PALOK BASU, J. Against S. L. AO. s award dated 22-2-1973 the respondent, Malik Sartaj Wali Khan filed Land Ac quisition Reference No. 13 of 1974 before the District Judge, Bareilly which has come to be decided by Vlth Additional District Judge, Bareilly on 30-10-1987. 2. The acquisition related to a total area of the land measuring 77. 80 acres in village Biharman Nagla Pargana Tahsil and District Bareilly. There is no dispute with regard to the compensation which was awarded with regard to the building (Kothi) tube-well, timber trees and drains etc. which have been priced at Rs. 72,000/ -. The main dispute centers round the com pensation payable with regard to open land included in the said acquisition proceedings. The notification under Sec tion 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published in 29-4-1972 followed by the notification under Section 6 on 25-5-1972, whereafter possession of the land was taken under Section 17 doing away with. the formalities of Section 5 (A) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). 3. The S. L. A. O. held that total sum of Rs. 1,16,997/- was payable to the respon dents as compensation for the land. Ad ding solatium at the rate of 15% he held that Rs. 5,61,179. 38 p. was payable. The Additional District Judge in his order has enhanced the said amount and has held that total compensation should be paid to the respondent amounting to Rs. 12,24,5007 -. He further held that since Rs. 1,16. 997/- stood already paid to the respondent under the S. L. A. p. s award, the respondent was, thus, entitled to be paid compensation amounting to Rs. 11,07,5007- only as excess market price of the land measuring 50. 61 acres. On this amount he held that interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of dispossession, i. e. 25-5-1972, was payable to the respondent and further that solatium at the rate of 30% on the amount of compen sation was also to be paid to the respon dent. 4. Feeling aggrieved, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Bareilly, who was a beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings, as the land was earmarked for marketyard to be established for the Samiti, has come up in appeal. 5. 4. Feeling aggrieved, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Bareilly, who was a beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings, as the land was earmarked for marketyard to be established for the Samiti, has come up in appeal. 5. Sri B. D. Madhyan, learned Coun sel for the appellant, has been heard at extensive length and Sri Murlidhar as sisted by Sri Pankaj Naqvi has also been heard in detail, who sponsored the cause of the respondent, the land owner. Learned Counsel for the parties requested that they may be permitted to file written arguments in order to put their oral arguments black and white, which request was accepted. Sri Madhyan as well as Sri Naqvi has filed their respective written arguments. It may be added that apart from six grounds men tioned in the written arguments typo graphically Sri B. D. Madhyan has added two further grounds by pen and numbered them as 7 and 8. 6. The gist of the arguments advanced is: (1) Whether the District Judge was jus tified in relying upon the sale-deed filed by the respondent indicating the sale of nearby land in August, 1970 by Bareilly House Building Cor poration Ltd. in favour of Avas Vikas Parishad at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. yard and in that process was he justified in not placing reliance on the only exemplar relied upon by the S. L. A. O. which was a sale-deed executed in february, 1972 relating to adjoining land sold out through that deed? (2) If it is held that reliance could be placed on the aforesaid sale-deed of 1972 in order to make enhanced payment of compensa tion, what amount should have been deducted by the District Judge towards possible develop ment charges. In this connection it was said that the District Judge should not have relied upon the resolution of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti offering Rs, 4,00,000/- lump sum for the entire acquisitioned land to the respondent as agreed price. (3) Grove land principles should not have been applied by the District Judge and it should have been treated only as agricultural land as was held by the S. L. A. O. It was further argued that in this case acquisition authorities should have applied belting process and therefore, the enhancement awarded by the District Judge is unduly excessive. (3) Grove land principles should not have been applied by the District Judge and it should have been treated only as agricultural land as was held by the S. L. A. O. It was further argued that in this case acquisition authorities should have applied belting process and therefore, the enhancement awarded by the District Judge is unduly excessive. (4) The applicability of the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984 has been wrongly pressed by the respondent in as much as the matter should have been decided on the rates of interest and solatium payable before the Amending Act came into force and further that since the refer ence before the District Judge took 13 long years to decide, no case at all for the enhanced rate of interest was made out. 7. In the very nature of the things, the land acquisition provisions are compulsive in nature. It divests personal owner-ship of the land owner and vests the land free from all encumbrances in acquiring authorities. It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in a number of decisions, reference of which will be made hereinafter, that compensation and interest are statutory liability to be paid to the land owners and that is not dependent upon any calculation to be made by the authorities. While it is to be determined by the S. L. AO -. at the first instance and by the court at the second, as to what has to be the compensation for the acquired land, there is no choice, with regard to the interest and solatium liability, which is fixed by Section 23 of the Act. Therefore, if it is first deter mined as to the validity of the enhancement made by the Disritict Judge of the compensation payable to the respondent, the only point to survive will be whether Amending Act will apply or not and following that it has to be held whether en hanced interest is payable to the respon dent as claimed by him during the argu ments and also through written arguments filed in this Court. 8. There is no dispute about the fact that the acquired land is situate just at the outskirts or the municipal limits of Bareilly. It is admitted further that there are housing societies existing at the nearby land and the Housing Board has also es tablished Housing colony. 8. There is no dispute about the fact that the acquired land is situate just at the outskirts or the municipal limits of Bareilly. It is admitted further that there are housing societies existing at the nearby land and the Housing Board has also es tablished Housing colony. In front of the acquired land there is a famous Indian Vejenary Research Institute with expan sion that has taken place within the district of Bareiily. The acquired land is invaluable from any point of view. Sri B. D. Madhyan initially wanted to argue that in so far as the exemplar of 1970 is concerned, though certified copy of the sale-deed was filed, neither the vendee nor the vendor was examined. However, on record there exists the statement of PW-4, Shyama Charan Agrawal. He is aged about 66 years and is a practicising Lawyer. He has stated that he himself was the President of Bareilly House Building Society Ltd. in the year 1970 and in August, 1970 the land was sold to Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Housing Development Board) at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. yard. He further testified that the acquisitioned land was only 150 yards away from the land which he had sold and that on the land which he had sold, Avas Vikas Colony had already come into existence. He has given typography of the land ac quired and has stated that several years ago, there was no habitation in that area and he had purchased his land in the year 1942 at the rate of Rs. 0. 50 paisa per sq, yard then, i. e. in 1942. 9. Both the learned Counsel for the respective parties have relied upon this statement, one saying that it is not suffi cient to award compensation at the rate of Rs. II- per sq. yard and the other contend ing that the District Judge has correctly relief upon the same. 10. It may be pointed out that the District Judge has carefully gone into this evidence and has discussed other ex emplars also. II- per sq. yard and the other contend ing that the District Judge has correctly relief upon the same. 10. It may be pointed out that the District Judge has carefully gone into this evidence and has discussed other ex emplars also. He has taken note of the exemplar which was made the basis by S. L. A. O. He has recorded a finding that the said sale-deed of 1972 relied upon by the S. L. A. O. is the deed by one relative selling to another and, therefore, concluded that the said sale-deed alone cannot be the sole basis for concluding the compensation. The reasonings adopted by the District Judge in relying upon the exemplar of 1972 proved by PW-4 Shyama Charan Agrawal appears to be without any blemish. Being conscious of the fact that some develop mental steps have to be taken, the District Judge applied the principles laid down by Honble Supreme Court and held that the compensation only at the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq-yard is payable to the respondent, though the sale-deed indicates Rs. 7/- as the price per sq- yard. There is no error in District Judges judgment in reducing the aforesaid sale price from Rs. 7/- per sq-yard to Rs. 5/- per sq-yard. 11. Sri B. D. Madhyan has argued that since it was agricultural land and the area was expansive the District Judge should have followed the principle applicable for determining the compensation on acre or bigha basis and not on sq. yard basis. How ever, even the S. L. A. O. had drawn the compensation on per sq. yard basis and not on acre or bigha basis. As stated above, the acquired land is close to the municipal limits, probably the boundary line, there fore, for all practical purposes the argu ment that solely agricultural basis should be made applicable as the principle of adjudicating the compensation is not cor rect. However, no much discussion on this point is needed because even the S. L. A. O. himself had applied per sq. yard basis, the District Judge only toed the said line and there is thus no error in applying the said measure for determining compensation. 12. However, no much discussion on this point is needed because even the S. L. A. O. himself had applied per sq. yard basis, the District Judge only toed the said line and there is thus no error in applying the said measure for determining compensation. 12. The last point in this connection was that belting should have been done by the District Judge because obviously the entire land was not on the main road and some part of it was bound to go inside and away from the main road. The sale-deed exemplar does not make this distinction possible and once it is held that exemplar was correctly applied, it is also to be held that belting was neither necessary nor may have been justifiable on the facts of the present case. The acquired land is urban area and is close to the housing society and for all practical purposes has ceased to be the agricultural land, therefore, the Dis trict Judge has not committed factual error in enhancing the compensation. Likewise, in determining the market price the Dis trict Judge was justified to rely upon the said examplar and concluded the compen sation on that basis giving due concession for development charges etc. and reducing the said market price from Rs. II- to Rs. 5/-per sq-yard. 13. Sri B. D. Madhyan, learned Coun sel for the appellant, has relied upon the decisions of Honble Supreme Court, JT 1995 (6) 92; JT 1995 (2) 339; JT 1996 (4) 154 and AIR 1997 (SC) 2625 . 14. The first case is that of M/s Hasanali Khanbhai and Sons and others v. State of Gujarat. This case lays down guidelines as to how market value of the land is determined. It says that the Court has to sit in the arm-chair of a prudent purchaser and then consider whether a prudent purchaser would be willing to pur chase such a large extent of land at the price which is determined as compensa tion. The other observations are regarding the details and as noted above the District Judge has correctly applied the principles of evaluating the compensation. 15. The second case lays down that it is only the bonafide sales which can be used as exemplars and not manipulated sales of land in the neighbour. The other observations are regarding the details and as noted above the District Judge has correctly applied the principles of evaluating the compensation. 15. The second case lays down that it is only the bonafide sales which can be used as exemplars and not manipulated sales of land in the neighbour. Further or later development in the locality or neighbor hood may not normally be guiding factor for determining the compensation. 16. On what has been stated above, the principles have always to be followed and in the instant case guidelines have been correctly applied. 17. In the next case, i. e. Subhashgir Khushalgir Gosavi and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and other the point for determination was whether ex ecution of the decree was being validly carried out. Consequently, this case is to tally besides the point. 18. Other cases cited by Sri B. D. Madhyan, namely, AIR 1997 SC 2625 , AIR 1988 SC 1652 ; 1996 JT (4) SC 446 and 1995 JT (3) SC 410 are reiteration of the points mentioned above. Similarly, the cases in AIR 1989 SC 1933 and AIR 1995 SC 1012 also do not require discussion for the reason that exemplar has been correct ly applied by the District Judge and he was fully justified on facts and law to interfere with S. L. A. O. s award. However, Sri Madhyans reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1986 Al lahabad 321 dealing with the principles on which enhanced interest may be payable after one year, shall have to be interpreted in his favour for the reasons following a little later. 19. Coming now to the other point as to whether separate compensation should have been awarded on the grove land with trees standing thereon, it has to be adjudi cated on the basis of its physical existence and considering the fact that the District Judge has made two spot inspections and then determined that some area in the acquired land shall have to be treated as grove land and then compensation has to be determined, suffers from no factual or legal error at all. The inspection notes of the District Judge dated 20-3-1980 and 29-7-1985 go to support his conclusion fully and nothing has been pointed out by Sri Madhyan on the basis, of which the aforesaid finding about paying some com pensation on the basis of adjudicating a portion as grove land is fully justified and is hereby upheld. 20. Coming to the next point it may be stated here that acquisition in the instant case having been done on 25-5-1972, S. L. A. O. s award having been passed on 22-10-1973, the matter having been taken on reference by the respondent to the District Judge in the year 1973 and decision on the reference by the District Judge on 30-10-1987 leave no room for doubt that Amending Act 68 of 1984 was squarely. applicable. However, applicability has to be confined to the first part of Section 28 of the Act and the District Judge was right in holding that the respondent is entitled to the interest only at the rate of 9%. However, it maybe mentioned here that so far as the claim of solatium at the rate of 30% is concerned it has to be decided in view of the mandatory provisions brought about by the Amending Act 68 of 1984. It should be mentioned here specifically that what is true about liability of the State to pay solatium, is not true in the facts and circumstances of this case with regard to the claim of additional enhanced rate of interest. 21. In this connection it was vehe mently argued on behalf of the respondent that since the reference has been decided on 30-10-1987, the respondent is entitled to enhanced rate of interest, i. e. at the rate. of 15% with effect from at least the year 1988 till date. Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision made in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 Supreme Court 656 and Manipuri Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd, v. Collector of Hailakandi, AIR 1997 Supreme Court (Suppl.) 1779. Sri B. D. Madhyan, how ever, strongly placed reliance on a Division Bench decision made in State of U. P and others v. Raj Narain Singh and another, AIR 1986 Allahabad 321. Pvt. Ltd, v. Collector of Hailakandi, AIR 1997 Supreme Court (Suppl.) 1779. Sri B. D. Madhyan, how ever, strongly placed reliance on a Division Bench decision made in State of U. P and others v. Raj Narain Singh and another, AIR 1986 Allahabad 321. A Division Bench of this court speaking through Honble N. D. Ojha, J. (as his Lordship was then) has held that in the matter where excess amount was determined by the Dis trict Judge after seven years of taking of possession of the acquired land, the enhanced amount would not be deposited within one year of taking possession and, therefore, in such a situation proviso to Section 28 will not be attracted. The argument raised by Sri Murlidhar has no force for two reasons; first the liability of paying interest is recurring liability dependent upon the fixed amount payable as compen sation. Where admittedly reference was kept pending for 13 years before the Dis trict Judge and neither of the parties made any application to get the reference decided early, the enhanced compensation as per the proviso to Section 28 cannot be held payable for the delay in hearing of the reference. Second, when the appeal was filed by the appellant in this Court a Division Bench had ordered on 31-3-1988 that the execution of the award shall remain stayed for a period of four months if during this period of four months the appellant deposits half of the decretal amount. Admittedly half of the decretal amount was deposited by the appellant in pursuance of mat stay order and conse quent thereupon Sri Pankaj Nagvi has made statement that the respondent has withdrawn that amount also. For this added reason the argument of the respondents Counsel that the enhanced interest is payable, is hereby rejected. 22. In view of the aforesaid discus sion, the award of the S. L. AO. as amended by the reference order of the Additional District Judge calls for no interference and, therefore, the appeal has no force whatsoever. 23. It may be mentioned now that the respondents Counsel has moved an ap plication during the course of arguments after serving copy thereof on Sri B. D. Madhyan, through which it has been prayed: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . be pleased to correct the figure of Rs. 23. It may be mentioned now that the respondents Counsel has moved an ap plication during the course of arguments after serving copy thereof on Sri B. D. Madhyan, through which it has been prayed: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . be pleased to correct the figure of Rs. 2,60,000,00 in the operative part of the judgment and in the decree as Rs. 3,60,000. 00 and also to grant consequential benefits over the said difference. . . . . . . . . " 24. There appears to be a typing error in the order of the District Judge. He has held rightly that the amount which was paid in pursuance of the award of S. L. AO. shall have to be deducted from the amount which is held by him to be payable, but while typing out the balance it appears that inadvertently the sum of Rs. 2,60,000/- has been written which should be corrected as Rs. 3,60,000/ -. The application is allowed. The award and decree as per the judgment of the Additional District Judge under ap peal is modified to the extent that the amount written in the operative portion as Rs. 2,60,000/- shall be read as Rs. 3,60,000/ -. 25. With the aforesaid modification in the award/decree, the appeal is dis missed. Parties will bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. .