Honble SINGH, J.–Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the non-petitioners. (2). In these six petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, common question of law has arisen for decision. All the 6 petitions are against the orders passed by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balotra on 7th Feb- ruary, 1986 in criminal cases pending before him. Six revision petitions were filed by the petitioner under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Balotra against the orders dated 7.2.86 passed by the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate, Balotra and all the six criminal revision petitions were disposed of by the learned District & Sessions Judge by a common order. It is, there- fore, proper to dispose of these petitions by a common order. (3). Shorn of details, the relevant facts for the purpose of disposing of these petitions are as given below : (4). Criminal Original Cases No. 270/83, 272/83, 269/83, 268/83, 271/83, and 267/83 were instituted on the basis of complaints filed on behalf of the Rajasthan State Board for Prevention and Control of Pollution, Jaipur alleging the commission of offences punishable under Section 42 and 44 of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (in short, referred to hereinafter as `the Act of 1974). The above-mentioned cases were registered as cases instituted on complaint, as cognizance of the offences was taken under Section 190(1)(a) of the Criminal Proce- dure Code, 1973. On 7.2.86, the complainant did not appear in the Court of the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate when the cases were called for hearing. The Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate, Balotra, on the same day, discharged the accused-persons under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 because the complainant was not present. The powers under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code were exer- cised by the learned Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate, Balotra because it was urged before him that the offences under Section 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 were non- cognizable offences and, therefore, the learned Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate on the footing that offences under Sections 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 were non-cognisable offences passed the order under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code discharging the accused persons. (5). Chief Judl. Magistrate on the footing that offences under Sections 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 were non-cognisable offences passed the order under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code discharging the accused persons. (5). The revision petitions were filed under Section 397 of the Criminal Proce- dure Code in all the six cases mentioned above. The learned District & Sessions Judge, Balotra dismissed the revision petitions as he held that the offences under Sections 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 were non-cognisable offences. He further considered it not necessary to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate. (6). Feeling aggrieved by the orders passed by the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate, Balotra and the District & Sessions Judge, Balotra, the petitioner has filed these 6 petitions under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (7). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the offences under Sections 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 is punishable with more than 2 years impri- sonment and, therefore, the cases were warrant cases, but the powers conferred by Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code could not have been exercised by the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate for the purpose of discharging the accused persons on account of non-appearance of the complainant, as the offences of which cognizance has been taken were neither compoundable nor they were non-cogni- sable offences. He has, therefore, submitted that the orders passed by the Courts below are illegal, without jurisdiction and amount to the abuse of the process of Court and, therefore, deserve to be set aside. (8). Learned counsel for the non-petitioners have submitted that though the offences under Sections 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 ``are not compundable, they are ``non-cognisable offences and, therefore, the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balotra could exercise the power under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code for discharging the accused-persons on the ground that the complainant was not present. It is, therefore, prayed that these petitions should be dismissed. (9). In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the only question arises for decision is whether the offences under Section 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 are non- cognisable offences. (10). It is, therefore, prayed that these petitions should be dismissed. (9). In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the only question arises for decision is whether the offences under Section 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 are non- cognisable offences. (10). Section 2(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 defines the expression ``cognisable offence in the following words : ``2(c).-``Cognisable offence means an offence for which, and ``cog- nisable case means a case in which, the police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. (11). Section 2(1) defines the expression ``non-cognisable offence in the following words : ``2(1).-``non-cognisable offence means an offence for which, and ``non-cognisable case means a case in which, the police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant. (12). A bare reading of the definitions given in clauses (c) and (1) of Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows that the Legislature has defined 4 expres- sions which are : (a) cognisable offence, (b) non-cognisable offence, (c) cognisable case, and (d) non-cognisable case. (13). Section 2(c) makes it very clear that cognisable offence means an offence for which the police officer may arrest without a warrant in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force and the cognisable case means a case in which the police officer may arrest in accordance with the First Schedule or any other law for the time being in force. In other words, the test for determining whether the ``offence and the ``case referred to in Section 2(c) is cognisable or not, is to find out whether the police officer can make arrest in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force. If the police officer can be said to be vested with the power to make arrest, whether this power is in accordance the First Schedule or under any other law, it will have to be said that the offence or the case, as the case may be, is a cognisable one. If the police officer can be said to be vested with the power to make arrest, whether this power is in accordance the First Schedule or under any other law, it will have to be said that the offence or the case, as the case may be, is a cognisable one. On the other hand, if no such power to make arrest is vested in the police offi- cer, the offence or the case, as the case may be, would be non-cognisable by virtue of the definition contained in Section 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (14). What is to be noted is that Section 2(c) and 2(1), separately mention ``offence and ``case. It is, therefore, appropriate to infer that these two different expressions are the subject matter of Section 2(c) and Section 2(1) because the Legislature considered it necessary to make a distinction between ``offence and ``case. What is defined in Section 2(c) is the expression `cognisable and Section 2(1) defines the expression ``non-cognisable. The criterion for distinguishing ``cognisable from ``non-cognisable is the power of the police to make arrest without a warrant, irrespective of the fact whether such power is available to him in accordance with the First Schedule of the Criminal Procedure Code or under any other law for the time being in force. Keeping the above scheme of Section 2(c) and Section 2(1) in mind, the reasons given by the Courts below may be scrutinised to find out whether the offences under Section 42 and 44 of the Act of 1974 are cognisable offences or they are non-cognisable offences. (15). The Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate has relied on the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Prahlad Rai vs. State of Rajasthan (1). In that case, an application for anticipatory bail was filed under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a person who was apprehending his arrest on the charges under Section 276(C) and 276(CC) of the Income Tax Act. At page 208 of the report, the learned Single Judge observed : ``The offence under Section 276 C, u/s. 276 CC is such of which cognisance can be taken by Magistrate only when a complaint is filed by the Department. At page 208 of the report, the learned Single Judge observed : ``The offence under Section 276 C, u/s. 276 CC is such of which cognisance can be taken by Magistrate only when a complaint is filed by the Department. Therefore, it cannot be said that this is cognisable offence as it requires a complaint to be filed by the Department be- fore the Magistrate can take cognizance of the same. (16). A perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge shows that neither the provisions of Section 249, Cr.P.C. nor the definitions contained in Section 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 were considered. Since it was an application under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was pending before the Court, the only point to be decided was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. Whether the offences under Section 276(C) and 276(CC) of the Income Tax Act were or were not cognisable offences by virtue of the definition contained in Section 2(C) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code did not arise for decision in that case. In view of these facts, the observations (above quoted) can at the most be said to lay down the law that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offences under Sections 276C and 276CC of the Income Tax Act unless a complaint is filed by the Income Tax Department and, in that sence, those offences are non-cognisable offences. There is nothing in the order passed by the learned Single Judge to indicate that by the aforesaid obser- vations it was intended to lay down the law that since the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of any offence without the complaint by a particular person or by the Department. The offence would be regarded as non-cognisable offence for the purpose of Section 2(1) and Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (17). For the above reasons, it is proper to hold that the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Prahlad Rais case (supra) cannot be used as authority for the proposition that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence without a complaint filed by a particular person or Department, the offence shall be treated as non-cognisable offence for the purpose of Section 2(1) and Sec- tion 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (18). (18). In Union of India vs. Maj. I.C. Lala (2), the Honble Supreme Court observed : ``Unless there are clear and compelling reasons to hold otherwise the division of offences given in the Code of Criminal Procedure as cog- nisable and non-cognisable should be given effect to. When the same Code makes sanction under Section 196-A necessary for trial of non-cognizable offences it clearly contemplates non-cognizable offences as defined in the Code. There is no justification for relying upon extraneous considerations and far-fetched reasoning in order to get over the effect of these provisions. (19). In view of the above observation of the Honble Supreme Court, the only way in which it may be ascertained whether a certain offence is not a cognisable offence, is to apply the definition contained in Section 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to the offence in question. (20). Section 2(c) gives the definition of ``cognisable offence and ``cognisable case and Section 2(1) gives the definition of ``non-cognisable offence and ``non-cognisable case. By the above definition, the Legislature has made a distinction between the expression ``offence and the expression ``case. The reasons for making these distinctions are not difficult to ascertain. A bare perusal of Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows that under the Section a police officer has been given the legal authority to make arrest without a warrant not only when the offence committed by the offender is a cognizable offence but also when the offence is non-cognizable, if, but there are circumstances justifying his arrest under Section 41 without the warrant of arrest. Whereas clause (a) of Section 41 refers to the involvement in any cognisable offence, the cases referred in clauses (b) to (i) are not necessarily restricted to cognisable offences. The cases referred in clauses (b) to (1) may be related to cognisable offences as well as non-cognisable offences. It is, therefore, obvious that whereas arrest under clause (a) of Section 41 may be said to be arrest on charge of a cognisable offence the arrest made under clauses (b) to (1) of Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be said to be arrest on the charge of cognisable offence if the person to be arrested is not involved in the commission of any cognisable offence. The cases in which power under clauses (b) to (1) of Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code may be exercised would attract the definition of ``cognisable case rather than the definition of ``cog- nisable offence. (21). Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly confers on a police officer power to make arrest of the offender who has committed or has been accused of committing a non-cognisable offence and who, refuses, on demand of such officer, to give his name and residence or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false. It is obvious that Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code would attack the definition of ``cognisable case rather than ``cognisable offence. I am, therefore, of the view that the definitions given in Section 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code make a distinction between an `offence and a `case and it is quite conceivable that in a given case the offence may not be cognisable but the case may be cognisable if the police officer is empowered according to the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force to make arrest without a warrant. Similarly, it is conceivable that though the offences may be cognisable, the cases may be non-cognisable if the police officer has been deprived of his power to make arrest without a warrant. An example of this kind of cases is to be found in Section 202(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code which denies to the officer-in- charge of the police station the power to arrest without a warrant while he is conducting investigation under the orders issued by the Court under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (22). If the distinction between the `offence and the `case is kept in view, the confusion which sometimes arises on account of restrictions placed on the power of the Court to take cognisance under Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code would be avoided. Cognizability of the offences as well as cases under Section 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not depend on the answer to the question whether the Magistrate can or cannot take cognizance unless the conditions imposed by law are satisfied. Cognizability of the offences as well as cases under Section 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not depend on the answer to the question whether the Magistrate can or cannot take cognizance unless the conditions imposed by law are satisfied. It may be, that unless the conditions necessary for taking cognizance are not fulfilled, the Court may not take cognizance under Sec. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but that does not mean that the offence will not be a cognisable offence within the meaning of Sec.2(c) even if the police officer has the legal power to make arrest without a warrant, in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule, or under any other law for the time being in force. (23). In Tej Khan vs. State of Rajasthan (3), the Court observed : ``The fact that the power to investigate or to arrest without warrant has been circumscribed by certain conditions (which conditions were clearly provided for the purpose of safeguarding public servants from harassment at the hands of subordinate police officers) under the proviso to Section 3 of the said Act cannot lead to the conclusion that such offence is non-cognizable. (24). In view of the above observations, it may be said that if there is a power to make arrest without a warrant, the offence will have to be treated as cognizable offence even if the power to make arrest has been circumscribed by the imposition of certain conditions. (25). For reasons mentioned above, I hold that the conditions circumscribing the powers of the Court to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, having direct relevance to the definitions given in Sections 2(c) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the conditions which are imposed to circumscribe the power of the police officer to make arrest without a warrant, do not convert a cognisable offence into a non-cognisable offence and, that, in view of the definitions contained in Section 2(c) and 2(1), the expression ``offence and the expression ``case cannot be taken as synonimous. They have to be treated as separate and distinguishable signifying different things and, therefore, it is conceivable that though offence may be cognizable yet there may be no cognisable case if the power to make arrest without a warrant is denied. They have to be treated as separate and distinguishable signifying different things and, therefore, it is conceivable that though offence may be cognizable yet there may be no cognisable case if the power to make arrest without a warrant is denied. For instance, a case under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that there may be a case in which the power to make arrest without a warrant may be available and, therefore, the case may be cognizable though the offence which is alleged to have been committed may be a non-cognizable offence. (26). The offence under Section 42 of the Act of 1974 is punishable with impri- sonment which may extend to 3 months or with fine which may extend to 10,000/- rupees. The offence under Section 44 of the Act of 1974 is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and six months but which may extend to 6 years and with fine. Having regard to the punishment prescribed by the Act, the offence under Section 42 must be regarded as non-cognisable offence because offence is punishable with less than 3 years imprisonment. But, the offence under Section 44 of the Act deserves to be regarded as a cognisable offence, according to Schedule-I as the maximum punishment prescribed for this offence is 6 years. (27). I am, therefore, of the view that offence under Section 44 of the Act of 1974 is a `cognizable offence within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, the provisions of Section 249 were not applicable. The view taken by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate as well as by the learned District & Sessions Judge that the above-mentioned offences are non-cog- nisable offences is erroneous. The impugned orders of discharge passed on 7.2.86 purporting to be under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code are without jurisdiction and they amount to the abuse of the process of the Court. (28). For the reasons mentioned above, all the six petitions filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code deserve to be allowed. The impugned orders dated 7.2.86 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balotra and the impugned order dated 31.7.87 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Balotra are hereby quashed and set aside. The Addl. (28). For the reasons mentioned above, all the six petitions filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code deserve to be allowed. The impugned orders dated 7.2.86 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balotra and the impugned order dated 31.7.87 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Balotra are hereby quashed and set aside. The Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balotra is hereby directed to proceed with the cases and decide them in accordance with law.