Judgment This application is directed against an order dated 10.9.93 passed by the revenue officer and S.D.O., Contai as contained in Annexure ‘H’ to the writ application, whereby and whereunder the petitioners' application for cancellation of patta granted in favour of respondent Nos. 10 to 12 was rejected, inter alia, by the following order:- “C/R is put up Perused all records and documents. Seen the report of B.L. & L.R.O. It appears that the suit land was vested under W.B.E.A. Act without any encumbrance and as such the petitioner cannot claim any barga or other right on the land. The petitioner has failed to prove that the O.P. was ineligible to obtain patta or that the patta was granted to O.P. through fraud or mistake. The question of possession is not a ground for annulment of patta under Section 49(2) of W.B.L.R. Act. Hence, the application for annulment of patta under Section 49(2) of W.B.L.R. Act is rejected and the case is filed.” 2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. 3. The petitioners claimed that they had been bargadars in respect of the lands in question as would appear from the possession certificates granted in their favour as contained in Annexure ‘A’ series to the writ application. The said certificates had been granted on or about 16-18.9.71 by the Sabhapati, Contai-II. Panchayat Samity. The petitioners claimed that they had been in possession of the land in question for a long time. They came to learn that the respondent No. 2 in purported exercise of his conferred upon him under Section 49 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, granted settlement of the land in question in favour of the respondent Nos. 10 to 12. The said application is contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the writ application. A bare perusal of the said application shows that their in the petitioners had claimed possession for a period of more than 10 years, and thus they claimed a preferential right in respect of settlement. It has been contended that such settlement had been made in favour of the said respondent Nos. 10 to 12 by mistake or by misrepresentation. Pursuant to the said application, notice had been issued upon the respondent Nos. 10 to 12. It does not appear that any opportunity had been granted to file independent evidence and only the parities addressed the respondent No. 2. 10 to 12 by mistake or by misrepresentation. Pursuant to the said application, notice had been issued upon the respondent Nos. 10 to 12. It does not appear that any opportunity had been granted to file independent evidence and only the parities addressed the respondent No. 2. By reasons of the aforementioned order, the question which had been determined by the said respondent is as to whether barga could be an encumbrance within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the west Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Having held that the right claimed by the petitioners would ……….. to encumbrance, the said application has been rejected, and only laconically and casually it has been recorded that the petitioners have filed to prove that the O.P. was ineligible to obtain patta and that patta was granted to the O.P. through fraud or mistake. As indicated herein before, from the order sheet as contained in Annexure ‘H’ to the writ application, it does not appear that any opportunity had been granted to the parties to file their respective evidences or even records had been called for to see as to whether the provisions of the land Management Manual, and in particular the provisions of rules 60 to 65 thereof had been complied with. 4. Mr. Bhunia, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners sought to raise a larger question, that is, keeping in view the provisions of Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, vis-a-vis Section 2(6A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, which was inserted by West Bengal Act XVIII of 1965 with retrospective effect both the provisions have to be read harmoniously. According to the learned Counsel both West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, as also West Bengal Land Reforms Act, contain non-obstante clause. Learned Counsel contended that although in terms of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, barga would be deemed to be an encumbrance, the same would not be in terms of Section 2(6A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. According to the learned Counsel both West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, as also West Bengal Land Reforms Act, contain non-obstante clause. Learned Counsel contended that although in terms of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, barga would be deemed to be an encumbrance, the same would not be in terms of Section 2(6A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. Learned Counsel contended that the question as regards distribution of land having not been dealt with under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, and specific provisions had been made therein under Section 49 read with Section 14S thereof, both the Acts should be construed harmoniously and in any event, West Bengal Land Reforms Act, being a latter Act, non0obstante clause contained therein which is of wide amplitude should prevail over the non-obstante clause contained in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision in (1) Swapan Kumar Acharya v. Subhas Chandra Bhattacharjee reported in AIR 1998 Calcutta 271, wherein a decision of the Apex Court in (2) M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, L.I.C. reported in AIR 1994 SC 1343 has been followed. 5. Mr. Sahoo appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 10 to 12, on the other hand, submitted that although 13 petitioners have joined in this writ application, originally only 11 persons have filed the aforementioned application under Section 49(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, as contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the writ application. It has been pointed out that petitioner Nos. 6 to 8 had affirmed an affidavit stating that they have got nothing to do with the said land. Learned Counsel contended that the criteria for attaching the provisions of Section 49(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act having not been fulfilled and a finding of having been arrived at by the respondent No. 2 this application should not be entertained. In any event, leaned Counsel contended as admittedly, an appeal lies against the impugned order, this application should be dismissed in limini and in support of his said contention reliance has been placed in (3) C.A. Abraham v. Income Tax officer, reported in AIR 1961 SC 609 ; (4) H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. M/s. Gopinath & Sons. & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 and a recent decision of the Apex Court in (5) Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., reported in 1996 (1) SCC 327 . The question raised in this application is of some importance. Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act reads thus:- Sec. “2(h) “encumbrance” in relation to estates and rights of intermediaries therein dose not include the rights of a raiyat or of an under raiyat or of a non-agricultural tenant (but shall, except in the case of land) allowed to be retained by an intermediary under the provisions of Section 6, include all rights or interest of whether nature, belonging to intermediaries or other persons, which relate to lands comprised in estate or to the produce thereof.” 6. As noticed hereinbefore, the said Act also contains a non-obstante clause in Section 3 of the said Act. Section 2(6A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act reads thus:- “Section 2(6A) “encumbrance” means any lien, easement or other right or interest created by a raiyat on his holding or in limitation of his own interest therein, but does not including the right of the bargadar to cultivate the land of the holding.” 7. Section 3 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act also contains a non-obstante clause. It is and cannot be the case of the petitioner that they being bargadars under the ex-intermediary were entitled to hold the land as bargadars. The estate belonging to the ex-interme diary including the land in question having vested in the State of West Bengal, the question of the petitioners having retained any right under the said Act, did not arise as in terms of Section 2(h) of such Act, the right of bargadar would come within the purview of the word ‘encumbrance.’ The right of the petitioners as bargadars, if any, therefore, also vested in the State of West Bengal. West Bengal Land Reforms Act, which is supplementary to the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, deals with the vesting of the land of raiyats. Under West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, except in certain cases, lands of the reiyats do not vest. It is not the case of the petitioners that Ganga Ram, in whose name the land was recorded, was raiyat and not an ex-intermediary. Under West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, except in certain cases, lands of the reiyats do not vest. It is not the case of the petitioners that Ganga Ram, in whose name the land was recorded, was raiyat and not an ex-intermediary. The right of the petitioners as bargadars could have been saved in terms of Section 2(6A) read with Section 14S(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, provided such rights survived with the coming in to force of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. No such right of the petitioners having survived, the question of taking recourse to Section 2(6A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, does not arise. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the contention of the petitioners before the respondent No. 2 and before this Court must be rejected. In Swapan Kumar Acharya (supra), this Court held:- “The said provision contains a non-obstance clause which is of wide amplitude. It not only overrides the provision of the said Act but also overrides the provision of any other for the time being force. Such a non-obstante clause must be given its full effect. See decision of the Apex court in the case of M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manger, L.I.C. reported in 1994 (2) SCC 323 : AIR 1994 SC 1343 .” 8. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned proposition, but the aforementioned ratio has to be considered in the light of the factual backdrop as also the statutory provisions contained in the relevant statute. A bare perusal of the application filed by the petitioners as contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the writ application, in any event, would go to show that the petitioners did not claim any right as burgadars, but clearly claimed right as being in possession for a period of 10 years, although certificates had been granted by Panchayat Samity. It is not understood as to under what provision of law, the Sabhapati, Panchayat Samity had granted such certificate. The said certificates do not have any legal value. Unfortunately, although the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the question of law raised by Mr. Bhunia, the same otherwise cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, the said order does not contain any reason. The said certificates do not have any legal value. Unfortunately, although the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the question of law raised by Mr. Bhunia, the same otherwise cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, the said order does not contain any reason. It is now a well settled principal of law that assignment of reason although is not a basic and foundational pillar of the principles of natural Justice, the same has become a part and parcel thereof by reason of Judge made law. As indicated hereinbefore, Mr. Sahoo very vehemently contended that an appeal is maintainable as against the impugned order. If an appeal is to be filed by the petitioners by reason of the impugned order, the petitioners would be deprived from their right to prefer an appeal, as the same does not contain any reason. For the purpose of preferring an appeal, the appellant must know the reasons for passing the said order so as to enable this question the same. Reasons assigned by a judicial authority are also indicative of the fact as to whether they have applied their mind to the points at issue. Such reasons, if assigned, could have also gone to show as to whether he had considered the jurisdictional facts. A writ of certiorari is not issued only when the order is passed without jurisdiction, the same can also be issued where a competent authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial function refuses to exercise a jurisdiction despite existence of a foundational fact therefore. It is in the aforementioned context, the decisions cited by Mr. Sahoo have to be considered. In C.A. Abraham (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with an order of assessment which was not questioned on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural Justice. The Apex Court held that the petitioner should be asked to avail the alternative remedy as the Income Tax Act is a complete Code in itself and the relief's prayed for the petitioner in the writ application could nave been granted by the appellate authority itself. In H.B. Gandhi (supra), the Apex Court was again dealing with a fiscal statute. The Apex Court clearly held that when a hierarchy of appeals is envisaged by a taxing statute it is generally to be insisted that an assessee must go through the statutory proceedings. In H.B. Gandhi (supra), the Apex Court was again dealing with a fiscal statute. The Apex Court clearly held that when a hierarchy of appeals is envisaged by a taxing statute it is generally to be insisted that an assessee must go through the statutory proceedings. In the instant case, for the reasons noticed herein before, right of this Court to make judicial review of the order is not in question, as this Court is of the opinion that the respondent No. 2 has committed an illegally in its decision making process. Further more, a judgment rendered without any reason is no judgment in the eye of law, and thus the illegality committed by the said respondent is glaring on the face of it. In Executive Engineer (supra), merely a notice to show cause had been issued, and in the factual backdrop of that case, it was observed:- “It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. p-4 notice is ex facie a ‘nullity’ or totally “without jurisdiction” in the traditional sense of that expression – that is to say, that even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the fact of it and without any thing more, is totally unauthorized. In such a case, for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a show cause notice, at that stage, it should be shown that the authority has no power or jurisdiction, to enter upon the enquiry in question.” 9. On the other hand, it is now a well settled principle of law that asking a writ petitioner to avail an alternative remedy, is merely a matter of self-restraint on the part of the Courts. There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution of India not to exclude an appeal. The existence of an alterative remedy is not an absolute bar for an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when there had been a violation of the principles of natural Justice or where the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction. The existence of an alterative remedy is not an absolute bar for an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when there had been a violation of the principles of natural Justice or where the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction. What would be the matter falling within the jurisdiction of error have been properly dealt with in (6) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission reported in (1969) 2 AC 147 and (7) R. v. Cornwell C.S. Ex-parte Huntingion reported in (1992) 2 ALL ER 566, which has been upheld in appeal in (8) (1994) 1 All ER 694. 10. The concept of jurisdiction has been considered by De Smit in his celebrated treatise ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’, where the author states that breaking the rule of natural Justice, applying a wrong legal test and answering the wrong question, failing to take relevant considerations into account or basing the decisions on legally irrelevant considerations, would come within the purview of errors apparent on the face of record. It has further been stated that if a tribunal determines a question without addressing itself to an essential issue it must be held that he has acted without jurisdiction. There cannot be any doubt that inferior tribunal has a freedom to err, but where the error goes to the root of his jurisdiction, the same can becomes subject-matter of a judicial review. Application of a wrong legal test or taking irrelevant consideration into account gives rise to question of jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has also been considered recently by the Apex Court in (9) Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan reported in AIR 1998 SC 2311 , wherein the Apex Court has held application of judicial mind to all the circumstances and then from its opinion, is an essential judicial function. 11. Furthermore, it is now a well settled principle of law that where a writ application has been entertained and the same has been allowed to be argued on merit, it would not be a prudent decision on the part of the High Court to throw out a writ application only on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, and that ………. after a period of 4 years. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision reported in (10) AIR 1971 SC 33 . For the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed. after a period of 4 years. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision reported in (10) AIR 1971 SC 33 . For the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed. The impugned order as contained in Annexure ‘H’ to the writ application is set aside, and the matter is remitted back to the respondent No. 2 for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Before the respondent No. 2, both the parties shall be entitled to adduce their respective evidence, where after it would be open to the respondent No. 2 to decide the matter on the petitioners' application under Section 49(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, strictly in accordance with law, and while doing so, it would also be open to the said authority to consider the question as to whether the petitioner Nos. 6 to 8 are in any way interested in the matter, or not. Such consideration be made at an early date and preferably within a period of 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order.