ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court rejecting an application dated 1-9-1997 filed by the defendant-applicant under Order 13, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code for admitting 15 rent receipts claimed to have been issued during the period elapsing between 11-8-1962 to 16-3-1969, showing the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute to be Rs. 7 per month, he has now approached this Court seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the defendant-applicant as well as the learned counsel representing the plaintiff-respondent and have carefully perused the record. 3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit giving rise to this revision wherein he has prayed for a decree for eviction of the defendant from the premises in dispute, which was claimed to have been let out to him. The plaintiff has asserted that in spite of the notice terminating the tenancy and non-payment of arrears of rent, the defendant had neither cleared off the arrears of rent due nor had vacated the premises. It was claimed that requirement contemplated Under Section 12(1)(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, stood satisfied. 4. The plaintiff asserted that the accommodation in dispute consisting of four rooms and one tin-shed had been let out to the defendant at a rental of Rs. 250/- per month but he had encroached upon two rooms of the building, of which the accommodation which had been let out formed a part, in an authorised manner for which he was liable to pay Rs. 100/- per month towards damages for use and occupation. 5. In spite of repeated opportunities having been provided the defendant did not file any written statement. On 18-7-1990 the trial Court passed an order to the effect that the defendant will have no right to defend the suit. 6. This Court vide its judgment and order dated 25-1-1995 while disposing of Civil Revision No. 115/95 filed by the present defendant had however granted another opportunity to the defendant to file a written statement subject to certain conditions which included the condition of deposit of provisional rent at the rate of Rs. 250/- per month. 6. This Court vide its judgment and order dated 25-1-1995 while disposing of Civil Revision No. 115/95 filed by the present defendant had however granted another opportunity to the defendant to file a written statement subject to certain conditions which included the condition of deposit of provisional rent at the rate of Rs. 250/- per month. Even this opportunity afforded to the defendant was not availed of by him with the result that the order passed by the trial Court, to which a reference had been made hereinabove, continued to remain effective. 7. The plaintiff examined Kailashchand as a witness in support of his case on 5-4-1991. He could not be cross-examined on that date by the defendant. On 14-2-1996 the plaintiff examined Madan Mohan Gupta as a witness in support of his case, who was duly cross-examined by the defendant. Since the statement of the plaintiff's witness Kailashchand had remained incomplete as in the absence of the counsel for the defendant he could not be cross-examined, an application was moved by the defendant on 4-4-1996 under Order 13, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code praying for bringing on record and exhibiting two rent receipts dated 4-2-1964 and 4-3-1965, the photostat copies whereof had already been produced. 8. The trial Court vide its order dated 25-2-1997 allowed that application granting permission to the defendant to rebut the aforesaid evidence and posted the case for evidence of the plaintiff's witness Kailashchand on 3-4-1997. Kailashchand proved the receipts sought to be relied upon which were exhibited. The defendant was allowed to cross-examine Kailashchand which was completed on 9-8-1997 and the plaintiff's evidence was closed. 9. Thereafter the defendant moved the application dated 1-9-1997, which has been referred to hereinabove. In this application it was asserted that the receipts filed by the defendant were Pharzi, fabricated and fictitious. The defendant claimed that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was only Rs. 7/- per month and not Rs. 250/- per month. To establish this he wanted that the 15 receipts issued during the period from 11-8-1962 to 16-8-1969 be allowed to be brought on record and exhibited. 10. The defendant claimed that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was only Rs. 7/- per month and not Rs. 250/- per month. To establish this he wanted that the 15 receipts issued during the period from 11-8-1962 to 16-8-1969 be allowed to be brought on record and exhibited. 10. It may be noticed that the receipts which were sought to be brought on record by the defendant had been issued by Pooranchand, in favour of Devi Charan Shastri but these receipts did not contain the signatures of Devi Charan Shastri, the tenant who was the predecessor in interest of the contesting defendant. The rent receipts which have been filed by the plaintiff and were brought on record as Exhibits P-5 and P-6 had been issued by Pooranchand but they contain the signatures of Devi Charan Shastri, the original tenant, also. The receipts are dated 4-2-1964 and 4-3-1965. 11. The trial Court in its impugned order has observed that the receipts which are sought to be produced by the defendant did not contain the signatures of Kailashchand the witness examined by the plaintiff and that the receipts have not been issued by him. Further, it was also observed that the receipts purported to be in support of the plea that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was Rs. 7/- per month and was not Rs. 250/- per month. Since, there was no written statement and such a plea had not been taken by the defendant, no evidence in support of this plea could be allowed to be brought on record. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the trial Court came to the conclusion, that neither the receipts could be allowed to be brought on record nor the plaintiff's witness Kailashchand could be recalled for cross-examination on this aspect of the case. In the aforesaid view of the matter the application was rejected. 12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the trial Court came to the conclusion, that neither the receipts could be allowed to be brought on record nor the plaintiff's witness Kailashchand could be recalled for cross-examination on this aspect of the case. In the aforesaid view of the matter the application was rejected. 12. The learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has strenuously urged that in the earlier order dated 25-2-1997 passed by the trial Court while permitting the plaintiff to bring on record the two receipts relied upon in support of its case, the trial Court had clearly preserved the right of the defendant to lead evidence in rebuttal and in this view of the matter there could be no justification for refusing permission sought for by the defendant to bring on record the receipts in question. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that the right to lead evidence in support of a plea and the right to lead evidence in rebuttal cannot be put at par. The contention is that no amount of evidence can be looked into in support of a plea which was never made. The right to lead evidence in rebuttal, it is asserted, is a right to demolish the plaintiff's case or plea by bringing on record material ex facie demonstrating the falsity of the plea set up by the plaintiff, which evidence could be such which could be permitted to be led even in the absence of a plea having been taken in the written statement. 14. It is contended that the defendant had every opportunity to cross-examine the witness, Kailashchand but even at the stage of cross-examination no effort was made to establish that the receipts filed by him, which had been proved, could not be admitted in evidence on account of their being forged, fabricated or fictitious and manufactured for the purposes of the case and especially when the photostat copies of those had already been produced much before the oral evidence was tendered. In the circumstances, it is urged that the defendant had no right to set the clock back and allowed to recall Kailashchand for being cross-examined once again especially when it was not a case where the aforesaid witness was to be confronted with his own admission negativing the plea set up by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, it is urged that the defendant had no right to set the clock back and allowed to recall Kailashchand for being cross-examined once again especially when it was not a case where the aforesaid witness was to be confronted with his own admission negativing the plea set up by the plaintiff. The learned counsel has urged that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case no ground has been made out for any interference by this Court. 15. In the present case in spite of repeated opportunities having been provided he defendant had not filed any written statement raising a plea that the assertion made by the plaintiff in paragraph 8 of the plaint asserting that the premises in disputes had been let out at a rental of Rs. 250/- per month was incorrect and the rate of rent was actually Rs. 7/- per month only. The attempt of the defendant in bringing on record the receipts relied upon by him clearly was to establish a plea to the effect that the rate of rent was Rs. 7/- per month and was not Rs. 250/- per month as claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in support of the claim in regard to the rent being Rs. 250/- per month had relied upon the admission of Devicharan Shastri, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant, which according to the plaintiff was binding on the defendant. The receipts relied upon by the plaintiff being more than 30 years old were admissible in evidence Under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. The defendant, had however been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Kailashchand on 3-4-1997. The cross-examination of Kaitashchand does not indicate that the defendant had disputed the signature of Devicharan Shastri occurring on the aforesaid receipts. He could have objected to the admission of the aforesaid documents and further objected against their being exhibited, denying the genuineness of the signatures of Devicharan Shastri occurring thereon. This was, however, not done. A perusal of the application dated 1-9-1997 filed by the defendant indicates that the plea sought to be raised by him was that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was only Rs. 7/- per month and in support of this plea he wanted to bring on record the receipts relied upon by him. 16. A perusal of the application dated 1-9-1997 filed by the defendant indicates that the plea sought to be raised by him was that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was only Rs. 7/- per month and in support of this plea he wanted to bring on record the receipts relied upon by him. 16. I am of the considered opinion that the defendant could not be permitted to do indirectly what he could not do directly. In this connection it should not be lost sight of that if a plea is denied then alone the question of its proof can arise. In case, the allegations of fact are admitted or must be deemed to be admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or deemed to be admitted. But, there might be cases in which having regard to the nature of the circumstances the Court may insist upon proof independently of such admissions by non-traverse. Further, no amount of evidence can be looked into in support of a plea which was never made. The defendant having failed to file any written statement and having failed to raise a plea that the rate of rent was only Rs. 7/- per month denying the specific claim of the plaintiff that the rate of rent of accommodation in dispute was Rs. 250/- per month, could not by indirect method bring on record evidence in support of the plea which was never made by him in the written statement. 17. The learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has strongly relied upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Meethalal in Civil Rev. No. 1654/84, decided on 6-8-1985, reported in 1986(1) MPWNSN9. In the aforesaid decision it was noticed that the only disability which a defendant could suffer in the event of non-filing of the written statement was that he could not be entitled to lead evidence or cross-examine on facts which may amount to special plea which he could have raised had he filed the written statement. The learned Single Judge in the aforesaid decision had observed that such a defendant would not only be entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness but also lead evidence in rebuttal. 18. The learned Single Judge in the aforesaid decision had observed that such a defendant would not only be entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness but also lead evidence in rebuttal. 18. The learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has urged that the defendant's right to lead evidence in rebuttal, therefore, stood secured and by leading evidence in rebuttal he could still demolish the plaintiff's case as set up in the plaint. 19. As has already noticed hereinabove and also has been indicated in the decision of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram reported in 1992 AIR SCW336, if a plea is denied then alone the question of its proof can arise. The Privy Council in its decision in the case of Siddik Mohomed Shah v. Mt. Saran and Ors. reported in AIR 1930 PC 57(1) had clearly observed that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. 20. In the present case the evidence of the plaintiff stood closed. The defendant had no right to get the witnesses of the plaintiff recalled for cross-examination as he was not entitled to produce evidence in support of a plea which was deliberately omitted from being taken in the written statement as in spite of repeated opportunities having been provided no written statement had been filed by the defendant. The ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the applicant and he cannot derive any advantage out of the same. 21. Considering the facts and circumstances brought on record I do not find any ground having been made out justifying any interference in the impugned order while exercising the revisional jurisdiction envisaged Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. The revision is accordingly dismissed. 23. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.