294 and Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trust of the Port of Bombay reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 . ( 5 ) MR. Majumdar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand submitted that anexure 'a' being the advertisement does not at all speak overtime. According to the learned counsel, the gross emoluments including allowance at the mimum scale for the grade was Rs. 2700/ -. According to the learned counsel, qualification required for serial No. 3 of the said advertisement was full time apprenticeship in approved Marine Workshop and simultaneously attendance of approved course of Engineering in a Technical School and passing diploma Engineering etc. The learned counsel contends that only usual benefits were mentioned therein. ( 6 ) THE submission of Mr. Bhunia to the effect that in absence of any regulation, the respondents have no right, authority or jurisdiction to determine the duty hours cannot be accepted. As indicated hereinbefore, the said Act is self-contained code. The Board is body corporate and the Board of Trustees are entitled to take any decision even in absence of a regulation to control its affairs. Section 25 of the Act in no uncertain terms states about the power granting extension of service to, granting leave to, suspending, reducing, compulsarily retiring, removing or dismissing or of disposing of any other question relating to the services of, the employees of a Board, including the power of dispension with the services of any such employee otherwise than by reason of the misconduct of such employee subject to any regulation made under section 28. section 25, therefore, provides for the power of the Board of Trustees not only to carry out its function relating to condition of service of its employees which in the opinion of this court, keeping in view the terminologies used "of disposing of any other question relating to the services of" the matter relating to fixation of duration of working hours and laying down the condition as to under that circumstances a person shall be entitled to get overtime allowance would come within the purview thereof. The respondents in paragraph 14 of their affidavit-in-opposition while traversing the statements made by the writ-petitioner in paragraphs 9 to 23 stated, "it is not mandatory that the Engineers will have to be deployed on "12 hours on and 12 hours off duty basis as has already been pointed out in the aforesaid paragraphs under reply. The deployment of these Engineers are made strictly as per the operational requirement. The deployment pattern of Shri P. K. Maitra, as highlighted by annexure-I of the writ petition and that of Shri N. K. Nanda, vide annexure-J of the writ petition, clearly confirms that the Marine Engineers are deployed only on the basis of operational exigencies and overtime allowance is paid, if earned, accordingly. Hence, one Engineer may be deployed for 8 hours on a particular day and for 12 hours on the next day, there being no mandatory rule that the Engineers have to be deployed for 12 hours every day. It is further denied and disputed that at the time of selection of the Marine Engineers they were assured that their duty hours will be for 12 hours every day. As already stated in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not alway sessential to deploy a Marine Engineer for 12 hours. There is nothing on record to show that in fact any promise had been made to the petitioners that they would be provided with 12 hours duty which would include overtime allowances. A State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India must act in public interest. No court in absence of any legal right existing in favour of an employee, can direct an employer to change its policy decision as regard the extent of the working hour or laying down a scheme as to how and in what manner overtime allowance shall be paid. Fixation of duration of working hours or payment of overtime is a matter of policy decision for the employer. The employer apart from its statutory power conferred upon it under section 25 of the Act qua employer is entitled as a matter of right to fix the same. Can such policy decision keeping in view the exgencies of the situation adopted by the respondents be said to be wholly arbitrary and unfair so as to arract Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India? Can such policy decision keeping in view the exgencies of the situation adopted by the respondents be said to be wholly arbitrary and unfair so as to arract Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India? Answer to the said question in my opinon, must be rendered in negative. Employer is the best judge as to how best work can be obtained from its employees. Normally, working hours is 8 hours is not dispute. Employees, thus, in absence of any statutory provision or in absence of any terms of condition of service cannot as a matter of right claim that they should be allowed to work for a period of 12 hours irrespective of fact that the employer requires such overtime service or not and be paid overtime allowance. ( 7 ) IT may be that at one point of time there existed such necessity but need of an employer changes and along therewith policy may also be changed. There is nothing in the Act or the regulation to prohibit an employer from changing such policy decision. The doctrine of promissory estoppel can have application only in a case where a promise had been made pursuant whereto the promisee has altered his position. Condition of service cannot be a subject matter of promise, far less in a situation of this nature were neither the duration of the duty hours nor the extent of overtime allowance had been fixed. Only because in the past 12 hours itself have been fixed for the employees as of the BCG, do not mean that the employers cannot change the same. It is now well settled principle of law that the court of law can refuse to enforce the claim of promissory estoppel in the event a notice therefor has been given by the promisor. I am therefore of the opinion that the same in any event should not enforced in public interest. The respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition have clearly stated that not only no promise have been given but they are entitled to take such decision keeping in view the exigencies of circumstances. For the selfsame ground doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot also be said to be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Subject to the condition laid down under a statute, the relationship of the petitioner and the first respondent is that of employer and employee. For the selfsame ground doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot also be said to be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Subject to the condition laid down under a statute, the relationship of the petitioner and the first respondent is that of employer and employee. A contract of service has been entered into by them, normally doctrines of promissory estoppel or doctrine of legitimate expectations are attracted only in the matter of discharge of other duties by the State and the said doctrines have no application in the contractual fields although expectations to the said rule are there but in this application, this court does not find any. Reference in this connection may be made to A. C. Roy Co. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 Calcutta 246 wherein upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions this court observed, "however, the Supreme Court recently in Union of India v. Hindusthan Development Corporation, reported in Judgments Today 1993 (3) SC 15 has clearly held that no enforceable right is created in terms of the doctrine of legitimate expectations but the same only checks arbitrariness on the part of the State. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered by the Supreme Court upon reviewing its earlier decisions including Kamdhenu Cattle's case (supra) in Madras City Wine Merchants' Association v. State of T. N. 1994 (5) SCC 509 , wherein it has been held :-"from the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise- (a)if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or (b)because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue; (c)such an expectation must be reasonable. However if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise. "most of the decisions cited by the learned counsel had been taken into consideration, in the said decision. The decisions relied uponby Mr. Bhunia are distinguishable. In State of Madhya Pradesh's case (supra) question was as regards higher retirement age. In Siben Kumar Mondal's (supra) question was for selection for grant of dealership by the Oil Selection Board. "most of the decisions cited by the learned counsel had been taken into consideration, in the said decision. The decisions relied uponby Mr. Bhunia are distinguishable. In State of Madhya Pradesh's case (supra) question was as regards higher retirement age. In Siben Kumar Mondal's (supra) question was for selection for grant of dealership by the Oil Selection Board. The respondents have in their affidavit-in-opposition mentioned that duty of the employees like the petitioners, are deployed in tugs which are used for shifting vessel for loading and unloading operation as also laid off vessels. There cannot be any question of giving 12 hours duty in the laid off vessels. The duty roster is merely allotment of duty and cannot be challenged in a writ. In S. R. Yadav v. Board of Trustees. Calcutta Port Trust (supra) question arose as regards withdrawals of certain items from auction sale to which petitioners therein claimed a right in terms of section 64 (2) of Sale of Goods Act. In B. N. Sadhukhan v. State of West Bengal (supra), the court was concerned with a matter relating to running a Cinema. In V. R. Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (supra) the apex court was considering a case of ejectment of tenant upon service of notice of termination. In that decision itself it has been held that there has been no promissory estoppel as the Estate Manager allegedly promised to allot land upon deposit of certain amounts which does not attract the principle of promissory estoppel. The apex court clearly held that the said principles have been evolved on equitable consideration to avoid injustice. However, in the instant case, no injustice is being caused as the petitioners would be paid their salary according to the scale of pay to which they are entitled to and only in the event, they are asked to perform overtime duties, they would be paid such overtime allowance. In Arvind Kumar Dhanuka v. Board of Trustees and Ors. reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 377, a learned single Judge of this court has held :"after giving my anxious consideration to the entire matter, I am of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner should succeed. In Arvind Kumar Dhanuka v. Board of Trustees and Ors. reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 377, a learned single Judge of this court has held :"after giving my anxious consideration to the entire matter, I am of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner should succeed. In other words, it must be held that having prescribed a particular scale of rent for a particular plot in the exercise of its statutory powers, the respondents now have no right, authority or jurisdiction by virtue of notifications or circulars to treat that scale of rent as the reserved rent or minimum rent and invite tenders for higher rents and offer it to the highest bidder. To allow the respondent to do so, in my view would clearly enable them to deviate from the exercise of statutory powers which have already been exercised in the present case. This contention of the petitioner therefore succeeds. " ( 8 ) THE said decision has no application in the fact of the present case. For the reasons aforementioned I do not find any merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed