JUDGMENT B.P. SINGH & I.P. SINGH, JJ. The Petitioner herein has impugned the order of compulsory retirement, as contained in Annexure 5, dated 18th October, 1990, whereby he has been compulsorily retired from Government service under Rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. 2. The petitioner has averred in his writ petition that he joined on the post of, Village Level Worker on 27.4.1960 and has been serving the State Government to the best of his ability without any complaint. The date of birth of the petitioner is 1.4.1934. In the year 1991 the petitioner was rewarded for his excellent performance. However, since the Block Development Officer, Pathargama did not like the petitioner, for whatever reasons, he recommended that the petitioner be retired compulsorily. The petitioner received a communication from the Deputy Commissioner Godda dated 23rd February, 1989 compulsorily retiring from his service. It appears that respondent no.4 the Block Development Officer Pathargama reported that the petitioner was not physically and mentally fit to perform his duty. This report was never communicated to the petitioner and he had no opportunity to reply to the same. On the basis of such report an order of compulsory retirement was passed, despite the fact that the petitioner was at all times fit, physically and mentally, to perform the duty of his post. In fact the matter relating to the promotion of the petitioner in, the selection grade and super selection grade was pending before the Deputy Commissioner and the case of the petitioner had been favourably recommended. The petitioner was also due for time bound promotion and was subsequently granted first time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1981 as would be evident from Annexure2 dated 12.6.1989. The petitioner was surprised to receive the order of compulsory retirement, as there was nothing against him which could justify his compulsory retirement. He, therefore, challenged the order of compulsory retirement before this Court and the order dated 23rd February, 1989 was quashed by this Court on 24:10.1989 as would be evident from Annexure-3. The order was quashed on the ground that requirement of Rule 74 (b) (ii) had not been complied with, inasmuch as neither the petitioner was given three months previous notice in writing nor an amount equal to three months pay and allowance in lieu of such notice. The order was quashed on the ground that requirement of Rule 74 (b) (ii) had not been complied with, inasmuch as neither the petitioner was given three months previous notice in writing nor an amount equal to three months pay and allowance in lieu of such notice. The Court, however, made it clear that it would be open to the State Government or the appointing authority to pass any appropriate order in accordance with law if so advised. The petitioner has made a grievance that despite quashing of the order, he was not paid his dues and other injustices were perpetuated when the petitioner pressed for payment of salary etc. The Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2 again compulsorily retired him by issuing the impugned order, as contained in Annexure 10, dated 18.10.1990. According to the petitioner there was no justification for retiring the petitioner in public interest, and the impugned order suffers from the vice of malice and arbitrariness. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it is stated that the petitioner was working under the direct control of the Block Development Officer and he was found both physically and mentally weak to perform the arduous duty of a Village Level Worker. Therefore, the Block Development Officer recommended to the Deputy Commissioner, Godda for compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Thereafter the Deputy Commissioner after perusing his annual confidential reports, and considering the report of the Block Development Officer, passed an order for: the compulsory retirement of the writ petitioner. In paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that the petitioner was never communicated with any adverse remark, but it is reiterated that the writ petitioner was not compulsorily retired because he was not efficient, but because he has become unfit for continuing, in the Government service and, therefore, it was not in public interest to allow him to continue in service. 4. It, therefore, appears from the averments made in the counter affidavit that there are no adverse remarks against the petitioner. In any event no adverse remarks was ever communicated to him at any stage or has been brought to our notice. There is only a report of the Block Development Officer that the petitioner was found both physically and mentally unfit to perform his duties. In any event no adverse remarks was ever communicated to him at any stage or has been brought to our notice. There is only a report of the Block Development Officer that the petitioner was found both physically and mentally unfit to perform his duties. This report was submitted to the Deputy Commissioner, but the assertion of the petitioner that such a report was never communicated to him, has not been controverted. It is well settled that even if an order of compulsory retirement is couched in innocuous language without making any imputations against the Government servant who is directed to be compulsorily retired from service, the Court, if challenged, in appropriate cases can lift the veil to find out whether the order is based on any misconduct of the Government servant concerned, or the order has been made bonafide and not with any oblique or extraneous purpose. Mere form of the order in such cases cannot deter the Court from delving into the basis of the order if the order in question is challenged by the concerned Government servant. ( AIR 1990 SC 1368 , Ram Ekbal Sharma V. State of Bihar & another). 5. Counsel for the petitioner also placed strong reliance on the judgment reported in 1980 (Vol. 4) SCC 321 (Baldeo Raj Chadha Vrs. Union of India & others). In that case it was held that when an order is challenged, and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest, the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatsoever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain' the ground of 'public interest' justifying forced retirement of the public servant. The court is confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest. In that case after going through the material on record the court found that there was no material which justified the compulsoriy retirement of the Government servant concerned. 6. In the instant case we must proceed on the basis that there was no adverse report against the petitioner at any time, and admittedly no such adverse report was ever communicated to the petitioner. 6. In the instant case we must proceed on the basis that there was no adverse report against the petitioner at any time, and admittedly no such adverse report was ever communicated to the petitioner. No such report has been brought even to our notice. The competent authority did not find anything against the petitioner in his service record. All that remains is the report said to have been made by the Block Development Officer to the Deputy Commissioner reporting that the petitioner was found both physically and mentally unfit for the performance of his duties. Even this report was never communicated to the petitioner, and he had no opportunity to represent against the adverse comments made by the Block Development Officer, perhaps, in a note to the Deputy Commissioner. Assuming that it was not necessary to invite the objection of the petitioner to such adverse comment, the question still remains whether such material provided sufficient justification for the premature retirement of the petitioner. In our view, it did not. The adverse report regarding physical and mental unfitness is not supported by any medical opinion. It is the mere ipse dixit of the Block Development Officer. If the petitioner was really unfit, both mentally and physically, that would rave reflected on his performance, and one would have expected an entry about his unsatisfactory performance in his annual confidential reports. No such adverse report has been brought to our notice. In fact in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been stated in clear terms that the petitioner was not being prematurely retired on the ground of his inefficiency, but of the ground of his physical and mental unfitness. One fails to understand the nature of mental and physical unfitness which does not affect the efficiency of a Government servant. We are, therefore, satisfied that the sole material on the basis of which the impugned order was passed, did not provide any justification for the premature retirement of the petitioner in public interest. In fact the impugned order suffers from malice in law, if not in fact. The competent authority does not even appear to have applied its mind to a careful scrutiny of the report of the Block Development Officer. In fact the impugned order suffers from malice in law, if not in fact. The competent authority does not even appear to have applied its mind to a careful scrutiny of the report of the Block Development Officer. It acted mechanically on such report, even though the report appears to be malicious, and was not supported by any material whatsoever, reflecting on the petitioner's integrity or efficiency. 7. In these circumstances, we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 18.10.1990, as contained in Annexure 5. 8. Before parting with this judgment, we observe that no one represented the respondents before us. On our request, counsel for the petitioner had conveyed to Standing Counsel No.4 to appear before this Court since the case was entrusted to Standing Counsel No.4. The present Standing Counsel No.4 appeared and stated before us that he had not been entrusted with the brief. We had, therefore, no option but to hear the counsel for the petitioner and peruse the record ourselves.